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[CONFIDENTIAL.]

HISTORICAL REVIEW OF CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO

AFFAIRS IN CENTRAL ASIA.


1872—1875.

[WITH APPENDICES INCLUDING PAPERS
ON MERV AND THE EXPLORATION OF THE OXUS.]

COMPILED BY

FREDERICK HENVEY,

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CHAPTER I.

CONTINUATION OF THE CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FRIENDLY UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN ENGLAND AND RUSSIA AS TO THE POLICY OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS IN CENTRAL ASIA.

1. Reference to previous summary of correspondence on the subject.—For previous discussions and correspondence on this subject reference should be made to Chapter I., pages 1 to 68, of Mr. Wynne's *Précis* of 1867-72. The last paper noted in that Chapter was the despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 21, dated 5th April 1872, in which the Government of India replied to Russian objections on the subject of the northern boundary of Afghanistan, and maintained that the boundary should be the line of the river Oxus east of Khoja Saleh, thereby including within the territories of the Ameer of Cabul the principality of Badukshan and other petty States south of the Oxus which the Russians had hitherto professed to regard as independent.

2. General Kauffmann's visit to St. Petersburg in October 1872. Lord Loftus recommends resumption of negotiations regarding the Afghan Frontier. Discussions which ensued.—The Russian view of the case, however, was not as yet definitely settled. The Ministers of the Imperial Government were awaiting a communication of the opinions held by General Kauffmann, Governor-General of Turkestan, to whom the despatch of the Government of India, No. 1, dated 11th March 1870, had been forwarded for report (page 57 of Mr. Wynne's *Précis*). Up to October 1872 General Kauffmann had sent no report, but in that month he arrived at St. Petersburg on leave of absence, the object of his visit being, as it was believed, to arrange measures with the Imperial Government for the future administration of the province of Turkestan. Lord A. Loftus, who had succeeded Sir A. Buchanan as Her Majesty's Ambassador to the Court of the Czar, thought this a favorable opportunity to press for a resumption of the negotiations on the subject of the frontier of Afghanistan; but he added that in his opinion the Russian Government were seeking to gain time and to put off the final delineation of the frontier to a period more favorable to their policy. Their possession of Turkestan was not as yet consolidated: the tenure was one of military occupation and to a certain extent precarious; it was therefore of great importance to Russia that she should appear to be on friendly terms with England.

[Secret, December 1872, No. 337.]

Her Majesty's Government had already determined to lay before the Imperial Government the conclusions at which they had arrived. By despatch from the Foreign Office, No. 197, dated 17th October 1872, the Ambassador at St. Petersburg was told that Her Majesty's Government considered this course of importance "both for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in Central Asia and for removing all causes of misunderstanding." He was accordingly instructed to communicate the following definite and important statement of the case:—

"In the opinion, then, of Her Majesty's Government the right of the Ameer of Cabul (Shere Ali) to the possession of the territories up to the Oxus as far down as Khoja Saleh is fully established, and they believe, and have so stated to him through the Indian Government, that he would have a right to defend those territories if invaded.

"On the other hand, Her Majesty's authorities in India have declared their determination to remonstrate strongly with the Ameer should he evince any disposition to overstep those limits of his kingdom.

"Hitherto the Ameer has proved most amenable to the advice offered to him by the Indian Government, and has cordially accepted the peaceful policy which they have recommended him

to adopt, because the Indian Government have been able to accompany their advice with an assurance that the territorial integrity of Afghanistan would in like manner be respected by those powers beyond his frontiers which are amenable to the influence of Russia.

“The policy thus happily inaugurated has produced the most beneficial results in the establishment of peace in countries where it has long been unknown.

“Her Majesty’s Government believe that it is now in the power of the Russian Government, by an explicit recognition of the right of the Ameer of Cabul to those territories which he now claims, which Bokhara admits to be his, and which all evidence as yet produced shows to be in his actual and effectual possession, to assist the British Government in perpetuating, as far as it is in human power to do so, the peace and prosperity of those regions, and in removing for ever by such means all cause of uneasiness and jealousy between England and Russia in regard to their respective policies in Asia. For Your Excellency’s more complete information I state the territories and boundaries, which Her Majesty’s Government consider as *fully* belonging to the Ameer of Cabul (*viz.*):—

“(1.) Badukshan with its dependent district of Wakhan from the Sarikul (Wood’s Lake) on the east to the junction of the Kokcha River with the Oxus (or Penjab) forming the northern boundary of this Afghan province throughout its entire length.

“(2.) Afghan Turkestan comprising the districts of Kunduz, Khulm, and Balkh, the northern boundary of which would be the line of the Oxus from the junction of the Kokcha River to the post of Khoja Saleh inclusive, on the high road from Bokhara to Balkh. Nothing to be claimed by the Afghan Ameer on the left bank of the Oxus below Khoja Saleh.

“(3.) The internal districts of Akcha, Siripool, Maimena, Shibbergan, and Andkoi, the latter of which would be the extreme Afghan frontier possession to the north-west, the desert beyond belonging to independent tribes of Turkomans.

“(4.) The Western Afghan frontier between the dependencies of Herat and those of the Persian province of Khorassan is well known and need not here be defined.”

The boundary thus proposed met with the entire concurrence and approval of the Government of India.

[*Secret, January 1873, Nos. 160A-161.*]

In the following November Her Majesty’s Ambassador at St. Petersburg pressed the matter on the ~~subject~~ of Prince Gortchakoff. The Prince in the course of the conversation which ensued expressed his dissent from the statement that the line of the Oxus was the rightful frontier of Afghanistan, adding that the Imperial Government had accepted the previous proposals of Her Majesty’s Government, and that a map had been given to Count Brunnow, in which the frontiers were marked in yellow. “We accepted,” said the Prince, “these frontiers as given in your own map, and we can show you the map with the frontier of Afghanistan marked in yellow.” On further enquiry it transpired that this map was one given by Lord Clarendon to Count Brunnow in 1869. It showed Afghanistan marked with yellow, but the provinces which were usually regarded as Afghan, namely, Maimena, Balkh, and the northern districts of the kingdom, were not colored at all. M. de Stremoukoff, Director of the Asiatic Department, threw over this map, and said that Prince Gortchakoff had referred to it without previous reflection or communication with him; but he informed Lord Loftus that M. de Struve, the Civil Adlatus of General Kauffmann, was engaged in drawing up a memorandum on the frontier question, adding that before taking any decision the Imperial Government must have the question duly investigated. Lord Loftus was assured by M. de Stremoukoff that there was the greatest desire on the part of the Russian Government to meet the views and wishes of Her Majesty’s Government, and that if the claims of Afghanistan were clearly proved to be just and right, they would be acknowledged without hesitation, but that—

“if Badukshan, which in the estimation of the Imperial Government had been hitherto an independent State was to be included in the territory of Afghanistan, it would bear the character of an annexation which was neither in conformity with right or justice.”

Another objection urged by M. de Stremoukoff to the inclusion of Badukshan and Wakhan within the confines of Afghanistan was that the frontier so arranged would not be traced in a direct line, but would take a northerly direction following a confluent of the Oxus, and making a triangle in the form of a wedge which would equally menace Bokhara, Kokand, and Kashgar.

[*Secret, February 1873, No. 227.*]

Lord A. Loftus in a subsequent conversation with M. de Westmann took occasion to correct an error which had been adopted in Russia regarding the results of recent explorations into the territory of Badukshan undertaken under the orders of Major Montgomerie, Officiating Superintendent of the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India. Colonel Veniukoff had stated that when these explorations took place, *viz.*, in the autumn of 1870, Badukshan was ruled by *Jehandar Khan independently of the Ameer of Cabul*. This statement was erroneous, the Sapper employed by Major Montgomerie had in fact found Jehandar Shah supplanted by Mahmood Shah, and the latter supported and assisted by the Ameer of Cabul.

[*Secret, January 1873, Nos. 157-158.*]

3. General Kauffmann's report on the northern boundary of Afghanistan submitted to Prince Gortchakoff, November 1872.—The discussion was resumed on the submission of General Kauffmann's long expected report at the close of November 1872. The papers received by the Indian Foreign Office were French translations from the original Russian; but for facility of reference an English version following the French as closely as possible is given below:—

General Kauffmann's Report of 29th November 1872.

“I have the honor to submit to Your Excellency copies of a memorandum on the question of the northern boundary of Afghanistan. This memorandum has been worked out on the basis of some data and materials, which I have succeeded in collecting in the course of the last few years on the subject of the situation of affairs on the frontier of Afghanistan and Bokhara, and in the States above the Amu Darya which are independent of us.

“These data, I confess, are far from being complete.

“In Central Asia investigation or personal observation exercised on the spot is the sole means of obtaining information on any question whether political or geographical. Hitherto I have not been able to have recourse to those means.

“The despatch of a Russian officer into these countries even under the pretext of a scientific mission might have caused alarm in Afghanistan, and would have awakened suspicions and fears on the part of the Government of India.

“I was bound to avoid everything whatsoever which might possibly disturb the satisfactory condition of those relations between us, which had resulted from the friendly and frank interchange of ideas between the Imperial and Britannic Governments.

“I have already had the honor to submit to Your Highness my views on one of the causes of mental perturbation in the Central Asian Khanates, which are conterminous with and adjacent to Russia. It is that all our neighbours, and more especially the Afghans, are filled with the conviction that there exists between Russia and England an antagonism which sooner or later will bring us into conflict with the English in Asia.

“In accordance with the instructions and views of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I have striven to lay this ghost of a struggle, supposed to be impending between the two great Powers. In my communications with Kokand and Bokhara, and especially in my letters to Shere Ali Khan, I have always spoken of the friendship which exists between us and England, and I have done my best to show that the two powers, Russia and England, had an equal care for the tranquillity of the countries and nations within the scope of their influence and protection. This is the reason which has induced me hitherto to refrain from sending officers to the abovementioned places with the view of obtaining information on questions which had not been sanctioned by the Imperial Minister.

“This position is above all things as much to your advantage as to that of England; but it may change its aspect from the time when Shere Ali shall have secured a guarantee for his possessions within the limits actually proposed by Lord Granville in his despatch to Lord Loftus, dated 5th-17th October last. Such a guarantee would give him a considerable prestige, and he would at once endeavour to make himself master *de facto* of territories which would thus be conceded to him. Above all his attention would be turned from the side of Badukshan and Kokcha to a prey which would be at once the most easy and the most accessible.

“By the acquisition of these two territories (Badukshan and Kokcha) he would prolong his line of contact with Bokhara, and would find himself placed side by side with Karategin, from which Kokand is within easy reach. Finally he would touch, on the north-east boundary, the possession of Yakoob Beg. And there you have a road which leads straight to a collision with Russia.

"If the British Government is indeed animated with the same desire as ourselves that peace and tranquillity should be preserved in the Khanates which separate us from the English possessions in India, if the English are willing to believe in our sincere declarations that we do not even dream of undertaking any hostile movement whatever against their Indian possessions, common sense ought to suggest to them the necessity of acknowledging the independence of Badukshan and Kokcha, whether in relation to the Ameer of Cabul or to the Ameer of Bokhara."

General Kauffmann's Memorandum on the northern Afghan boundary.

"In the strict sense of the word the possessions of Ameer Shere Ali Khan only extend on the east to the meridian of the point of junction of the River Kokcha with the Amu Darya. This line separates Badukshan and Kokcha from the province of Kunduz, which unquestionably forms part of Shere Ali Khan's dominions. It was annexed to Afghanistan twenty years ago by Dost Mahomed's son, Afzul Khan, who was then Governor of Balkh. Afzul Khan, as we learn from an English communication, made an unsuccessful attempt to possess himself of Badukshan, which however had this result that the Meer of Badukshan in order to ensure the security of his domains bound himself to pay Dost Mahomed a yearly tax of 2 rupees per hearth, and to make over to him the mines of rubies and *lapis lazuli* which are situated in his territories. But this agreement was not kept, and the death of Dost Mahomed suggested to the Chiefs of Badukshan, who were little desirous of submitting to Cabul, the idea of again seeking the protection of Bokhara. The Ameer, Seid Muzuffur, however, declined all interference in the affairs of Badukshan, not because he looked upon that country as a dependency of Afghanistan, but because at that time he was anxiously watching the progress of our arms in Central Asia, and was preparing to march against Kokand. Jehandar Shah, who was at that time Governor of Badukshan, was an entirely independent sovereign, and all his neighbours recognized him to be such. He had cultivated friendly relations with Mahomed Afzul Khan and Abdul Rahman Khan, his son, and payed them nothing whatever. When Shere Ali Khan after his victory over Abdul Rahman Khan had occupied Cabul and Balkh, and made himself master of the whole of Afghanistan, he sent an embassy to Jehandar Shah to call on him to abide by the agreements which he had formerly made. Jehandar Shah refused. Thereupon Mahomed Shah, his nephew, overthrew his uncle by the aid of Afghan troops, and made himself master of Faizabad, while his younger brother, Mirzah Shah, took possession of Shorab, the capital of the province of Rostak. At the present time the two brothers pay Shere Ali Khan a yearly tax of Rupees 15 (9 roubles) as a sort of acknowledgment for the help which he afforded them. But with the exception of a very small number of Afghan adventurers, neither officers nor troops of the Ameer of Cabul are to be found in Badukshan, and the people themselves hate the Afghans. These particulars, which have been supplied by Abdul Rahman Khan, and partly gathered from the envoys of the Sirdar of Balkh who came to Tashkend, are confirmed by the account of Alif Beg, Ex-Governor of Sirikul (a province of Kashgar bordering upon Wakhan), who presented himself at Tashkend in the month of August of this year. He added that Jehandar Shah, the legitimate ruler of Badukshan, had afterwards made his way back by Samarcand and Kokand to Shignan. Such a state of things in Badukshan proves incontestably that the Ameer Shere Ali Khan could not claim possession of Badukshan as an inheritance which had been bequeathed to him by Dost Mahomed Khan, and that his authority is not yet established in Badukshan. Mahomed Shah and Mirzah Shah, the actual masters of Badukshan, do not consider themselves Beks of the Ameer of Cabul; and if they pay him tribute, it is in the interest of their own safety and to shelter themselves from the sudden attacks of the brigands of Kunduz. Moreover, they have still reason to fear their uncle Jehandar Shah. There is nothing which would lead to the belief that the state of affairs in Badukshan may change soon in favor of Shere Ali Khan, and it is certain that the actual state of things in this country is pretty closely adapted to the aims which we are prosecuting in Central Asia in common with, and after a preliminary and voluntary understanding with, England. Nor does anything forebode the possibility of a rupture between Afghanistan and Bokhara on the side of Badukshan. The Ameer Seid Muzuffur has no pretensions to the possession of this country. In the same way Shere Ali Khan, who with great difficulty maintains a semblance of authority in Badukshan, is not at present by any means in a position to exercise any influence over the affairs of Kolab and Hissar, the towns of Bokhara which are nearest to Badukshan. The official recognition by Russia and England of Shere Ali Khan's right to this country would at once make that Sovereign use every effort to establish himself at Faizabad and in Rostak, and the moment he succeeds in doing so, a collision would inevitably ensue between Afghanistan and Bokhara. It will suffice to mention in support of this prediction, that the former Bek of Hissar who rebelled against Ameer Seid Muzuffur in 1869, and who in 1870 took refuge in Afghanistan, has already made attempts to regain possession of his province by the help of the Afghans, to whom he promised that the whole of the province of Hissar and Kolab should be made over to the Ameer of Cabul. If this combination has not yet been carried into effect, that must be attributed to the fact that Shere Ali Khan possessed no authority in Badukshan, and that under these circumstances the Ameer had at his disposal no means of attack.

"To the east of Badukshan in the upper basin of the Amu Darya is a country little known called Wakhan. This country, which is sometimes described under the name of Daria Pendj (the five rivers), because of the five principal tributaries which go to form the Amu Darya, borders on the north on Pamir which separates it from Karategin; on the east it is bounded by Sarikul which forms part of Yakoob Beg's territories; on the south it is separated from Chitral (a country entirely independent of Cabul) by the mountains of Nouksan, which form the eastern continuation of the Hindoo Koosh.

"Wakhan is administered by a Chief of its own, but the poverty of its inhabitants and the barrenness of the soil of this mountainous region have rendered it dependent on Badukshan, whose Chiefs, however, abstain from interfering in the internal affairs of the country. Once a year the Chief of Wakhan sends to the Begs of Badukshan a certain sum of money. There is no direct communication between this country and Afghanistan.

"A road connecting Kunduz with Sarikul, Yarkund, and Kashgar, crosses Badukshan and Wakhan. According to certain information in our possession this route is longer than the direct road between Peshawur and Yarkund travelled by Mr. Shaw.

"As regards the Amu Darya, this river serves as a line of demarcation between Afghanistan and Bokhara for an approximate stretch of 300 versts between the mouth of the Kokcha on the east to the point where the two banks of the river become Bokharian, and especially as far as the passage of Tchouch-ka-Gouzar, situated opposite the Bokharian village of Khoja Saleh which is on the right bank of the river.

"Finally, as regards the north-western boundary of Afghanistan, although doubts have arisen as to the fact of the Ameers of Cabul possessing the towns of Akcha, Siripool, Maimena, Shiberagan, and Andkoi situated to the west of Balkh, we may be guided by the consideration that the whole of this region is isolated from the States of Bokhara by a scarcely passable desert and partly also by sand, and that an immediate collision between Afghanistan and Bokhara is very little to be feared from that quarter.

4. Prince Gortchakoff's despatch of 7th December 1872 to Count Brunnow on the Afghan boundary.—The papers which have been translated above were sent to Count Brunnow, Russian Ambassador in London, with a despatch from the Imperial Chancellor, dated 7th December 1872, of which a translation is given below:—

"Your Excellency has already received a copy of Lord Granville's despatch of 17th October which Lord Loftus communicated to us by the order of his Government. It has reference to the affairs of Central Asia.

"Before answering it, it is necessary to recall the course of our discussions with the English Cabinet on this question.

"The two Governments were animated by an equal desire to prevent all cause of dissension between them in this part of Asia. They both wished to establish there an order of things which would insure peace and strengthen their friendly relations and good understanding. For this purpose they came to an agreement as to the expediency of allowing a certain intermediate zone to exist between their respective possessions which would preserve them from immediate contact with each other. As Afghanistan seemed to fulfil these conditions, it was settled that the two Governments should use all the influence which they possessed over the States in their neighbourhood so as to prevent all collision and encroachment on either side of this intermediate zone.

"It only remained to trace the exact limits so that the understanding between the two Cabinets should be as complete in practice as it was in theory.

"Then misunderstandings began.

"The founder of the Afghan kingdom, Dost Mahomed Khan, had left after him a state of confusion which did not allow the acceptance, as a basis, of the extension of territory acquired from time to time by Afghanistan during his reign.

"It was therefore agreed to deal only with those States which had formerly recognised the authority of Dost Mahomed, and which were still in actual possession of Shere Ali.

"It remained to establish this state of actual possession with the required exactness.

"For this purpose it was necessary to have local *data*, which neither of the two Governments had acquired, regarding these distant and imperfectly known countries.

"It was settled that the Governor-General of Turkestan should be ordered to take advantage of his proximity to, and relations with, the neighbouring Khanates to collect all the information which might illustrate the question and place the two Governments in a position to form a practical opinion with a full knowledge of the subject. This, as Your Excellency will remember, is the point to which our discussions with the English Cabinet had arrived. Conformably with these decisions Aide-de-Camp General de Kauffmann, undertook what measures were possible

in proceeding with this preliminary investigation; but the difficulty caused by distance, the extreme complication of the points requiring elucidation, the want of authentic sources of information, and the impossibility of a direct enquiry, prevented him from fulfilling this task with the promptitude which we, no less than Her Majesty's Government, should have desired. Hence the delay mentioned in Lord Granville's despatch.

"At the same time, as we have already observed, these delays are attributable to the serious attention which the Imperial Cabinet devoted to this affair. It would have been easy to have satisfied ourselves with information collected in a superficial manner and which would have become a source of misunderstanding at a later period. We preferred to study the question conscientiously, since the object was to lay down a solid and durable foundation for the political organisation of Central Asia, and for the friendly and good understanding which the two Governments intended mutually to establish upon that base for the present and for the future.

"At the beginning of the month of October last the Imperial Minister was in a position to announce to Lord Loftus and Your Excellency that the Councillor of State, M. Struve, who had been entrusted with these investigations, had just arrived at St. Petersburg, and that as soon as the materials which he had collected had been elaborated, the result of them would be communicated to the Cabinet of London. It was while this work was being carried on that we received intelligence of Lord Granville's despatch which informed us of the point at which Her Majesty's Government thought fit to take up its position regarding the topics under discussion.

"The Imperial Cabinet, preserving the same spirit of agreement which was established in principle between the two Governments, does not the less consider itself bound to transmit to the Government of Her Majesty the information gathered on the spot by the order of the Governor-General of Turkestan, and to show plainly the conclusions which appear to it to flow therefrom. Both these points will be found set out in the accompanying copy of an official despatch which the Aide-de-Camp, General Kauffmann, has just addressed to me and in the memorandum which is annexed thereto.

"The question to be determined had two aspects—

"I. To determine the state of actual possession as far as it is possible to determine it in those countries.

"II. While accepting the *status quo* as a basis, to seek to trace the best line of demarcation in order to fulfil the purpose of the actual discussions, *i.e.*, to remove as far as possible any cause of conflict or mutual encroachments between the neighbouring Khanates, and in consequence to guarantee that state of peace among them which the two Governments ought hereafter to cause to be respected, on the one side and on the other, by all the means of influence which they possess. Having in view this twofold arrangement of ideas on the subject, the issue of the examination which has been made is as follows:—

"*First.*—That as regards the north, the Amu Darya constitutes in fact the normal frontier of Afghanistan from the confluence of that river with the Kokcha to the point of Khoja Saleh. So far our *data* were in agreement with the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, and the frontier mentioned seems to be the more rational, in that it leaves no room for dispute on the part of those people who dwell on the borders of the Amu Darya.

"*Second.*—To the north-east the *data* which we have collected assign the confluence of that river with the Kokcha as the limit of the territory over which Shere Ali exercises an unquestioned and effective authority. Beyond that limit, and especially in regard to Badukshan and Wakhan, it has been impossible to lay hold of any traces of even a semblance of authority. The result of the investigations, taken as a whole, presents on the contrary numerous indications that these territories should be considered as independent. In the communication from Her Majesty's Government, which was made to us in the month of November last, we learn from Major Montgomerie that the Ameer of Cabul 'has considerable authority in Badukshan, and that the Afghans helped Mahomed Shah to overthrow the Ameer or Chief of that country, Jehander Shah,' but these acts themselves seem to show the real independence of Badukshan rather than its actual subjection to the Ameer of Cabul. The information collected by Mr. Struve and recorded in his memorandum confirm this conclusion. There are allusions, it is true, to some interference on the part of the Afghan Ameer in the internal quarrels of Badukshan and attempts to recover payment for his assistance by a sort of tribute, but the signs which in Asia accompany the exercise of sovereignty, that is to say, the presence in the country of Afghan officers and agents for the collection of taxes are not to be met with. The Chiefs of Badukshan always considered themselves, and have been considered by their neighbours, independent Chiefs. It follows from this that the most that can be admitted is that the Ameer of Cabul has tried several times to incorporate Badukshan with his dominions; that he has several times taken advantage of civil dissensions to exercise an interference in the affairs of this country based on the proximity and superiority of his power, but that it is impossible to deduce from these facts the existence of an unquestionable and effective sovereign authority.

"As to Wakhan, that country appears, up to the present time, to have remained even more out of the reach of all direct action by the Chiefs of Afghanistan.

Third.—It remains to enquire whether in this state of things, and considering the aim which we are endeavouring to inaugurate, *i.e.*, the establishment in these countries of a lasting peace under the guarantee of the two Governments, it is well to recognise the claims which the Ameer of Cabul advances over Badukshan and Wakhan, and to include these two countries within the territorial limits of Afghanistan. Such is not the opinion of the Aide-de-Camp, General de Kauffmann, and the Imperial Cabinet has arrived at the same conclusion.

“Under the existing state of things there are no disputes between Badukshan and its neighbours. Bokhara has no pretensions whatever to that country. The two States are, besides, too weak, too much absorbed by their own affairs to seek quarrels.

“England and Russia would only have to employ themselves in maintaining this state of peace between the Khanates, as well as between Afghanistan and Badukshan, and the task would not seem to be beyond their power. But it would be quite otherwise on the day when the Ameer of Cabul extends his authority over Badukshan and Wakhan. He would find himself in immediate contact with Kashgar, Kokand, and Bokhara, from which he is now separated by those two countries. It would from thenceforth be much more difficult to avoid the conflicts proceeding either from his ambition and the consciousness of his power, or from the jealousy of his neighbours.

“The effect would be to lay down a very precarious foundation for the peace which is sought to be established in those countries, and to compromise the guarantee which the two Governments would be bound to afford. This combination would seem to us consequently to work directly against the aim which the two Governments pursued from the outset.

“It seems to us much more in accordance with that aim to allow the present state of things to remain. Badukshan and Wakhan would thus form a barrier between the States to the north and those to the south of Central Asia, and that barrier, fortified by the combined action which England and Russia are in a position to exercise over those States which are accessible to their influence, would effectually prevent all dangerous contact, and, in our opinion, as far as possible insure the peace of those countries.

Fourth.—As to the boundary to be recognized as belonging to Afghanistan from Khoja Saleh, our information throws equal doubts upon the fact of actual possession by the Ameer of Cabul of the towns of Aktchi, Siripool, Maimena, Shibergan, and Andkoi, which it is proposed to include within the acknowledged limits of Afghanistan.

“At the same time these territories being separated from Bokhara by deserts, their annexation to Afghan territory would not give rise to the dangerous contacts which we have mentioned on the north-east. It would not therefore present the same causes of embarrassment. If Her Majesty’s Government adheres to its opinion that it is desirable to include these territories within the bounds of the Afghan dominions, we will not insist on the principle laid down, *i.e.*, that we should recognize as part of Afghanistan only those portions which were under the dominion of Dost Mahomed Khan and which are at present under the actual rule of Shere Ali Khan.

“In deference to the view of Her Majesty’s Government the Imperial Cabinet would be disposed to accede, as regards this part of the frontiers, to the line indicated in Lord Granville’s despatch. The above, M. Le Comte, is a recapitulation of the conclusions which we think can be drawn from the *data* now in our possession. Be pleased to lay them before the Chief Secretary of State. In communicating them to Your Excellency our intention is not merely to redeem our promise. We think we are fulfilling the thought which from the outset has presided over the interchange of friendly sentiments established between the two Governments by seeking to solve in the most rational way a question which interests them equally.”

[*Secret, March 1873, Nos. 28-30.*]

The reasons which induced the Russian Government to oppose so strenuously the recognition of Afghan sovereignty over Badukshan and Wakhan were explained in Lord Loftus’s despatch No. 370, dated 25th December 1872. There was some soreness felt at the manner in which the decision of Her Majesty’s Government had been conveyed. Prince Gortchakoff in fact referred to Lord Granville’s despatch of 17th October 1872 (*vide supra* pages 1 and 2) as bearing the character of an ultimatum and as deciding a question which should have been the subject of a mutual agreement between the two Governments. But the principal and ostensible objections to recognizing the boundary as indicated by Her Majesty’s Government appeared to be—

First.—Fears that the Ameer of Afghanistan would at once occupy Badukshan and Wakhan with the view of establishing his sovereign authority in those provinces.

Second.—Fears that the aggressive position of Wakhan might give the Ameer an appetite for conquest, and thus produce a collision which would be fatal to the peace and tranquillity of Central Asia.

[*Secret, March 1873, No. 73.*]

5. Discussion of the Russian correspondence regarding the Afghan boundary, 1872-73.—The Russian case, as stated in General Kauffmann's memorandum and Prince Gortchakoff's despatch, underwent considerable discussion in England.

Mr. Mitchell, in a memorandum dated 16th December 1872, observed that Her Majesty's Government had taken a very decided step in their policy towards Russia. He considered that the statements made to the Russian Government regarding the limits of the Afghan dominions implied that Her Majesty's Government were morally, if not by distinct engagement, bound to assist the Ameer, directly or indirectly, in maintaining the integrity of the dominions thus defined, and he advised that having acknowledged the line of the Oxus as the boundary of Afghan-Turkestan in the north, we should not submit our recognition to revision by Russia.

[*Secret, March 1873, No. 33.*]

Sir J. W. Kaye also wrote a memorandum, dated 31st December 1872, with special reference to the past history of Badukshan, from which he proved that although early in the current century the Province was independent, the Ameer of Afghanistan had for many years exercised rights of sovereignty over it. The country was conquered by Dost Mahomed in 1859, and though the Afghan Rulers thought it best to farm the revenues of Badukshan to the Meers of the Province, their claims to supremacy were not affected by this arrangement. Such being the case, to declare the independence of Badukshan would be to disturb the *status quo*.

[*Secret, March 1873, No. 42.*]

Sir Henry Rawlinson wrote the following memorandum on the same subject:—

"The persistency with which Russia clings to the notion of securing the independence or *quasi*-independence of Badukshan is both remarkable and significant. The frontier settlement which she originally proposed, and has never altogether abandoned, was a neutral zone or a cluster of independent States of which Badukshan should be the nucleus, forming, as it were, a 'buffer' between the direct dependencies of the Russian and British Indian empire, and it was only in consequence of the determined opposition of the Viceroy, who protested that the establishment of a so-called neutral zone would cripple his own action, while it would impose no corresponding restraint upon Russia; that this scheme, which had received the approval of Lord Clarendon, was not proceeded with. It is, moreover, important to observe that the complete one-sidedness in detail of the Russian scheme of neutralization would have been fatal to its adoption by the Indian Government, even had it been unobjectionable in principle; for Russia proposed to detach from the Afghan domination three States south of the Oxus, namely, Balkh, Kunduz, and Badukshan, while she did not propose to interfere with the three corresponding States to the north of the river, namely, Shehr-i-Sebz, Hissar, and Kulab, which, however, bore precisely the same political relation to the Crown of Bokhara which the three southern States bore to the Crown of Cabul. To have accepted her proposition would have been, then, to have shut ourselves out from all access to the banks of the Oxus, to have impoverished and disorganized Afghanistan, and to have brought Russian influence to the very gates of Cabul.

"Another ground which was taken up by Russia in regard to Badukshan, and which, though frequently disproved, was reiterated in a guarded manner both by M. de Stremoukoff and M. de Westmann as recently as October 1871, * * * * referred to the supposed claims of Bokhara upon that province. How such an argument could have been employed after the Bokhara Ambassador at St. Petersburg, in the presence of Mr. Forsyth and M. de Stremoukoff, had distinctly repudiated the claim, and Sir A. Buchanan had felt himself authorized thereupon to telegraph to the Foreign Office that the 'Ameer of Cabul's right to Badukshan has been acknowledged,' * * * * it is difficult to understand.

"At any rate the argument about Bokhara may be now considered to be definitely abandoned, and a new ground has been taken up. It is said that if the main stream of the

Oxus, as proposed by us, be admitted to be the northern boundary of the Afghan territory, the Ameer of Cabul will be at once emboldened to realize his rights over Badukshan and Wakhan; that he will occupy these districts in force, and that his position will then be one of menace and danger to Russian interests. Being conterminous with the Bokharian district of Kulab, with the Kokand districts of Darwaz and Karategin, and with the Kashgarian district of Tashkurghan, it is feared that his aggressive passions will be aroused, and he will become so formidable and troublesome to his neighbours on the north and east as to compel the interference of Russia.

“The peace, in fact, of the valley of the Oxus will be compromised, and, in the remarkable words of General Kauffmann, ‘by touching to the north-east on the borders of the territory of Yakooob Beg, he will be launched on a road that leads directly (*tout droit*) to a collision with Russia.’

“Now this is a most distorted and exaggerated view of the position. In the first place, the Ameer has no intention at present of sending fresh troops into Badukshan or in any way strengthening his position in that province for purposes of offence, and if he did ever manifest such an intention, he would be strongly counselled against it by us. In the next place, with regard to a contiguity of frontier developing an aggressive tendency, and increasing the chances of collision, it is to be observed that the Oxus does already form, and has formed for years, the boundary between Bokhara and Afghan-Turkestan for 300 miles from Khoja Saleh to the junction of the Kokcha without any such result ensuing. It is extraordinary that Russia should see no danger of collision along this extended line of frontier, where troops are already stationed in considerable numbers and where rich districts on either side invite attack, and yet higher up the river from the junction of the Kokcha to the eastward, where population is sparse, where the country is so mountainous as to be almost inaccessible and so poor as to be not worth invading, and where, moreover, neither are there in the present, now are there likely to be in the future, any troops available for military operations, in this wild and desolate region, she should believe the prolongation of the natural Oxus frontier to be fraught with such serious consequences. As for Badukshan threatening Bokhara through Kulab, or threatening Kokand through Karategin and Darwaz, the idea is simply preposterous. The routes are so precipitous in these lines that even traders cannot pass to and fro, and further to the east the districts of Roshara, Shignan, and Shakh-derek shut in the Wakhan valley of the Oxus with an impregnable barrier to the north.

“There is, however, one point in connection with the possession of Badukshan which may be of some consequence in the future, and which perhaps furnishes a clue to Russia’s persistency on the subject. Wakhan has always been politically and geographically a dependency of Badukshan. It is a narrow but open valley forming the bed of the mainstream of the Oxus from the Badukshan hills to the sources of the great river on the high table-land of Pamir, and along this valley lies the only high road to commerce between the west and east of Central Asia. If the Ameer of Cabul holds Badukshan, he will always have a right of way for himself and his allies from the Oxus valley into China, but if his territories towards the east are to cease at the embouchure of the Kokcha river in the Oxus, then from that point to Yarkund the high road will naturally fall into the hands of the power which guides the destinies of Bokhara and Kokand. It must be remembered, too, that there is a high road conducting from Bokhara and Samarcand by Hissar to the ford over the Oxus at the confluence of the Kokcha, so that, if the Ameer of Cabul were shut out of Badukshan and Wakhan, Russia might have a complete and exclusive command of the great line of communication between Western Asia and China. Another important consideration connected with this subject refers to the communication with India. The natural high road which conducts from the plains of India to the great plateau of Chinese Turkestan, a road incomparably superior in every respect to the mountain track across Thibet, follows the Chitral valley from the Cabul tributary to the Indus and debouches on the valley of the Oxus in Wakhan, so that a foreign power in possession of Wakhan would not only command the great trade route from the west to the east of Central Asia, but would also hold the ‘Gates of India.’

“It is thus evident that the arguments which are brought forward ostensibly by Russia to support her objections to the recognition of the Oxus boundary are of no force, while the consideration which does in all probability really govern her policy, but which is carefully kept in the back ground, may involve results highly prejudicial to our interests. We have already, in advising Shere Ali Khan as to his relations with Bokhara and in warning him against a violation of frontier, indicated the general limit which we assign to his rule, and we cannot therefore now in mere deference to the importunity of Russia call upon him to relinquish rights which he has done nothing to forfeit. It is not pretended by us that he has ever ruled over Badukshan in the same substantive way that he rules over Cabul and Candahar. Ever since Badukshan was conquered and annexed in 1859, it has been held as a fief of the Afghan kingdom, precisely upon the same tenure in which Bokhara has held the outlying districts of Hissar and Kulab. The Lord Paramount in such cases appoints the Governor and receives tribute, and occasionally he exacts military service or sends an expedition to

enforce his authority, but he does not habitually interfere with the collection of the revenue or the administration of justice, or the executive functions of Government. Such is the present condition of Badukshan and Wakhan (the position, however, being somewhat complicated by the continued efforts of an Ex-Meer, Jehandar Shah, to create disorder), and such it will continue to be. It would hardly be prudent to enter into a definite engagement with Russia, nor would she have any right to demand such an engagement that the Ameer of Cabul should not send troops into Badukshan, since a hostile demonstration from Hissar and Kulab beyond the Oxus might render such a precaution necessary, but we could at any rate assure the Russian Government that in recognizing the main stream of the Oxus as the northern boundary of the Afghan dominions we did not intend to modify in any respect the present political condition of the province of Badukshan, and we might add that Shere Ali Khan assuredly entertained no designs of territorial aggrandizement and would be never likely to send troops to that remote portion of his kingdom except to repel invasion or to suppress rebellion. It may be as well too to remind the Russian authorities that we do not speak on Badukshan without book, or on the authority of interested parties such as those who supplied Mons. Struve with his information, but that in fact we are almost as well acquainted with the geography, the statistics, and the political condition of the province as with any portion of our Indian Empire. A British Agent, named Pundit Munphool, now employed in a highly responsible office at Bhawalpoor, having resided in Badukshan for some years, and a succession of native officers and travellers, amongst whom I may mention Abdul Majid, Mahomed Amin, Faiz Buksh, Ibrahim Khan, and Major Montgomery's Mirza and Havildar, having recently visited the country and furnished independent and most elaborate reports on it. A glance, indeed, at two papers on Badukshan recently published by Colonel Yule, one in the *Royal Asiatic Society's Journal*, and the other as an introduction to the new edition of *Wood's Journey to the source of the Oxus*, would satisfy the Russians that we are far in advance, as we ought naturally to be in regard to a region adjoining our own Indian frontier, of the second-hand and very hazy intelligence which seems to have been alone at General Kauffmann's disposal. The practical conclusion at which I have arrived from a full consideration of the subject is that there is no particular object in obtaining the assent of Russia to the establishment of the Oxus from Khoja Saleh to Wood's Lake as a line of demarcation between Afghanistan and the Usbeg Khanates. It is quite sufficient for our purpose of present repose and future security to have determined to our own satisfaction the line of this eastern Rubicon, and to have communicated our views to our Afghan allies, the parties most interested in the matter. If Russia thinks fit to accept the settlement, some formal compact, binding on the two European powers, might to a certain extent furnish a guarantee for the continuance of peace upon the Upper Oxus; but no such compact is necessary. If she declines to give in her adhesion, and still impugns the justice of our decision, it will be sufficient to point out that the claim of Bokhara or Kokand to Badukshan or any of its dependencies south of the Oxus being definitively abandoned, as it has been, she (Russia) has no *locus standi* in the further consideration of the question. The regulation, indeed, or rectification of the frontiers of a neighbour and ally, such as Cabul is to India, is a domestic affair and does not admit of foreign interference. In fact Russia is no more entitled by her relations with the Uzbek Khanates to question the 'suzerain' rights of Cabul over Badukshan and Wakhan, than we should be entitled, as the friend of the Afghans, to question the 'suzerain' rights of Bokhara and Kokand over Kulab, Ab-i-Germ, Karategin, and Darwaz; and as it is certain that she would resent any such interference upon our part, we may very properly, and without any imputation of unfriendly motives, resist a like pretension upon her part.

"I think that we should answer the Russian letter with all possible courtesy, disclaiming any intention of giving offence by our former communication and explaining that our dry recapitulation of names in that document was not meant as an 'ultimatum,' but simply as a geographical delineation of the boundary which in our view actually at the present time enclosed the Afghan dominions, and was thus entitled to a public recognition; but I am at the same time clearly of opinion that, in the interests of India, we should not recede in any way from the position we have taken up as to the right of Cabul to a 'suzerainty' over Badukshan and its dependencies. We must remember, indeed, that not only is it essential to the maintenance of public order and confidence in India that Russian influence should be kept beyond the Oxus, but that it is of equal importance to the success of our frontier policy to avoid the risk of offending our Afghan ally by any seeming desertion of his cause or lukewarmness in supporting his rights."

[*Secret, March 1873, No. 43.*]

Sir Robert Montgomery also recorded his opinion that there should be no hesitation or receding from the decision which had been arrived at in the previous October. He said that he was Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab in 1859 when Dost Mahomed reconquered Balkh and its dependencies cis-Oxus. There never was any question as to Badukshan forming a portion of those conquests; and they had been maintained by the Afghans ever since.

6. Count Schouvaloff's mission to London in January 1873. Friendly sentiments of the Emperor of Russia on the Afghan boundary question.—While this discussion was going on Count Schouvaloff, who had been deputed by the Emperor of Russia on a special mission to Her Majesty's Government, arrived in London. The assurances with which he was charged on the subject of the Afghan boundary question were of a satisfactory character :—

“The Emperor knew of no questions in Central Asia which could affect the good understanding between the two countries. It was true that no agreement had been come to as to some of the details of the arrangement concluded by Lord Clarendon and Prince Gortchakoff on the basis of Mr. Forsyth's recommendation as to the boundaries of Afghanistan, but the question could not be a cause to ruffle the good relations between the two countries. His Imperial Majesty had agreed to almost everything that we had asked. There remained only the point regarding the provinces of Badukshan and Wakhan; there might be arguments used respectively by the departments of each Government, but the Emperor was of opinion that such a question ought not to be a cause of difference between the two countries, and His Imperial Majesty was determined that it should not be so.

“He was the more inclined to carry out this determination in consequence of His Majesty's belief in the conciliatory policy of Her Majesty's Government.”

Lord Granville took advantage of this favourable turn in affairs to impress upon the India Office the expediency of at once restating in civil and courteous terms the grounds on which Her Majesty's Government adhered to the views previously expressed by them.

7. The Duke of Argyll maintains the views previously expressed regarding the status of Badukshan.—Accordingly the Duke of Argyll caused the Foreign Office to be addressed in a despatch dated 15th January 1873. After dwelling with satisfaction on the friendliness of the Russian Government, and noting that the *status* of Badukshan was the only point on which the two Governments differed, the writer proceeded :—

“The Imperial Government contend that the province of Badukshan and its dependency, not having been formally incorporated into the territories of the Ameer, is not legitimately any portion of the Afghan empire. On this point I am directed by the Duke of Argyll to observe that the Ameer of Cabul having attained by conquest the sovereignty of Badukshan, having received in the most formal manner the submission of the Chiefs and people of that province, had the right to impose upon it such form of government as he might think best adapted to the position of affairs at the time. He appointed a local Governor, and he consented experimentally to receive a fixed portion of the revenues of the country instead of taking upon himself the general financial and other administration of the province. But His Highness expressly reserved to himself the right of reconsidering this arrangement, which, in the first instance, was made only for one year,* of at any

* See page 123 of Wynne's Memorandum on Afghanistan affairs (1871).
time subjecting Badukshan to the direct Government of Cabul, and of amalgamating the revenues with the general revenues of the empire. Adverting to these circumstances, the Duke of Argyll directs me to observe that he cannot perceive in them anything to weaken the claims of the Ameer Shere Ali to the absolute sovereignty of Badukshan. The conquest was complete. The submission was complete. And it cannot be reasonably urged that any experimental form of administration, which His Highness, with the acknowledged right of sovereignty, might think fit to impose, could possibly disconnect Badukshan from the general territories south of the Oxus, the sovereignty of which the Russian Government have unhesitatingly recognized as belonging to the Ameer of Cabul.

“I am further instructed to request that, whilst laying the views of the Duke of Argyll, in the above sense, before Lord Granville, you will inform His Lordship that there can be no departure from the recognition of Badukshan as part of the Afghan dominions, without seriously compromising the good faith of the Indian Government, and that, therefore, His Grace trusts that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in any further discussions with the officers of the Russian Government, will firmly maintain this position and show that in maintaining it Her Majesty's Government seek only, in the words of the Government of the Czar, to recognize the *status quo*, any departure from which might cause serious complications embarrassing to both Governments.”

[*Secret, March 1873, Nos. 39-41.*]

8. Final statement of the views of Her Majesty's Government in respect to the relations between Cabul and the Provinces of Badukshan and Wakhan, 25th January 1873.—

On receipt of the foregoing despatch and of its continuation dated 25th January 1873, in which the Duke of Argyll represented the importance of making it plain to Prince Gortchakoff that Her Majesty's Indian Government had recognized the claim of the Ameer of Cabul to the sovereignty of Badukshan and Wakhan as a right, and as a sovereignty already established, Lord Granville announced to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg the conclusions at which Her Majesty's Government had arrived. The Foreign Office despatch dated 25th January 1873 explained the relations between Badukshan and Cabul, as stated in the India Office letter of the 15th idem, and then proceeded :—

“ Her Majesty's Government have not failed to notice in portions of the statement of the Russian Government to which I am now replying, that its objection to admitting Badukshan and Wakhan to be under the sovereignty of Shere Ali is rested in part on an expressed apprehension, lest their incorporation with the remainder of Afghanistan should tend to disturb the peace of Central Asia, and specifically should operate as an encouragement to the Ameer to extend his possessions at the expense of the neighbouring countries. I alluded in my despatch of the 17th of October to the success which had attended the recommendations made to the Ameer by the Indian Government to adopt the policy which had produced the most beneficial results in the establishment of peace in countries where it had long been unknown, and Her Majesty's Government see no reason to suppose that similar results would not follow on the like recommendations. Her Majesty's Government will not fail to impress upon the Ameer in the strongest terms the advantages which are given to him in the recognition by Great Britain and Russia of the boundaries which he claims, and of the consequent obligation upon him to abstain from any aggression on his part, and Her Majesty's Government will continue to exercise their influence in the same direction.

“ They however cannot but feel that if Badukshan and Wakhan, which they consider the Ameer justly to deem to be part of his territories, were to be assumed by England or Russia, or by one or either of them, to be wholly independent of his authority, the Ameer might be tempted to assert his claims by arms, that, perhaps, in that case Bokhara might seek an opportunity of acquiring districts too weak of themselves to resist the Afghan State, and that thus the peace of Central Asia would be disturbed, and occasion given for questions between Great Britain and Russia, which it is on every account so desirable to avoid, and which Her Majesty's Government feel sure would be as distasteful to the Imperial Government as to themselves.

“ Her Majesty's Government, therefore, most earnestly hope that the Imperial Government, weighing these considerations dispassionately, will agree with them that the best course to be pursued would be that both powers should concur in recognizing Shere Ali's claims, as stated in my despatch of 17th October, and by so doing put an end to the wild speculations, so calculated to disturb the minds of Asiatic races, that there is some marked disagreement between England and Russia on which they may build hopes of carrying out their border feuds for purposes of self aggrandizement.”

[*Secret, March 1873, No. 71.*]

9. The Russian Government accepts the position of Afghanistan as defined by England.—

The alacrity with which Lord Granville's final despatch was answered by the Russian Government seemed to indicate a foregone conclusion that, if the British Government persisted in their views, no further opposition would be offered on the part of Russia. Prince Gortchakoff addressed Count Brunnow in a despatch of 19th-31st January 1873, of which the following is a close translation :—

“ Lord A. Loftus has communicated to me the reply of the Chief Secretary of State of Her Britannic Majesty to our despatch on Central Asia dated 7th-19th December. I annex hereto a copy of that document. We observe with satisfaction that the English Cabinet continues to pursue in these latitudes the same end which we pursue,—namely, that of securing peace and as far as possible tranquillity.

“ The difference of opinion between us had reference to the boundaries assigned to the dominions of Shere Ali.

“ The English Cabinet includes within them Badukshan and Wakhan, which, according to our views, enjoyed a certain independence. Having regard to the difficulty of establishing in all its lights and shades (*dans toutes ses nuances*) the reality of these distant latitudes, as well as the greater facility which the British Government enjoys of collecting precise information,

and especially having regard to the desire not to give to this question of detail a greater importance than it admits, we do not refuse to recognize the English line of demarcation.

"We are the more disposed to this act of courtesy seeing that the English Government undertakes to use all its influence over Shere Ali in order to keep him in a peaceful attitude and to insist upon an abandonment on his part of all aggression or ulterior conquest. That influence is incontestable. It rests not merely upon the material and moral ascendancy of England, but also upon the subsidies for which Shere Ali is indebted to her. We are able, henceforth, to see in it a real guarantee for the preservation of peace."

[*Secret, March 1873, No. 288.*]

10. The Indian Government communicates to the Ameer of Cabul the issue of the negotiations respecting the confines of his dominions.—It now became necessary to communicate to the Ameer of Cabul the issue of the negotiations regarding the northern confines of His Highness' dominions. This was done through the Government of the Punjab in despatch No. 562P., dated 22nd March 1873. His Highness was reminded of the peaceful assurances given from time to time by the Russian Government in respect to the territories in his possession. He was told that the views of the British Government regarding those territories had been accepted and then the despatch proceeded:—

"Having now received the official pledges of the Russian Government to recognize the Ameer's possessions, His Excellency in Council trusts that His Highness will be enabled to devote his undisturbed attention to the consolidation and improvement of his internal Government. In accordance with the advice given to him by Lord Mayo, the Ameer has more than once expressed his determination to abstain from interference in the affairs of States and tribes beyond the borders of Afghanistan, and has issued stringent instructions to his frontier officers to commit no aggressions on neighbouring powers. Her Majesty's Government have therefore felt no hesitation in undertaking to use their influence to impress upon His Highness the importance of maintaining this peaceful attitude and of allowing no considerations to tempt him to entertain any designs of conquest or aggression beyond the country described in Lord Granville's letter* of 17th October 1872. The Russian Government have, as His Highness was informed in Lord Mayo's letter of 24th† June 1870, undertaken on their part to use their best endeavours to restrain the States over which they have any influence from transgressing the limits of Afghan territory."

* *Supra* pages 1 and 2.

† *Vide* pages 139-141, Cabul Précis.

The action of the Indian Government was reported to the Secretary of State in despatch No. 33, dated 28th March 1873, from which the following is an extract:—

"We have not failed to counsel His Highness Ameer Shere Ali to persevere in the peaceful policy which, in accordance with the advice formerly given him by Lord Mayo, he has adopted, and has enjoined the Governor of his Turkestan frontier to observe. So far as our advice and influence will avail, we shall be ever ready to exert them for this end. We understand that the result of the late correspondence is that the Russian Government have agreed to co-operate with us in our endeavour to establish and maintain peace in Central Asia by impressing a similar policy on those States and tribes beyond the limits of Afghanistan which come within the sphere of Russian influence or control. Relying therefore on the friendly assurances again given by Prince Gortchakoff in his despatch‡ of 19th-31st January 1873 that

‡ *Supra* page 12.

peace and tranquillity in Central Asia are the objects which Russia in common with England continues to pursue, we look with confidence to the fulfilment of the promises given by the Russian Government in 1869, to which we

§ See particularly despatch No. 27, dated 20th May 1870 (pages 55 to 57, Mr. Wynne's Précis.)

have so often referred in former despatches. § We confidently expect that while on the one hand our good offices are exerted to dissuade the Ameer from aggression, Russia, on the other hand, will similarly use her good offices to restrain the States of Central Asia within her influence from transgressing their proper limits.

[*Secret, March 1873, No. 290.*]

11. Views taken by the parties concerned as to the nature of the arrangements concluded.—Having thus brought the summary of the correspondence down to the acceptance by the Russian Government of the Afghan boundary as described in Lord Granville's despatch of 17th October 1872, it will be convenient now to shew how the settlement of this question has been viewed and understood by the parties concerned.

And, first, in respect to the interpretation put upon the arrangements shortly after their conclusion by Her Majesty's Government, this will be learnt from the following extract from a speech of the Prime Minister, Mr. Gladstone, in the course of a Debate on Central Asian affairs which took place in the House of Commons on the 22nd April 1873.

Mr. Gladstone's speech, 22nd April 1873, as to England's responsibility in reference to the Ameer of Afghanistan.

“The correspondence (regarding the Afghan boundary) proceeded on the assumption that in Asia two powers, such as Russia and England, naturally stood in the position of relative superiority to Asiatic States to which they were respectively conterminous. It assumed that a certain influence would flow from these superior powers, perhaps insensibly, and affect the Asiatic powers. The correspondence referred entirely to exercise of that influence and their geographical limits. So viewed, the correspondence contained three things. It contained a negative engagement on the part of Russia which was perfectly distinct, and was described in a few words by Prince Gortchakoff, who stated that the Russian Emperor looked on Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which Russia would be called upon to exercise her influence. Then as to the boundary of Afghanistan, there was considerable difference of opinion, but after careful investigation Russia, in a manner for which it was entitled to every credit, acceded to the British view as probably founded on more copious and accurate information than had been within its power to obtain. An understanding sufficient for all practical purposes had thus been arrived at as to the actual frontier of Afghanistan. The third point was the engagement entered into by ourselves. He entirely agreed in the remarks made on the propriety of promoting in Afghanistan, as the best of all bulwarks, a state of things which would make the people contented and prosperous; but he saw no cause for the apprehension expressed as to the extent of our obligations. England had undertaken to impress on the Ameer in the strongest terms his obligation, in consideration of Russian recognition of his boundaries, to refrain from any aggression, and to continue to exercise our influence in this direction. Russia naturally attached value to this undertaking, and he would not extenuate its import. Prince Gortchakoff had given his own version of it, in which he spoke of England as engaging to use its influence with the Ameer to maintain a peaceful attitude, and to give up all measures of aggression or further conquest. Even if Prince Gortchakoff had placed the construction on our engagement that it bound us to coerce the Ameer and become responsible for his conduct, we should not be bound by this, unless it were a construction flouted in our face, in which case we should have been called upon to repudiate it; but Prince Gortchakoff had done nothing of the kind; the fact that the argument turned entirely on the use of the word influence showed that moral influence was meant, not an engagement to use force; and he believed the French version was even more satisfactory than the English on this point, the word “insist” being more capable of the construction of physical force in English than as it stood in the French version. The engagement referred solely to the moral influence necessarily possessed by England and Russia in the East, Russia engaging to abstain from any attempt to exercise it in Afghanistan, and England engaging to exercise it for a pacific purpose. He did not believe any doubt had arisen or could arise between the parties concerned as to the meaning of the engagement.”

12. Views of the Indian Government as to the obligations undertaken by Russia and England consequent on the conclusion of the negotiations regarding the Afghan boundary. Despatch, 30th June 1873.

—The manner in which the Government of India received and gave effect to the communications which had reached them on the subject of the negotiations with Russia has been briefly described in the papers quoted *supra* on page 13. It was felt to be necessary, however, in order to avoid the risk of future misunderstandings, to explain at length the Indian view of the policy which had been agreed upon between the two countries, and the following despatch giving a summary of the most important points in the discussion and explaining the obligations which the Indian Government acknowledged to have devolved on them was sent to the Secretary of State on 30th June 1873:—

“2. To advert shortly to the general policy which has been pursued of late years by the Russian Government in Central Asia, our opinion is still that which we expressed in 1869 in the following language:—

“We by no means share in the exaggerated apprehensions expressed in many quarters as to the danger to British rule in India which may arise from an extension of Russian influence in those countries lying to the south and east of her enormous possessions in Asia.

“ We believe that the influence of a civilized European power over wild and savage tribes cannot be otherwise than beneficial.

“ We would therefore heartily assist in establishing a frank and clear understanding with Russia as to the relative position of British and Russian interests in Asia.’

“ In accordance with these principles, therefore, we suggested that, as it was for the interests of both countries that a wide border of independent States should exist between the British and Russian frontiers, it would be desirable that Russia should be invited to adopt the same policy with regard to the independent States which come under her legitimate influence as we have pursued with regard to Afghanistan and the independent States within our influence. The friendly interchange of communications between Her Majesty’s Government and the Russian Government which we propose to review in this despatch appears to us to have established results entirely in accordance with the sentiments we have heretofore expressed.

“ 3. It is unnecessary for us to advert to any occurrences previous to the communications which are contained in the papers recently laid before Parliament, commencing with the letter addressed by the Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan on the 27th of March 1869.

“ Lord Clarendon, shortly before the date of that letter, in several conversations with Baron Brunnow, recommended the ‘recognition of some territory as neutral between the possessions of England and Russia, which should be the limit of those possessions, and which should be scrupulously respected by both powers.’

“ Prince Gortchakoff, to whom Baron Brunnow had communicated Lord Clarendon’s suggestions, replied that the idea of maintaining between the possessions of the two Empires in Asia ‘a zone to preserve them from any contact’ had always been shared by the Emperor, and authorized Baron Brunnow to ‘repeat to Her Britannic Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State the positive assurance that His Imperial Majesty looks upon Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence. No intervention or interference whatever, opposed to the independence of that State, enters into his intentions.’

“ 4. Lord Clarendon answered, after expressing the thanks of Her Majesty’s Government for the friendly feelings which had prompted Prince Gortchakoff’s communication, that the Secretary of State for India, having consulted those Members of his Council who were well acquainted with the countries in question, had arrived at a decided opinion that Afghanistan would not fulfil those conditions of a neutral territory that it was the object of the two Governments to establish, and that it was, therefore, thought advisable to propose that the Upper Oxus should be the boundary line which neither Power should permit its forces to cross.

“ 5. In the autumn of 1869 an interview took place at Heidelberg between Prince Gortchakow and Lord Clarendon, at which the subject was further discussed. On the one hand, the Prince declared that ‘the Emperor considered, and he entirely shared His Majesty’s opinion, that extension of territory was extension of weakness, and that Russia had no intention of going further south,’ and that it was the desire of the Emperor not to retain Samarkand. On the other, Lord Clarendon explained that the relations between the Government of India and the Ameer of Afghanistan had been entered into solely with the object of enabling him to maintain that order in Afghanistan which was of importance to the neighbouring possessions of Great Britain,—had no reference to the advances of Russia in Central Asia,—and evinced no hostile disposition towards Russia.

“ 6. In the latter part of the year 1869 the presence of Mr. Douglas Forsyth at St. Petersburg afforded an opportunity for a more full discussion of the proposals which were under the consideration of the two Governments.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon, November 2nd, 1869.
Mr. Forsyth to Sir A. Buchanan, November 2nd, 1869.

“ The subject of the influence which should be exercised by Russia and Great Britain respectively over the States on their frontiers was frankly entered into, and it was agreed that beyond the limit of the provinces which the Ameer of Afghanistan then held he should not attempt to exercise any interference or influence,—that the good offices of England should be exerted to restrain him from all thought of aggression,—and that, similarly, Russia should exercise all her influence to restrain Bokhara from transgressing the limits of Afghan territory.

“ 7. Prince Gortchakow expressed his opinion that there might be some difficulty in restoring Samarkand to Bokhara, notwithstanding the desire of the Emperor to do so. He considered that the influence possessed by the Government of India over the Ameer of Afghanistan was greater than that of Russia over Bokhara, but admitting ‘that to be a mere question of appreciation,’ he did not anticipate much difficulty in inducing the Ruler of Bokhara to abstain from aggressive acts against Afghanistan. He felt assured that the advice of Russia to the Khan of Khokand to live in peace with his neighbours would be followed. He stated that he

saw no objection to English officers visiting Cabul, though he agreed with the Earl of Mayo that Russian Agents should not do so.

"With regard to Kashgaria or Yarkund, in which country the Atalik Ghazee had recently established a Government, Prince Gortchakow observed to Sir A. Buchanan that the Atalik Ghazee had nothing to fear from Russia, but as the

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon, November 2nd, 1869.

Russian Government had no relations with him, and the Government of India appeared to have had dealings with him, 'you can assure him, on my authority, that Russia has no hostile intentions towards him or any desire to make conquests in his territories.'

"Prince Gortchakow, on the conclusion of these communications, requested Sir A. Buchanan to tell Lord Clarendon that 'as both Governments are free from all *arrière-pensées*, ambitious views, or unfriendly feelings towards each other, the more fully and frankly all questions connected with Central Asia are discussed between them, the more effectually will the 'mists' be blown away which, through the misrepresentations of over-zealous subordinate agents may, at any time, hang over them.'

"Lord Clarendon, in reply, requested Sir A. Buchanan to state to Prince Gortchakow 'that

Lord Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan, November 10th, 1869.

Her Majesty's Government entirely reciprocate these opinions, and will act upon them without reserve and in a spirit of confidence, being assured that such a course is best calculated to promote the entirely good understanding with Russia which we are so anxious to maintain upon the only matters upon which an apparent, though not necessary, divergence of interest might lead to differences.'

"8. The general policy to be pursued by the two Governments was thus satisfactorily agreed upon. The result of the communications that had passed was summarized as follows by Prince Gortchakow in his despatch to Count Brunnow of the 1st of November 1871:—

"(a).—That the territory in the actual possession at the present moment of Shere Ali

Prince Gortchakow to Count Brunnow, November 1st, 1871.

Khan should be considered to constitute the limits of Afghanistan.

"(b).—That beyond these limits the Ameer should make no attempt to exercise any influence or interference, and that the English Government should do all in their power to restrain him from any attempts at aggression.

"(c).—That for their part the Imperial Government should use all their influence to prevent any attack by the Ameer of Bokhara upon Afghan territory.

"These principles had been unreservedly accepted both by the Cabinet of London and the Governor-General of India.

"9. There remained the settlement of the boundary of Afghanistan so as to embrace the provinces then held by the Ameer.

"Some delay not unnaturally occurred in the settlement of the north-eastern and western portions of this boundary, for it required an investigation into the condition of countries little known either to the British or to the Russian authorities. Ultimately there was a difference of opinion between the two Governments upon the question whether Badukshan and Wakhan did or did not form part of the provinces held by the Ameer. It is only necessary for us again to express the satisfaction with which we have learnt from Prince Gortchakow's letter to Count Brunnow of the ^{19th}/_{31st} January last that the Russian Government finally agreed to accept the views of Her Majesty's Government upon the question, and we regard this as a proof of the desire of the Russian Government to avoid, as far as possible, any future elements of discord.

"10. Notwithstanding, however, that the precise boundary of Afghanistan had remained unsettled from the end of the year 1869 until January last, the Government of India have been guided in their transactions with their Asiatic neighbours by the principles of policy which were agreed upon in 1869 between the two Governments. At the Umballa Durbar and on several other occasions the Ameer of Afghanistan was earnestly advised to commit no aggression on his neighbours. This advice was repeated with special reference to the differences then existing between the Ameer of Bokhara and his rebellious son and to the wish of Shere Ali Khan to annex Kirkee and Charjui. Our influence was on these occasions exercised with success, and we had the satisfaction of being informed by Your Grace that our proceedings were considered by the Emperor of Russia as a gratifying proof of the good effects of the communications between Prince Gortchakow and Lord Clarendon at Heidelberg, and of the determination of the two Governments to do everything in their power to promote peace in Central Asia.

"We have also advised the Atalik Ghazee to abstain from interference in the political affairs and quarrels of neighbouring States. Our communications with him have been confined to the establishment of friendly relations, and in pursuance of negotiations which commenced some years ago we are now engaged in the conclusion of a Treaty of Trade and Commerce with

Yarkund. It is apparent from the language used by Prince Gortchakow to Sir Andrew Buchanan in 1869, which is quoted in the 7th paragraph of this despatch, that Yarkund was not included by the Russian Government among the countries within the immediate sphere of Russian influence, and we do not consider that the recent conclusion of a commercial treaty by Russia with Yarkund has substantially altered the position of that country as regards Russia.

“ We have declined to exercise any interference in the affairs of Bokhara and Khiva when appealed to more than once by Envoys from those countries.

“ 11. On the other hand, the action of the Russian Government upon several occasions has been in accordance with the same policy.

“ In the beginning of 1870 apprehensions were entertained of a hostile movement on the part of the Ameer of Bokhara upon Afghanistan, and a rumour had reached India of a contemplated attack on the territories of the Atalik Ghazee by the Khan of Khokand. Communications were addressed to the Russian Government, and Prince Gortchakow repudiated the idea of the Ameer having the slightest ground for apprehension. Sir Andrew Buchanan then said—

“ That if it can be shown that the Emperor of Russia is following a similar policy with the Government of India, and that the object of His Majesty's policy is to create on his frontiers a series of influenced but not tributary or neutralized States, to secure to them national independence, and to put an end for ever to that state of conflict and internal disturbance which has for ages prevailed in those regions, the interests of civilization will be strengthened and possibly permanently consolidated; that the Viceroy had done all in his power to maintain peace on the frontier of Afghanistan, and that it therefore rests with the Government of the Emperor, by adopting the same course with regard to those countries which bound the Russian possessions in Central Asia as the Viceroy has taken towards Afghanistan, permanently to secure peace throughout their wide districts, which are influenced respectively by the Government of the Queen and that of His Imperial Majesty.’

“ M. Stremoukoff replied—

“ ‘ What you have read is our programme, and describes exactly what we desire, and are endeavouring to establish.’

“ Subsequently Prince Gortchakow requested Sir A. Buchanan to assure Lord Clarendon in the most positive manner that ‘ the Russian Government lost no opportunity of impressing on the Khan of Bokhara their desire that he should abstain from all aggression on the territories of the Ameer of Cabul.’ At the same time, the Emperor, in an interview which he accorded to Sir Andrew Buchanan, entirely confirmed this assurance.

“ 12. General Kauffmann, during the same period, assured the Ameer of Afghanistan that he had given no encouragement to Abdool Rahman Khan, the nephew of the Ameer, who was residing as a refugee in Russian territory and was supposed to entertain designs upon the tranquillity of Afghanistan.

“ General Kauffmann's language to the Ameer was as follows :—

“ ‘ The Czar's possessions in Turkestan do not border on the countries at present under your rule : we are separated by the Khanate of Bokhara, whose Ameer, Seid Mozuffur, has concluded a peace with Russia, and is at present friendly towards and under the protection of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias. No collision or misunderstanding can therefore take place between us, though we are distant neighbours, and we can and ought to live in peace and concord. I have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, because, on the one hand, you are under the protection of the English Government, who, as you are probably aware, are friendly towards that of the Czar ; and because, on the other hand, I do not perceive any interference on your part in the affairs of Bokhara.’

“ 13. The settlement of the boundaries of Afghanistan will render it more easy for the authorities of both nations to carry into practical effect the policy which has been agreed upon between the two Governments, and the public announcement of the agreement will, in our opinion, conduce to the preservation of peace in the countries concerned. At the same time, much will depend on the firm adherence to the policy of non-annexation both by England and Russia ; for we have good reason to believe that an advance of the Russian frontier towards that of Afghanistan would undoubtedly revive in that country the uneasiness which the frank avowal of the good understanding between Great Britain and Russia on the general question of Central Asian policy has done much to allay.

“ 14. It is obvious, from the whole tenor of the communications between the two Governments, that although the term ‘ neutral territory ’ was originally used by the Earl of Clarendon, the idea has not been pursued in the subsequent negotiations, mainly owing, as it appears to us, to Prince Gortchakoff's objections to the adoption of the Upper Oxus as the line of demarcation for a neutral ground. The expression originally used by Prince Gortchakoff,

indeed,—‘*zône destinée à préserver les possessions des deux Empires en Asie de tout contact*,’—appears to us more accurately to express the condition in which both Governments desire to maintain the countries which intervene between their respective possessions in Asia.

“15. Our opinion upon this subject was given to Her Majesty’s Government in the year 1869; and we still think that the existence of a treaty which would limit and control the conduct of either of the two great Powers with regard to their immediate neighbours might prove a fertile source of dispute between the two Governments. It would be impossible to expect Russia to agree to any such stipulations in regard to Khiva or Bokhara, and our relations with Afghanistan are of a kind quite inconsistent with ‘neutrality’ in its strict sense.

“16. As it is possible that the Russian Government are not in possession of full information with respect to the nature and scope of those relations, it may be advisable shortly to recapitulate them.

“The Earl of Mayo informed the Ameer of Afghanistan at Umballa, in the spring of 1869, that although the British Government did not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, yet, considering that the bonds of friendship between the Government of India and His Highness had lately been more closely drawn than heretofore, we should endeavour, from time to time, by such means as circumstances might require, to strengthen the Government of His Highness; and that we were willing to assist him with money, arms, ammunition, and in other ways, whenever we deemed it desirable to do so. The hands of the Government of India were left absolutely free as to the occasions on which, and the circumstances under which, such assistance was to be given to or withheld from the Ameer. He was given clearly to understand that the assistance then or hereafter to be given him was solely for the purpose of establishing a just and merciful as well as a strong Government in Afghanistan, and that the continuance of our support must always depend upon the pleasure of the Government of India. These explanations were accepted and approved by Your Grace as in all respects satisfactory and in accordance with the opinions and principles laid down by Her Majesty’s Government. It was distinctly explained to the Ameer that he was to receive no fixed subsidy from us, and as a matter of fact the only occasion on which, since the Umballa Durbar, His Highness has received assistance in money from us was in the spring of 1872 when we made him a present of two lakhs of rupees to assist him in carrying out certain reforms in his internal administration. It is probable that a further sum of money will now be supplied to him for the purpose of facilitating the peaceful settlement of the disputed boundary between Afghanistan and Persia in Seistan.

“17. This statement will suffice to show the nature of our relations with Afghanistan. Our influence has been exercised with the Ameer to encourage him in the peaceful policy which he has hitherto pursued towards his neighbours, and we believe that it will in future be sufficient to secure that most desirable object. Indeed, we are confident that the Ameer himself will appreciate his obligation, in consideration of the recognition by Russia of the boundaries of his territory, to refrain from any aggression; but we have never desired to interfere with the independence of Afghanistan, and, therefore, we can undertake no further responsibility with regard to the action of the Ameer than to press upon him in case of need in the strongest manner our friendly advice, and to govern our relations towards him in accordance with the action he may take, in the same way as the Russian Government have engaged to act with regard to Bokhara.

“18. Although we have abstained from entering into any treaty engagement to support the Ameer by British troops, in the event of Afghanistan being attacked from without, yet the complete independence of Afghanistan is so important to the interests of British India that the Government of India could not look upon an attack upon Afghanistan with indifference. So long as the Ameer continues, as he has hitherto done, to act in accordance with our advice in his relations with his neighbours, he would naturally look for material assistance from us; and circumstances might occur under which we should consider it incumbent upon us to recommend Her Majesty’s Government to render him such assistance.

“19. The assurances given by the Russian Government of their determination not to interfere with Afghanistan have been clear and positive throughout the whole course of these negotiations. We unreservedly accept those assurances, and we are satisfied that this frank explanation of the position of the Government of India as regards Afghanistan will not be misinterpreted.

“20. Both Powers have now publicly avowed their adherence to the policy of not further extending their territorial possessions in the southern portion of Central Asia. They have pledged themselves reciprocally that so far as their influence extends over the States lying between their respective frontiers, that influence will be exerted in the interests of the general peace to restrain those States from aggression upon each other. As regards Afghanistan, the boundary recently settled is to be the limit of the Ameer’s dominions; while, on the one hand, the Government of India are to use all the influence they possess with the Ameer to prevent him from transgressing that boundary, Russia will on her part use all her influence over Bokhara and the other States to which her influence extends to restrain them from aggressions

on Afghanistan. Therefore, so long as the Ameer confines himself to the boundary now defined, he need fear no molestation from Russia or the countries under her influence.

"21. Should our general view of the recent negotiations and of the obligations which will consequently devolve upon us receive the approval of Her Majesty's Government, we would suggest that a copy of this despatch might be communicated to the Russian Government, in order that we may act with freedom and confidence in our future communications with the different countries whose interests are concerned."

It may here be observed that the foregoing despatch was *not* communicated to the Russian Government. Lord Granville considered it undesirable to do so, or to convey to Russia indirectly an intimation that any aggression by her on Afghanistan would be resisted by Great Britain with force of arms.

[*Secret, December 1873, No. 238.*]

13. Views of the Ameer of Afghanistan on the issue of the negotiations with Russia in respect to his boundaries. Causes of his dissatisfaction.—The party to the agreement most nearly concerned was the Ameer Shere Ali Khan of Cabul, and unfortunately he was by no means in a mood to accept without hesitation the assurances offered to him. He was dissatisfied with the result of the Seistan arbitration (for which the Seistan Précis should be consulted), and moreover he had a deep-rooted suspicion that, whatever arrangement might be made, the intentions of Russia were hostile to him. Thus in April 1873 he remarked to the Cabul Agent that as for the recently defined boundary of northern Afghanistan, whatever views the British Government might have entertained, great anxiety weighed on him day and night by reason of his fear that the juxtaposition of boundaries with Russia would involve difficulty in making provision for the security of the borders in the interests of both Governments. He was therefore anxious to send an Agent, who should wait on the Viceroy and ascertain the real views of the British Government.

[*Secret, May 1874, No. 144.*]

The above statement was followed by another early in May more full and still more discontented. He informed the Cabul Agent that after the assurances given him that the Russians would not interfere with the dominions in his possession, he was at a loss to surmise what great difficulty had given rise to the renewal of the deliberations between the British and Russian Governments about the northern boundary of Afghanistan. His Highness continued :—

"It cannot be concealed that it is impossible for the Russians to remain always firm in their negotiations. For instance, they could not remain firm in their engagements about the Crimea even for a short period. My anxiety, which I feel on account of the Russians, will never be removed unless the British Government adorns the Afghan Government with great assistance in money and ammunitions of war for the troops, and unless great aid is given for the construction of strong forts throughout the northern Afghan border. And, further, if an emergency arises for the Afghan Government to oppose the Russians, such opposition cannot take place without the co-operation of the disciplined troops of the British Government. Should the British Government desire that I should at once organize the Afghan troops, and make arrangements for the security of the border against the Russians on a favourable occasion, I think it is impossible to do so. No person has attained his object in this world immediately. It is plainly obligatory on the British Government to show their cordiality in this matter before anything happens. It is rather advisable that the British Government for its own and my satisfaction should set apart some property, either in India or in Europe, for my support, in order that if, which God forbid, a serious difficulty constrains me to quit Afghanistan, I may retire there with my family and children, and find both accommodation and maintenance there, and after this reassurance I will work with zeal and high spirit day and night for the security of the border of Afghanistan, which is in truth the border of India. Time has approached very near when the Russians, after taking possession of Urgunj and Merve Shahjehan, will make communications for exercising some influence in my kingdom. It is as clear as daylight that, as soon as the Russians will take possession of Merve Shahjehan, the Turkomans will necessarily take refuge in Badgees in Herat; and if they do not desist from their misbehaviour, *viz.*, from causing injury to the Russians from time to time, the Russians will undoubtedly send messages to the Afghan Government that either the Turkomans should be prevented from aggression, or permission should be given to them (the Russians) to punish these hostile tribes. Under these circumstances, such difficulty will present itself to me that even the British Government, with regard to the interests of the Afghan and English

Governments being identical, will have to adopt very serious measures for its removal. Kosheed Khan, Chief of Merve Shahjehan, has sent his son to me undoubtedly for this reason, that should the people of that territory be unable to oppose the Russians, the Afghan Government may not prevent them from seeking shelter in Badgees. It is well known that if, in the event of the Turkomans being overcome by the Russians, they wish to come to Badgees, the Russians will not withhold themselves from going in pursuit of them."

[*Secret, September 1873, No. 123.*]

Shortly after this came a letter from the Ameer written on the 22nd May 1873, and stating that His Highness' special Motamid, Noor Mahomed Shah, had been deputed to wait on His Excellency and to submit all that the Ameer had to make known regarding the welfare of the two States.

14. Visit of the Cabul Envoy to Simla in July 1873. Explanation given him on the subject of the Afghan northern boundary question.—The Envoy from Afghanistan reached Simla in July 1873, and there ensued conversations and discussions which are important and which will therefore now be summarized. The first interview took place on the 12th July. On this occasion the Viceroy, after recapitulating the points which had been gained by the recent negotiations, observed that

"the British Government would be prepared to use their best endeavours to maintain the frontier intact so long as the Ameer or the Ruler of Afghanistan follows their advice as regards his external relations, and abstains from encroachment and aggression on his neighbours. If, for example, troubles should arise and the boundary in question were violated by neighbouring countries or by any tribes under Russian influence, the natural course would be for the Ameer to refer to the British Government, and every effort would be made by that Government to bring about a satisfactory settlement. The influence proposed to be exercised by the British Government referred to the external relations of Afghanistan alone, and no interference was contemplated in the internal affairs of that kingdom. The Ameer must be well aware that occupying as Afghanistan does an intervening position between the British and Russian dominions, it was important for the interests of India that she should be both a strong and an independent State.

"If, in the event of any aggression from without, British influence were invoked and failed by negotiation to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was probable that the British Government would in that case afford the Ruler of Afghanistan material assistance in repelling an invader. Such assistance would of course be conditional on the Ameer following the advice of the British Government and having himself abstained from aggression."

15. Her Majesty's Government had previously enjoined caution in promising the Ameer material aid.—It should be here remarked that Her Majesty's Government had previously enjoined upon the Government of India great caution in promising the Ameer material assistance. On 27th June the Viceroy had telegraphed to the Secretary of State quoting the 18th paragraph of despatch subsequently issued on 30th June, *vide supra* page 18, and stating that it was proposed to inform the Cabul Envoy of the sense of that paragraph.

The Secretary of State answered by telegraph on 1st July:—

"I do not object to the general sense of the paragraph which you quote as a communication to Russia from the Foreign Office, but great caution is necessary in assuring Ameer of material assistance, which may raise undue and unfounded expectations: he already shows symptoms of claiming more than we may wish to give."

16. Apprehensions of Russia by Afghanistan as stated by the Cabul Envoy, 12th July 1873.—The Cabul Envoy assured the Viceroy that the Ameer as well as the people of Afghanistan were fully aware that the influence of the British Government would be exercised solely in the interests of Afghanistan, and that no interference in the internal affairs of that kingdom was to be anticipated. The rapid advances made by the Russians in Central Asia had aroused the gravest apprehensions in the minds of the people of Afghanistan. Whatever specific assurances the Russians might give, and however often these might be repeated, the people of Afghanistan could

place no confidence in them, and would never rest satisfied unless they were assured of the aid of the British Government.

[*Secret, September 1873, No. 125.*]

17. Interview between His Excellency the Viceroy and the Cabul Envoy, 30th July 1873. Internal affairs of Afghanistan not to be interfered with. Case of external aggression considered. Policy to be pursued by Ameer towards the Turko-mans.—The second interview between His Excellency the Viceroy and the Cabul Envoy took place on the 30th July 1873. The following is the official record of the conversation which ensued :—

The Envoy said that on perusal of the correspondence between the Russian and English Governments, translations of which had been furnished to him, he had noted two points which might give rise to question in Afghanistan, and which it would be advisable to explain in the paper containing the result of the present communications of which he would be the bearer to the Ameer. These points were as follows :—

(a.) From the passage marginally quoted, occurring in Earl Granville's despatch of the 17th October 1872, it appeared that the object of the correspondence between the English and Russian Governments was to secure peace and tranquillity in Central Asia. If at any time fault should be found with the internal condition of Afghanistan by a foreign power, and if it should be asserted that these terms "peace and tranquillity" were not appropriate to it, there was room for apprehension that this might be held to constitute a condition of affairs that would invalidate the arrangement entered into between Russia and England. The Envoy, therefore, wished it to be clearly explained that the Afghan Government should be allowed to follow its own laws and customs in its own territories; that the internal administration of the States on both sides of the frontier should be free from interference; and that the expression alluded to had no reference to the internal condition of these countries.

His Excellency the Viceroy replied that there could be no doubt whatever that the words "peace and tranquillity" referred to the external relations of the countries concerned, and that the absence of these conditions in the internal economy of those countries could not in any way invalidate the arrangements. His Excellency had no doubt that in the letter to the Ameer, of which the Envoy would be the bearer, this point would be satisfactorily disposed of. At the same time His Excellency observed that if any Russian subjects or other foreigners entering Afghanistan were subjected to molestation and denied protection through any fault of the Government of Afghanistan, it would be the duty of the Ameer to give redress and compensation in accordance with the usage of nations. His Excellency could say nothing which could give countenance to any neglect on the part of Afghanistan of the ordinary duties of every Government in respect to matters of this kind. The Envoy thereupon remarked that, as there were so many objections to the merchants of such great powers entering Afghanistan, and Afghanistan was unable to control their movements, the above conditions could apply only to such merchants as might enter Afghanistan with the Ameer's permission given after due consideration. These would receive the same protection as other merchants have received up to the present day. His Excellency replied that his remarks had reference to merchants entering with the permission of the Ameer.

(b.) The second point to which the Envoy alluded was the confirmation by Bokhara of the claims of Afghanistan, mention of which was made in the same despatch from Lord Granville.* The Envoy was apprehensive that at some future time Bokhara might under pressure be induced to deny this confirmation

* "Her Majesty's Government believe that it is now in the power of the Russian Government, by an explicit recognition of the right of the Ameer of Cabul to the territories which he now claims, and which Bokhara herself admits to be his, &c."

and thus afford a ground for re-opening the question. The remedy against such a contingency would be a declaration that the arrangement arrived at was final, and that no further negotiation on the subject would take place.

His Excellency the Viceroy replied that no subsequent denial by Bokhara could in any way affect the arrangement between the English and Russian Governments, and that this would be declared in the letter to be given to the Envoy.

The Envoy next alluded to the absence of any distinct assurances on the part of Russia in the recent correspondence that no aggression would be made on Afghanistan.

To this the Viceroy replied that the latter part of the correspondence between England and Russia was confined to the specific subject of the actual northern boundary of Afghanistan, and that such assurances would, therefore, have been out of place. As they had, however, been repeatedly given by Russia before, and also in the commencement of the correspondence, they would be embodied in the final letter to the Ameer.

Next the Envoy proceeded to state that whatever assurances were given by Russia, the Ameer and people of Afghanistan would rely only on definite promises of assistance given by the British Government. He had explained in detail to the Secretary the precise grounds for the apprehensions entertained by Afghanistan, and it was therefore unnecessary to enlarge on the subject. Assistance was solicited by Afghanistan for two reasons: *First*, it was the expectation of the Ameer that the British Government would aid him with money and arms so that he might be enabled to strengthen his frontier against any possible future aggression. The request, said the Envoy, was based partly on the promises made by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, on the strength of which the Ameer had been induced to raise a large body of troops for the defence of his territories.

With respect to these promises the Envoy appeared to be under the impression that the British Government were pledged to comply with any request for assistance preferred by the Ameer. He professed unwillingness to press this point, but His Excellency the Viceroy deemed it desirable to refer to the correspondence in order to remove any incorrect impressions that he might entertain with regard to the promises of the British Government. After hearing the passages in the correspondence bearing on the subject, the Viceroy enquired of the Envoy whether he still held that the British Government were bound to comply with every request preferred by the Ameer. The Envoy replied to the extent that may be proper. Such being the case, His Excellency observed, that it was desirable that no doubt should exist on the subject, and that it must be distinctly understood that the British Government were to be the judges of the propriety of any request preferred by the Ameer. His Excellency proceeded to say that Lord Mayo had assured the Ameer that any representation he might make would 'always be treated with consideration and respect,' and His Excellency was quite prepared to maintain the policy of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, and to entertain in a similar spirit the request now preferred. His Excellency said that the British Government were far from sharing the apprehensions entertained by the Ameer of dangers from without, for they considered that the result of the recent correspondence between England and Russia was to strengthen very materially the position of Afghanistan; but that, apart from these considerations, it was the policy of the British Government to see Afghanistan powerful. The request for present assistance would, therefore, be complied with to the extent which the British Government might consider appropriate to the present necessities of Afghanistan, and His Excellency invited the Envoy to see the Foreign Secretary again on the subject.

Proceeding in the next place to the question of the assistance to be given to Afghanistan in case of actual aggression from without, the Envoy observed that at the previous interview His Excellency had said that if, in the event of any aggression from without, British influence were invoked and failed by

negotiation to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was probable that the British Government would in that case afford the Ruler of Afghanistan material assistance in repelling an invader. His Excellency had also said that such assistance would of course be conditional on the Ameer following the advice of the British Government, and having himself abstained from aggression. Now the Ameer in expectation of the assistance of the British Government had up to the present time followed the advice of the Viceroy as regards abstinence from aggression, and in the event of assistance being given would continue to follow that policy. The Envoy continued that he had at an interview with the Secretary brought forward many arguments with regard to the proffered assistance, showing how it would fail to convey sufficient reassurance. In the event of assistance being given to Afghanistan by the British Government, it should be in the form of a promise to assist that country with money and arms according to the circumstances of the case in the event of invasion, and if the Ameer should be unable to cope single-handed with an invader and should prefer a request for troops, the British Government should promise to despatch troops to his aid and withdraw them when the necessity for their employment is over.

His Excellency the Viceroy replied that the British Government did not share the Ameer's apprehensions, but that, as already mentioned in the previous conversation, it would be the duty of the Ameer, in case of any actual or threatened aggression, to refer the question to the British Government, who would endeavour by negotiation and by every means in their power to settle the matter and avert hostilities. It was not intended, by insisting on such previous reference to the British Government, to restrict or interfere with the power of the Ameer as an independent Ruler to take such steps as might be necessary to repel any aggression on his territories, but such reference was a preliminary and essential condition of the British Government assisting him. In such event should these endeavours of the British Government to bring about an amicable settlement prove fruitless, the British Government were prepared to assure the Ameer that they would afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, and would also in case of necessity aid him with troops. The British Government held itself perfectly free to decide as to the occasion when such assistance should be rendered, and also as to its nature and extent: moreover, the assistance would be conditional upon the Ameer himself abstaining from aggression, and on his unreserved acceptance of the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations. The Envoy said that both in conversation with the Foreign Secretary and at the present interview he had explained his views on the subject, and his objections on certain points, and the matter would now be laid before the Ameer for his consideration.

Two points in connection with the promised assurance were then brought forward by the Envoy. He requested in the first place that, in the event of any aggression on the Ameer's territories, the British Government would distinctly state that they would consider such aggressor as an enemy.

His Excellency said that in diplomatic correspondence such expressions were always avoided as causing needless irritation. In His Excellency's opinion the assurance above given should be sufficient to satisfy the Ameer as to the light in which any aggression would be considered by the British Government.

Next the Envoy pressed that the contingency of aggression by Russia should be specifically mentioned in the written assurance to be given to the Ameer.

To this His Excellency replied that, setting aside the inexpediency of causing needless irritation to a friendly Power by such specific mention, the suggestion was one that could not be adopted, inasmuch as it implied an admission of the probability of such a contingency arising, which the British Government are not prepared to admit in the face of the repeated assurances given by Russia.

The Envoy then asked what reply should be given by the Ameer to the request which the Turkomans had preferred for advice as to the attitude they

should assume to the Russians who had demanded a passage for their troops through the Turkoman territory.

His Excellency replied that the advice given by the Foreign Secretary was correct. These Turkomans were robbers and kidnappers, and the cause of a large portion of the mischief in Central Asia. The Ameer would do a most unwise thing to make himself responsible for such people in any way whatever. Of course friendly answers should be returned to friendly letters from them, but the Ameer should in no way make himself responsible for them or countenance their lawless proceedings or any opposition on their part to the march of the Russian troops.

[*Secret, September 1873, No. 126.*]

18. Remarks of the Cabul Envoy in conversation with the Foreign Secretary regarding Russian aggression.—The conversation with the Foreign Secretary referred to above had taken place on the 19th and 20th July. The Envoy had been explicit on the subject of Russian aggression. He said that in a year or two the Russians would seize Merve, whereupon the Turkoman tribes would take refuge in the district of Badgees and the neighbourhood of Herat. When in Afghan territory the Turkomans, who know no other avocation but that of plunder, would certainly not forsake their predatory habits, and would thus afford the Russians an excuse for calling on the Ameer to restrain them. No proper control could be exercised by the Ameer on these wandering tribes, and a demand would then be made by Russia to allow a force to be cantoned in Badgees for the purpose of controlling them. Again the Russians would certainly advance beyond Bokhara, and establish cantonments in Kerki, Charjooee, and other places near the Afghan frontier, and their next step would be to call upon the Cabul Government to enter into engagements for facilitating trade, and for the establishment of a Russian mission and agents as in other countries. It would be impossible for the Ameer to accede to these requests, compliance with which would certainly lead to complications and troubles. In view then of these apprehended dangers the Envoy said it was the expectation of the people of Afghanistan that the British Government would attentively consider their situation and suggest what reply should be made to the overtures of Russia, and at the same time that the British Government would state definitely what assistance would be given to Afghanistan in such an emergency.

19. The assistance which the Ameer expected to get from the British Government as explained to the Foreign Secretary by the Cabul Envoy.—The Envoy also explained to the Foreign Secretary what his master looked for in the way of material aid from the British Government. He begged that a written assurance might be given to him to the effect that if Russia or any State of Turkestan or elsewhere under Russian influence should commit an aggression on the Ameer's territories, or should otherwise annoy the Ameer, the British Government would consider such aggressor an enemy, and that they would promise to afford to the Ameer promptly such assistance in money and arms as might be required until the danger should be past or invasion repelled. Also, that if the Ameer should be unable to cope single-handed with the invader, that the British Government would promptly despatch a force to his assistance by whatever route the Ameer might require the same, the said force to be employed against the invader and to return to British territory when the invasion was repelled. No return for the assistance above mentioned was to be required by the British Government from Afghanistan. Such assistance was to be rendered solely out of friendship to Afghanistan, and with the view of protecting the integrity of the frontier, so that the existing friendship of both countries might be maintained.

The Foreign Secretary made it plain to the Envoy that there was no chance of getting an unconditional promise of assistance from the British Government whoever the enemy and whatever the circumstances might be.

The Envoy was also disabused of the notion that the Government of India was bound by previous engagements to give the Ameer arms and money whenever and to whatever extent he might ask for such aid. He was told that "if assistance were given by the British Government, it would doubtless be such as in their opinion would be sufficient to meet the circumstances of the case."

20. The Foreign Secretary's advice given to the Cabul Envoy in reference to the Turkomans.—The counsel given by the Foreign Secretary on the subject of the Turkomans and approved by the Viceroy was that it would be advisable for the Ameer to abstain as far as possible from interference in the affairs of the Turkomans beyond his frontier and to disclaim the allegiance which had been proffered to him by them. While maintaining with the Turkomans relations of peace the Ameer should on no account assist them, or in any way countenance them in opposing the Russians. The Turkoman country lay beyond the recognized limits of Afghanistan. The Russians had a just and legitimate quarrel with the Khan of Khiva, to punish whom their troops were then marching through the Tekke country. If the Ameer thought it necessary to give the Tekkes advice, it should be to the effect that they should allow an unmolested passage to the Russians, and in no way whatever interfere with their operations.

[*K. W. Secret, September 1873, Nos. 118-139.*]

21. Telegraphic correspondence with the Home Government regarding the assurances of aid to be given to the Ameer.—The following telegrams were in the meantime exchanged between the Indian and Home Governments:—

"To Secretary of State, dated 24th July 1873.

"Ameer of Cabul alarmed at Russian progress; dissatisfied with general assurances, and anxious to know definitely how far he may rely on our help if invaded. I propose to assure him if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations, we will help him with money, arms, and troops if necessary, to repel unprovoked invasion. We to be the judge of the necessity. Answer by telegraph quickly.

"From Secretary of State, dated 26th July 1873.

"Cabinet think you should inform Ameer that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it. But you may assure him we shall maintain our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan if he abides by our advice in external affairs.

[*Secret, September 1873, Nos. 120-121.*]

22. Letter from His Excellency the Viceroy to the Ameer of Cabul dated 6th September 1873 explaining the British policy towards Afghanistan and the results obtained by the settlement of the boundary question.—On the 6th September 1873 the Viceroy wrote to Ameer Shere Ali Khan. His Highness was reminded of the assurances which the Russians had given that there was no intention of interference with Afghanistan, and was informed that the object of the more recent correspondence between the British and Russian Governments had been to remove the possibility of doubt or misunderstanding by declaring definitely what territories were recognized as belonging to Afghanistan. The letter then proceeded:—

"It has been a source of much satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government that Your Highness has more than once expressed your determination, in accordance with the advice given by the late Earl of Mayo, to abstain from all interference in the affairs of States and tribes beyond the borders of Afghanistan. Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, felt no hesitation in undertaking to use their influence to impress upon Your Highness the importance of maintaining this peaceful attitude, and of allowing no considerations whatever to lead to any designs of conquest or aggression beyond the limits described in Lord Granville's letter of the 17th October 1872. On the other hand, the Russian Government have undertaken on their part to use their best endeavours to restrain the States over which they have any influence from transgressing the limits of Afghanistan as above described.

"Your Highness will see that the correspondence on the subject of the boundaries relates only to the external relations of Afghanistan; and I entertain a confident hope that, by the conclusion arrived at, the important object referred to in Lord Granville's letter of 17th October, *viz.*, the maintenance of peace and tranquillity between the States of Central Asia in their external relations will be attained, and that in future no aggressions will be made from either side of the boundary now fixed.

"The result of the communications between the British and the Russian Governments has been, in my opinion, materially to strengthen the position of Afghanistan, and to remove apprehension of dangers from without. The boundaries of Your Highness' dominions to which the letters refer have now been definitely settled in a manner which precludes any re-opening of the matter by Bokhara or any other power, or any further question or discussion on the subject between Your Highness and your neighbours in those quarters. To this settlement the British Government are a party, and they are consequently even more interested than before in the maintenance of the integrity of Your Highness' frontier. I have had some conversation with your Envoy on the subject of the policy which the British Government would pursue in the event of an attack upon Your Highness' territories. A copy of the record of these conversations is attached to this letter. But the question is, in my opinion, one of such importance that the discussion of it should be postponed to a more suitable opportunity.

"I do not entertain any apprehensions of danger to Your Highness' territories from without, and I therefore do not consider that it is necessary that Your Highness should at present incur any large expenditure with a view to such a contingency. My hope is that having received the foregoing assurance, Your Highness will now be enabled to devote your undisturbed attention to the consolidation and improvement of your internal government. The British Government desires to see Your Highness' country powerful and independent. It is my determination to maintain the policy which has been adopted towards Your Highness by my predecessors, Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, and I repeat to Your Highness the assurance given you at the Umballa Durbar, that the British Government will endeavour from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the government of Your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honors of which you are the lawful possessor."

[*Secret, September 1873, No. 132.*]

The record of conversations referred to in the foregoing despatch, so far as the conversations touched upon the subject of this chapter, was as follows:—

Memorandum of certain points which will be laid before the Ameer by the Envoy.

"The Envoy has explained the views entertained in Afghanistan regarding the advance of the Russians towards the frontier of that country, and the probable establishment by them of cantonments in Kirkee, Charjoe, and other places near the frontier; also regarding the probable entry of the Turkomans into the Badgees District, and he expressed a fear lest the Cabul Government should be called upon by Russia for political objects to enter into arrangements for the establishment of a Russian Mission and Agents in various parts, or to comply with other demands. He represented that the establishment in Afghanistan of a mission on the part of so great a power presents many difficulties and is indeed impossible. As regards other matters also many difficulties might arise, and he enquired in the unprovided condition of Afghanistan what answer could then be given to such demands.

"With regard to the location of Russian Agents in Afghanistan, the Envoy was informed that Prince Gortchakoff has officially intimated that while he saw no objection to English officers going to Cabul, he agreed with Lord Mayo that Russian Agents should not do so. In the event of any such request being made, the advice of the British Government should be at once sought. If in this or any other matter the Ameer should seek the advice of the British Government, such advice would be given him as the circumstances of the case might require.

"As before explained, the British Government are far from entertaining apprehensions of a Russian invasion of Afghanistan. It is, on the contrary, their decided belief that the effect of the recent arrangements has been to render the occurrence of such a contingency more remote than ever. Under these circumstances, therefore, they could not encourage the Ameer to launch out into any large expenditure for the purpose of guarding against this contingency."

The remainder of the memorandum related to the question of the arms and money which the Ameer expected to receive from the British Government, and to the suggested deputation of a British officer to visit the northern and north-western boundary and to concert measures with the Ameer for the defence of Afghanistan.

[*Secret, September 1873, No. 128.*]

The communications which had taken place with the Cabul Envoy and the Ameer of Afghanistan on the subject of the boundaries of Afghanistan and the general policy of the British Government towards that country were reported to the Secretary of State in despatch No. 75, dated 15th September 1873, but the despatch was merely explanatory and contained nothing which need be added to the foregoing extracts.

23. Ten lakhs of Rupees and fifteen thousand rifles offered to the Ameer at the close of the conferences with the Cabul Envoy.—As a conclusion to the conferences with the Cabul Envoy arrangements were made to afford the Ameer pecuniary aid to the extent of 10 lakhs of rupees, five lakhs of which were intended to be devoted to the adjustment of the claims of sufferers from recent raids upon the province of Seistan, and to supply him with 10,000 Enfield and 5,000 Snider rifles for which he had asked.

[*Secret, September 1873, Nos. 135 and 139.*]

24. The settlement of the Afghan boundary question from the Russian point of view.—It may next be seen how the settlement of the Afghan boundary question was regarded from a Russian point of view. The correspondence previously summarized in page 11 will have shown that the concession regarding the *status* of Badukshan and Wakhan was forced upon the Russian Ministers by the influence of the Emperor himself. That the issue of the negotiations was not grateful to the Russian public mind as expressed in the newspapers will appear from the following extracts :—

“ Now, says the *Contemporary News*, England has turned her attention to the safe-guarding of India from the Central Asian side. By safe-guarding the actual and supposititious possessions of Shere Ali Khan, the English are pursuing from afar the same policy of self-defence by means of others which they have adopted with regard to Turkey, which they are gradually following in Egypt.....But what is most amusing is the fact that in this quarter the English rely upon the closing of the approaches to India, not by their own hands, nor by the hands of any intermediate party, but by the hands of those very people from whom they wish India to be kept closed. In one word, they calculate upon converting Russia into a guardian of their Indian possessions, upon throwing upon her, in case of need, even the burden of sacrifice for the safety and tranquillity of the Anglo-Indian subjects of Her Britannic Majesty.

“ The *Moscow Gazette* observes that the line of Afghan frontier drawn by England in the recent correspondence between the two Governments cannot have any practical effect, and is calculated only to give rise to difficulties. This line of the limitation of Russian influence passing along the Oxus arrests the progress of Russia at the point where it now stops. Russian influence has now no field to spread over further, except in the direction of comparatively poor Khiva and of the mountainous country between Shahr-i-Subz and Badakhshan. Badakhshan is famous for its wooded dales, fruits, flowers and nightingales (Burnes), and is well known for its mineral wealth, its ruby mines and quarries of lapis-lazuli. Maimena is also noted for its excellent soil (Vambéry), but that oasis being removed from the Oxus and from the Russian possessions by deserts, Russian trade, if it extended beyond the Oxus, would rather take the direction of Badukshan.

“ With regard to Badukshan, and more especially of Wakhan, the *Moscow Gazette* says that information is forthcoming, which tends to show that the mutual understanding between England and Russia will be followed by a fight between the Afghans and Badukshans and others for the independence of the latter. Badukshan has turned not alone to Yakoob Beg of Kashgar for assistance (Veniukof), but concluded an alliance against Afghanistan last summer with the Padisha of Chitral. Bokhara and Khokand may interfere in this struggle for the southern bank of the Oxus and its sources, if only Russia had not pledged herself to restrain them. The petty mountain tribes at the sources of the Oxus frequently refer their affairs to Khokand. The Ameer of Bokhara lays claim to Maimena and other towns west of Balkh. The Ameer has somewhat recovered himself of late; he has obtained rifled arms from beyond the Hindoo Koosh, and his troops are trained according to the Russian system.

“ The Anglo-Russian agreement gives the Afghans the best chance for victory in the expected struggle, and in Calcutta the English are therefore triumphing as may be seen from the telegrams. But will the victory be solid and lasting? Will it not produce a demoralizing influence on the Central Asian potentates who are vassals of Russia, and will this not bring forth fresh difficulties? In event even of the establishment of Afghan power in Badukshan and Maimena, will Russia not be obliged to consider the Oxus as the frontier line of the

English and Russian dominions? For the Ameer of Afghanistan, to retain his conquest, must become simply a vassal of England.

As regards the mountaineers of Wakhan and the dependence of that people either on Afghanistan or even Badukshan, there is absolutely no information.

[*Secret, May 1873, No. 89.*]

25. Opinion of M. de Stremoukoff that the agreement between England and Russia would provoke collision.—The Russian official view of the situation appears to have been still less reassuring. On 27th March 1873 Lord Loftus wrote that he had learnt from a confidential and perfectly reliable source that M. de Stremoukoff, the Director of the Asiatic Department of the Russian Foreign Office, had recently expressed his conviction that the agreement between England and Russia respecting the boundaries of Afghanistan was calculated to provoke the very collision which it had been the desire of the two Governments to avert.

“England, he said, had not weighed well the responsibility which she had undertaken under the agreement, for it would be no easy matter to restrain the Afghans, who might give much trouble under the rule of an active and enterprising successor to Shere Ali. There was danger for instance in the direction of Hissar, the deposed ruler of which State was at present in Afghanistan watching an opportunity for his return to power. ‘We would, in such a case,’ said His Excellency, ‘address ourselves to the English and say, dear friends, will you be kind enough to cause the Afghans to desist from their plans and action with respect to Hissar. The English will remonstrate with the Afghans, but the Ameer will probably not listen to them, particularly if he has had time enough to put by a store of English sovereigns out of his subsidy from the Indian Government.’ ‘Where will then the agreement be?’ asked M. de Stremoukoff.

“His Excellency further stated that the Ameer of Cabul had no right whatever to the possession of Badukshan, and that it was very doubtful whether Badukshan had any rights over Wakhan. He insisted that General Kauffmann’s information under this head was more reliable than that obtained by the Indian Government.

“When asked, why, under such circumstances, the Russian Government had consented to the terms proposed by England, M. Stremoukoff replied—‘The English were very violent on the subject, and even threatened us with war. There was therefore nothing else for us to do.’”

[*Secret, September 1873, No. 22.*]

M. de Stremoukoff was in fact thoroughly dissatisfied with what had been done. He hinted to Lord Loftus on several occasions that although the Imperial Government had evinced a very conciliatory spirit towards England, public opinion and the press there clearly showed a distrust of Russia and of her policy in Central Asia, observing at the same time that this feeling of suspicion and hostility to Russia could not continue without eventually estranging the two nations by keeping alive a feeling of distrust so baneful to the interests of both, and so calculated to bring about the very collision which it was the desire of both Governments to prevent.

“No sooner,” said His Excellency, “have the fears which have been expressed by English politicians for the safety of the Indian possessions on the north and north-eastern frontier been calmed by the frank acceptance by Russia of the frontier of Afghanistan designated by Great Britain, than they immediately raise fresh apprehensions on the side of Russia, holding forth that Russia is seeking to reach Herat by the valley of the Attrek, and to menace the Indian possessions through Persia.”

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 174.*]

26. Endeavour of the semi-official Russian Press to prove that Mr. Gladstone’s speech on the Afghan boundary question had relieved Russia from her engagement and left the two Powers in their previous position.—About the same time the semi-official Russian Press took advantage of Mr. Gladstone’s speech on the situation from the British point of view (*supra* page 14) to argue that, since England was declared to have entered into no engagement towards Russia, clearly Russia on her part had undertaken no formal engagement towards England, and the late diplomatic correspondence bore only the character of a simple exchange

of amicable ideas. The article containing the above opinion was borrowed from the *Moscow Gazette*, and published in leading type by the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* of 21st April-3rd May 1873. A translation of the principal part of it is given below :—

“ Mr. Gladstone made a very short speech, in which, without alluding to the details discussed by other speakers, he defined with clearness and an unusual exactitude the opinion of the British Government in the issue of its negotiation with Russia. We may therefore regard his declaration as the accurate expression of the relations which have been actually established between Russia and England on the subject of the affairs of Central Asia. The *Times* is satisfied with the explanations given by the leader of the Cabinet, and on this occasion we are quite ready to agree with that paper though the considerations which have led us to this conclusion are very different from those of the *Times*.

“ Mr. Gladstone especially comforted his hearers by assuring them that for some time past there had no longer been a question of the neutrality of Afghanistan, and that England had preserved an entire liberty of action in respect to that country. The more recent negotiations had for result the definition of three points. First, the correspondence contains a ‘ negative engagement ’ undertaken by Russia, and according to the terms of which that power regards Afghanistan as being altogether beyond the sphere of her influence; second, the northern boundary of Afghanistan has been defined agreeably to the English point of view, which the Russian Government accepted with a courtesy that was honorable to them; and lastly, inasmuch as there never was any other question but the demarcation of influence, England has not been tied down to an onerous engagement which would make her answerable for the good conduct of the Ameer, and has only promised to work upon him for the ends of peace by moral influence and not by compulsion. In this way we learn, to our great delight, from the mouth of the British Premier, that at bottom no engagement has been concluded between the two countries, but that both of them remain in the same position as before and keep an entire liberty of action, a fact which cannot be considered otherwise than as altogether satisfactory. Every international transaction having in view the interests of both parties thereto, and voluntarily concluded without any compulsion, must be reciprocal: and it is only thus that it acquires the importance of an international engagement having the force of law, no matter what the conditions may be, up to the moment at which it is denounced. If England declares through her Prime Minister that she has bound herself to nothing as respects Russia, it is plain that Russia on her side has undertaken no formal engagement, and that the diplomatic correspondence interchanged between the countries bears the character of a simple exchange of friendly ideas. So far as we understand the explanation of Mr. Gladstone, the ‘ negative engagement ’ as he calls it, undertaken by Russia, is nothing more than a frank and candid statement of her views, and which is all the more valuable in that it harmonises with the true and actual state of affairs. With regard to what the future may bring forth Russia reserves, as a matter of course, the same liberty of action as England has reserved to herself.

“ The same opinion on the issue of the negotiations is to be derived from an examination of the diplomatic correspondence.

“ At first, as is well known, Lord Clarendon started the idea of setting up a neutral barrier between the Russian possessions and India, a barrier which would be strictly respected by both powers. This proposition, whether expedient or not, had at least the bearing of a mutual engagement, and although all artificial combinations of this kind resting on no foundation are fraught with dangers, Russia having no designs upon Afghanistan would have accepted it without demur. We, for our part, pointed out from the beginning of the negotiation all the chief disadvantages of this project, and fortunately for England herself, thanks to the warnings of Lord Mayo, Viceroy of India, account was soon taken of those disadvantages, and the question of the neutrality of Afghanistan gradually disappeared from the correspondence. As matters stand it may be taken for certain that this plan is condemned by all the English.

“ Nevertheless the discussions on the subject of the frontiers of Afghanistan have continued, and when the question of neutrality had been shelved, its place was taken by a new combination. It will be readily understood that England was anxious to secure the acknowledgment of exclusive rights over Afghanistan, which would cause that country to be regarded as a continuation of her possessions. Russia appeared willing enough to subscribe to this combination. The engagement to respect the frontier of Afghanistan, as though it were the frontier of England herself, would also have been perfectly intelligible, but it would have had the result of rendering England directly responsible for the conduct of the Afghan Ameer as Prince Gortchakoff caused it to be very clearly understood in his last despatch. He wrote that Russia all the more willingly adopts the frontier proposed by Great Britain, seeing that ‘ l’Angleterre de son côté s’engage à user de toute son influence auprès Shir Ali, afin de l’amener à conserver une attitude pacifique.’

“ But England herself has declined to accept the transactions. She does not desire the neutralisation of Afghanistan, maintaining her liberty of action, but her ‘ politicians ’ perceived that it would be impossible to answer formally for so turbulent a nation as the Afghans

and for their feeble leaders, who are often overturned by tumults, unless England were really to take the country under her guidance. The practical annexation to India of the neighbouring provinces, although England desires to maintain and strengthen her influence in them (which seems to us in no way open to blame), appears inexpedient, as Mr. Grant Duff confesses, because such a measure would be destructive to Indian finances.

"Thus the logic of facts has forced the English to regard as the most expedient course for themselves, that they should maintain in Central Asian matters, in preference to every kind of artificial combination, the same relations with Russia which existed heretofore. Immediately after the publication of the diplomatic correspondence the *Times* already foresaw that the engagement undertaken by England to prevent the Ameer from displaying the slightest hostility in action would be a source of great difficulties to her, and we then remarked that the difficulties in which the English might be involved could not interest us so much as the question what effectual guarantee would be secured by Russia in return for a certain restriction placed upon her liberty of action. Now, however, the English Government declares on its part that there is no guarantee: it is therefore plain that as respects Russia all restriction is thereby removed. The two powers regain their liberty of action; this is the best result which could ensue in the interests of either of the two powers, and we cannot refrain from congratulating ourselves that we have been able so happily to escape from a false position, which owed its birth to useless and ill-defined engagements."

[*Secret, May 1874, No. 68.*]

27. Steps taken by the English Government to correct the false impression that Mr. Gladstone had repudiated any engagement on the part of England in respect to the conduct of the Ameer of Afghanistan.—This article, as Lord Loftus remarked, savoured of official inspiration: not only so but Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg found to his surprise that the language and opinions of the *Moscow Gazette* were supported and fully approved by two of the immediate Councillors of the Chancellor in the Foreign Department, whose language had proved to him a connexion of opinions between the newspaper article and the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs in respect to the position of Russia under the recent understanding with Great Britain.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 174.*]

It was therefore high time that the matter should be noticed. Accordingly, on the 7th May 1873, the English Foreign Office addressed the following despatch to the Ambassador at St. Petersburg:—

"Endeavours would seem to be made in some quarters in Russia to make light of the recent agreement between the British and Imperial Governments respecting the boundary of Afghanistan, and in furtherance of this policy to place an erroneous construction on what Mr. Gladstone said in the House of Commons on the 22nd ultimo in the debate on the Central Asia question, alleging that he had declared that England had entered into no engagement towards Russia, and that Russia had consequently entered into no engagement towards England, and that as the British Government declared that no engagement existed on their part, it was evident that no restraint has been imposed on Russia, and that both parties were free to act as they might think fit.

"Mr. Gladstone, however, by no means repudiated the existence of any engagement between the two countries; but, on the contrary, maintained it while defining its character. Though controverting the interpretation which in some quarters it had been attempted to give to the nature of the engagement entered into on the part of Her Majesty's Government, and denying that it implied a guarantee for the future conduct of the Ameer of Afghanistan, Mr. Gladstone said that what England had undertaken to do was to impress on the Ameer, in the strongest terms, his obligation, in consideration of the recognition by Russia of the boundaries of his territory, himself to refrain from any aggression, and had further undertaken to continue to exercise her influence over the Ameer in this direction. The engagement, Mr. Gladstone said, referred solely to the moral influence necessarily possessed in the East by England and by Russia, the latter declaring that the Russian Emperor looked on Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which Russia could be called upon to exercise her influence, and England engaging to exercise her influence there for pacific purposes. Your Excellency will be careful, therefore, on all suitable occasions, to disabuse those who may seek to make light of this engagement of the false impression which they have received, and more especially you will point out that there was nothing in Mr. Gladstone's language on the occasion in question to justify that impression.

[*Secret, May 1874, No. 68.*]

28. Prince Gortchakoff assures the Ambassador at St. Petersburg that no change had taken place in the understanding, and admits that England's engagement merely implied moral influence.—On the 14th May 1873 an interesting conversation took place between Prince Gortchakoff and Her Majesty's Ambassador, the subject being the article in the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* and Lord Granville's despatch of the 7th May, copy of which had been sent to the Chancellor. The Prince began by repudiating the alleged official character of the article, and spoke about the liberty of the Press, to which Lord Loftus replied that he would not have deemed it necessary to notice the article had not M. de Stremoukoff and Baron Jomini, two of the most eminent of the Prince's Councillors in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stated that they heartily concurred in and approved of the interpretations given of Mr. Gladstone's speech by the article in question. Prince Gortchakoff then observed that the *Messenger Officiel* was the recognised organ of the Imperial Government, but that he did not consider it necessary on the present occasion to have recourse to it for correction of the false impressions which the article in the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* had conveyed; Baron Jomini and M. de Stremoukoff had their own personal opinion, and might have expressed them without their bearing an official importance. The Chancellor, however, charged Lord Loftus to inform Her Majesty's Government that

"nothing was changed as regards the disposition of the Imperial Government, or the engagements taken by them in the late negotiations between the two Governments; and he admitted that the engagements taken by Her Majesty's Government merely implied the exercise of a moral influence on the Ameer of Afghanistan."

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 174.*]

29. Debate in the House of Lords on the responsibilities of England in respect to Afghanistan.—In order still further to illustrate the position which England now occupies in respect to Afghanistan, it will be convenient here to give an account of the debate which took place in the House of Lords on the 8th May 1874, the subject of the debate being the responsibilities and duties of England in this matter. The question was raised by Lord Napier and Ettrick, who enquired whether Her Majesty's Government fully adopted the conclusions stated in Lord Granville's despatch of October 17th, 1872 (*supra* pages 1 and 2), and after giving a brief sketch of the negotiations, stated broadly that we had pledged ourselves to defend Afghanistan because we had fixed its boundaries.

"He supposed it would not be contended that in fixing those boundaries we merely fixed a geographical fact. This might have been done by a Committee of the Geographical Society. The fixing of those boundaries was intended to be a political fact, and to have political consequences. Because it was a political fact, we told the Ameer that he might defend the boundaries. Could it ever have been intended that our Government could tell a semi-dependent and semi-barbarous power that it might defend boundaries which we had fixed without by implication conveying to it that we would assist in the defence of those boundaries? We were bound to defend them not only by our engagements, but also by motives of general policy in connection with the welfare of India. But if we were bound to defend the boundaries of Afghanistan, we were also bound to control the government of that State. The latter position seemed to him to follow from the former. We must see that the Government of Afghanistan conducted itself in such a manner that we should not be called upon frequently or lightly to enter on its defence. We had strengthened the Government of Afghanistan by our alliance, by subsidies, and by our arms, and he contended that our obligations to control and regulate the action of the Government of Afghanistan commenced with the first assistance that we gave to that Government. If Afghanistan should prove a restless and aggressive neighbour, she must be restrained by some one. If we did not restrain the action of Afghanistan, she must, in the last resort, be restrained by Russia. Surely it was better that we should exercise that duty than that Russian forces should enter the territory of Afghanistan. If Russian forces entered the territories of Afghanistan on one side, he thought it would be absolutely necessary that English forces should enter the territories of Afghanistan on the other, and in all probability some worse results would arise from the conflict of these forces than could arise from an independent action on the part of England."

* * * * *

Lord Napier and Ettrick thought that our relations with Afghanistan had been seriously affected by Mr. Gladstone's speech of April 22nd, 1872, (*supra* page 14).

"In that speech there was a distinct declaration on the part of the late Prime Minister that we were under no obligation whatever to employ material restraint in regulating the conduct of the Government of Afghanistan. He held the opinions of Mr. Gladstone in the highest respect on every subject except that of Afghanistan, and he could not refrain from expressing deep regret that a statement, so impolitic and unnecessary, had emanated from so distinguished an authority. It was some consolation, however, that the noble Earl who, at the time that speech was delivered, had charge of our foreign relations had never, so far as he was aware, given utterance to the same sentiments, and therefore, perhaps, they need not be regarded as those of the Foreign Office. We knew the impression such a speech made in Europe, but could little imagine the effect it would have throughout Asia. No doubt it had been done into Persian, probably with very doubtful accuracy. There was in all likelihood a Hindoo version, a Marathi version, a Tamil version. It might be assumed that in every Indian Durbar it had been debated, and that in every bazaar it had been a topic of common talk. And what impression could it have had on the Hindoo mind? Probably it had given rise to a feeling that the Government of England was inconsistent and did not abide by its resolutions, or that it had come to no conclusion at all on the subject of Afghanistan. Any reference to the policy of Russia was quite apart from his intention. He had no wish to infuse the slightest bitterness into the relations between this country and Russia. No one could be more deeply persuaded than he of the policy and necessity of maintaining as long as possible a cordial understanding with the Government of Russia. There was much in the character of the Russian nation which deserved our esteem, and it had a mission of civilisation in Asia which accorded with our own. But if harmony between the two Governments was to be maintained, it could only be by conduct that would give rise to mutual respect, and nothing was more important than that this country should make a clear and consistent declaration of its policy and be ready at all times to support it. He hoped Her Majesty's Government would be able to state that he had correctly interpreted the engagements this country had entered into. Should Government not yet have had sufficient time to devote to a consideration of the question, he trusted an assurance would be given that due attention would be bestowed upon it without delay, and that at no distant date a clear, intelligible, and consistent policy would be announced."

Lord Derby's reply is of great importance as containing the view of the present Cabinet. It is therefore given below *in extenso* as reported:—

"The Earl of Derby: My Lords, the question which the Noble Lord has addressed to me divides itself into two parts, and probably it will be for the convenience of Your Lordships if I deal with the two parts separately. The Noble Lord asks me, in the first instance, whether Her Majesty's present Government 'fully adopt the conclusions stated by Earl Granville in his despatch to Lord Augustus Loftus of October 17th, 1872, respecting the territories and boundaries of Afghanistan.' Now, that is a very simple inquiry, and it is one which I have no difficulty in answering. The despatch to which the Noble Lord refers, and of which he in part stated the purport, lays down the boundary of the territory which was regarded as belonging to the Ameer of Cabul, and proposes that the boundary so laid down should be recognised by the Russian Government. That boundary was—I will not say unfixed—but undoubtedly uncertain. Differences of opinion might fairly exist as to the lines which ought properly to be drawn. At any rate, they had not been determined by any international engagement. The Russian Government, after some correspondence on the subject—in which it is but just to say they manifested a very friendly spirit—acquiesced in the proposals made by the noble earl opposite (Lord Granville). The line of boundary submitted by us was accepted, and so far as Afghanistan is concerned, all danger of disputes upon questions of territorial sovereignty has thereby been avoided. Now my lords, I am bound to say that I see no reason for dissenting from the language of that despatch, or from the conclusions arrived at by the Noble Earl who preceded me in the management of foreign affairs. (Hear, hear.) In any case I should hold that an incoming Government is bound by an international engagement of that character. The inconvenience and complications that would arise would be extreme if, whenever a change of administration occurs, questions of this kind were to be considered as re-opened. It is only fair to add that, as far as I have formed a judgment on the matter, I think the settlement of the boundary question obtained by the Noble Earl opposite was as satisfactory as could be expected. I now come to the larger and much more difficult question to which the greater part of the Noble Lord's speech was directed. He asks me whether the Government are prepared to give their moral and material support to the Ameer of Afghanistan in case of any unprovoked aggression. Now I may observe that to every quarrel there must be two parties, and that every question has two sides. Whether, therefore, any given case of aggression is unprovoked or not is very likely to be a matter on which different opinions may be entertained. But passing from that point, I must guard myself from saying that I, accepting as I do the despatch of the Noble

Earl opposite, feel myself in any degree bound by the conclusions which the Noble Lord has drawn from that despatch. I do not think he was justified in raising so extensive a superstructure upon so small a foundation. The Noble Lord says that we have contracted three distinct obligations with the Ameer. He tells us that we have fixed the boundaries of his territory, and have pledged ourselves to defend it against all comers. Now that is to me a totally new theory in international obligations, and if the Noble Lord can point to any authority or precedent for the views he has advanced on this subject, I shall be very glad to hear it. Then the Noble Lord proceeded to quote some words of mine used last year, from which he drew certain inferences; but I think that if he will carefully consider those words and their context, he will find that I carefully guarded myself against expressing any definite opinion upon the subject until the papers with regard to it, which were not at the time before us, were laid on the table of the House. What I said on that occasion comes to no more than this—and I willingly now repeat it—that in the case of Oriental nations you ought always to watch with great care the engagements which you incur, and which are apt to pass into alliances which bring with them somewhat difficult obligations. I must say that if anything could to my mind furnish an additional reason for caution in those matters it would be the speech to which we have just listened. If we are bound, as the Noble Lord says, to defend the Ameer of Afghanistan against all comers, we are equally bound to tell him that he should not place himself in a wrong position, and eventually perhaps to undertake the obligation of regulating the affairs of the country. That involves a protectorate, and I venture to say such an agreement would be one into which it would be undesirable for this country to enter. It must be borne in mind that the people of a country themselves—whether in Asia or in Europe—ought to be permitted to have something to say on the regulation of their own destiny, and to establish English control over Afghanistan against the will of the people—and I do not think we can do it with their consent—would be to engage in an undertaking which would probably result in reducing Indian finance to a worse position than that which would be brought about by many successive famines. If in the event of the Ameer proposing to go to war with any neighbour beyond his own recognised frontier, it should be intended that we are bound to use our influence to prevent such a war, then in that limited theory of our obligations I should concur. That, however, falls very far within the obligations which the Noble Lord desires that we should undertake. He asks us what course we should be prepared to adopt under some hypothetical circumstances which do not at present arise, and he has put to me two distinct questions which it is very difficult for the Government to answer without causing inconvenience in one direction or another. (Hear, hear.) If I were to say to the Noble Lord, your questions are vague, and we really cannot tell you what we shall do under circumstances which do not exist, he would probably meet us with the reply, 'Well, that is a confession that, so far as the affairs of Afghanistan are concerned, you have no policy.' If, on the other hand, I were to inform the Noble Lord that I could make a good guess as to what it would be our duty to do, but that I did not think it would be desirable to state what that course was, he might turn round and say, 'Then it is clear Her Majesty's Government have a policy, but it is also evident that it is a policy which they dare not venture to announce to Parliament or the country.' If, again, I were to tell Your Lordships in plain words that I thought it very doubtful whether, under such circumstances as those supposed, the Ameer of Afghanistan would have any right to claim protection from us, the Noble Lord will see, and I am sure Your Lordships will see, that a statement of that kind would be a very plain and broad hint to the Ameer that he must not expect too much from the alliance of England, and that he had better look out for allies in other quarters. Now, I do not think that is an answer which it is desirable to give. If I am to accept the challenge of the Noble Lord, and to say that in any case the Ameer is entitled to claim from us not only moral but material support, then what I should be doing would be to give in a casual and informal manner, in answer to a question put to me from the other side of the House, a guarantee which the Government of this country have given only in rare cases and under circumstances—as in the case of Belgium—which imperatively called for it. I need not remind Your Lordships what and how great a responsibility is thus incurred. To give the guarantee of this country to an independent foreign nation is, so far as I can see, to take a step involving the gravest responsibility which can be incurred by an English Government. I hope, therefore, the Noble Lord will not think that I am disrespectful to him if I decline to involve the Government or the country in such a responsibility merely in order to gratify his quite natural and legitimate desire to ascertain the course which we may deem it to be our duty to take under circumstances which have not arisen, which may never arise, and which we are not in a position to foresee. Much will depend on the precise nature of the case, supposing it to arise, much will depend on the feeling of the Afghan population themselves, much must depend on the conduct of the Ameer both in relation to his own subjects and to other States. All that I can be justified in saying, and it has been repeatedly said by my predecessor in office, is that to maintain the integrity and territorial independence of Afghanistan in our judgment—and I am quite sure my noble friend behind me, who is responsible for the administration of Indian affairs, will concur in this expression of opinion—is, and ought to be, a most important object of English policy, and that any interference with the national independence of Afghanistan would be regarded by Her Majesty's Government as a very grave matter, requiring their most serious and careful consideration, and as

one which might involve considerable danger to the peace of India. I think if such an interference occurred, to put the matter mildly, it is highly probable that this country would interpose; but there is a very wide difference between admitting this probability and acknowledging the right of the Ruler of Afghanistan or any other person to claim from us, under circumstances and conditions which cannot be foreseen, material as well as moral support—not as a matter of policy or of expediency with reference to Indian or English interests, but as a matter of positive international obligation.”

30. Russian official maps issued after the close of the Afghan boundary negotiations omitted to shew the boundary as recognized beyond Khoja Saleh.—Before closing this chapter on the Afghan boundary correspondence, it may be worth while to notice the following points of geographical detail. Although the delimitation proposed by the British Government had been accepted in January 1873, the Russian maps of Central Asia, issued soon after from the Topographical Department of the War Office, marked off the frontier of the Afghan possessions from Khoja Saleh to the junction of the Kokcha River, but no further. This omission to recognize the recent decision was reported to Lord Granville in despatch from the Ambassador at St. Petersburg, No. 120, dated 31st March 1873, and Lord Loftus was thereupon instructed to invite Prince Gortchakoff's attention to the circumstance. The map was at the same time submitted to Sir H. Rawlinson who made the following remarks on that part of it which related to the Afghan frontier on the line of the Oxus:—

“The singular oversight committed by the Russian official geographers in limiting the Afghan frontier along the Oxus to the space between Khoja Saleh and the junction of the Kokcha, instead of prolonging that frontier along the river to its source in Lake Victoria according to the understanding arrived at in the recent negotiations between the Russian and English Governments, has been already animadverted on by Lord A. Loftus, our Minister at St. Petersburg; but His Excellency does not seem to have observed that the Russian cartographers do not as yet admit the correctness of our delineation of the upper course of the Oxus, but still cling to the fictitious geography of the so-called German Baron, removing Wakhan from its true position east of Badakshan to the southern border of Karategin, and placing a fabulous city of Bolor in the centre of Pamir, so that it would really be difficult on the map in question to show the exact contour of the frontier which has been recognized as the northern limit of the Afghan kingdom.

“It certainly would be very desirable that the Ameer of Cabul should send, or should permit us to send under the protection of his Government, a native surveyor, who should follow up the main stream of the Oxus from the embouchure of the Kokcha to Lake Victoria, thus determining the precise line of this eastern portion of the Afghan northern frontier, and deciding the several questions of political as well as geographical interest which are involved in fixing the true positions of Kelat, of Darwaz, of Roshan, and Shignan, and in identifying the various streams which descend from Pamir to form the Oxus.”

[*Secret, July 1873, Nos. 128-133.*]

31. M. de Stremoukoff explained that the deficiencies of the Russian maps in respect to the northern Afghan boundary were due to ignorance of the localities.—Lord Loftus instead of speaking to Prince Gortchakoff mentioned the subject to M. de Stremoukoff, Director of the Asiatic Department, to whom it was said that the Chancellor invariably referred all questions relating to the affairs of Central Asia. M. de Stremoukoff was at first unable to offer any explanation of the omission to colour the whole line of frontier agreed upon between the two Governments, but he said that it was probably attributable to ignorance of the localities, and soon afterwards he sent Lord Loftus a confidential note, of which the following is a translation:—

“I have thought it better to enter into direct relation with the superior authority, *i.e.*, with the Minister for War, on the subject of the map of Central Asia. I have ascertained that my suppositions were perfectly accurate, and that if the frontier of Badukshan and Wakhan has not been coloured, the reason is that in the absence of precise information it has been thought better to wait for a time and so to avoid inaccuracy. Since this excess of prudence, which I for my part entirely approve, seems, from what Your Excellency has said, to produce an unfavorable effect and to give rise to fresh ‘suspicions,’ the next edition of the map will show the line traced and coloured, though somewhat by guess work.”

Lord Loftus in reporting what had taken place to Her Majesty's Government failed not to comment upon the soreness and irritation which M. de Stremoukoff had displayed, seeming to regard the enquiry "as portraying a want of confidence in the loyalty of the Imperial Government." Her Majesty's Ambassador of course endeavoured to allay this feeling, but he also wrote to Lord Granville that he had thought it advisable not again to revert to the question by bringing it directly before Prince Gortchakoff, and that it would be very undesirable to cause useless irritation on a point of no intrinsic importance.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 174.*]

It has been ascertained from Colonel Walker, R.E., Superintendent of the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India, that the copper plates of the well known Russian map of Central Asia on the scale of $\frac{1}{4,200,000}$ which was originally brought out in 1863 were corrected in 1873 so as to show the recognised boundary line. Colonel Stubendorff, Director of the Russian Topographical Office, sent Colonel Walker a copy of the corrected map in December 1873, and informed him that the corrections in that quarter had been made from English sources and principally from Colonel Walker's map mentioned below.

32. Inaccurate map compiled in the English War Office in 1873. Explanation requested by Government of India and given by Her Majesty's Government.—In the course of the same year (1873) a map of Central Asia, purporting to have been compiled in the Topographical Department of the English War Office by E. G. Ravenstein, reached the Government of India through its Survey Department. This map differed materially from the official maps which had been sent to India with India Office despatch No. 52, dated 10th April 1873. Mr. Ravenstein's map carried the Afghan boundary north of the Oxus so as to include in Afghanistan the district of Shignan and a considerable strip of territory on the right bank of the river north of Wakhan: the boundary, moreover, stopped at some distance to the west of Sirikol or Victoria. These errors were pointed out by the Government of India: and it was suggested that if the map were based on wrong information, it should be authoritatively suppressed.

The War Office, however, explained that the map had been compiled for a special purpose from various sources, that it did not pretend to be accurate or to illustrate the understanding recently made with Russia: and that the map had only been issued to a few persons for official purposes, as a confidential map issued only when specially asked for and its supply approved.

[*Secret, May 1873, No. 136.*]

[*„ Sept. „ „ 32.*]

33. Colonel Walker's map of Central Asia.—The map of Central Asia and Turkestan published in the Office of the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India under the superintendence of Colonel Walker, R.E., gives the northern boundary of Afghanistan in accordance with the agreement between England and Russia. Colonel Walker in his memorandum dated 4th June 1873 describes the boundary as

“trending E.N.E. in a nearly straight line, from the point where the Heri-rud River crosses the parallel of 36° to Khoja Saleh on the River Oxus. It is carried thence up the course of the Oxus and its principal source—the Panja River—to Wood's Lake, Victoria, in conformity with the line of boundary which has been approved of by the British and the Russian Governments.”

CHAPTER II.

RUSSIA AND KHIVA.

34. Failure of the Khan's pacific overtures in 1872.—It will be seen from pages 217 to 225 of Mr. Wynne's *Précis* on affairs in Central Asia that during the year 1872 the Khan of Khiva, alarmed by the reconnoitring expeditions which approached his dominions both from Tashkend and Krasnovodsk, showed a disposition towards a peaceful adjustment of the differences with Russia. He had failed, however, to persuade the British Government of India to intervene on his behalf. The Governor-General had advised him to set at liberty, without delay and unconditionally, all Russian subjects who might still be in custody or under surveillance in his dominions, and to enter into friendly communications with the Russian Governor-General at Tashkend with a view to remove all causes of misunderstanding. This action of the Government of India had been acknowledged in terms of warm approval by the Russian Cabinet. On the other side the Khan's Ambassadors both to Tiflis and Orenburg were turned back by the Russian authorities, the Imperial Government having made known to the Khan that no negotiation would be entered into until he should have released the Russian prisoners in his hands and addressed a letter of apology to the Governor-General of Turkestan. The Khan was not yet sufficiently humbled to comply with such demands. Forty Russian captives remained unreleased at Khiva: and from the time that the Khan's Ambassadors were repulsed from the Russian frontiers it became evident that an appeal to arms was unavoidable.

35. Moderate views professed by Russian authorities in September 1872.—The Russian Government as yet displayed much moderation. So late as September 1872 M. de Westmann, in a conversation which, though professedly private, doubtless conveyed the official views at that time prevalent, assured Lord Loftus that the Government of the Emperor would be glad to avoid acts of coercion against Khiva and would continue a policy of patience and forbearance. He said "the Imperial Government felt all the difficulties and embarrassments of fresh conquests, and they still hoped that the Khan of Khiva would yield to prudent counsel and save them from the necessity of coercion." He denied that any expedition against the Khan had been prepared: merely reconnoitring detachments had been sent with the view of inspiring alarm: "all that the Imperial Government required from the Khan of Khiva was that commerce should not be endangered by the hostile tribes which infest the Khanate, and that Russian subjects should not be exposed to illegal seizure and imprisonment."

Not less re-assuring was M. de Westmann's despatch to Count Brunnow on the subject of this very conversation.

"I told him (Lord Loftus) that for the moment there was no question of an expedition, and still less were there such ideas of annexation as those attributed to us. The utmost contemplated was to send out a reconnoitring expedition from this side. As to the future it was impossible to foretell what turn might be given to our relations with a country which keeps subjects of Russia in captivity and is continually urging on the wandering tribes to deeds of enmity against us. Clearly such a state of affairs could not be endured indefinitely. We had declined all negotiation with Khiva until all Russian prisoners are given up. It still rested with the Khan to return to peaceful relations with us. But it could not be foretold whether the obstinate behaviour of the Khan of Khiva might not force us to take stern measures. I said further that we in no way wished this to happen: that in such a case it was the well determined intention of the Imperial Cabinet to limit its action to chastising the Khivans and forcing them to live in peace while avoiding annexation which could only be a source of embarrassment to us: but that there was the example of England in India to show how hard it was for a Government to lay down beforehand, in such countries, a programme, which might any day be upset by necessity arising from local circumstances."

[*Secret, December 1872, Nos. 328 and 347.*]

36. Views regarding Khiva expressed by Russian newspapers towards the end of 1872.—While the assurances of a responsible Statesman were thus moderate and even pacific, rumours of an approaching expedition continued to come in from every side. The Russian Press spoke out for the punishment of the Khivan despot and the acquisition of his territory, which, according to the Odessa newspapers, was indispensable to Russia to round off her Central Asian dominions.

The *Journal de St. Petersbourg* gave prominent place to articles from the *Times* in which it was said that the subjection of Khiva would give the Russians a vast increase of power in Central Asia, and that, whether the Khanate were annexed or not, they would thenceforth command all the country from the Caspian Sea and the Sea of Aral to the borders of Afghanistan and China: the Oxus penetrated into the heart of Central Asia and was navigable for 700 miles; when steamers should once be launched upon it, Russian trade and influence would be carried to Koondooz, and practically there would be nothing between the Russian and British Empires in Asia save the turbulent realm of Afghanistan.

"The capture of Khiva," wrote the *Exchange Gazette*, "is to us an historical necessity. Sooner or later we must occupy that Khanate, and not alone with the view of promoting our trade with Central Asia, but also in obedience to the dictates of our high historical mission which consists in the spreading of European civilization among the neighbouring people."

[*Secret, January 1873, Nos. 132 and 148.*]

37. Count Schouvaloff's mission to London in January 1873. Assurances given by him to Lord Granville on the subject of Khiva.—While the public mind was thus being prepared in Russia for the events which were shortly to happen, the Russian Government deemed it prudent to send to London Count Schouvaloff, a Statesman enjoying the full confidence of the Emperor, with the object of explaining personally the Central Asian policy of the Imperial Government. Count Schouvaloff's interview with Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs took place on the 8th January, and the conversation which ensued is reported in Lord Granville's despatch of the same date to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The assurances given by the Emperor in regard to the Afghan Northern Empire have been previously noted on page 11. On the subject of Khiva Count Schouvaloff made the following important statement:—

"With regard to the expedition to Khiva it was true that it was decided upon for next spring. To give an idea of its character it was sufficient to say that it would consist of four battalions and a half. Its object was to punish acts of brigandage, to recover fifty Russian prisoners, and to teach the Khan that such conduct (on his part) could not be continued with the impunity in which the moderation of Russia had led him to believe. Not only was it far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it, and directions given that the conditions imposed should be such as could not in any way lead to a prolonged occupancy of Khiva."

Lord Granville replied in general terms referring to the advice which Lord Northbrook had given to the Khan, and said that if the expedition were undertaken and carried out with the object and within the limits described by Count Schouvaloff, it would meet with no remonstrance from Her Majesty's Government, but it would undoubtedly excite public attention and it made the settlement of the boundary of Afghanistan more important.

[*Secret, March 1873, No. 40.*]

It will appear from the sequel what interpretation was put by the Russian Chancellor upon Count Schouvaloff's assurances and how far those assurances were falsified by subsequent events. Count Schouvaloff himself at any rate entertained no doubt as to the nature of the communications with which he had been charged. On the 22nd January 1873 he called upon Her Majesty's Ambassador at St Petersburg and expressed his gratification with his reception in England. He had been impressed with the deep interest evinced in England in all matters concerning the Indian Empire, and in his reports to the Emperor had compared the circumstance to the national feeling in Russia when any question arose affecting Poland. He stated that he had been charged to give Lord Granville

"the most positive and categorical assurances from the Emperor of Russia that there was no intention to incorporate Khiva, nor to extend the Russian possessions in Central Asia. It had never been the wish of the Emperor or of the Imperial Government to do so, but unpremeditated annexation under exigencies and events which could not be controlled had nevertheless taken place, and the Emperor and the Imperial Government were determined not again to be so entrapped. (His Excellency's expression was 'Que l'Empereur ne se laisserait pas prendre une seconde fois dans cette souricière.')

[*Secret, March 1873, No. 75.*]

38. Reverse sustained by Colonel Markosoff's Expedition in the autumn of 1872. Khivan campaign.—In the meantime preparations were being actively made for the approaching expedition. M. de Westmann indeed, as late as the 11th December 1872, assured Lord A. Loftus that no military action had been taken against Khiva beyond a mere reconnoitre: but there was reason to believe that the reverse sustained by this very reconnoitring party had precipitated the movement of the Russian Forces.

[*Secret, March 1873, No. 66.*]

Whatever the immediate cause, there was no longer any attempt to conceal the fact that a campaign against Khiva was imminent. The Khan of Khiva himself had no doubts on the subject. He was not afraid of his capital being reached by the road through Kungrad, but he felt anxious and apprehensive with regard to the routes by the desert where dwelt the Yamoot Turkomans, some of whom, such as Ata Moorad Khan and his friends, had allied themselves with the Russians.

[*Secret, April 1873, No. 75.*]

39. Probability or otherwise of a general Mahomedan rising in Central Asia against the Russian invaders.—On one important point opinions differed, namely, whether, as commonly reported, there was any chance of a general Mahomedan rising against the invaders. The following extract may possess interest as showing why the Russian authorities made their minds easy on this score. The first is a translation from an article in the *Neva* of 16th-23rd December 1872:—

"Very exaggerated reports have been spread abroad regarding the strength of Mussulman fanaticism in Central Asia.

"The indolent and lazy character of the natives is little prone to excitement. Those who are well acquainted with the country are convinced that personal advantage will carry the day in the minds of the people over religious hatred for Europeans. Strict observance of Mahomedan rites in the regions of Central Asia has ever been enjoined by Governments and the priesthood, whose power is founded on religion and who support through its means the most arbitrary despotism in all matters relating to the persons and goods of their subjects.

"In places where in consequence of extraneous influences the authority of the Begs and the importance of the clergy are almost nil, the Mahomedans are far from keeping the articles of the Shariat. This religious relaxation is specially to be seen in the countries which were until a short time ago subject to the influence of China. At Kooldja for instance Mahomedan women do not cover their faces; it is the same at Kashgar and Yarkund notwithstanding the severity of YakooB Beg's repressive measures. After making ourselves masters of a tract in Central Asia we avoid as far as possible wounding the religious beliefs of the natives and this system of tolerance is the best weapon we possess against the fanaticism of our Mahomedan subjects. Full half the inhabitants of Central Asia are always engaged in tillage and trade; wanting in warlike spirit they require above all things peace and liberty to betake themselves to trade. The Russians not only refrain from meddling with what relates to religion, but moreover pay deference to their customs, leaving to them in this respect complete liberty of action. They even borrow from them whatever may be found useful and practical in these usages, and this mode of action alone is calculated to secure the development of our influence in Central Asia. The Begs and Ulemas must acknowledge this. The influence of the Mahomedan clergy in the territories conquered by us has already been considerably lessened, and the authorities, both civil and ecclesiastical, foresee the time when the greater part of their subjects, jealous of the new and vigorous *regime* in the neighbouring States which are under our rule, will no longer submit to their despotic and unbridled power."

Lord Loftus' account of what he was told by Baron Kaulbars and General Kauffmann is to the same effect:—

"Baron Kaulbars observes, and his language has been confirmed to me in conversation with General Kauffmann, that the Russian Government in Turkestan strictly abstains from any interference with the religious rites of the population. So cautious is General Kauffmann in this respect as he informed me, that he invariably consults the Mussulman clergy before promulgating any new law or regulation as to its bearing on the religious scruples of the people. In all respects the greatest regard and deference is paid to the religious feelings and habits of the Mussulman population.

"I enquired of General Kauffmann whether he anticipated any danger from the threat (reported by the Press) of the Khan of Khiva to make a general appeal for assistance against Russia to the Mussulman populations of Asia.

"General Kauffmann replied that he did not believe in this rumour, but that, under any circumstances, he felt quite assured against any general rising, and was persuaded that any such appeal of the Khan of Khiva would find no echo in Bokhara and Kokhan."

[*Secret, March 1873, Nos. 81-82.*]

40. The Russian Conservative Press urges annexation of the lower Oxus, February 1873.—In February 1873 Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg drew attention to a powerful article in the *Russki Mir*, the representative of conservative views in Russia, and said to be particularly well informed on military matters. The writer after justifying the expedition recommended the adoption of a steady and consistent policy. He argued that after the capture of Khiva, or the defeat of the Khivan army of occupation, a contribution should be imposed upon the Khan in order to cover the expense of the expedition, and a treaty made with him ceding to Russia the lower course of the Oxus. Kungrad should be occupied by Russian troops, or a new and strong fortification built at the mouth of the Oxus, with a port for a flotilla which should have the right, under treaty, to ascend the river. A portion of the flotilla then on the Syr Daria should be removed to the Oxus, where it would be of greater use than on the Jaxartes. The article concluded by recommending the annexation of a certain amount of territory on the lower course of the Oxus, in order that "Russia may secure a strong footing at the mouth of that river, establish steam navigation upon it, and thus keep the Khan of Khiva in proper subjection, while the trade of Central Asia would receive a fresh impetus by being attached towards new channels."

"The arguments of the writer," said Lord Loftus, "appear to be very sound from a Russian point of view, and it is certainly to be expected that after the capture of Khiva measures will

be adopted by the Governor-General of Turkestan to prevent the recurrence of hostility on the part of the Khivans by firmly establishing the dominion of Russia on the lower course of the Oxus.

"It appears to me desirable, in view of the contingency referred to in the Russian newspaper, that the assurance given to Her Majesty's Government by Russia of not extending her territory and of withdrawing from Khiva, should be equally applicable to the territory forming the mouth of the Oxus, as well as to the southern portions of Khiva bordering on the now independent Khanate of Merv, which is strategically the advanced post towards Herat."

[*Secret, May 1873, No. 87.*]

41. Count Schouvaloff's assurances as viewed by the Government of India.—An opportunity soon presented itself not so much for ascertaining whether the Russian Government would be prepared to give a wider scope to their promises, as for testing the worth of the promises already given. The Government of India in despatch No. 33, dated 28th March 1873, which dealt chiefly with the question of the Afghan boundary, expressed the satisfaction with which the Governor-General in Council had learnt that Count Schouvaloff had given Her Majesty's Government the "most decided and positive assurances" quoted previously on page 38. Alluding to despatch* No. 28, dated 26th May 1871,

* *Vide* pages 207-209 of Mr. Wynne's Précis.

"we accept" it was said "the renewed assurances given by Count Schouvaloff as evidence that the policy of the Russian Government has undergone no change, and that the Government of His Imperial Majesty will approve of no course of action calculated to revive the uneasiness in regard to Central Asian Affairs which the frank and amicable discussions of the last three years have done so much to allay."

[*Secret, March 1873, No. 290.*]

42. Visible tendency among the Russian Ministers to draw back from Count Schouvaloff's engagement.—When however the substance of the Indian despatch came to be communicated to the Russian Chancellor, it appeared that Count Schouvaloff's "assurances" were not so valuable as had been supposed. Lord A. Loftus had already hinted to Her Majesty's Government as to what might be expected. In his despatch No. 182, dated 10th May, he noted how strongly the denunciations in the Press against the idea of giving up Khiva had worked upon the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. To such a feeling he attributed the attempt made by the *Moscow Gazette*† to use Mr. Gladstone's speech upon the Afghan Frontier as proving that Russia was not bound down by her engagements with England. This was said to be the object at which M. de Stremoukoff aimed.

† *Supra*, pages 29-30.

"He is preparing as it were beforehand a mode of extricating the Imperial Government from their engagement not to occupy Khiva, and in order to do so it is attempted to cast on England the responsibility of withdrawing from her engagement, with a view to cover a breach of faith by Russia."

Count Schouvaloff on the other hand on the subject of the same article in the *Moscow Gazette* again gave the Ambassador

"the most positive assurance that the promises which the Emperor had charged him to give to Your Lordship with reference to Khiva would be strictly fulfilled notwithstanding any attempt that might be made to overrule them. He seemed to be quite aware of the opposite current which had set in, and said that no further articles of the nature of that of the *Moscow Gazette* would appear."

43. Conversation between Lord A. Loftus and Prince Gortchakoff about Count Schouvaloff's engagement. The Chancellor thought the Envoy had gone too far, but said the Imperial Government would abide by their assurances.—The conversation between Lord Loftus and Prince Gortchakoff as reported in the despatch from the former, No. 195, dated 14th May, was as follows:—

"With regard to the question of Khiva, and the reference to it in the despatch from the Government of India, His Highness observed that too much stress had been laid on the nature of

the communications made to England by Russia. Before Count Schouvaloff left for England he had told him that the question of Khiva was one on which the Imperial Government could not treat with a Foreign Power, but that in conversation with Your Lordship and as a matter of friendly intercourse he was authorized to state the intentions of the Imperial Government. He thought that Count Schouvaloff had gone perhaps further than he was authorized by engaging the Imperial Government. The communications of Count Schouvaloff had consequently been interpreted into an engagement of a binding nature taken by Russia towards England, and this interpretation had worked on the Russian Press, and had produced a very unfavorable impression. 'Nevertheless' said His Highness 'this will not influence our intentions, and the Imperial Government will adhere to their assurances.'

"I observed to His Highness that the assurances given to Her Majesty's Government had been wholly voluntary on the part of the Imperial Government. They had been of a formal and decided character, in proof of which I recalled to His Highness the interview at which he had stated to me that his last word to General Kauffmann, on taking leave of him, was, by the Emperor's order, 'to burn rather than to occupy it permanently.'

"His Excellency confirmed this, and stated that such were the intentions of the Imperial Government. Having suggested to His Highness that he should charge Count Brunnow to communicate to Your Lordship the opinions he had expressed, he replied that it was not advisable to repeat assurances which had once been given as it tended to weaken their effect, but he again charged me to say that nothing was changed as to the engagements taken by the Imperial Government in the understanding with Her Majesty's Government on the affairs of Central Asia."

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 174.*]

44. Prince Gortchakoff converts the assurances given by Count Schouvaloff into intentions of the Emperor. Conversation with Lord A. Loftus, May 1873.—The despatch which communicated the above conversation was read to the Chancellor by Her Majesty's Ambassador. This course was the more necessary, as Prince Gortchakoff had declined to state his views to Her Majesty's Government through the Ambassador in London. Accordingly on the 21st May 1873 an interview took place, and the comments which Prince Gortchakoff made upon the language of Lord Loftus' letter to Lord Granville justified the belief that the Russian Chancellor was endeavoring to convert the formal assurances of Count Schouvaloff regarding Khiva into mere intentions of the Emperor, which intentions might be altered by circumstances. Those comments were as follows:—

"His Highness then stated that there were two points in my despatch which he wished to rectify. In the first place, His Highness observed that it had never been his intention to disavow Count Schouvaloff; on the contrary he had nothing to object to the language which he had held to Your Lordship. On leaving for London, Prince Gortchakoff had instructed him to communicate to Your Lordship, confidentially, and as an act of friendly intercourse, the intentions of the Imperial Government in regard to Khiva, but His Highness could not admit that these communications of Count Schouvaloff bore the character of an engagement on the part of Russia to England. His Highness stated that he had never admitted any intervention on the part of England in regard to the affairs of Khiva, nor had he ever had any cause to complain of such intervention. His Highness rendered full justice to my abstention from any reference to Khiva in my official communication with the Imperial Government, and admitted that I had never addressed to him any question in regard to the affairs of Khiva.

"His Highness then referred to the terms 'assurance' and 'engagements' used in my despatch respecting Khiva. He could not accept the terms of 'assurances' and 'engagements' in their application to Khiva, as the Imperial Government had merely conveyed their 'intentions' to Your Lordship.

"His Highness then confirmed the intentions of the Emperor which, His Highness explicitly stated, had undergone no change."

"Assurances" and "engagements" had thus been superseded by "intentions": and "intentions" were not immutable as experience had shown in the case of Samarcand which had been annexed to Russia, although formal promises were given regarding the intentions of the Imperial Government to restore it to the Ameer of Bokhara.

[*Secret, August 1873, Nos. 157, 170, 171.*]

45. Brief sketch of the Campaign of Khiva. Capture of the City on 10th June 1873.—Into the military details of the campaign

against Khiva this note does not profess to enter. The outlines of the expedition are well known. Khiva was approached by four columns. The first under General Verovkin took the same route as that followed by General Perovski in 1839-40. From Orenburg the column marched southwards to the Emba Fort, and thence by the western shore of the Sea of Aral. The distance travelled is said to be about 870 miles. The second column under Colonel (now General) Llamakin marched east from Kinderli Bay on the Caspian over 485 miles of unexplored and trackless steppe to meet the Orenburg column near the south-west corner of the Sea of Aral. The third column led by Colonel Markosoff set out from the Fort of Chikishlar near the mouth of the River Attrek, and had to accomplish a march of 550 miles in a north-easterly direction. The fourth column headed by General Kaufmann marched from Tashkend over 530 miles to reach the gates of Khiva. The force in the field is said to have numbered 14,000 men with 45 guns of various calibre, six mortars, five rocket batteries, and two mitrailleuses. No less than 19,200 camels were required as transport. The hardships met and surmounted by the hardy Russian soldiers need not be described. Colonel Markosoff's column alone failed to reach the appointed goal; and it was not until half of his men had become unfit for duty and scarcely any of his beasts of burden remained that this gallant officer gave up the attempt.

To Colonel Verovkin's column from Orenburg belongs the honor of capturing Khiva. On the morning of the 10th of June 1873, having left Orenburg at the end of February, they carried the north gate of the city, which was a strongly-fortified place, well mounted with guns, at first well served, with a loss of only 15 killed and wounded. Later on the same day the Khan sent an offer of surrender to General Kaufmann, who had crossed the Oxus, below Hezarasp, on the 3rd of June, and on the afternoon of that day the Russian army entered Khiva, with a total loss of 107 killed and wounded.

General Kaufmann's telegram announcing the occupation of Khiva by the troops under his command was despatched from Tchemkend on 28th June, and appeared in the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* of the 18th-30th June. The Khan of Khiva, it was said, allowing himself to be led away by the warlike party, had fled from the city and concealed himself among the Yomoot Turkomans.

47/1
46, Results following the capture of Khiva. The Russian Press urge rigorous measures.—The time had now arrived for testing the worth of Russian declaration whether called "assurances," "engagements," or "intentions." Would the Russian Ministers now prove by action that they were sincere in professing that an extension of territory was an extension of weakness? Or would the temptation be too great? The immediate results of the capture of Khiva were soon known. The Khan delivered himself up unconditionally to General Kauffmann on the 2nd-14th July 1873. He had previously issued a manifesto decreeing the liberation of all slaves and the abolition of slavery in his territories. As yet the rumours of General Kauffmann's intentions were confined to statements that he would exact two millions of roubles as a war indemnity, and continue in occupation of the Khan's territory until that sum should be paid.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 106.*]

Early in August 1873, however, Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg sounded a warning note. In his despatch No. 310 he wrote to Lord Granville that the Russian journals continued to urge upon the Imperial Government the expediency of retaining such portions of the dominions of the Khan of Khiva as would best secure Russia against further depredations on the part of the Turkomans. The great object of the writers appeared to be to secure for Russia the complete possession of the Oxus, and they had noticed with satisfaction a report that the Grand Duke Nicholas Constantinevitch intended in the following summer to explore the Oxus to its very source. There could be no doubt that whatever the terms imposed on the Khan might be they would be

such as to cripple his resources and to secure for Russia points on the Oxus from which she might keep the Turkomans in check and promote the development of commerce.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 109.*]

On the 28th October 1873 Lord A. Loftus again wrote to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs foreshadowing the arrangements which were soon afterwards to be disclosed :—

“Two of the leading Journals published in this city have announced, on the authority of the *Turkestan Gazette*, that, ‘with the permission of the Emperor,’ the right bank of the Amu Daria and the delta of that river from the Caspian* to the most westerly branch of the Oxus have been annexed to the Russian Empire.

“I have obtained no official confirmation of this intelligence, but the *St. Petersburg Gazette* considers that the annexation in question is a natural result of the recent expedition to Khiva, and a happy realization of the hopes to which the expedition had given rise. The *Russki Mir* is likewise of opinion that the news communicated by the *Turkestan Gazette* is perfectly correct, and it professes to have had no faith in the possibility of making a treaty of peace with the Khan of Khiva, to whom Russia is in a position to dictate such terms as are most conducive to her interests.

“If, therefore, the statements of the *Turkestan Gazette* be admitted to be authentic and to be derived from an official source, it would appear that the Khanate of Khiva has become tributary to Russia until a war indemnity of about £300,000 shall have been paid off, and that, meanwhile, the lower course of the Oxus will be held by Russian troops, and a Russian town and naval station be built on the right bank of that river, at a distance of 60 miles from Khiva and about 133 miles from Bokhara.”

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 115.*]

48. Disclosure of the Khivan Treaty in November 1873.—

But there was no longer any question whether the Russians intended to abide by their professions of a non-annexation policy. Already on the 22nd November 1873 Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg had forwarded to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the following important document, being no less than a translation of the Treaty of Peace concluded between General Kaufmann and the Khan of Khiva. The Treaty had been published by the official organ of the Imperial Government at Tashkend; and the translation was as follows :—

Translation of the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Khiva proposed by GENERAL AIDE-DE-CAMP VON KAUFMANN, Commanding the troops operating against Khiva, and accepted by the Khan of Khiva, SYUD MAHOMED RAHIM BAHADOOR KHAN.

“In pursuance of the will of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias General Aide-de-Camp Von Kaufmann I., Governor-General of Turkestan, and Commander of the troops operating in the Khanate of Khiva, entered the town of Khiva on the 29th day of May of the present year and took possession of the entire Khanate. The annexation of the new conquered country to the Empire of Russia not having formed part of the plan of action laid down by His Imperial Majesty, the Governor-General of Turkestan invited Syud Mahomed Rahim Bahadoor Khan, the lawful Ruler of the Khanate, who had withdrawn to the Turkomans, to return to the capital, in order to receive from him his lost power and his former rights. In consequence of this invitation Syud Mahomed Rahim Bahadoor Khan came to the camp of the Russian troops stationed under the walls of Khiva and expressed his complete and sincere readiness to comply with all the demands, and to accept any conditions that the Commander of the forces might propose to him. On the basis of this declaration, General Aide-de-Camp Von Kaufmann I. proclaimed Syud Mahomed Rahim Bahadoor Khan Ruler of the Khanate of Khiva, and gave him detailed directions for his guidance in the government of the country during its occupation by the Russian forces.

* Aral (?) sic in original.

“Tranquillity was in this manner established in the Khanate. The new condition of affairs was at once submitted to by all the subjects of Syud Mahomed Rahim Bahadour Khan, with the exception of a majority of the Turkoman tribes; but, although the latter testified their submission by sending elders and deputies to the Commander of the forces, yet they did not practically recognise the authority of the Khan, and did not comply with the demands of the Commander of the Russian forces. They have been punished and put down by the force of Russian arms.

“The loss of a considerable part of their property, their great loss in lives, and particularly the moral defeat which they have suffered, have firmly established the power of the Khan over those tribes, and have assured the tranquillity of the entire country for the future.

“Before withdrawing the Russian troops from Khiva, General Aide-de-Camp Von Kaufmann I., Governor-General of Turkestan, Commander of the forces, has, by agreement with His High Dignity Syud Mahomed Rahim Bahadour Khan, laid down the following Articles, and, by confirming and accepting the same, His High Dignity the Khan of Khiva concludes a Treaty of Peace and Amity with Russia, and enjoys the high protection of His Imperial Majesty :—

ARTICLE I.

“Syud Mahomed Rahim Bahadour Khan acknowledges himself to be the humble servant of the Emperor of All the Russias. He renounces the right of maintaining any direct and friendly relations with neighbouring Rulers and Khans, and of concluding with them commercial and other treaties of any kind soever, and shall not, without the knowledge and permission of the superior Russian authority in Central Asia, undertake any military operation against them.

ARTICLE II.

“The boundary between the Russian and Khivan territories shall be the Amu Daria from Kukertli down the river as far as the point at which the most westerly branch of the Amu Daria leaves the main stream, and from that point the frontier shall pass along such branch as far as its mouth in the Aral Sea. Farther, the frontier shall extend along the sea coast to Cape Urgu, and from thence along the base of the chink (escarpment) of the Ust-Urt, following the so-called ancient bed of the Amu Daria.

ARTICLE III.

“The whole of the right bank of the Amu Daria, and the lands adjoining thereunto, which have hitherto been considered as belonging to Khiva, shall pass over from the Khan into the possession of Russia, together with the people dwelling and camping thereon. Those parcels of land on the right bank which are at present the property of the Khan, and of which the usufruct has been given by him to Khivan Officers of State, become likewise the property of the Russian Government, free of all claims on the part of previous owners. The Khan may indemnify them by grants of land on the left bank.

ARTICLE IV.

“In the event of a portion of such right bank being transferred to the possession of the Emir of Bokhara by the will of His Majesty the Emperor, His Majesty the Khan of Khiva shall recognize the latter as the lawful possessor of such portion of his former dominions, and engages to renounce all intentions of re-establishing his authority therein.

ARTICLE V.

“Russian steamers and other Russian vessels, whether belonging to the Government or to private individuals, shall have the free and exclusive right of navigating the Amu Daria River. Khivan and Bokharian vessels may enjoy the same right not otherwise than by special permission from the superior Russian authority in Central Asia.

ARTICLE VI.

“Russians shall have the right to construct wharves (landing-places) on the left bank wherever the same shall be found necessary and convenient. The Government of the Khan

shall be responsible for the safety and security of such wharves. The confirmation of the selection of localities for wharves shall rest with the superior Russian authority in Central Asia.

ARTICLE VII.

“Independently of such wharves, Russians shall have the right to establish factories on the left bank of the Amu Daria for the purpose of storing and safe-keeping their merchandize. For the purposes of such factories the Government of the Khan shall allot in the localities which shall have been indicated by the superior Russian authority in Central Asia a sufficient quantity of unoccupied land for wharves, and for the construction of storehouses, of buildings for the accommodation of the servants of the factories, and of persons transacting business with the factories, and of merchants’ offices, as well as for the establishment of domestic farms. Such factories, together with all persons residing thereat, and with all goods stored therein, shall be under the immediate protection of Government of the Khan, which shall be responsible for the safety and security of the same.

ARTICLE VIII.

“All the towns and villages without exception within the Khanate of Khiva shall henceforward be open to Russian trade. Russian merchants and Russian caravans may freely travel throughout the entire Khanate and shall enjoy the special protection of the local authorities. The Government of the Khan shall be responsible for the safety of caravans and stores.

ARTICLE IX.

“Russian merchants trading in the Khanate shall be free from the payment of customs duties (“ziakut”) and of all dues on trade, in the same manner as the merchants of Khiva have long enjoyed immunity from “ziakut” on the route through Kazalinsk, at Orenburg, and at the stations (landing-places) on the Caspian Sea.

ARTICLE X.

“Russian merchants shall have the right of carrying their goods through the Khivan territory to all neighbouring countries free of customs duties (free transit trade.)

ARTICLE XI.

“Russian merchants shall, if they desire it, have the right to establish agents (caravan-bashis) in Khiva and in other towns within the Khanate for the purpose of maintaining communication with the authorities and superintending the regularity of their trade.”

ARTICLE XII.

“Russian subjects shall have the right to hold immovable property in Khiva. A land-tax shall be leviable on the same by agreement with the superior Russian authority in Central Asia.

ARTICLE XIII.

“Commercial engagements between Russian and Khivans shall be fulfilled inviolably on both sides.

ARTICLE XIV.

“The Government of the Khan engages to examine without delay the complaints and claims of Russian subjects against Khivans, and in case such complaints and claims shall prove to be well founded to give immediate satisfaction in respect to the same. In the examination of disputes (claims) between Russian subjects and Khivans, preference shall be given to Russians in respect to the payment of debts by Khivans.

ARTICLE XV.

“Complaints and claims of Khivans against Russian subjects shall be referred to the nearest Russian authorities for examination and satisfaction, even in the event of such complaints and claims being raised by Russian subjects within the confines of the Khanate.

ARTICLE XVI.

“The Government of the Khan shall in no case give refuge to emigrants (run-aways) from Russia, having no permit from Russian authorities, without regard to the nationality of such individuals. Should any Russian subjects, being criminals, seek concealment within the boundaries of Khiva, in order to avoid judicial pursuit, the Government of the Khan engages to capture such persons and to surrender them to the nearest Russian authorities.

ARTICLE XVII.

"The proclamation made by Syud Mahomed Rahim Bahadoor Khan on the 12th-24th day of July last, respecting the liberation of all slaves in the Khanate, and the abolition in perpetuity of slavery and of trade in men, shall remain in full force, and the Government of the Khan engages to employ all the means in its power in order to watch over the strict and conscientious prosecution of this matter.

ARTICLE XVIII.

"A fine is inflicted on the Khanate of Khiva to the extent of 2,200,000 roubles in order to cover the expenses incurred by the Russian Exchequer in the prosecution of the late war which was provoked by the Government of the Khan and by the Khivan people. Since, owing to the insufficiency of money in the country, and particularly in the hands of the Government, the Khivan Government is unable to pay the above sum within a short time, the Khivan Government shall, in consideration of this difficulty, have the right of paying the said fine by instalments, with the addition of interest thereon at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum on condition that, during the first two years, 1,00,000 roubles shall be annually paid into the Russian Exchequer, 1,25,000 roubles per annum during the two ensuing years, and after that 1,75,000 roubles per annum during the succeeding two years; and the year 1881, that is to say after the expiration of eight years, the sum of 2,00,000 roubles shall be paid; and lastly, a sum of not less than 2,00,000 roubles shall be paid until the final settlement of the claim. The instalments may be paid both in Russian bank notes and in the current coin of Khiva, at the pleasure of the Government of the Khan.

"The first instalment shall be paid on the 1st-13th December 1873. On account of this instalment the Khan shall have the right to levy taxes for the current year from the population on the right bank, according to the assessment hitherto in force; this collection shall be terminated by the 1st-13th December by agreement between the Khan's collectors and the local Russian authorities.

"Subsequent instalments shall be paid by the 1st-13th November of each year, until the entire fine, with the interest thereon, shall have been paid off.

"After the expiration of nineteen years, that is to say, by the 1st-13th November 1892, after the payment of 2,00,000 roubles for the year 1892, the sum of 70,054 roubles will still be due by the Government of the Khan, and, by the 1st-13th November 1893, the last instalment of 73,557 roubles shall be paid. Should the Government of the Khan desire to shorten the term of payment and thus to reduce the amount of accruing interest it shall have the right to pay larger annual instalments.

"These conditions have been fixed and accepted for exact execution and constant guidance on the one part by General Aid-de-Camp Von Kaufmann I., Governor-General of Turkestan, and on the other part by Syud Mahomed Rahim Bahadoor Khan, Ruler of Khiva, in the garden of Hendemian (the camp of the Russian troops at the city of Khiva) on the 12th-24th day of August 1873 on the 1st day of the month of Radjab in the year 1290.

"The original Treaty was signed and sealed by General Aide-de-Camp Von Kaufmann I., Governor-General of Turkestan, and by Syud Mahomed Rahim Bahadoor Khan."

49. Note of the principal points gained by Russia through the Treaty of Peace with Khiva. Remarks of the English Government thereupon.—By this Treaty, it will be observed, not only did the Russians annex the Khivan territory on the right bank of the Amu Daria and in the Delta of the river from the point where the most westerly branch leaves the main stream, but they acquired complete command of the river throughout the dominions of the Khan. As the Ambassador at St. Petersburg put the case in his despatch No. 416, dated 20th November 1873 "a considerable portion of the territory of Khiva including the Delta of the Oxus, and the whole of the lower course of that river to a point which Russia considers to be the limit of the possessions of Bokhara has been annexed and constituted into a new Russian district with the newly constituted fortress of Alexandro-Petrovsk as the seat of its military and civil administration." Thus had the dreams of the Russian Press become a reality: and Count Schouvaloff's "assurances" melted like snow before the ardent longing of Russian politicians to secure the navigation of the Oxus. The English Government, however, were not disposed to do more than to take note of the facts. After pointing out the accession of territory and other privileges gained by Russia, and mentioning the report that a Russian fort was in course of construction on the right bank of the Oxus near Shourakhan about 30 miles east of Khiva, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in his despatch dated 7th January 1874, proceeded to say

that Her Majesty's Government saw no practical advantage in examining too minutely how far these arrangements were in strict accordance with the assurances given to Lord Granville in January 1873 by Count Schouvaloff as to the intentions with which the expedition against Khiva was undertaken, since they were not disposed to share in the exaggerated apprehensions which had at times been expressed in England as to the danger to British rule in India which might arise from the extension of Russian influence in Central Asia. Lord Granville then stated the views of the English Government on the subject of threatened movements against the Turkomans, whose affairs will be noticed hereafter in a separate Chapter.

[*Secret, April 1874, Nos. 231 and 248.*]

51 & 52. Prince Gortschakoff attributes Russian proceedings in Khiva to regard for the Khan's protection.—Prince Gortschakoff's apology represented the Russian proceedings to have been dictated by a benevolent desire for the Khan's welfare. When Lord Granville's despatch No. 23, dated 7th January 1874, was communicated to the Russian Chancellor, he made no remark on that part of it which related specially to the issue of the Khivan campaign. But he stated to Her Majesty's Ambassador early in January 1874, that the Imperial Commissioner had strictly abstained from remaining in occupation of Khiva, although requested to do so by the Khan for his own protection; but that he had been obliged to occupy such a position as would enable him to maintain peace and order, which otherwise would have been impossible. The wish of the Imperial Government was to maintain the Khan in his sovereign position, and to do so they were obliged to grant him their protection. Had the Russian forces retired altogether, disorder would have recommenced, and, if they had been obliged to make a second expedition to Khiva, no other course but that of annexation would have remained.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 251.*]

53. Expedition against the Yomuds after the fall of Khiva.—

In the treaty of peace with Khiva mention is made of the punishment inflicted on the Turkoman tribes. This needs explanation, not only as a remarkable episode in the military operations of the Khivan Campaign, but because the attack upon the Yomuds is said to have been unprovoked, and to have either formed part of a scheme for the general subjugation of the Turkoman tribes, or to have sprung from less honorable motives. The following is the account given of General Kaufmann's proceedings by the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg in his despatch No. 359, dated 30th September 1873 :—

“General Kaufmann had acquired the conviction that the power of the Khan over these Turkoman tribes was merely nominal, and that to ensure the maintenance of future good relations with the Khivan Government, it was necessary to reduce them to submission, and to profit by the present occupation to do so.

“Accordingly, General Kaufmann decided to impose on the Turkoman tribes a war contribution, and to commence by imposing it on the tribe of Bairam Schalees, the most turbulent and most warlike of the Turkoman Yomuds.

“The contribution was fixed at 300,000 roubles (£40,000) and was leviable on the number of their tents, estimated at 30,000. Towards the end of June, General Kaufmann summoned the elders of the Yomuds to notify to them the contribution and the conditions of its payment.

“After delaying their arrival, they subsequently consented to the payment. Five of the elders were sent back to inform the several tribes and to raise the contribution. Twelve were detained by General Kaufmann as hostages to be liberated when the Yomuds had commenced their first payment.

“To superintend the collection of this contribution, General Kaufmann despatched a detachment of troops under General Golovatchow to Kazavat, the district where commence the first establishments of the Yomud Bairam Schalees.

“On his arrival there General Golovatchow learnt not only that no preparations were made for collecting the contribution, but that the Yomud tribe had decided to oppose armed resistance to the demands in question.”

The particulars of the struggle which ensued, the defeat of the Turkomans, and the barbarity of the Russians, will be found vividly depicted in the work of an eye-witness, MacGahan's "Campaigning on the Oxus." In the official accounts which formed the basis of Lord A. Loftus' despatch dated 30th September 1873, these proceedings were made out to be not only justifiable but beneficial. The defeat of the Yomuds, it was said, appeared to have created a great impression in the Khanate: the sedentary population felt relieved from the oppression they had hitherto suffered from their warlike neighbours: even the Khan of Khiva had sent a congratulatory letter to General Kaufmann: the severe chastisement of the Bairam Schalees was expected to ensure the pacification of the Khanate.

54. General Kaufmann's policy in attacking the Turkomans condemned by General Tchernaiëff and criticised by the Governor-General of Orenburg.—Very different, however, and far less favorable were the comments of those who were not bound to paint with rose-color every movement of the Russian Military Commanders. On the 19th December 1873 Mr. R. Michell wrote that he had received from an English traveller a confirmation of the report that General Kaufmann had purposely and wantonly attacked the Turkomans with a view to military operations in the future.

[*Secret, April 1874, Nos. 179 and 228.*]

Another view of the same events was given in Lord A. Loftus' despatch dated 17th November 1873. The Ambassador had learnt that on a recent occasion the Governor-General of Orenburg had stated his conviction that the severe punishment inflicted on the Turkomans by order of General Kaufmann after the capture of Khiva had not been immediately provoked by these nomads, but that, since the Turkomans had been purposely exasperated into hostile opposition to the Russian troops, an expedition against them in the following spring, and even the occupation of Merv, the oasis which they occupy during the summer months, had become inevitable.

"This view," wrote Lord Loftus, "of the action taken by General Kaufmann is, to a great extent, supported by a leading political and literary magazine published in the city, which, in reviewing the incidents of the campaign against Khiva, shows that General Kaufmann's object in attacking the Yomud Turkomans was to place on a different basis the relations that had hitherto existed between the Turkomans and the Khivan Government, in order to enable the latter to comply with any demands that might hereafter be made upon Khiva by Russia.

"With that object the Russian Commander-in-Chief ordered a contribution of 300,000 roubles to be levied on the most numerous and most powerful tribe of the Yomud Turkomans, the elders of which at once promised to comply with the requisitions, and accordingly despatched five elders of their body to acquaint the whole of the tribe with the demand that had been made upon them, and left twelve other elders as hostages in the Russian Camp.

"The writer of this article in the Magazine states that on the 7th-19th of July, without waiting for the result of the action thus taken by the Turkomans, a detachment under General Golovatchow was pushed forward to the town of Hazarat, where the settlement of the Bairam Schalee tribes of the Yomud Turkomans commenced.

"It consisted of eight companies of infantry, eight columns of Cossacks, 10 guns, and a rocket battery, inclusive also of two mitrailleuses.

"Having met only with small parties of Yomuds, who were apparently watching the movements of the detachments, General Golovatchow nevertheless commenced military operations on the 21st July by seizing a caravan and firing shell into some retreating Turkomans.

"It is therefore clear, says the writer of the article in question, that the payment of the contribution had from the first not been expected; military operations were commenced on the

fourth day after the elders had appeared before General Kaufmann in compliance with the summons. It is true that the Commander of the detachment had received information to the effect that, far from proceeding to collect the contributions, the Yomuds had risen, and were preparing to decamp and to resort to force of arms.

"It is not however known, continues the article, how far that information was well founded, as only three days had passed since the contribution had been demanded. Nevertheless whether or not the initiative of the expedition against the Yomud Turkomans had been taken in consequence of their conduct, and whether it is or not entirely attributable to the local authorities, no real significance can be attached to the circumstance."

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 231.*]

If the above account be correct, two points are plainly established—*1st*, that the movement against the Khivan Turkomans was in pursuance of a premeditated policy and was undertaken irrespectively of their past conduct; *2nd*, that the Turkomans were not given time to yield before they underwent the Russian attack.

55. Mr. Eugene Schuyler's account of the expedition against the Turkomans, and the causes which led to it.—A similar version of the story is given by Mr. Eugene Schuyler, Secretary of the United States Legation, who visited the Russian Province of Turkistan, and whose testimony, as an impartial observer, is entitled to weight.

His account of what occurred is as follows:—

"A contribution of some 2,200,000 roubles was laid upon the Khan; but, as his income amounted to 400,000 roubles a year, it was intimated that it would require at least 20 years to pay this. Khiva having been punished, the aim of the expedition was over, and the promise of the Emperor given to the English Government by Count Schouvaloff, that, after punishing the Khan, the Russian armies would retire, had to be carried out. A part of the contribution, however, had been laid on the Turkoman tribes, whom it was also desired to punish for the part they had taken in the war. It would perhaps have been wiser to have passed this in silence, for the Turkomans, in so far as the war was concerned, were nominally subjects of the Khan, and in his service had fought against the expedition of Orenburg, but after being beaten off, they were for a month on the most friendly terms possible, and the small detachments which were sent out for geological and surveying purposes passed nights and days in the Turkoman encampment with perfect safety. The opinion of the officers from Orenburg—who think very highly of the Turkomans—is that they would strictly have adhered to the peace which had been signed. It was, however, necessary to have some actions in which the Tashkend expedition could distinguish itself and receive its share of honors and rewards, the glory of the affair having been so far to the Orenburg and Caucasus expeditions alone. After imposing the contribution upon the Turkomans, General Kaufmann called to himself the elders of the nomad tribe, and informed them that they should pay within two weeks a part of this sum and time would be given for payment of the rest, and detained a portion of them as hostages until the first payment was made. Instead of waiting for the two weeks, he immediately sent out a detachment, commanded by General Golovatchow, to ascertain the probability of the payment. General Golovatchow immediately began to attack the Turkoman villages and encampments, burned the houses, destroyed the wagons of household stores, and spread devastation generally among them. The Turkomans were, of course, exceedingly angry at this, and complained to the detachment of Orenburg, which was then in its retreat, saying, that if they were not so friendly with General Kaufmann, now would be just the time to fall together upon General Golovatchow's expedition and utterly annihilate it. At last at Illyalli there was an attack of Turkomans upon General Golovatchow's camp, in which, after great disorder, the Russians were successful and the Turkomans retreated. After this the Yomuds abandoned their country, and marched off into the desert, being however thoroughly angry, and ready at the first opportunity to renew their attack, and indisposed to keep any peace that might be made. The attack on the Turkomans was, as General Kryzhanofsky, the Governor-General of Orenburg, informed us, quite uncalled for, and likely to lead to serious results. 'It will now be necessary,' he said, 'for us to have expeditions against the Turkomans for many years. It will be a second Caucasus, and in the end we shall find ourselves obliged to take Merv, which would undoubtedly lead to complications with England.'"

[*Secret, October 1874, No. 23.*]

56. The attack on Yomuds attributed to jealousy on the part of the Tashkend Division of the Khivan Force.—It will be observed that Mr. Eugene Schuyler assigned as one of the principal reasons for the savage treatment of the Yomuds the necessity that the Tashkend Force should have an opportunity of sharing in the glories of the campaign.

57. General Kaufmann's instructions to the Officer Commanding the expedition against the Yomuds.—Barbarity of those instructions.—The following is an extract giving the most important part of General Kaufmann's orders :—

No. 1167, dated Khiva, 6th July 1873.

TRANSLATION.

Field Staff of the Armies operating against Khiva.

To Officer Commanding, Turkistan Division.

"I summoned the leaders and influential people of the Yomuds for the final settlement of the Turkoman question.

"Of the twenty-five summoned, seventeen came to me to-day; their names are on the annexed list.

"I told them I should levy a contribution on all the Yomuds amounting to 300,000 roubles, a third of which (100,000) must be paid within ten days from the 7th July, and the remaining 200,000 roubles five days later, that is, on Sunday, July 22nd.

"The elders promised me to pay this money, and I therefore ordered them to choose five of their number to have charge of the collection and the payment of the tax.

"The names of the five men thus chosen appear on the annexed list.

"I retained the remaining twelve as hostages.

"Those appointed to collect the money asked me to appoint five more men from those retained as hostages to assist them, to which I replied that when the other six who had been summoned came to me, I would release the five asked for as assistants.

“The money was ordered to be paid to Your Excellency at Kazavat.

“In order closer to follow up the collection from the Yomuds, I ask Your Excellency to start on the 7th July with your division for Kazavat, and there take up a suitable position.

“If Your Excellency should perceive that the Yomuds do not busy themselves with the collection of the money, but assemble with a view to attacking our armies, or even to escaping, then I propose that you should immediately march against the Yomud villages situated along Kazavat canal and its branches, *and deliver these villages, their houses and families to full and complete ruin and destruction, and their property, flocks &c., to confiscation.*

“Your Excellency can alone determine on the spot what measures to take in order to carry out these orders.

“The only information I have respecting the Yomud villages on the Kazavat canal is derived from verbal enquiries; I can therefore at present merely give you a general idea of the plan of action of the ‘division of execution.’

“I think it would be best to send the troops as nearly as possible to the extremities of the canal on its left bank, close to the lakes into which the canal flows, near the desert.

“That portion of the troops which should be cavalry would move at the same time as the infantry would be advancing along the road from Kazavat to Zmakshira, and the Yomuds with their families and flocks would be surrounded.

“An important condition for this is that the cavalry and infantry should reach Zmakshira as soon as possible, in order to cut off the escape of the Yomuds into the steppe.

“With this position of the troops in Zmakshira, and with the movements of the column which would act on the outskirts of the Yomud villages, the Yomuds would appear to be in a position from which there could be no escape.

“Should they plunge into the desert, it is to be supposed that they and their flocks and herds would perish from want of water.”

[*Secret, November 1874, No. 42.*]

Whatever may have been the reasons or motives which led to the expedition against the Yomuds, there can be no doubt that the severity of the measures adopted was in accordance with General Kaufmann's plan of action. The documents quoted, especially the passages in italics, speak for themselves. Assuming the misconduct of the Yomuds, it would still be difficult for the Russians to free themselves from the imputation of treating their enemies with unusual barbarity.

(Sd.) F. H.,—5-4-75.

CHAPTER III.

THE TURKOMANS, MERV, AND THE LINE OF THE ATTEK RIVER.

58. **Statistics of Turkoman tribes and their settlements.**—According to Vambéry (page 309, *Travels in Central Asia*) there are nine tribes of Turkomans, numbering—

	No. of tents.
1. Tchador	12,000
2. Ersari	50,000
3. Alieli	3,000
4. Kara	1,500
5. Salor	8,000
6. Sarrak	10,000
7. Tekke	60,000
8. Goklen	12,000
9. Yomuds	40,000
	196,500

or, reckoning five persons to each tent, a total of 982,500, which agrees closely with the total 1,000,000 given by M. Sobolef. (*Michell's Abstract No. XXXII.*)

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 120.*]

Another authority, Colonel Venioukoff, gives the numbers of four principal tribes as below :—

	Tents.
Yomuds	about 48,000
Tekkes	" 60,000
Ersaris	" 66,000
Alielis	" 58,250

and the total number of tents 340,000.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 86.*]

In a recent memorandum, however, prepared by Mr. Michell, the total number of families is said to be 308,200, or, reckoning five to a family, more than a million and a half; while the families in the principal tribes are said to be—

	Families.
Goklens	29,600
Tekkes	46,000
Ersaris	80,000
Oka (including Alielis and others)	80,000
Yomuds	33,300

Captain Napier, who has recently visited Meshed and collected information respecting the Turkomans, computes the number of Tekke tents, excluding the Akhal branch at 25,000 which, accepting seven instead of five as the average of a nomad family, he considers equal to a population of 175,000 and a total of effective males, not slaves, of about 30,000. Allowing 25,000 as the available fighting force of the Tekkes and 10,000 for the Akhal and dependent clans, he obtains a total of 35,000 fighting men, of whom 15,000 are horsemen and 20,000 foot. The prowess of the former is notorious, but it is not so generally known that the latter are considered staunch fighters by their enemies, the Persians, and are capable of making a good stand behind entrenchments.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 205, and Captain Napier's Memorandum of 22nd February 1875.*]

In Appendix, I, will be found a letter from the Astrabad Mission Agent, dated 30th December 1873, giving the statistics of the Yomuds. If these are accurate, the tribe is more numerous than has been supposed.

"The Yomud tribe, which resides in the neighbourhood of Astrabad, consisted formerly of 40,000 families, but have now increased to 60,000. Of these families 20,000 reside to the north of Astrabad from Hussua Kooli, which is at the mouth of the Attrek, up to the Goombed-i-kaboos, which is the boundary line between the Yomud and Goklen tribes, and the remainder from Balkhan, Aladagh, and Senoo Daghee, to near the Khivan territory, extending over a space of 20 stages."

[*Political A., April 1874, No. 198.*]

The country occupied by the several tribes is well enough known. The Tchador are said to roam over a tract from the Caspian Sea to old Urgunj and Baldumsaz in Khiva; the Ersari occupy the left bank of the Oxus from Charjoe to Balkh: the Alieli surround Andkhoy: the Kara are found in the sandy desert between Andkhoy and Merv: the Salor, Sarrak, and Tekke hold the country about the Koppet and Karendagh Mountains, around Merv and along the Murghab to near Herat: the Goklen till the banks of the River Gurgan: while the great tribe of Yomuds range over the eastern shore of the Caspian and extend from the Rivers Attrek and Gurgan to the south-western portion of the Khanate of Khiva, which they occupy along with branches of the Tchador, Kara, and other minor tribes.

[*From Hellwald's "Russians in Central Asia," pp. 107-108, and Michell's Abstract LXVIII. Secret, April 1874, No. 239.*]

In Chapter II some account has been given of the attack made by order of General Kaufmann upon the Bairam Schalee branch of the Yomuds. The tribes to which attention will be more especially directed in this Chapter are those on the Attrek and Gurgan and in the neighbourhood of Merv, namely, the Goklens, Yomuds, and the warlike Tekkes.

59. Description of the Rivers Gurgan, Attrek, and Kara-Su.—Before proceeding further, it may be well to note such information as we possess regarding the course of the rivers to the south-east of the Caspian and the country through which they run. The following account of the Gurgan is taken from Mr. Michell's memorandum on the country of the Turkomans and from a recent report by Captain Napier on the topography of the Eastern Elburz tract.

THE GURGAN takes its rise from Germeh Cheshmé, in the Guli-dagh Mountains, a little to the north of Shahbas, close to the camping grounds of the Goklen Turkomans of the Kara Balkan branch of that tribe. Captain Napier places the perennial source of the river at the defile called Dehana-i-Gurgan, 30 miles north-west of Jah Jerm. From thence it is said to wind for 18 or 20 miles to the open meadow of Gurgan. It is formed by the junction of two streams, the Guli-dagh and the Zau, or the left and principal branch. The confluence of these streams occurs near the great stone rock, which is crowned with a fort called Kazan-kai. On the right bank of the Zau are the ruins of Merish. The Gurgan has no affluents from the right: but on the left, according to Blaremburg, it receives the Dugh Saudjak, Karadja-Su, Karateken, Kosh-Kupri, with its affluents the Chagaly (Surche-Magaleh) and the Egdyrj, 10 miles below Salian, at the mouth of the Kosh-Kupri.

By the ruins of Altyn Kala, 10 miles below the mouth of the Egdyrj, the Gurgan separates into two main channels to the sea.

The Tumacha Ab, or the right arm, changes its name after passing through the lagoon Kuduk Naura, $2\frac{2}{3}$ miles below Altyn Kala, to Gomush-tepe

Aghazi, and then runs 20 miles farther to the sea, discharging itself one mile to the south of Gomush-tepe through several mouths, of which the Bairankil is the principal one.

The left arm flows south-west from Altyn Kala for a distance of eight miles to the Karaval lagoon, which has two outflows, the Great Hodja-Nefes on the north, and the Kichik Gurgan on the south, both of which open into the sea in several branches, such as the little Hodja-Nefes, the Bai-Daulet Kil, the Gurgan, and the Kara Kilek. Boats can penetrate from the sea only into a very few of these mouths.

The sources of the Gurgan are 100 miles distant from the coast; they serve to irrigate the best portion of the Turkoman country, where there is a great congregation of settlements of Yomud and Goklen Turkomans, which tribes are separated from each other by the Karadja-Su River. The course of the Gurgan by the camping grounds of the Goklen Turkomans is 60 miles distant from the chain of mountains on the south. In this part of the country by the mountains, vegetation is luxuriant; there are even trees. The mountain heights are clothed with forest; on the slopes grow pomegranates, Brazil nuts, grapes, figs, and the white mulberry tree. In a word, all the moisture from the southern portion of the Caspian, which is brought by the westerly winds, rests here and fertilises the soil to such a degree that the lands by the sources of the Gurgan, (such an exception to the entire country of the Turkomans taken generally,) constitute the Turkoman paradise.

Being fed from mountain ranges of great attitude, the Gurgan comes down in a larger body of water than the Attrek, although its course is shorter than that of the latter river. As the Gurgan nears the sea, its banks fall and the currents become sluggish. The river is said to be fordable everywhere, except after floods.

THE ATTREK river is described in Mr. Michell's memorandum as issuing from the Kharys Lake in the mountains of Khorassan, a few *farsangs* to the south-east of Kuchan, and flowing by Shirvan, Budjnur and Hermah. According to Blaremborg, this river takes its rise at Kale Yusuf. It flows first to the north-west, and then in a westerly direction. It is for some way skirted by the Zané-dagh Mountains on the right, and by the Kurd-Litch on the left.

From its sources to its embouchure the Attrek runs about 260 miles. The Attrek receives only one considerable affluent, from the north, *viz.*, the Zumar or Zund River with its tributary, the Chandyr which joins the Zumar on its left, 40 miles above the mouth of the latter. The Zumar on its right side is skirted by a range of mountains called Karagatch Bairy, which extend in a north-westerly direction and terminate on the side facing the river in numerous deep defiles. From the south the Attrek receives its largest tributary known as Germekhans, which drains the plateaux north and east of Koochan, the western slopes of the Kelat chain, the Koochan plain, and the mountains bounding it on the south.

From the Chat-i-Attrek, the point of junction of all the principal tributaries of the Attrek, to the sea the river is said to have a course of about 80 miles, bending towards the south. The fertile plain between it and the Gurgan lies on one side, varying from 12 to 7 *fursakhs*; on the other and stretching far away to the north, a wide expanse of desert.

The Attrek flows into the Caspian at the head of a deep indentation forming a Bay or Estuary known as Hussun Kooli.

The course of the river is circuitous. The stream is very rapid, and the water is discolored. Near the embouchure of the Attrek the banks are low and muddy. Boats can pass some three or four miles up the stream.

Hussun Kooli Bay or Lagoon extends about nine miles from north to south, and the same from west to east. Its shores are low, flat, sandy and barren. There is an Ojurgilly Turkoman village on the western shore of the spit, which all but shuts in the lagoon, consisting of 200 tents, where the Turkomans build their

boats (flat-bottomed), procuring the timber from Persia. Here, too, since 1835 has been settled a Russian fishing company. The mouth of the Attrek is eight miles distant from this *aul* or village.

THE KARA-SU is said to be the natural boundary of the lands of the Persians and Yomud Turkomans. It forms the frontier of the province of Astrabad, and is, according to Blarernberg, about 40 miles in length; according to General Khodsko, who was Russian Consul at Resht in 1836, it is only 24 miles long.

The Kara-Su is so called only at its mouth. It has its source in the Ketul defile, south-east of the town of Astrabad, which is five miles distant from its left. There is a bridge called Lemerdan over this river (which is here called Andinali); at the village of Berestan, 15 miles up from Astrabad, the river flows through wide swamps. Down stream, about five miles from Astrabad, the first village is Siapal, the next is Aksin, $2\frac{1}{3}$ miles lower; then again Murd-ab or Poshtogul, $6\frac{1}{3}$ miles; from the latter place it is only $3\frac{1}{3}$ miles to the bay. Boats can pass about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles up the Kara-Su, the breadth being from 21 to 84 feet, and the depth from 7 to 21 feet; the banks are fringed with reeds, and higher up they prevent all passage; the Persian fort Sengir stands on the left bank, one mile from the mouth of the river. Immediately opposite is a landing place, where the Turkomans come to trade with the Persians.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 205 and Captain Napier's Memorandum on the Eastern Elburz Tract.*]

60. Situation and habits of the Goklen Turkomans.—The Turkoman tribes which inhabit the country bordering on the Attrek, Gurgan, and Kara-Su are the Goklens and Yomuds. The former are peaceable people, given to agricultural pursuits, and acknowledging the sway of Persia. Their situation and habits are thus described in Mr. Michell's memorandum:—

“The limits of the camping grounds of the Goklens in the west are the Gumbeti Kaús minaret and the Hermrúd Rivers. This line separates the Goklens from the Yomuds, between which two tribes there is a neutral zone of two *farsangs*. These tribes are hostile towards each other. The Goklens encamp on the east of this zone and the Yomuds on the west. In the east the Goklens do not at present extend beyond the sources of the Gurgan. The chain of the Elburz Mountains, stretching north-north-east, separates them from Nardin Fort and from the Budjnur and Semulgau Koords, as well as from Kugh Sor, which is subordinate to the administration of Astrabad. The northern limits of the Goklens lie along the right bank of the Gurgan, and it is on this line, and particularly near Gumbeti Kaús, where the Yomuds and Goklens, who both pasture here, come so frequently in contact. The lands of the Goklens are the richest of all occupied by the different tribes of that race, and the nature of their country affords them a great deal of protection, which is not the case with the Tekkes who occupy the plains. The Goklens, though numerically inferior to the Tekkes, command great respect. With respect to Persia, their position is less favorable, and, if proper measures were taken by the Persian Government, these people could easily be reduced to order and obedience.

“The Goklens can bring 1,000 horsemen into the field, capable of resisting 3,000 of their enemies, the Yomuds and Tekkes, being considered braver than the latter and possessing better arms and horses. The Yangaks are the most warlike of this tribe and camp in the districts more open to attack from their enemies. It is believed that, if Persia were to train these people to arms and to encourage them in their agricultural occupations, she would completely secure herself on that side of her frontier.”

Vambéry also, on page 306 of his *Travels in Central Asia*, says:—

“Goklen, judging by the position and the relation in which I found them, I am justified in characterising as belonging to the most peaceable and most civilised Turkomans. Willingly occupying themselves with the pursuits of agriculture, they are subject, most of them, to the King of Persia. They dwell in the lovely region so famed in history,—that of the ancient Gurgan.”

61. Situation and habits of the Yomuds and their relations to Persia.—The character of the Yomuds is not so favorable. Of them Mr. Michell writes:—

“The limits of the Yomuds on the east are as above described (*i. e.*, in the description of the Goklen). On the south they are limited by the Gurgan and the margin of the forest

descending from the Elburz Mountains, on the west the Caspian, and on the north the desert which separates them from Khiva. A greater portion of the Bairam Schalee branch of the Yomud tribe has passed over entirely to Khiva. The Chomur Yomuds have corn, rice fields, and melon grounds on both banks of the Gurgan, which extend even to the Kara-Su; these people are less rude than other Turkomans and lead a more settled life; they are in constant relations with the Persians, although they as frequently harbour raiders. These people could be easily made good subjects of Persia. The Chorwas camp by the Attrek, and they have corn fields between that river and the Gurgan; they are more nomadic than the Chomurs, and side with the raiders. As these lands are accessible to the Persians, the Chorwas, in anticipation of chastisement for misdeeds, hasten to reap their harvests and to decamp. They also cultivate the lands in common with the Chomurs. These two conditions of life are interchangeable. When a Chomur acquires wealth, he invests it in live-stock, and becomes a Chorwa and inimical to Persia; when his means are reduced, he is converted into a pacific, industrious Chomur. The number of Chomurs is said to have been decreasing."

This account is confirmed by Colonel Veniukoff:—

"The Yomuds live on the shore of the Caspian as far as the River Kara-Su, and in the interior on the Attrek and Gurgan, and are for the most part sedentary. Although the members of this tribe employ themselves in cultivating the land and in fishing, they lose no opportunity of robbery or piracy."

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 205.*]

The rights of Persia on the Attrek form one of the most important questions of the day, as will appear from the sequel. It may be observed in this place that the Shah's authority over the Yomuds has always been doubtful. This fact was well known in Arthur Conolly's time. He wrote (page 44, Vol. I, edition of 1834):—

"For the privileges of pasture and cultivation, the Gurgan Yomuds affect allegiance to the Shah of Persia; and their brethren, as far as Balkan, being dependent upon this quarter for their supplies, also call themselves Astrabad Yomuds: but they are very independent liegemen, pay their slight tribute only when it suits them, and carry off their fellow-subjects, the Persians, whenever they can catch them. An Astrabadee dares not go to Gurgan without the safeguard of a Turkoman, neither do the Turkomans venture to Astrabad unguaranteed."

The concluding sentences of the foregoing extract almost justify the taunt, that a Persian is never seen on the banks of the Attrek but with a rope round his neck. The Russian view is that, with the exception of the Goklens, none of the Turkomans are subject to Persian supremacy, and that even the Goklens are subject only in name.

[*Veniukoff's Lecture, Secret, April 1874, No. 86.*]

62. Russian views in 1854 as to the strategical importance of the Attrek River line.—The Russians are credited with great pertinacity in following up plans which have once been approved. It is therefore interesting to note the strategical importance attributed by Russian authorities to the line of the River Attrek so long ago as the year 1854. At that time it was natural that the possibility of attacking or annoying the English in India should be discussed in Russian circles. The *Friend of India* of 27th February 1873 gives a translation of three Russian memoranda prepared in 1854 with the above object—one by General Duhamel, Russian Minister to the Shah of Persia, and the second and third by eminent Russian statesmen whose names were not given.

General Duhamel's opinion was that India might best be attacked either—

- (1) From Astrakan to Astrabad, thence to Meshed, Herat, and so on; or
- (2) From Julfa to Tabriz, Teheran, Meshed, Herat, and so on.

It may be observed in passing that the second route thus suggested is at this moment being facilitated by the Railway concession which Russia has induced the Shah to grant in favor of General Falkenhagen. But we are

now concerned with the Attrek line. One of the eminent but anonymous Russian statesmen in his memorandum undertook to show how the invading force would march. It would proceed—

“from Asia Minor and from Astrakan by land and by water to Mazender on the Gurgan, along the *Attrek* and her tributaries, over *Boojnoord* and *Koochan*, to *Meshed*,—from *Meshed* by Herat and Candahar, to Cabul.”

The writer then enumerated the advantages which Russia would enjoy in the naval station at Ashurade, the excellence of the roads and the fertility of the country through which the troops would march, and recommended that

“a fortified point near the Caspian should be selected for the junction of the army—the artillery and the military train. The best would be the countries between the rivers *Kara-Su* and *Gurgan*. Fourteen *versts* from *Astrabad* and 20 *versts* from the Caspian Sea there stand the ruins of *Achkele*. The country is fertile; the climate healthy, and not subject to sudden changes. Close by, the forest affords plenty of wood for building purposes. The land by right belongs to Persia, but the Turks (*Turkomans*) are in actual possession. It would not be easy to invade the country; but still it is to be conquered, as it materially strengthens the union with the *Caucasus*. It would overawe Persia, would be a check upon the *Bokharans*, the *Khivans*, and would cause all the tribes of Central Asia to act in concert.”

It will be well to bear these suggestions in mind when considering the advances actually made by Russia in the Attrek country.

63. Recent opinions of Russian authorities regarding the Attrek line.—Coming down to more recent times, Russian views on the importance to them of the Attrek line have undergone no change. These views will be readily understood by looking at a map of this part of Central Asia, and considering the facility with which troops could be concentrated on the south-east coast of the Caspian. Captain *Murdoch Smith*, in his lecture delivered on 13th March 1873 before the Royal United Service Institution, points out what advantages Russia possesses in point of communications—

“Her great line of communication with the Caspian is the *Volga*, a noble river, navigable from its mouth to *Tver* between *St. Petersburg* and *Moscow*, a distance of somewhere about 1,000 miles. One of its tributaries, the *Kama*, is also navigable to *Perm*, on the highway to *Siberia*. The *Oka*, which joins the *Volga* at *Nijni Novgorod*, is also navigable for a great distance. Three great railways connected with the general railway system of the Empire already lead to the *Volga* at *Nijni Novgorod*, *Saratov*, and *Tsaritzni*, from which last another short line leads to a point on the *Don*, which is thence navigable to the *Sea of Azov*. There are three flourishing companies on the *Volga*,—the *Kavkaz-e-Mercury*, the *Samolet*, and the *Folga*, each with a numerous fleet of excellent fast steamers, besides an immense number of barges and steam tugs. The river is peculiarly free from obstructions to navigation. * * * * Passenger steamers ascend from *Astrakan* to *Nijni Novgorod*, a distance of 800 miles, in eight days, and descend in six, including stoppages at all the principal towns on the banks. * * * At *Astrakan* there is a well-appointed naval arsenal, leased by Government to one of the steam companies.”

The lecturer then went on to explain how the stoppage of navigation on the *Volga* during winter was remedied by lines of rail, either existing or projected, from *Poti* to *Tiflis*, and thence to *Bakou* on the Caspian, or from *Rostov* on the *Don* to *Petrovsk* on the Caspian, adding that even should the *Bakou* line be abandoned, *Tiflis* would have excellent communication with the railway to *Petrovsk* by the magnificent road over the range of the *Caucasus* through the pass of *Vladi Kavkaz*.

Such being the position of Russia on the Caspian, it is not surprising that an advance eastward along the most favorable line of march from that sea should be recommended. Thus, the *Neva* of the 5th—17th January 1873 recommended that a point on the Attrek should be occupied with the view of protecting commercial caravans on the journey from *Khiva* to the south-east of the Caspian. Before this, in 1871, a correspondent of the *Golos*, writing from *Baku* after a visit to all the military positions on the east coast of the Caspian, had observed that the recognition (*vide infra*) of the rights of Persia to the lands on the *Gurgan*

and along the left bank of the Attrek left no place in the Turkoman oasis which might serve as the basis of Russian operations. A similar opinion was declared by Colonel Venioukoff in the course of a lecture delivered to the Staff College at St. Petersburg in March 1873 on the subject of Central Asia. In the following October the *Moscow Gazette* drew attention to a report said to have been submitted in 1859 by Colonel ~~Dubamil~~, who commanded an expedition for the survey of the east coast of the Caspian. It was to the effect that tranquillity could only be restored in the country of the Turkomans by the erection of one fort at Krasnovodsk, and another at the mouth of the Gurgan or at some other point that might be selected after a careful survey of the locality, and that two decisive expeditions from such two points towards the Attrek and the Balkan Mountains would put an end to the disorder. The *Moscow Gazette* added that, since the report was made, it had become evident to the Russian Government that the Turkomans of the Attrek depended for support upon the Tekke tribes, and that a decisive expedition should march not only to the Attrek, but into the country of the Tekkes as well; the recommendations of Colonel ~~Dubamil~~ therefore remained in full favor. Similar suggestions continue to be made to the present day. The St. Petersburg *Vedomosti* said to be an inspired paper, and one of the most influential Russian organs, has urged the necessity of erecting a Russian fort at some point where a control can be exercised over the Turkomans of the Gurgan and *Upper Attrek Rivers*,—a suggestion which is supposed to indicate a site at the head of the Sumbar affluent of the Attrek at the southern base of the Daman-i-koh Mountains. We have further the opinion of General Kaufmann himself that—

“It was absolutely necessary to occupy the Attrek Valley, although he alluded to the projected expedition to Merv as a hearsay. It is not, he said, a question of establishing a frontier line along the northern bases of the mountains of Khorassan, but of merely raising a few forts and of placing garrisons in them with a view to keeping the Turkomans constantly in check.”

[*Secret, March 1873, No. 255.*]

[*„ April „ „ 44.*]

[*„ „ 1874, „ 86.*]

[*„ „ „ „ 225.*]

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 219, and Collection of Merv Papers, dated 4th March 1875.*]

64. Opinions of British authorities on the strategical value of a position on the Attrek River.—Nor have British authorities failed to draw attention to the value of this position on the Central Asian chessboard. On 19th December 1873, Mr. Michell wrote from St. Petersburg that Colonel Baker and Lieutenant Gill, who had just arrived from Teheran had traced the Attrek River from its source, and were impressed with the strategical and political importance of that river valley, from which an excellent road led by the very walls of Herat. So, too, Major St. John informed the Royal United Service Institution, in March 1873, that, although the Attrek was not navigable, there was a good military road to the north, quite clear of the river, through a country called the *Daman-i-koh*, or skirt of the hills in Persian, and the *Attok* in Turkish. The road followed these hills to a point where the Tejend River, which flows from the south-east loses itself in a swamp. From that point there was a road with some two or three days of desert to Merv.

The opinion of Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran is contained in his Despatch No. 99, dated 16th August 1873.

“The portion of territory lying between the Attrek and Gurgan is that which to Russia, as an aggressive strategical position, is of the utmost value. In grain, forage, cattle, and beasts of burden it is capable of supplying the wants of a large army. Valuable as Merv may also be to Russia as a strategical point against Afghanistan, the Gurgan and Attrek is to her still more so, and if held, is a permanent menace against England. Having the Caspian

at her command and the ports of Ashurade and Krasnovodsk in her possession, Russia on the plains of Hyrcania is in a position within a short space of time to concentrate thereon a large force drawn from the reserves of the Caucasian army."

Thus also the Minister at Teheran in his letter to Lord Clarendon, dated November 14th 1869, wrote that the danger arising from the Russian Settlement at Krasnovodsk on the east coast of the Caspian was imminent—

"For, in order to open a road to the Oxus from the Caspian, the Russians would have to construct forts and station troops within the Turkoman country through which it will pass, and this being done, the Turkoman tribes will all sooner or later be brought under the protection and authority of Russia. The desert across which the Russians now propose to establish a line of communication with Central Asia is ill adapted for the purpose, the supply of water being insufficient for caravans traversing the plains, and the heat in summer being excessive. It is possible that before long they will find these difficulties insurmountable and they may then seek a more practicable route which will be found by starting from Hussun Kooli, at the embouchure of the Attrek, in the Bay of Astrabad near Ashurade, the Russian naval station in the south-east of the Caspian; following the course of that river eastwards and then skirting along the hills to the north of Boojnoord and Koochan in the direction of Merv, which is not more than four marches from the Oxus and within the 10 easy stages of Herat. By that line the road would pass for nearly the whole distance from the Caspian through an inhabited tract of country where an abundant supply of water exists, together with rich pasturage and a salubrious climate at all seasons."

Her Majesty's Agent and Consul General at Odessa on the 6th February 1873 warned the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the possession by the Russians of a fort upon the Attrek was a little sprout from the great Empire, which might soon grow into magnitude and lead to the dismemberment of Khorassan from the sovereignty of Persia, thereby placing in jeopardy much more important interests.

Mr. Eastwick, in a debate in the House of Commons, reported in the *Times* of 23rd April 1873, referred to the concentration of troops at Ashurade and to the occupation by the Russians of Chikishlar, near the mouth of the Attrek, as involving a danger to India, which no man with any pretensions to a knowledge of strategy could overlook. And Mr. Grant Duff, while contending that the Russian movements on the east coast of the Caspian should not give rise to apprehensions, said that—

"Chikishlar could only be important to us, if the Russians meant to feel their way along the north of the Attrek, and to take possession of Merv."

The danger of a Russian occupation of the Upper Attrek line and the country south of the Daman-i-Koh Mountains has also been indicated in a paper on "Merv" sent from the India Office on 4th March 1875:—

"It involves proceedings against the Goklens and other Turkoman tribes in a country forming an integral part of Persian Khorassan and brings the Russians into immediate contact and relation with the Koords, a race traditionally hostile to Persia. It opens the road to Meshed through the most fertile regions of northern Persia."

[*Secret, April 1874, Nos. 161-179.*]

[*„ May 1873, No. 76.*]

Enough has been written to justify a careful examination of the correspondence on record for the purpose of showing whether or not the Russians have recently displayed signs of activity and aggression on the line of country bordering upon the Rivers Attrek and Gurgan and in the direction of Merv. But, first, some account must be given of Merv, its position, and the tribes which occupy the neighbouring valleys and mountains.

65. **The Tekkes, Salors, and Sarraks.**—The most warlike and plundering tribes of the Turkoman race are the Tekkes, Salors, and Sarraks. These are said by Mr. Michell to

"occupy the country about the Keppet and Karendagh Mountains, about Merv, and along the Murghab to near Herat. The Tekkes have about 59 settlements along the northern side

of the mountains skirting Khorassan. One of these, Kizzil-Arvad (about 133 miles from the Caspian, north latitude 39°) was demolished by the Russians in 1870. The two most important places now are Karys and Ashkabad."

It should be noted that there are two sections of the Tekke tribe, the Akhal and the Merv Tekkes, the latter inhabiting the oasis on the Murghab and the former occupying the 'Atak,' or Daman-i-Koh of the Khorassan highlands. The distinction is said to date from 1860, when the wild Turkomans inflicted a terrible defeat on the Persian Prince Hamza Mirza Hashmat-u-Dowla and reoccupied Merv, which thenceforward fell to the Tekkes, while the "Akhal" Contingent returned laden with booty to the 'Atak,' where there is a wide pasture from which their name is derived. It is said that in time of war the Tekkes proper can reckon on the full support of the Akhal branch.

[*Captain Napier's Memorandum, 22nd February 1875.*]

The Tekkes own no masters, though they have recently expressed a wish to be placed under Afghan protection, when Merv was threatened by the Russians.

66. Some account of the city of Merv.—Merv is an interesting place, not only from its strategical importance, but also from its great antiquity. Colonel McGregor states that the city was

"founded by Alexander the Great, and became the residence of one of his successors, Antiochus Nicator, who called it Antiochia. In more modern days it was one of the four imperial cities of Khorassan and was long the seat of many of the Kings of Persia, but, in particular, of those of the Seljukian dynasty. Alp Arslan, the most powerful prince of his time, after reigning for a number of years here, died and was buried at this place. When the Suffavean Kings fixed their capital at Ispahan, Merv, which became the frontier city in the most exposed quarter of the empire, was always committed to the charge of a military leader of the highest rank."

Malcolm Khan, in his memorandum on the political situation of Persia, writes of Merv as "l'ancienne capital de Korassan."

[*Secret, July 1874, No. 30.*]

It appears that at one time Merv formed an integral part of the Persian Empire. It is said that the city was surrounded with stately palaces, groves, and gardens by Alp-Arslan (A. D. 1063-1073) of the Seljukian dynasty of Persia. The tomb of Sunjur Shah or Sultan Sunjur, Alp-Arslan's grandson, (A. D. 1126-1157), who conquered all the country between the Oxus and Jaxartes, still remains at Merv, and, although the few settled residents of Merv are Uzbeks, and the Turkomans are historical foes of Persia, yet the great deeds of the Persian sovereigns are remembered. On the downfall of the Suffavean dynasty the Turkomans became altogether independent, but Nadir Shah re-established the Persian supremacy. After his death the Turkomans again asserted their independence and invaded Persia. Merv then seems to have fallen at one time to the Khivans, at another to the Bokhariotes, and again to the Turkomans. In 1855 the Persians made a great effort to recover their influence in this quarter. Merv was re-occupied by the Persian Governor of Khorassan in that year, but in the year following it again fell into the hands of the Turkomans. From that time to 1860-61 the Persians made unsuccessful attempts to reduce the Turkomans, from whom they sustained sanguinary defeats.

The independence of Merv was mentioned by M. de Stremoukoff, in conversation with Sir A. Buchanan, as an illustration of changes among petty Central Asian States. He said that—

"Merv was supposed to be a province of Persia till within the last 10 years, when it was found that it acknowledged no allegiance to the Shah, and was either an independent State or in the possession of the Turkomans."

[*Secret, January 1872, Nos. 227-239.*]

67. Recent accounts of Merv. Russian description of the place.—On the very existence of the place as an inhabited settlement doubts have been cast by the same authority. According to Stremoukoff Merv is “merely a square portion of land encircled with a mud wall, and the resort, during three months of the year, of the nomad tribes for shelter and for pasturage for their cattle, but..... during the remainder of the year it was uninhabited.....entirely devoid of trade, and no agricultural produce of any sort in its neighbourhood.”

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 202.*]

68. Proposed fortification of Merv by Kousheed Khan.—With this description may be contrasted the particulars given by the Meshed Agent regarding the defensive measures undertaken by Kousheed Khan, who was chosen to lead the Tekkes in their anticipated struggle with Russia. Kousheed Khan is there said to have ordered a wide and deep moat to be dug round Merv, that walls should be built round the city, and that regular gates should be put to the town.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 186.*]

69. Description of Merv in modern times.—Travellers who have visited Merv during the current century agree in representing it as an insignificant place compared with its former glories. Abbott found Merv in 1840 “an assemblage upon the Murghab of about 100 mud huts, where a considerable bazaar is held.” In the same year Sir Richmond Shakespear visited Merv and wrote: “There is a small shell of a fort here and a considerable bazaar.” Dr. Blocqueville, on the other hand, described Merv in 1860-61 as surrounded by “a strong wall of earth and sun-dried bricks, flanked by several towers, and protected by a broad ditch. The enclosure can contain about 30,000 tents. A branch of the Murghab flowing from about midway between Merv and Yoleten traverses this entrenchment along its length and afterwards takes the name of the Carai Ab.”

Lastly, we have an account of Merv, as it now is, by Daood Khan, at present newswriter in Candahar, and who visited Afghanistan and Khorassan three years ago. He writes:—

“As regards Merv, its forts are entirely out of repair, and the people live in woods and cottages of reeds. Of these forts, one is Killa Sanjari, at a corner of which the tomb of Sultan Sanjar is situated under a high tower which is visible from a considerable distance. There was another fort which was in good order until the death of Bairam Ali Khan. One of the predecessors of the King of Bokhara attacked it, killed him, destroyed the fort, and took 1,200 families of Merv to Bokhara—some of whom still live there, and others have run away to Meshed, Herat, Killa Mawez, and Shibekan in Herat, and taken their residence at those places. The other forts are Chahl-burj and Killa Kashan, and some other forts on the Merv River which flows towards Bokhara and Khiva. There is also a fort on this side of the river in the direction of Meshed, which had been built by the Turkomans of the Sarrak tribe. The Persian troops occupied it ten years ago, when they attacked Merv and were repulsed. Since then it has been abandoned.

“The Turkomans who reside in the Merv territory are divided into two tribes—the Taft-mash and Utmash. The Taftmashes live on that side of the Merv River which is in the direction of Bokhara and Khiva, and the Utmashes on that which goes towards Meshed. From the first embankments of Merv, which are one league distant from the abovementioned demolished forts to Kanahyah, twenty leagues distant, these two tribes live in groups of houses varying from one thousand to one hundred families, and cultivate on all sides with the water of these streams. Both these tribes are all Tagas, but about 10,000 families of other Turkoman tribes dwell with them, such as Sarraks, Salors, Mujawn, Atta, Yamarli, Syed, &c. (The Utmashes and Taftmashes together appear to number about 60,000 families.) * * * The Turkoman Tagas are for the whole year engaged in breeding horses, in learning the art of riding them, and in committing raids. * * * * Of the guns which have been left by the Kajjars in Merv, 40 guns, on which the names of different kings are inscribed, were seen by me

on the bank of the Merv River. *There is no city in Merv, as the old cities have been entirely destroyed. At present there is an enclosure, with walls on all sides and with shops of reed roofs.* A bazaar is held twice a week in which articles of all descriptions are sold. One side of the bazaar is occupied by borsedealers, and the other by sellers of other articles. The skill of the people consists in the manufacture of carpets, numdas, saddles, rifles, and matchlock guns, and they also work as goldsmiths or blacksmiths. They do not pay revenue to any authority, nor is such the custom among them. They are not under the control of any Governor, but they act at the discretion and advice of the elders of their tribes, though they give nothing to them."

As recently described by Captain Napier, the Fort of Merv, constructed under the orders of Kousheed Khan, is a formidable work. It is defended on one side by the Murghab, flowing between steep banks, deep and unfordable; on the other by a moat 10 to 12 yards deep and 30 yards wide. A rampart of irregular outline 12 feet high and about 8 miles in extent forms an enclosure which is sufficient for the whole non-combatant population with their tents. Captain Napier's account of the mode of defence which the inhabitants propose to adopt is very interesting:—

"On the first alarm the whole of the women, children, tents and mares, with an unlimited store of provisions, will be sent into the fortress with all the unmounted men. The plain will be cleared of crops and laid under water. The mounted men of the tribe, a large proportion, will advance into the desert and meet the enemy, working on his flanks and communications. Any better plan it would be difficult to devise, and against an undisciplined Persian force it would probably enough succeed. Their communications would certainly go, and they would lack the vigour to deal a crushing blow by the capture of the entrenchment with sufficient speed."

[*Captain Napier's Memorandum No. 16, dated 22nd February 1875.*]

70. Sir H. Rawlinson on the strategical importance of Merv.—Regarding the strategical importance of Merv as a point from which the occupant is enabled to command Meshed (distant 215 miles), Bokhara (distant 200 miles), and Herat (distant 265 miles), there is a very unanimous opinion:—

"Merv," writes Sir H. Rawlinson, "although at present a mere ruin and uninhabited during nine months of the year, is of much political importance, both from its strategic position and from its great natural advantages. Situated at the point where the high road from Persia to Bokhara crosses the road from Khiva to Herat, and possessing an unlimited supply of water, it will probably take a leading place in the future history of the East. At any rate, if Merv were garrisoned by Russian troops and order were established in the surrounding country, the city would rapidly recover its old condition of prosperity and would completely overawe Herat and Afghan Turkistan."

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 215.*]

71. Persian and Afghan opinions on the importance of Merv.—The Persian view of the case is very forcibly stated in the memorandum by Malcolm Khan, an extract from which has been translated and is given below:—

"The provinces of Mazenderan and Guilan so marvellously endowed by nature,—those provinces which a Russian statesman has described in his secret reports as 'a new India placed within the grasp of Russia'—are manifestly fated to be devoured by our terrible neighbour.

"The loss of such splendid provinces, however ruinous it might prove to Persia, would not perhaps be considered in certain respects a crisis of sufficiently immediate gravity to engage the present attention of the English Government, but that Government could scarcely preserve the same indifference in the face of that other movement, so manifest and so threatening, which has been taken by Russia from the bank of the Attek across our Turkoman tribes, and which has for its inevitable end, Merv, the ancient capital of Khorassan.

"Need we recall here the incalculable advantage which would accrue to the Russian power in Asia from this fresh conquest?

"It is notorious that, thanks to an extraordinary combination of physical energy and warlike habits, the Turkoman tribes, uniting as it were their lives to a race of incomparable horses, have turned out the boldest cavalry of which history makes mention. With their savage energy and marvellous aptitude for distant adventure, they would twenty times have

invaded and destroyed the whole of Persia, had it not been for their internal divisions which rendered them incapable of ever combining in sufficient numbers.

"But it is a truly lamentable fact that these tribes, who are so formidable to their neighbours, are incapable by themselves of offering the smallest resistance to the attacks of the Russians.

"Coerced on the side of Persia, and having no longer either their customary asylum in Khiva or their old slave-trading haunt at Bokhara, all these Turkoman people are compelled to shelter themselves under the Russian sceptre, which alone from henceforth can guarantee their very existence.

"Further, it is well known that this Turkoman element is no new thing to Russia. For the last 30 years during which Russia has assumed such a prominent position at Ashurade, she has spared no effort to attract to her these turbulent tribes and familiarise them with the blessings of her approaching rule. Most of the Chiefs and Cazees are in her pay, and their children are brought up in Russia at the cost of the State. Finally, all the merchants of the tribes arrive in Persia with Russian passports, and Russia has already come to be regarded by the Turkomans as a natural defender, a master sent from heaven.

"Such being the state of affairs, is it possible for a moment seriously to doubt the aim and the successful issue of a policy which has been planned and carried out with such far-sightedness? So far as we are concerned, we feel sure that nothing more is required than the system of Caravans, which are being organised at Moscow and on the Caucasus, with a mixture of the military element, to peaceably establish the Russian power on both banks of the Attek.

"And then what would remain to keep the Russians from Merv?

"They would be undisturbed masters of a solid basis, and, having at their command all needful resources, they would merely have to secure the formal submission of tribes who are already half dependent and to traverse a tract as fertile as it is favorable to military movements.

"There is one point which will still further smooth the way for the Russian expedition to Merv, and that is that unfortunately the importance of the undertaking will be completely veiled from the eyes of the English people. Merv, deprived of all present vitality and lost among the ruins of Asia, seems to the European mind to be of no practical value, of no real interest, in short, it has nothing which can draw public attention to the invader. Russia may establish herself at Merv almost without Europe being aware of it. And yet Merv is undoubtedly the most important spot in Central Asia. Situated in a country of almost fabulous fertility, it commands equally Turkistan, Afghanistan, and Khorassan. All the lines of communication for military and commercial purposes between Meshed and Bokhara, Khiva and Herat, necessarily converge upon Merv. In every respect, and especially with respect to Russia, the position of Merv is infinitely superior to that of Herat, and the very fact that this celebrated capital of Khorassan is in ruins testifies to that superiority of position which, placing it in the pathway of all our conquerors, has marked it out as the blood-stained stage, on which the barbarous hordes of Asia contend. To understand Merv, one must not judge by what it is now; one must consider what it has been, and especially what it may become. To judge of Merv by what it actually is would be like judging of Sevastopol by what it was under Turkish dominion. Persia, always anxiously aware of the importance of this historical position, has made many attempts to secure this outwork of its frontiers. Our failures have been caused solely by the absence of intelligent supervision. The capture of Merv and the reduction of the surrounding Turkomans present in themselves no serious difficulty. Only a small part of the sacrifices which enabled the Russians to reach Khiva would quite suffice to establish definitely their dominion from Astrabad to the gates of Herat. On the day when the Russian flag restores order and security in Merv, that destined capital will be re-established, and nature itself, aided by Russian administration, will inevitably render it the most active centre of new enterprises and certain successes. For, we may be sure, when Merv is once in the hands of Russia all barriers will be broken down and all neighbouring States blotted out.

"In face of the immense advantages which will be guaranteed to Russia by the possession of Merv, we see not a single obstacle, not a single consideration which can arrest for a moment the impending march of this power towards its natural prey."

[*Secret, July 1874, No. 30.*]

To the same effect is the following extract from a note sent to Mr. Michell by Iskunder Ahmed Khan, Barukzai, of Afghanistan, on 8th January 1875:—

"Merv at this time is only a refuge for marauders, but let Russia possess it, and it will then become a place of notoriety and one of the richest in the world, both for its fertility and well known capacity for the maintenance of a corps of soldiers at a little cost. In short, if Merv pass into the hands of Russia, it will regain its former splendours. But the question will not rest here, that Russia will take Merv merely and hold it quietly, but she will take the Murghab River also and march up to it, and thus possess all the country. For example, when she leaves Merv, the first country worthy of note with which she will come into contact on the same river is Ulatan, with its ruined fort, and which was the country of the Salor Turkomans for

some years after their defeat by the Persians, and who, through the invasion of the Tekke Turkomans, were compelled to desert, and for these 15 years they have come under the jurisdiction of Herat in the fort of Maroochagh and cultivate its territory. The next country which Russia will seize is Panjdeh on the same river, where are Sarrak Turkomans dwelling, which place is nearly equal in fertility to Merv. That country was frequently dependent upon Herat; for example, the Shah Kameran, the last sovereign of Sadozai, had always a commission there, and my father, at the request of the Sarrak Turkomans, sent twice a commission amongst them to collect taxes.

“One stage further on and Russia will come to the fort of Maroochagh, and from thence within one stage to the fort of Murghab, which is situated on the high road betwixt Herat and Maimena, and further on still to Afghan Turkistan. When Russia shall have reached here, she will divide or cut off Herat from Afghan Turkistan.”

72. Situation of the Persians at Sarraks between Merv and Meshed.—It may be worth while here to observe that, though the Persians have lost all hold on Merv, they maintain a garrison in Sarraks, which, according to Conolly, used to give its name to all the minor Turkoman tribes settled below Merv. Sarraks lies between Meshed and Merv and nearly equi-distant from either. It is about 50 miles from Moozderan, a military station of Persia on the road to Merv. The road, as far as the River Tejend, is said to be firm and adapted for the employment of wheeled carriages, but beyond it to Merv, a distance of about 110 miles, a considerable portion of the way lies through a sandy desert, and guns, even of small calibre, are with difficulty dragged along. The importance of Sarraks and the nature of its tenure by the Persians are well brought out in Captain St. John's memorandum of 19th July 1873:—

“Should the course of events in Central Asia result in a Russian occupation of Merv, the outlying Persian fortress of Sarraks will become the most important strategic point on the north-east frontier of Persia. Situated on the principal road from Meshed to Merv, but nearer the latter, in a country abounding with wood and forage, it affords a secure secondary base for operations against the flank of an army advancing along the Attrek Valley on Merv, or from that place along the Murghab Valley on Herat. In the hands of Russia, on the other hand, it would guarantee Merv against attack from Meshed, and would secure the communications of an army acting against Herat from the Caspian.”

Captain St. John then states on Blocqueville's authority:—

“Munzabad must be regarded as the limit of Khorassan properly so-called, as the fortress of Sarraks, although belonging to Persia, does not give them possession of the district which they are unable to cultivate, and which is only visited by the garrison to collect wood and forage, &c.”

And continues—

During the Shah's visit to London his uncle, Sultan Murad Mirza Hussain es Sultamet, who has just returned from Khorassan, where he was Governor, corroborated to me this account, adding that a strong force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery is kept up in Sarraks; that the country round is well watered and fit for cultivation, but that fear of the Turkomans prevents its settlement by Persian peasants, whilst the Turkoman nomads on their side are debarred from grazing their herds by the Persian garrison.” X

[Vide *Secret*, October 1873, Nos. 64-66.]

For a memorandum on the Turkomans of Merv by Captain Napier, see Appendix II, and for a collection of routes through the Attrek and neighbouring tracts, see Appendix III.

73. Foundation of the Russian forts and settlements on the east coast of the Caspian to close of the year 1871.—It is now time to trace the steps of Russian progress in the direction of the countries which have been described. From information collected by Mr. Michell it appears that, prior to the last ten or fifteen years, the Turkomans of the Mangyshlak promontory, as well as the Yomuds and Chaudors made frequent overtures of submission to Russia. Since, however, the Russians have shown unmistakable signs of an intention to establish themselves firmly on

the east coast of the Caspian, the attitude of the tribes has been generally hostile. The following is taken from Mr. Michell's summary of Russian advances eastward of the Caspian:—

"The first Russian forts erected on the east coast of the Caspian were Fort St. Peter, on Cape Tiuk-Karagan, Fort Alexander (named after the Prince Bekovitch-Cherkassky) or Alexander-Bai, in the Bekhtyr-liman Bay, and a fort on the Krasnovodsk spit, at the entrance into Balkan Bay, in 1715, 1716 and 1717; these forts were, however, abandoned after the utter failure of Bekovitch's expedition to Khiva.

"In 1819 General Yermolof, Commanding in Georgia, in the Caucasus, sent Major Ponomaref and Captain Muravief to select a proper site in Balkan Bay, or thereabouts, for a fort, to proceed to Khiva and to open relations with the Turkomans with the view of opening a trade route to Khiva.

"Muravief passed over the Caspian a second time in 1821 to select a site for a fort.

"The first Russian military settlement (after the abandonment of those founded in Peter's reign) on the east coast was, however, Novo-(new) Alexandrofsk, founded in 1833, at the entrance into Mertvi-Kulduk Bay* (Kaidak Bay).

"The unhealthy and in other respects unfavorable position of this place led to the despatch of an expedition under Karelin, accompanied by Blaremborg, to survey the east coast from Astrabad Bay to Tiuk-Karagan and to find another site.

"In 1846, the fort at Novo-Alexandrofsk was abandoned, and another, called Novo-Petrofsk, was erected at Tiuk-Karagan, which was in 1858 re-christened Alexandrofsk.

"In 1859 another expedition was sent under Colonel Dandevil to the east coast. This large reconnoitring force being attacked by Turkomans, lost its camel train and baggage near Balkan Bay, so that the survey of the Balkan hills could not be carried out. After examining the locality about Krasnovodsk Bay, and recommending a site there for the erection of a fort, Colonel Dandevil proceeded by vessel to Ashurade and to Hussun-Kooli Bay, where he bombarded a Turkoman settlement. He also stormed, bombarded and took Chikishlar. No lodgment was, however, then made on that part of the Caspian coast.

"In the autumn of 1869 a Russian expedition landed in Krasnovodsk Bay and laid the foundation of a new fort.

"In 1870 a military position was secured at Tash-Arvat-Kala (103 miles from Krasnovodsk Fort), with two intermediate posts, one at Mikhailofsk† and another at Mulla-Kari, by which latter communication was established with Krasnovodsk."

The settlement of Krasnovodsk is an important one. Captain Napier writes thus of it in his memorandum on the Eastern Alburz tract:—

"Krasnovodsk or Kizzil-Soo is marked on our maps on the north shore of Balkhan Bay, but the Turkomans place it on the south shore at the bottom of a little bay known as Kizzil-Soo, and on the shore of a tract known as Darya (Daryacha?) three or four fursukhs north of the first Russian settlement called by them Kaita Soo. This is probably Mikhailofsk, the first settlement on the east coast made under the orders of the Governor-General of the Caucasus in 1859. The position of Kizzil-Soo is further fixed by reference to that of the island of Cheleken, which may be presumed to be correctly placed in our latest maps derived from Russian sources. The Turkomans describe Kizzil-Soo as lying opposite to Cheleken, and within a long gun-shot, the channel not so deep or wide as to prevent the passage of a horseman; while Krasnovodsk, as at present placed, has the whole depth and width of the Balkhan Bay between it and Cheleken.

"The new fort is said to stand on the spur of a hill near the shore of the Bay, naturally escarped on one side and surrounded by a stone wall on the other.

"The garrison consists of 1,000 infantry, 50 Cossacks, and a few guns. Other guns are mounted on the fort."

In November of the year 1871 Colonel Markozoff organised an expedition to the Attrek river, and occupied Chikishlar, a point in Hussun-Kooli Bay, $9\frac{1}{3}$ miles north of the mouth of the Attrek and 267 miles south of Mulla-Kari. The Turkomans of Chikishlar were Yomuds, who with the Tekkes had, earlier in the same year, attacked the Russian Michael post. On the approach of Colonel Markozoff's column the Yomuds fled across the Attrek. By the 10th December 1871 the fort which the Russian soldiers had con-

* Muravief constructed in 1821 a temporary post, called Voznesenskoe, on Krasnovodsk spit, a little to the south of Bk-djar Point.

† This post is on the shore of Michael Bay. Mulla-Kari is situated further inland, on the Aktam, or supposed mouth of the Oxus. Troops proceeding to Tash-Arvat from Krasnovodsk go by ship to Mikhailofsk.

structed was ready for the reception of the garrison, and in the middle of the same month Colonel Markozoff, having visited the Attrek and left a small force at Chikishlar, took ship for Krasnovodsk. Up to the close of 1871 therefore the Russians had obtained a firm footing at four points in the country of the Turkomans, *viz.*, on the Mangyshlak Peninsula, in Krasnovodsk Bay, on the Attrek, and in the island and naval station of Ashurade in Astrabad Bay.

Captain Murdoch Smith gives the following interesting account of the Russian station at Ashurade:—

“This island, where I spent a few days in 1868, and which I again visited in 1871, is entirely of loose sand barely rising above the water. It almost touches the Peninsula of Potemkin in the west, and a long spit runs out from it to the eastward, forming a perfect natural breakwater, behind which there is excellent anchorage for any number of vessels. On the mainland of Persia, opposite Ashurade, the Kavkaz and Mercurij Steam Navigation Company have an agency, a landing wharf, cargo hulks, &c. There are usually three or four men-of-war stationed at Ashurade, besides a few others cruising in the neighbourhood—the whole under command of a Commodore, who, with many of the officers and men and their families, lives on the island. Supplies of provisions and fuel are chiefly derived from the neighbouring Turkomans, towards whom the Commodore, in addition to his strictly naval duties, acts in the capacity of a Political Agent. Every Turkoman boat is at once seized if found unprovided with a passport from the Commodore. By this system the whole of the independent coast on the east of the Caspian is practically under his control.”

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 205.*]

74. Indifference of Persia to Russian advances on east of Caspian until 1869. Discussion on the subject of Russian expedition to Kizzil-Soo.—It would be natural to suppose that the Persian Government must have regarded these encroachments on tracts of country over which the Shah claimed authority with suspicion and alarm. The Persians, however, appear to have been sufficiently pre-occupied by contests with the Turkomans, and to have taken no notice of the Russian advances eastward until the close of 1869, when a Russian force of 3,000 men with four guns was despatched from Petroffski on the Caspian to Kizzil-Soo (or Krasnovodsk) in Balkan Bay, with the avowed object of occupying that place in order to open out a road thence to Khiva and Turkistan. Then, at last, Mirza Saeed Khan, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, informed the Russian Minister at Teheran

“that the Persian frontier extended along the Turkoman coast beyond the point to which the expedition in question had been directed, and that if the Russians landed troops and established themselves there, whether for conquest or for the development of their trade with Central Asia, such a proceeding would be viewed by the Persian Government as a direct violation of the Shah’s sovereign rights in that quarter.”

To this remonstrance M. Beger replied that Persia had no reasonable grounds for objecting to the course pursued by the Russian Government, inasmuch as the Persian frontier extended no further than the Attrek, beyond which the Shah had never exercised any authority over the Turkoman tribes, who professed to be and in reality were an independent population under the immediate government of their own hereditary Chiefs.

The Persian Minister rejoined that the authority of the Shah was more or less precarious in many other districts near the line of frontier, but that this could not invalidate his claim to those places, for that the same argument might be employed respecting the whole tract of country from Balkan Bay to the Attrek, and even to the territory between that river and the Gurgan, extending to within a few miles of Astrabad, and stretching eastward along the frontier of Khorassan to Merv, since there also it must be admitted that Persia had hitherto been unable to consolidate her authority.

75. Mr. Alison’s opinion on the rights of Persia north of the Attrek.—Mr. Alison, who was consulted by Lord Clarendon, appears to have

taken the Russian view of the question. In his letter dated November 19th, 1869, he wrote that, although Persia might have exercised some influence north of the Attrek in the early days of the present dynasty, he was not aware on what grounds the Persians could claim Kizzil-Soo as part of their territory. In a subsequent letter, dated 18th December 1869, Mr. Alison mentioned the fact that a few years previously the question of moving the Russian Naval Station at Ashurade to Hussun-Kooli just opposite on the main land had been discussed and strongly recommended by Prince Oukhtomski, the Commandant, from which it was clear that Russia recognised no claim on the part of Persia on the eastern coast of the Caspian north of the Attrek. Mr. Alison, however, admitted that

“the establishment of a Russian military post at Hussun-Kooli, and the formation of a route along the course of the Attrek River, would afford matter for serious consideration to Persia, whose frontier in that direction might be exposed to the organised inroads of overwhelming hostile tribes.”

M. Beger in the meantime continued to assure Mirza Saeed Khan that there was no ground for apprehension: that the expedition had been despatched to the Turkoman coast with the sole object of developing and giving additional security to trade with Central Asia; that, owing to recent revolts of the Kirghiz tribes, the routes across the steppes from Orenburg to Kokand, and through Mangyshlak to Khiva, were no longer safe for caravans: and Russia had therefore resolved on opening a new and direct road for commerce from the Caspian to the Oxus; for that purpose it was necessary to occupy a position on the coast where the presence of a small force would have a salutary effect in repressing Turkoman marauders and giving confidence to trade: Kizzil-Soo had been selected as the most suitable spot for such an establishment, it being at some distance from the Persian frontier, and the intervening territory between the Caspian and the Oxus being inhabited by tribes who owed no allegiance to the Shah. When, however, the Persian Minister proposed that M. Beger should engage formally on the part of his Government that the Russians *would not occupy any territory to the south of Kizzil-Soo*, and that he should also come to a distinct understanding with the Shah's Ministers as to what was to be recognised as the Persian boundary line along the frontiers of the Turkoman country, the Russian Minister declined to take any such engagement without instructions from St. Petersburg.

76. Persian admission of Russian claims up to the Attrek, March 1870.—On the 7th March 1870 Mr. Thomson communicated intelligence from Teheran to the effect that the Persians had made a most damaging admission in respect to the Attrek line. As will be seen hereafter, there is reason to believe that a secret understanding existed between Russia and Persia, by which the rights of the latter were to be recognised up to the Attrek River. Mr. Thomson's views were based on the report of the Astrabad Agent, who wrote that on the 22nd instant a reply had been received from Teheran to the Astrabad Governor's representation respecting the landing of the Russians at Kizzil-Soo. The Shah had addressed a firman to the Governor saying that the Russians intended having a port at Kizzil-Soo for their commerce with Turkistan, and that such a step would in no way injuriously affect Persia, its subjects or tribes. But the Persian Ministers had written that

“the Russians are not to cross the Attrek, which is six *fursakhs* distant from the Gurgan River and Ak-Kaleh; they are at liberty to build whatever they like on the other side of the Attrek, but not anything on the Persian side.

[*Vide Secret, April 1873, No. 67, and pages 34, 37, 38, 46, 47, 73, 74, Collection of Correspondence respecting Central Asia, No. 2 of 1873, laid before Parliament.*]

77. Gortschakoff's assurance in December 1869 that Russians would not establish themselves on the Attrek.—The explanation

given to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg in December 1869 was more favorable to Persia, and probably less accurate. Prince Gortschakoff informed Sir A. Buchanan that there were then, including troops and artificers, about 1,000 men at Krasnovodsk, and that workmen in large numbers would doubtless be sent over in the spring from the Caucasus to construct buildings and to execute other works, and he looked forward to the place becoming an important commercial town. With respect to it, or rather to the country of the Turkomans, Prince Gortschakoff stated that the Shah of Persia had never any better claim to it than the King of Italy to the throne of Jerusalem; but the question had been discussed in Count Nesselrode's time, *when Russia acknowledged Persian sovereignty to the Attrek*, and held Persia responsible for the conduct of the Turkomans within that limit:

"and now," he said, "*the Persian Government has asked us for assurances which we have readily given, that we do not intend to build fortresses or establish ourselves on the Attrek.*"

[Sir A. Buchanan, dated 29th December 1869, page 42, *Parliamentary Papers, Central Asia, No. 2 of 1873.*]

78. Rumours in 1872 regarding Perso-Russian agreement in respect to the Attrek.—Reports of Russian designs upon the Attrek Valley received startling confirmation in May 1872, when Mr. Dickson wrote from Teheran to inform Lord Granville that the River Attrek was to be the frontier line between Russia and Persia according to an arrangement which had been made about two years previously by the Russian Mission and the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Sadr Azem, however, professed to have been ignorant of the transaction until a short time before, when the Governor of Astrabad had applied to him for instructions. And in the following January both the Russian and Persian Ministers in London positively denied the existence of any secret treaty by which Persia had ceded to Russia territory on the Attrek. Count Brunnow "not only was not aware of it, but was sure it did not exist." And the Persian Minister asserted he had no knowledge of the Russians having taken possession in any way of the valley of the Attrek, adding that there was no *firman* from the Shah giving the Russians possession of some Persian territory on the Attrek. *Indeed, the territory described did not belong to Persia.*

[Pages 109-124, *Central Asia Correspondence for Parliament, No. 1873.*]

On 23rd January 1873 Lord Granville wrote to Teheran, to the effect that Her Majesty's Government desired to possess more precise information in regard to the alleged secret engagement, and more especially the extent along the banks of the River Attrek over which Persia had acknowledged the control of Russia, and what concession of territory affecting Persia was involved in it:—

"Her Majesty's Government would, for instance, wish to know how far Turkoman tribes between Krasnovodsk and the Attrek River were subject to or under the control of Persia previously to the arrangement, and whether and how far the arrangement may be deemed an encroachment on Persian territory, or a stepping-stone to the further advance of Russia towards Meshed, Khorassan, and Afghanistan in another."

79. Russian declaration of 1869 in respect to the Attrek.—This despatch crossed on its way a letter from Mr. R. F. Thomson, No. 10, dated 27th January, giving such information as he had been able to obtain upon the subject. The Persian Ministers still denied that any treaty relating to the Attrek had been signed by the Shah's Government. But Mr. Thomson was furnished confidentially with a copy of the official declaration made by the Russian Minister in 1869 in reply to the remonstrances of the Persian Government against the Russian occupation of Krasnovodsk. The Sadr Azem stated that on receipt of this declaration the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs had

abstained from pressing the matter further on the Russian Government. The declaration bore date the 13th December 1869, and ran as follows :—

“His Majesty the Shah having on the 12th instant (4th December) requested the undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor, to explain for what object the fort at Kizzil-Soo (Krasnovodsk) was being constructed, and having also required an assurance that the Russian authorities would in no way interfere in the affairs of the Yomud Turkomans and of those living on the Attrek and Gurgan Rivers; also that no fort or stronghold should hereafter be built at the embouchures of the Attrek or Gurgan Rivers, and likewise that they should not interfere in any way with the possessions of Persia, but that the Persian Government should continue to maintain the authority they have hitherto held in respect to these tribes and their territories;—in accordance with the wish expressed by His Majesty the Shah, the undersigned lost no time in referring by telegraph to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the Emperor, and he has now the pleasure to bring to the knowledge of the Ministers of His Majesty the Shah the reply which he has just received, to the effect that the Government of His Majesty the Emperor recognises the authority and sovereignty of Persia up to the banks of the Attrek River, and that they have no intention to construct any fort. The undersigned begs most respectfully that His Excellency Mirza Saeed Khan, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, will represent these friendly and satisfactory assurances to His Majesty the Shah, and has the honor, &c.”

[*Secret, April 1874, Nos. 147-148.*]

It is scarcely necessary to observe that the fortification of Chikishlar near the mouth of the Attrek was inconsistent with the above declaration. As regards the declaration itself, Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran was of opinion, notwithstanding the asseverations to the contrary of the Sadr Azem, that when it was made—

“the Shah did send an officer of his Court who read to the Russian Minister an autograph memorandum, but did not give a copy of it, expressing His Majesty's satisfaction with the declaration in question.”

And Mr. Thomson went on to explain that this could not be wondered at, considering the miseries to which Persian subjects had been exposed from Turkoman forays. The Shah's Government had, in fact, only lately been awakened to the danger arising from a Russian occupation of the Attrek country.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 152.*]

80. Interpretation put by the Persians on the Russian declaration of 1869 in respect to the Attrek.—But in one very important particular the Persians place a narrower construction upon the declaration than the terms of it would at first sight appear to bear. In his despatch No. 30, dated 26th March 1873, the Minister at Teheran stated :—

“The Persian Government considers that the declaration made to them by the Russian Minister respecting the Attrek * * * had no reference to the territory in the interior towards Khorassan, but regarded only the territory adjoining the province of Astrabad, that is, from the Caspian Coast at the mouth of the Attrek along the banks of that river for about 30 miles to where the Gurgan district ends. This has been clearly explained by the Sadr Azem to M. Beger, who appears, however, to have avoided a discussion of the question.”

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 1497.*]

The British Minister at Teheran in his letter No. 99, dated 16th August 1873, produced evidence in support of the Persian view of the case. He wrote :—

“Although it is one of the points of gravest interest for England that Russia should hold no territory on the right bank of the Attrek, or exercise authority over the nomad tribes encamped thereon, or indeed that she should possess any part of the line of coast lying south of the port of Krasnovodsk, still without entering into the question of the validity of the informal assent which the Government of Russia so strenuously declare the Shah has given that the right bank of the River Attrek shall be considered to be the line of frontier on the Turkoman Steppe between Russia and Persia, it would appear to be a subject for enquiry what idea the Shah attached to the definition in question when the alleged assent was given.

"The Russian declaration that the Attrek should be considered the boundary between Russia and Persia was made in 1869, but in 1866 the Shah made a journey to the province of Khorassan, and the journal kept by His Majesty on that occasion was published at Teheran. At page 321 of that work, speaking of the rivers of Khorassan, there is the following passage:—

"The River 'Battrek' which flows by Koochan has its source on the north of the Deregez mountain. On its passing Koochan and entering the province of Boojnoord it is called 'Soum Bar,' and when it reaches Gurgan it is named the 'Attrek.'

"It follows therefore that, when the Russian declaration was made, His Majesty could have had no other idea than that it had reference to the lower part of the River Battrek when it has entered the Gurgan territory."

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 161.*]

81. Persian claims on the Attrek described by Sir H. Rawlinson.—Thus, also, Sir H. Rawlinson wrote in his memorandum dated 7th May 1873 on the Russian Map of Central Asia:—

"The Russian frontier is laid down from the embouchure of the Attrek in the Caspian along the main stream of the river for about 200 miles, or as far as the meridian of Boojnoord; but Persia certainly claims all the valleys through which flow the right hand affluents of the Attrek, these valleys indeed being inhabited by the Kurdish colonists who were placed there by Shah Abbas to guard the Khorassan frontier against the inroads of the Turkomans. Persia claims as her frontier in this quarter—*1stly*, the line of the Attrek to the junction of the Simbar; *2ndly*, the course of that river to its source in the Karendagh; and *3rdly*, the watershed dividing the streams which flow into the Attrek from those running north-west towards the Turkoman desert, and watering the lands of the Tekkes at the base of the hills. (It is interesting to observe from this map that the Russians appear to have surveyed a line of route along the northern slopes of these hills from the vicinity of the Caspian to Merv, every Turkoman village and fort being laid down with topographical precision.)

[*Secret, July 1873, No. 132.*]

This point was thought of so much importance that Colonel Walker was instructed to recall copies of his Map of Turkistan in which the Persian frontier line had been drawn along the south bank of the Attrek River from the supposed principal source of the river down to the junction with the Caspian Sea. Colonel Walker was instructed that the Persian boundary along the Attrek should be delineated in strict accordance with Sir H. Rawlinson's views, and, as will be seen by reference to the reprint of the map, these orders were carried out.

[*Secret, November 1873, Nos. 8-10.*]

[*„ February 1874, No. 98.*]

82. Russian account of the understanding with Persia in respect to the Attrek line.—The Russian official explanation of the understanding in respect to the Attrek was reported in despatch from the Ambassador at St. Petersburg, No. 52, dated 5th February 1872. The Ambassador called on M. de Stremoukoff with the view of eliciting information from him on the subject of the reported treaty between Russia and Persia for the cession of a portion of Persian territory to Russia. M. de Stremoukoff, however,—

"denied that any such engagement existed, supporting this denial by stating that (*un accord*) an agreement had been come to some years ago between England and Russia by which both countries agreed to respect the integrity of Persian territory.

"His Excellency then stated that in 1865 (I believe) the Russian Government, with a view to facilitate the suppression of brigandage and piracy on the part of the nomad tribes frequenting the shores of the Caspian, had proposed to the Persian Government to make the

* Gurgan.

Attrek River the boundary of Persia, in lieu of another small river* which was more to the south of the Attrek and which had hitherto been the recognised frontier; consequently the Persian territory was increased rather than diminished, or, as I had observed to M. de Stremoukoff, Russia had by this arrangement disposed of a strip of land in favor of Persia which virtually did not belong to her.

"This arrangement, as far as I am informed, was recorded in an official communication to the Persian Government without any instrument of a bilateral nature. It was agreed that the two Governments should mutually assist each other in the suppression of the forays of the nomad tribes, and for this purpose at the corner of the Caspian Sea, north of the *Attrek*, a small Russian encampment (not a Government in the usual signification of the term) was established solely for the purpose of watching the nomad tribes, and of protecting the Croats. M. de Stremoukoff expressly stated that there were no forts along the line of the Caspian to the Persian frontier but those of *Alexandrofsk* and of *Krasnovodsk*.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 119.*]

83. Failure of Russian endeavours to enlist the aid of the Turkoman tribes to the *Khivan* campaign.—In order to understand clearly more recent events, it is necessary that some account should here be given of the actual relations between the Russians and the Turkomans before, during, and immediately after the *Khivan* expedition. At first the Russians made considerable efforts to enlist the nomad tribes on their side. Conferences were held in the summer of 1872 at *Ashurade* with the Turkoman Chiefs, who received presents, promises, and applications for assistance. But the agents of the Khan of *Khiva* were also at work, and by October 1872 it was known that, owing to the activity of these emissaries, the Russian endeavours to induce the Turkomans of the *Attrek* and the adjoining steppes to furnish camels and baggage for the transport service had for the most part failed. In the same month, October 1872, the *Astrabad* Agent informed Her Majesty's *Chargé d'Affaires* at *Teheran* that a Russian force, which had been ordered to proceed from *Kizzil-Soo* and *Chikishlar* to *Balkan* with the view of purchasing camels from the *Yomuds*, had been misled by a *Jaffer-bai* guide and had mostly perished in the desert; that the Russians, in revenge, had arrested and imprisoned 100 *Jaffer-bai* Turkomans, who were only released on each giving a camel; and that the Turkomans were so alarmed at these proceedings that even the *Attrek* Turkomans had fled to the border of the *Gurgan* River, and were anxious to place themselves under the protection of the Persian Governor of *Astrabad*.

[*Political A., October 1872, No. 365.*]

[*Secret, December ,, ,, 325.*]

[*,, February 1873, ,, 233.*]

84. Capture of *Akhal* by the Russians and fortification of *Kareekala* towards the end of 1872. The *Akhalees* seek aid from *Merv*.—Matters therefore were ripe for a quarrel, and before the end of the year 1872 the news came that Russian troops, sent from the Caspian, had captured *Akhal*, which was described by the *Chargé d'Affaires* at *Teheran* as a place situated within the Turkoman territory on the *Attrek* River, about three marches to the north of the Persian town of *Boojnoord*; the Turkomans were dispersing, some taking refuge in *Persia*, others in *Merv*; the Russians were converting *Kareekala* into a stronghold; and the taking of *Akhal* had caused much consternation at *Meshed*, where it was said—

"It is only five stages from *Akhal* to the beginning of the *Ab-i-Tejjen*; therefore there is no doubt that the Russians will take *Herat* very soon."

As the Fort of *Kareekala* is an important point with reference to recent Russian movements, it may be well here to give such information as we possess regarding its situation. Captain *Napier* states that *Kareekala* stands on the spur of the mountain known as the *Soong-ting Soor*, or *Soont Soor* at the edge of the "*Dasht*," a wide plateau to the north of the *Ab-i-Soont*. The *Ab-i-Soont* is a stream draining the long high spur of the *Atak* Chain, which forms the boundary wall of the "*Atak*" and runs north-west past *Kizzil-Arvad* into the desert. The *Ab-i-Soont* is a tributary of the *Chandyr*, which again is a tributary of the *Attrek*, joining it at the point known as the *Chat-i-Attrek*. The

distance between Kareekala and the junction of the Ab-i-Soont and Chandyr, the point at which a force attacking from that direction would enter the hills, is said to be eight *fursakhs*. There is also a road from Kareekala to Kizzil-Arvad, ten *fursakhs* long, said to be passable for guns. From Hussun Kooli, a Turkoman settlement on the north of the Attrek estuary, Kareekala is approached by a road of four stages, aggregating 39 *fursakhs*, through Byat-i-Haji, Chat-i-Attrek and Chat-i-Chandyr. There is, moreover, a good bridle road leading south-west from the fort of Kareekala to the Gurgan plain; and this road is said to have been used by the Akhal Tekkes, when they held Kareekala as a starting point for their raids in this direction. From particulars supplied by Captain Napier it appears that about four years ago the Saham-udowla, Eelkhana or Chief of the Shahdilloo Koords, drove out the Turkomans; and it is noticeable that the Persian force was able to break the walls of the Fort of Kareekala with light field guns. After the fall of Khiva, 200 Goklen families, with the assent of the Eelkhana, took possession of, and repaired, the Fort. These Goklens are said to be still in possession and to be *nominally* subject to Persia. But they have been exposed to numerous attacks from the Tekkes; and, on the other hand, a rumour that they are leagued with the Akhal has given offence to Russia, who still regards them as her subjects and only awaits an opportunity to coerce them.

[*Captain Napier's Memorandum on the Topography of the Eastern Alburz Tract.*]

In January 1873 it was reported from Boojnoord that the Russians had left Akhal towards the close of the preceding November. Before going, they had dispersed the people of Kizzil-Arvad and Baum, and had built a fort at Kareekala, where they had remained for some time. On receiving orders of recall they departed for Balkan and the Caspian, but on leaving gave out that they would come back in the spring and take possession of the country. It should here be observed that these proceedings were not allowed to pass without protest on the part of Persia. As will be seen hereafter, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs remonstrated against the Russian reconnoitring expedition along the right bank of the Attrek to Kareekala and the districts lying north of Boojnoord. The Akhalees in the meantime, through their Chief, Noor Wirdee Khan, had written to Kousheed Khan, the Chief of the Tekkes at Merv, asking what course should be followed:—

“Will you send us aid, so that we may fight? If you will grant us a locality at Merv, we will repair thither. If you consider it advisable, we will accept service under the Kajjar (the Shah of Persia).”

And the Mervees, it was said, were intending to send 2,000 men with camels to try and attack the Russians first, and then to bring the Akhalees to Merv. Over the Turkomans in the neighbourhood of Astrabad the Russians had completely gained the upper hand; the Yomuds were quite peaceable through fear of the Russians; many of the Jaffer-bai tribe had taken service, and, wherever the Russians went, they were accompanied by 30 or 40 Jaffer-bai horsemen.

[*Secret, May 1873, Nos. 22-26.*]

[„ *June* „ *No. 34.*]

[„ „ „ *Nos. 389-90.*]

[„ *July* „ *No. 2.*]

85. Turkoman hostility to Russia during the Khivan campaign.—In the summer of 1873, while the Khivan campaign was being carried out, it was natural that all sorts of rumours should be spread in respect to Russian dealings with the Turkomans. In May 1873, the Governor of Deregez was informed that the Akhalees had held a Council with the Turkomans of Merv and some of the Yomuds, and had arranged to settle at Merv and strengthen it, after which they were to collect all their fighting men and oppose

the Russians at Khiva. In June 1873, news reached Meshed to the effect that the Russians had sent a force to attack the Akhalées by Kizzil-Arvad: that 2,000 foot and 1,000 horse had gone to the assistance of the Akhalees from Merv: and that the Merv, Salor, and Akhalee horsemen had assembled with the view of fighting the Russians: in the event of defeat the Akhalees and their property were to be transported to Merv.

[*Political A., August 1873, No. 14.*]

[*Secret, August 1873, No. 89.*]

86. **Markozoff's expedition across the Attrek in the spring of 1873.**—An incident also occurred in connexion with the march of Colonel Markozoff's troops from Chikishlar in the early spring of 1873 which served not only to illustrate the Persian view of the Attrek boundary agreement, but also to show how little that agreement was respected when Russian interests required a different course. In March 1873 it was reported from Astrabad that a detachment of 200 soldiers and 50 Cossacks, with two guns, had crossed the Attrek and marched through the Gurgan districts, occupied by the Zaffarbaee tribes, to the encampment of Kurreem Khan, the Chief of the Attabae Yomud Turkomans, situated within eight miles of the town of Astrabad. Kurreem Khan and some of the elders of his tribe had been seized by the Russians and taken prisoners, while the officers in command of the detachment was said to have seized the opportunity to secure and carry off with him a large number of camels belonging to the Attabae tribe.

87. **Explanation given by the Russian Minister at Teheran regarding the violation of the Attrek line.**—The Persian Government immediately demanded an explanation from M. Beger, who informed the Sadr Azem that Russia fully recognised the Shah's right to all territory south of the Attrek, and had no wish to interfere in any way with that territory, but that the Russian troops had recently been attacked by the Turkomans, who had killed seven Russian soldiers, and it was obvious that the Russian General in command at Chikishlar, being about to march through the Turkoman territory to Khiva, could not allow an attack of this kind to go unpunished. It was absolutely necessary for the safety of the whole expedition that punishment should be inflicted promptly and in a way that would show all the Turkomans unmistakably that the Russians could not be assailed by them with impunity, and on the other hand it was well known that Persia had very little power or authority over the Turkoman tribes inhabiting the country between the Gurgan River and the Attrek. It would, therefore, have been useless to apply to the Shah's Government for redress in the matter, and the Russian General had consequently detached a small force from the Attrek to follow up and punish the Turkomans who had attacked his troops. This had accordingly been done, and Kurreem Khan had been brought to account for his recent hostile proceedings. M. Beger further stated that Prince Ornoussoff, until lately Russian Chargé d'Affaires here, had informed the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs in the end of January, that if the force at Chikishlar was interfered with in any way by the Turkomans, the Russian troops would at once follow and punish them wherever they might be found.

If the Sadr Azem was to be believed, no such communication had been received. At any rate the Persian Government reiterated their objections and took the opportunity to remonstrate against the recent movements of the Russian reconnoitring expedition sent on the preceding autumn along the right bank of the Attrek to Kareekala, and the district lying to the north of Boojnoord. It was then also that the Persian Government acquainted Her Majesty's Ambassador at Teheran with their construction of the agreement in respect to the Attrek, *viz., that it had no reference to the territory in the*

interior towards Khorassan, but regarded only the territory adjoining the Province of Astrabad, that is, from the Caspian coast at the mouth of the Attrek along the banks of that river about 30 miles to where the Gorgan District ends—(vide supra page 76).

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 149.*]

88. Correspondence between M. Beger and Mirza Saeed Khan about the violation of the Attrek frontier.—In April 1873 diplomatic notes were exchanged between the Russian Minister at Teheran and the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the violation of the frontier. The former reminded Mirza Saeed Khan that in the preceding October Prince Ornoussoff, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, addressed a note pointing out the evil deeds of the Turkomans on the Persian side of the Attrek towards the Russian troops, and requested the punishment of the offenders, which was not inflicted; that this omission was attributed by the Russian Government, not so much to unwillingness of the Persian Government to carry out the just demand of the Legation, as to its want of authority and control over the Turkomans on the Persian side of the Attrek; and that the Russian troops were therefore obliged to take the responsibility upon themselves. M. Beger proceeded:—

“Several months ago the Turkomans on the Persian side having crossed the Attrek, they again committed evil acts towards the Russian troops, who could not rely upon the Persian authorities to pursue and punish the offenders. The pursuit of such offenders, who, although residing in Persian territory, are an obstacle to the exercise of Persian authority, has not left any trace of damage having been done to the country, and cannot have in the least affected the rights of sovereignty. The undersigned therefore does not make any alteration in the statements which he had communicated to the Persian Government in his letter No. 82 of the 25th December 1869.”

And he concluded by respectfully remarking that the Government of His Imperial Majesty would feel extremely rejoiced if the Persian Government should consolidate its authority in those districts, and thus relieve the Russian troops from the disagreeable necessity of punishing the culprits who crossed over from the Persian side of the Attrek.

The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs in his reply did not apparently venture to state the opinion of his Government in regard to the Russian claims upon the Attrek line. He contented himself with arguing that the case of Turkomans escaping from the Russian to the Persian side of the river was different from that in which the offenders were Turkoman subjects of Persia, and that the flight of a few offenders to the Persian side could not be assumed as a reason for the troops of Russia crossing into Persian territory, and making free of the country by treating Persian subjects and dependants in the way in which Kurreem Khan of the Yomud tribe and others had been treated. He requested that the Russian Minister would take effectual steps to prevent in future any aggression whatever by Russian troops on the lands and territory of Persia.

[*Secret, April 1874, Nos. 157-158.*]

89. The instructions from Prince Gortschakoff on which M. Beger acted in reference to the Attrek frontier.—M. Beger's communication was in strict accordance with the instructions which he had received from the Russian Chancellor, under date the 23rd March 1873. These instructions are important in several respects, and a close translation of the principal portion of them will therefore now be given. Prince Gortschakoff admitted that the Imperial Government had received intimation of an expedition undertaken by the Russian troops beyond the Attrek on the 10th—24th February 1873:

“The expedition had for its object the chastisement of the Turkomans of the left bank, who had attacked, annoyed, and plundered those of the right bank,—fired on our detachments, and

wounded one of our Cossacks. Such an aggression could not be allowed to go unpunished ; no Persian authority on the spot was in a position to repress these disorders and to punish the guilty. Colonel Markozoff was forced to take these duties upon himself.

" He was careful to warn the Persian authorities of Astrabad through the channel of our Consulate. Our detachment crossed the Attrek, inflicted on the Turkomans a well merited punishment, and returned on the same day to the right bank of the Attrek, after having released and despatched to Astrabad a Persian subject who had been found loaded with chains and a captive among the Turkomans.

" There end the particulars we have received. The second telegram from Teheran, communicated by the Persian Legation, mentions another expedition, undertaken by Colonel Markozoff, across the Attrek early in March. It is said to have been directed as far as the Gurgan, where it plundered tents of the Yomuds, after having captured and imprisoned their Chief Kurreem Khan.

" We have no information on this head. It is possible that a second expedition may have taken place. All that we can say is, if it has taken place, without doubt it is because it was provoked like the first. The expedition has been undertaken with the same object and for the same reasons. Further, we do not wish to dwell on questions of fact which will be explained by information to be received hereafter, but we ought to take up the question of right which appears to underlie the remonstrances presented by the Persian Legation in the name of its Government.

" We thought, Monsieur, that this question had been set at rest by the clear and frank explanation which the Prince Ornoussoff had been instructed to offer to His Persian Majesty in the month of November.

" It was intended by those explanations to show that our establishment, founded in 1869 at Krasnovodsk, having for its immediate consequence the recognition of the course of the Attrek as the line of demarcation between Russia and Persia in the Turkoman Steppe, there resulted on both sides the mutual duty of maintaining the peace and safety of the line which had been accepted by both parties. This is an obligation which flowed from their rights. It was to their mutual advantage.

" The Government of Persia having admitted its own inability to repress the disorders which reigned among these nomad tribes, it has been deemed just and expedient to grant our detachments the right of inflicting reprisals on the Turkomans who were guilty of acts of aggression and to pursue across the Attrek those who might be expected to take refuge there, so long as there should be no hope of obtaining from the Persian Government itself the repression of such misdeeds. Prince Ornoussoff warned the Ministers of the Shah accordingly. We have nothing to add to, or retrench from, the instructions which he carried out. So far as we are informed, the expedition undertaken by our troops on the other side of the Attrek was in entire accord with the spirit of these explanations.

" Colonel Markozoff was provoked by an open attack. No measures had been taken by the Persian Government to hinder that attack, and no Persian authority was at hand to punish the aggressors.

" The intentions to that effect which you communicated to us on the part of the Shah's Government in November of last year have not been fulfilled. The Persian Minister at St. Petersburg, while stating the remonstrances of his Government, has not even alluded to any steps of the kind, and the fact that a subject of Persia was found a captive among the Turkomans and released by our troops bears sufficient witness to the absence of an effectual control on the part of the Government of the Shah over the nomad tribes encamped in the tract over which his sovereignty extends.

* * * * *

" Be good enough then to repeat to the Ministers of His Persian Majesty that we should be the first to congratulate ourselves if the Government of the Shah should establish firmly its authority over the portion of the Turkoman Steppe which is included in its territory and substitute a social and political condition of some regularity for the vague and ill-defined situation which now exists on the Attrek.

* * * * *

" I need scarcely add that measures of repression will only be adopted in case of absolute necessity, that they will be transient in character, and that no establishment will be set up by our Military Commanders south of the Attrek.

* * * * *

" If the remonstrances preferred by the Persian Minister in the name of his Government were simply designed to affirm once more a question of principle, that is to say, the maintenance of the Attrek as marking the limit up to which the sovereignty of the Shah extends over the Turkoman Steppe, you are authorised by order of the Emperor to give the Minister of His Persian Majesty the positive assurance that the Imperial Cabinet finds no difficulty in renewing the declarations already made in its name by the Prince Ornoussoff.

Nothing can be plainer than that up to the time of the above instructions the Russians were content with the line of the Attrek, and had or professed to have no intention of advancing beyond that river.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 204.*]

90. Progress of the controversy about the Attrek frontier in August 1873, Mr. Thomson's prediction of the next step which the Russians would take.—Up to August 1873, the controversy appears to have been prolonged without any satisfaction to Persia. On 2nd August Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran wrote that the provisional Government had succeeded in coming to an understanding that the question should be deferred for further discussion, until the Shah and the Grand Vizier, who were then on a tour in Europe should have returned to Teheran, and on the 16th of the same month gave the following opinion on the general question :—

“ For the present, Russian troops have been withdrawn from the banks of the Attrek, and with some publicity from the worthless post of Chikishlar ; but, unless Russian policy should have been modified in consequence of her new position in the Khanate of Khiva, *her next step will probably be the construction of a fortified position at Kareekala or other equally favorable position on the right bank of the Attrek*, whence, whenever it may suit her policy to do so, the principle recently formally enunciated by the Russian Foreign Office, in its correspondence with the Persian Government, of the right of Russian troops to follow and chastise offending nomad Turkoman tribes within Persian territory would be enforced, and could hardly fail to lead, at any desired moment, to the permanent occupation of the Hyrcanian territory, under the pretext of acts of brigandage having been perpetrated by the tribes on the left bank of the Attrek upon those of the right, or upon Russian subjects trading between Astrabad and the provinces to the eastward.”

The italicised passage in the foregoing extract is worth noticing in anticipation of the more recent events, which will be mentioned further on.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 161.*]

91. Rumours of approaching hostilities between the Russians and Turkomans in the Autumn of 1873.—In the meantime Khiva had been taken and the quarrel with the Turkomans embittered by Kaufmann's cruel treatment of the Yomuds. Towards the end of August 1873 the Meshed Agent reported that the warlike Tekkes and the elders of the Akhalee tribes, *accompanied by such as had escaped the Khivan expedition*, proceeded *en masse* to Kousheed Khan, Chief of the Tekkes, and constituted him ruler and master of their lives and property. The Chief thereupon ordered the fortification of Merv, and that preparations should be made for war with Russia.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 186.*]

On the 4th September 1873 Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran telegraphed that Kousheed Khan, Chief of the Tekke Turkoman tribe at Merv, had informed the Persian Government that the tribes had been warned by the Russian Government either to tender their submission to Russia or prepare for war : the tribes therefore wished to be taken under the protection of the Shah : and the provisional Persian Government were disposed to comply with the wish on the Turkomans surrendering the guns captured when the Persian army under Prince Humzeh were totally defeated at Merv in 1860.

Kousheed Khan was said to have made a similar overture to Sirdar Yakoob Khan, son of the Ameer of Cabul, and then Ruler of Herat.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 213.*]

92. Anxiety in Afghanistan consequent upon Russian designs on Merv.—It may be noted here that the anxiety and embarrassment

in Afghanistan arising from apprehensions of a Russian advance to Merv were very marked. Information on this subject will be found in Chapter IX of the *Cabul Précis*. The fears of Ameer Shere Ali Khan are summed up in the following extract :—

“It is manifest that, as soon as the Russians take possession of Merv, the boundary of their kingdom will come into juxtaposition with the Herat borders, and, on account of the unscrupulous policy of the Russians, we shall always remain in great danger.”

And the immediate ground of his fear is that to which attention was drawn in despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg to Lord Granville, dated 20th November 1873 :—

“It is as clear as daylight that, as soon as the Russians take possession of Merv (Shahjehan), the Turkomans will necessarily take refuge in Badghees, in the province of Herat, and if they do not desist from their misbehaviour, *viz.*, from causing injury to the Russians from time to time, the Russians will undoubtedly send messages to the Afghan Government, that either the Turkomans should be prevented from aggression, or permission should be given to them, the Russians, to punish the hostile tribes.”

The policy pursued by the Government of India has been to advise the Ameer to abstain as far as possible from interference in the affairs of the Turkomans beyond his frontier, and to disclaim the allegiance which they proffered to him on being menaced by the Russians. And His Excellency the Viceroy informed Shere Ali's Envoy, when he visited Simla in July, August 1873, that

“the Ameer would do a most unwise thing to make himself responsible for such people in any way whatever. Of course, friendly answers should be returned to friendly letters from them, but the Ameer should in no way make himself responsible for them or countenance their lawless proceedings or any opposition on their part to the march of Russian troops.”

It was reported at Sarraks in October 1873 that the Ameer had declined to send troops to aid the Mervees, but he was said to have offered support in cash and ammunition. Enquiries from Cabul elicited an absolute denial of any such promise. The Ameer told the Cabul Agent that

“the son of Kousheed Khan, Chief of Merve (Shahjehan), who is a man wanting in intelligence, is yet at Cabul, and will shortly return to his country unsuccessfully. Many of the people of Turkoman territory come to Herat for the sale of their horses; probably they gave out this false rumour. I have given no promise of aid to Kousheed Khan's son, nor do I intend to do so.”

It will be observed, however, from Captain Napier's memorandum (Appendix II), that the promise is still believed by the people on the spot to have been given.

[*K.-W. Secret, September 1873, Nos. 118-139, and Sec. 956, Chap. IX., Cabul Précis; also Secret, April 1874, No. 188, and Cabul Diary 11th to 13th November 1873.*]

93. Sir H. Rawlinson's memorandum on the rumoured intention of the Russians to attack the Turkomans of Merv.—The gravity of the situation at this juncture was duly appreciated by Sir H. Rawlinson, who recorded the following memorandum :—

“If the Russians are really interfering with the Tekke Turkomans of Merve, as reported in Mr. Tylour Thomson's telegram, it is serious and requires careful consideration.

“The Tekkes are by far the most warlike and powerful of all the Turkoman tribes. They hold the desert along and beyond the northern slope of the hills which form the northern frontier of Khorassan from the Upper Attek to Merv, and are thus entirely removed from all contact with Russian territory, unless that Power, contrary to her declared intentions, should retain possession of Khiva.

“If Khiva is after all to be incorporated like Samarkand in the Russian Empire, then no doubt it will be essential to Russian interests that the Tekkes should be conciliated or subdued, but if Russia evacuates the territory west of the Oxus, merely retaining posts at Kungrad and Urgunj, as has been semi-officially announced, then she can have no legitimate object in keeping up relations with the Tekkes to the south. I should doubt very much her being prepared under any circumstances to coerce this powerful tribe, which can bring, it is said, 40,000 horsemen into the field; it is more likely in due course of time that she will endeavour to pacify and utilise them, as she has already to a great extent pacified and utilised the Kirghiz,

but this work could only be taken in hand with a good prospect of success after Bokhara and Khiva had been both permanently occupied and merged into the Russian empire. Retaliatory expeditions may possibly be sent during the coming autumn and winter from the Russian headquarters in Khiva against the Tekkes, as they have recently been sent against the Yomuds, but for the mere purpose of intimidation and with a merely temporary effect.

“If Russia really contemplated the subjugation of the Tekkes and the occupation of Merv, as might be inferred from the message to Kousheed Khan reported by Mr. Thomson, it could only be with a view of strengthening her own position in Khiva, and obtaining a further means of pressure both on Khorassan and Herat, and any such policy ought, of course, to be steadily resisted by us.”

“Merv, although at present a mere ruin and uninhabited during nine months of the year, is of much political importance both from its strategic position and from its great natural advantages. Situated at the point where the high road from Persia to Bokhara crosses the road from Khiva to Herat, and possessing an unlimited supply of water, it will probably take a leading place in the future, history of the East. At any rate if Merv were garrisoned by Russian troops, and order were established in the surrounding country, the city would rapidly recover its old condition of prosperity, and would completely overawe Herat and Afghan-Turkistan.

“It must be evident then that all Russian proceedings in this quarter require to be very carefully watched, and, if necessary, resisted.

“I should deprecate the interference of either Persia or Herat in Turkoman affairs. The acceptance of the overtures of Kousheed Khan would certainly give grave offence to Russia, and would inevitably lead sooner or later to still more serious results, for it would be impossible either for Persians or Afghans to control the marauding habits of the Turkomans, and the protecting power would thus be liable at any moment to be compromised with Russia through the raids of the Tekkes on Khiva or Bokharian territory. What I should desire to see, though I doubt its being possible to obtain it, would be a declaration by Russia that she had no intention of interfering with the Turkomans unless attacked by those tribes, and that under no circumstance would she sanction the permanent occupation of Merv by a Russian Garrison.”

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 215.*]

94. **The Russian Press urge an expedition to Merv.**—The Russian newspapers were hounding on the Government to take severe measures with the hostile Turkomans. A story was circulated in October 1873 that after the evacuation of Khiva by General Kaufmann the Turkomans had risen in insurrection, and massacred more than 1,000 Persians liberated from slavery and on their way to the Caspian. The *Moscow Gazette* in particular urged the necessity of despatching a force into the country of the Tekke Turkomans, and recommended that “a decisive expedition” should be sent “such an one as we have not yet sent,” and “not to the Attrek alone but to the country of the Tekkes also”; that “*some one point*” in that country should be occupied, and that a line of forts should be established like that which was maintained for the control of the Kirghizes. The Turkomans, it was said, who roamed in summer over the Trans-Caspian steppes were concentrated in winter on the banks of the Attrek and Gurgan Rivers along the line of the Tekke Forts and on the borders of the Khivan oasis, where the Tekke tribe was more especially vulnerable.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 225; and Epitome of Correspondence relating to Merv, India Office, 4th March 1875.*]

95. **M. de Stremoukoff denies the intention of Russia to attack the Tekkes.**—Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who had received instructions to ascertain whether there was any foundation for these reports and rumours, had an interview with M. de Stremoukoff on the 29th October 1873. The Director of the Asiatic Department said that the report about the massacre of the Persian slaves had not been officially confirmed, and that in his opinion it was, if not wholly untrue, at least greatly exaggerated. With respect to the alleged insurrection, he disbelieved it, as there existed no understanding or alliance between the Yomud Turkomans

and the Tekke Turkomans. As a proof of their disunion, he said that previous to the late collision between the Russians and the Yomuds, the latter had sent to the Tekke tribe to seek for their aid and support. The Tekke tribe had, however, replied that not only would they give no assistance, but that if they, the Yomuds, came near them, they would treat them as enemies, who would bring them into collision with the Russians.

As to the reports, published by the Russian Press, of an intended expedition against the Turkomans, M. de Stremoukoff remarked that it would be a senseless and profitless undertaking; it would be like following the wind into the desert. He observed that it would be attended with far greater difficulties than the expedition to Khiva, and the failure of Colonel Markosoff's detachment was sufficient to prove its impracticability. It had since been ascertained, he said, that if his detachment had advanced a day further into the desert it would have been entirely sacrificed.

96. The Ambassador at St. Petersburg warns the British Government of Russian designs on Merv. Further assurances from M. de Stremoukoff.—Lord A. Loftus, while communicating the above disclaimers, took care to warn his Government that, although it might not be the immediate intention of the Russians to take any offensive measures for the subjection of the Tekke Turkomans, there could be no doubt that *the fruits of the expedition to Khiva could not be fully secured to Russia without bringing under her domination the whole district lying between the Caspian and the Oxus. It was not improbable therefore that at no distant time some pretext would be found by Russia to possess herself of the line of the Tekke Forts north of the Attek and extending nearly to Merv.* Such an advance towards Herat would, in the Ambassador's opinion, require guarantees of a nature to counterbalance the dangers to which the Indian Empire would be thereby exposed. *Under no circumstances should Russia be allowed permanently to occupy Merv, or to create fortifications there, or fortified posts contiguous to the Persian frontier, which would prove a standing menace to Persia or Herat.*

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 228.*]

M. de Stremoukoff's assurances were repeated on the 12th November 1873, but he informed the Ambassador in confidence that there was a certain party (referring evidently to the military party of the Caucasian army) who had been greatly annoyed by the non-success of that division of the army of the Caucasus under Colonel Markozoff, and consequently anxious for another campaign. His Excellency said that this military jealousy was preposterous, and that the Imperial Foreign Office would not easily assent to another expedition. Lord Loftus, however, added with well-merited sarcasm that he was inclined to look upon the Russian Press, backed by the military party, as a surer indication of future events than "the mellifluous phrases" which he received at the Imperial Foreign Office.

97. News from St. Petersburg and Teheran that the Turkomans of Merv would be attacked in the spring of 1874.—On the 20th November 1873 the Ambassador telegraphed—

"Russian Journal announces that re-inforcement of 800 men has been sent to Tashkend to new fort on Oxus as protection against menacing movement of Turkomans. I hear from reliable source that an expedition is decided upon next spring against Turkomans."

[*Secret, April 1874, Nos. 225-227.*]

On the 21st December 1873 the Meshed Agent informed Mr. Taylor Thomson that the Governor of Deregez had written to say that a caravan of 100 camels laden with indigo, green tea, &c., and accompanied by two

Russians, was attacked by the Turkomans of Merv whilst proceeding from Bokhara to Khiva. The Turkomans carried off the whole to Merv; one of the Russians was killed when the attack was made, and the other carried off into captivity. He also stated that the Khan of Kharizm had sent seven or eight messengers, at the instance of the Russian General, to the Akhalees to tell them that if they would give up their plundering habits and desist from their slave traffic, all the property, &c., would be restored to them which the inhabitants of the surrounding country had taken from them in retaliation, but should they not accept this proposal, the troops from Khiva and Bokhara would be simultaneously sent against them, either whilst the snow was on the ground, or in harvest time.

~~And~~ Some Turkomans of Merv having gone on a plundering expedition to Khiva had carried off one of the *employés* of the Russian Commissariat and confined him in Merv. A person was sent to ransom him, but the Turkomans replied that his ransom had been fixed at double his weight in imperials.

On the 14th instant the Agent saw another letter which had been received from Sarraks. It was to the effect that the Russian General had sent an Agent to Merv to demand the restitution of the plundered caravan and of the Russians, otherwise they would be treated like the Yomud tribe. The Turkomans replied that they were quite ready to fight, and that they would not give up the captives for less than 20,000 tomans.

98. Mr. Taylour Thomson's views on the danger of a Russian advance against the Turkomans.—To this information Mr. Thomson added, by telegram of the 24th January 1874, that his Russian colleague had mentioned to him a few days previously that an expedition was to be despatched against the Turkomans of Merv. And on the same day he wrote as follows:—

“About the middle of April if any expedition be contemplated by Russia against the Turkomans of the eastern and south-eastern parts of the Caspian coast, the preparations will have been either already completed, or so far advanced as to indicate the object contemplated, and even if no hostile movements be this year intended against the tribes encamped in that quarter, trustworthy and valuable information will in all probability be obtained. The unfortunate acquiescence by Persia in the declaration of Russia that the left bank of the Attrek marks in that portion of Persia its frontier line, leaves it open to Russia from the undefined terms employed to claim, whenever it may suit her, the right bank of that river from its embouchure near Hussun-Kooli to its source between Deregez and Koochan as Russian territory, and whenever this shall have been established, the first opportunity of quarrel with Persia will probably bring with it the final declaration that, as the Caspian Sea has *ab antiquo*, belonged to Persia alone, its watershed must mark her circumjacent frontier.

“The pretension asserted and acted upon by Russia last year of her right to pursue into the Persian territory of the Gurgan offending Turkoman tribes and to punish them there, is equally applicable to the punishment and coercion of the Turkoman tribes of Akhal and Merv, and, as these would probably take shelter within the Herat territory, political complications with reference to that Afghan dependency would necessarily follow.

[*Secret, April 1874, Nos. 189 to 193.*]

99. Despatch of the English Foreign Office, dated 7th January 1874, regarding the apprehended Russian advance on the Turkomans.—It was sufficiently plain by this time that, if the British Government had any representations to make on the subject of a Russian advance against the Turkomans, the occasion for making them had arrived. Accordingly, on 7th January 1874, Lord Granville wrote the confidential despatch mentioned on pages 46 and 47 of this note. After quoting the terms of the Treaty with Khiva, and giving a brief summary of the negotiations, which were more fully described in the Indian despatch dated 30th June 1873 (pages 14 *et seq.* of this note), Lord Granville went on to claim that the agreement between the two countries had been faithfully executed by the British Government; the

influence of the Government of India had been successfully exercised to dissuade the Ameer of Afghanistan from interference in the affairs of Bokhara, and from any attempt at encroachment on the territories beyond his frontier; advice of a similarly pacific character had been given by the Indian Government to the Ruler of Yarkund; and they had declined to exercise any interference in the affairs of Bokhara and Kliiva, when appealed to more than once by Envoys from those countries; testimony was borne to the fact that the action of the Russian Government on various occasions had been in accordance with the same policy, as, for example, in the efforts made by them to discourage any aggression by the Khan of Bokhara on the territories of Afghanistan, and in the refusal of General Kaufmann to give countenance to the designs of Abdool Rahman Khan, nephew of the Ameer of Afghanistan, upon the tranquillity of that country. The despatch then continued as follows:—

“The Indian Government have repeated, and will continue to repeat, as opportunity may offer, advice in the same sense as that which they have hitherto given to the Ameer of Afghanistan, but it is not unnatural that that Ruler should feel and express some uneasiness at the rapid advance of Russian power towards his frontier. His apprehensions have been more especially roused by the reported intention to send a Russian expedition to capture Merv and reduce the Turkoman tribes of those parts, and he has applied to the Government of India for advice on the subject.

“Rumours of such an expedition, to be undertaken in the ensuing spring, have reached Her Majesty's Government from various quarters. The plan has been recommended, as you are aware, by some of the most influential organs of the Russian Press. The Turkoman tribes themselves state that they have received formal warning of such an intention from the Russian authorities, and are reported to have invoked the protection of Persia. It may indeed be true that such an expedition is as yet discountenanced and disavowed by the Government at St. Petersburg, but past experience shows that it would be unwise to look upon the project as being, therefore, entirely out of the question. Circumstances may occur, as they have more than once occurred before, to force the Russian Government into a course to which they are on principle opposed. The difficulties of a power like Russia, in dealing with wild tribes on its frontier, such as those in the deserts bordering on Kliiva, are well described in Prince Gortschakoff's Circular of the 21st of November 1864. As soon as one territory is subdued, and the populations immediately bordering on it are reduced, more or less, to subjection, fresh aggressions are committed by more distant tribes. Fresh expeditions against these become necessary; and to give to these expeditions any lasting effect, fresh annexations and occupations are required. At the time of that Circular, and in order to obviate the inconveniences thus set forth, the determination was announced to adopt for the Russian possessions in Central Asia a final line of frontier, stretching from Lake Isyk Kul to the Syr Daria, and embracing the town of Tchemkend, which was to be fortified for the purpose. But in practice it was found impossible to adhere to this line. Expeditions against Bokhara had soon afterwards to be undertaken. Tashkend, Khojend, Jeezakh, and Samarkand were successively occupied.

“Speaking to Lord Clarendon in September 1869, Prince Gortschakoff stated that the Emperor considered, and he entirely shared His Majesty's opinion, that extension of territory was extension of weakness, and that Russia had no intention of going further south. As a proof of this determination, he added that it was the intention of the Emperor not to retain Samarkand. Difficulties, however, interfered with the restoration of Samarkand to the Ameer of Bokhara; first, in regard to the payment of the indemnity due by that country to Russia, and later as to the protection of Russian interests which had grown up among the population, and as to the guarantees to be obtained against misconduct on the part of its future rulers; and, although Sir A. Buchanan reported in July 1870 that Prince Orloff had been authorised by the Emperor to confirm the assurances given by Prince Gortschakoff in the preceding year, still eventually, as was confessed by Prince Gortschakoff himself in February last, the Imperial Government found, after an occupation of four years' duration, and in view of the advantages which it had conferred on the population of the city, that they could not with credit to themselves, nor in justice to the inhabitants, restore Samarkand to the Government of Bokhara, and on these grounds Russia has retained possession of it.

“It is unnecessary to retrace the series of circumstances which, in spite of the reluctance of the Russian Government, led to the recent expedition against Kliiva.

“In the face of these events it would be unwise not to contemplate the possibility that considerations of self-defence, or the necessity of punishing acts of plunder and hostility, may eventually give occasion for a Russian expedition against the Turkoman tribes.

“Those tribes have now applied to the Ameer of Cabul for advice as to the attitude which they should assume towards the Russians, and he, in his turn, has consulted the Government of India as to the reply which he should make. He has at the same time expressed his apprehensions that the result of a Russian expedition against Merv will be to

drive the Turkomans to take refuge in the province of Badghees in Herat. This, the Ameer fears, will lay him open to a demand from the Russian authorities, that he shall either prevent the Turkomans from committing aggressions, or permit the Russian forces to enter the territories of Afghanistan for the purpose of punishing the hostile tribes. An incident of this kind occurred, as you are aware, not long ago on the Persian frontier, and led to a correspondence between the Russian and Persian Governments.

"The advice given by the Government of India has been in conformity with the policy hitherto pursued. The Ameer has been warned that he should avoid taking any course which would make him responsible for lawless or hostile proceedings on the part of the Turkoman tribes. The Viceroy of India has at the same time endeavoured to re-assure him as to the safety of his territories from any aggression or attack on the part of Russia.

"In face of the agreement which exists between the two countries, it is unnecessary for Her Majesty's Government to make any profession of their conviction that Afghanistan is perfectly secure from any hostile designs on the part of Russia. They think it best, however, to bring the fears entertained by the Ameer to the knowledge of the Russian Government, and to express their earnest hope that the question of any further expedition against the Turkoman tribes may be carefully considered in conjunction with the results which the Ameer of Cabul apprehends may ensue from it. They think it right to state candidly and at once that the independence of Afghanistan is regarded by them as a matter of great importance to the welfare and security of British India and to the tranquillity of Asia. Should the Turkoman tribes be driven into the neighbourhood of Herat, now or hereafter, in consequence of any military operations effected by Russian power, the Ameer might labor under a double hardship, (1st), in the disturbance of his dominions; (2nd), if he were held responsible for controlling tribes of that wild race and restraining them from incursion upon the country from which Russia had expelled them. On the one hand, it does not appear how he could justly be held responsible in such circumstances, and if he were so held, he would have a strong claim to consideration on the part of all such as rightly appreciate his position; on the other hand, questions might thus be raised which it was the object of the engagement entered into between Great Britain and Russia to obviate, and which it cannot be the interest of either country to revive.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 248.*]

100. Conversation between Lord Loftus and the Emperor of Russia regarding the Turkomans' assurances that no expedition was intended.—The above despatch, though signed on 7th January 1874, was not issued until the concurrence of the Duke of Argyll, communicated in India Office despatch of 17th January, had been received. On the 19th January Lord A. Loftus had an interview with the Emperor of Russia, and mentioned among other subjects a feeling of alarm at certain reports promulgated by the press of an intended Russian expedition in the spring against the independent Turkoman tribes—a restless race who led a wandering life among the steppes situated between the Caspian and Afghanistan. Such an expedition, Lord Loftus said, might be productive of dangers now unforeseen. It might drive the Turkoman on the soil of Afghanistan or into the Province of Herat, which might produce complications with the Ruler of Afghanistan. This was a danger which it would be wise to foresee, in order to avoid.

His Majesty said at once that there was no intention of making any expedition against the Turkomans, but if they should attack or molest the Russian settlements, they must suffer for the consequences of it.

On the same day the Russian Chancellor assured the Ambassador with reference to his conversation with the Emperor that no expedition was intended, unless the Turkomans took the offensive. And on the 26th January the Ambassador telegraphed that, after communication of Lord Granville's despatch Prince Gortschakoff had repeated the assurance previously given, adding that the report of an expedition to Merv was groundless: the Russians would only act on the defensive, and he wished that the Turkomans might be advised to abstain from aggressive acts against the Russians.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 251.*]

101. Prince Gortschakoff's conversation with Lord Loftus in January 1874 regarding Russian intentions towards the Turkomans.—A full report of the conversation which had taken place between the Chancellor and Her Majesty's Ambassador was communicated in the latter's despatch No. 47, dated 28th January 1874:—

"His Highness observed that Her Majesty's Government could materially assist the pacific intentions of the Imperial Government by using their influence through the Ameer of Afghanistan to restrain the lawless and predatory habits of the Turkoman tribes.

"We shall not," said Prince Gortschakoff, "attack them; but if they attack us, or commit depredations on our commercial travellers, we shall be obliged to inflict punishment on them.

"I remarked to His Highness that Her Majesty's Government had no doubt of the pacific desires of the Imperial Government, but that unfortunately these desires had been frequently counteracted by the Military Commanders, who acted on their own responsibility, in contravention of the instructions of the Central Civil Government.

"Military jealousy and military ambition were powerful stimulants at so great a distance from the Central Government and were not always to be controlled.

"His Highness replied with great decision that, although there was a party anxious for military activity and decorations, he felt that his influence was sufficiently strong to counteract such endeavours, and so long as he held power these efforts would be restrained.

"As regards Afghanistan, His Highness repeated to me that the Imperial Government considered that kingdom to be beyond the sphere of their political action, and that, happen what might, in the internal state of that country the Imperial Government would not interfere.

"He referred to the positive injunctions given to Abdool Rahman Khan by the Imperial Government as the condition on which he was permitted to reside at Samarcand, that he should abstain from all intrigues and designs dangerous to the present Ruler of Afghanistan, and His Highness repeated to me the assurance that, should he contravene them, he will be removed from his present place of residence."

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 254.*]

102. Note by Prince Gortschakoff to Count Brunnow on Russian policy towards Afghanistan and the Turkomans.—The following is a translation of the note which Prince Gortschakoff sent to Count Brunnow, and communicated by him to Lord Granville, on the 17th February 1874:—

"I have expressed to the Ambassador of England the satisfaction which we feel in viewing the equitable judgment at which the Government of Her Britannic Majesty has arrived on the questions with which we have in common to deal in Asia.

"In my opinion the understanding is complete. It rests not only on the loyalty of both Governments, but on mutual political advantages which are indisputable. So long as they remain animated by a spirit of reciprocal good-will and conciliation, no political misunderstanding between them need be apprehended.

"On our side we adhere with unchangeable fidelity to the programme drawn out by mutual agreement in the shape in which it issued from my conversation with Lord Clarendon, and has since been expanded and defined by the discussions between the two Cabinets.

"I have repeated to Lord A. Loftus the positive assurance that the Imperial Cabinet persists in considering Afghanistan as altogether outside its sphere of action.

"If on either side the two Governments exert their ascendancy over the States which are placed within the scope of their natural influence, in order to turn them away from all aggression, there is ground for hope that no violent collision will arise to disturb the peace of Central Asia, and to interrupt the work of civilisation which it is the duty and the interest of the two Great Empires to bring to a successful issue.

"So far as we are concerned, this is the sense in which we act in respect to the Khanates which adjoin our possessions. We depend in full confidence on the Government of India to do the same in regard to the Ameer of Cabul, and we doubt not that it has the means of enforcing his attention (*de s'en faire éconter*).

"As regards the eventual risk which Lord Granville points out to us, and to which Shere Ali appears to have called the attention of the Government of India, namely, that the nomad

tribes of Turkomans when pursued by our troops may seek aid or asylum in the territory of Herat, and involve us in a conflict with Afghanistan, I have told Lord A. Loftus that we had no intention of undertaking an expedition against the Turkomans: it rested entirely with them to live on a good understanding with us, and even to derive advantage from our proximity and from the channels which we have exerted ourselves to open for peaceful commerce; but if these troublesome tribes betook themselves to acts of aggression and brigandage against us, we should be forced to chastise them. This is one of the necessities which the Government of Her Britannic Majesty knows by its own experience, and to which every Government brought into contact with a wild population must be content to submit.

"We are in any case the first to desire that this chastisement, if it takes place, should be inflicted as near as possible to our borders.

"Lord A. Loftus has received the same assurances from the lips of our august master and has doubtless conveyed them to his Government.

"I have added that, though the eventuality which Shere Al has indicated may be very improbable, the Ameer of Cabul can aid in rendering it impossible by giving the Turkomans to understand plainly beforehand that, if they challenge measures of severity by acts of plunder against us, they must not reckon on any aid or shelter from him.

"The Government of India is certainly in a position to convey to him this advice in a shape which will ensure its proving effectual."

[*Secret, July 1874, No. 10.*]

From this time forward the idea of an expedition against the Tekkes may be said to have been temporarily abandoned. As the Chancellor informed Count Brunnow on 24th March 1874, the orders of the Emperor forbidding any expedition whatsoever against the Tekke Turkomans were so peremptory, that no local officer would dare to disobey them: but the Russians nevertheless thought it necessary to re-occupy the Fort at Chikishlar near the mouth of the Attek with the alleged purpose, according to Lord A. Loftus, of protecting that district.

[*Secret, July 1874, Nos. 20 and 101.*]

103. Correspondence showing that the Persians contemplated joining the Russians in an expedition against the Turkomans and Merv.—At Teheran, however, there continued to be rumours of an approaching campaign in the direction of the Akhalees, Tekkes, and Merv until the midspring of 1874. But the strangest thing, considering the inevitable effect on Persia of such a movement, is this well-ascertained fact that the Persians were at one time willing to co-operate with the Russians. The hint was first thrown out in Lord A. Loftus' despatch No. 404, dated 12th November 1873. He wrote:—

"From private information which has reached me * * * * I am inclined to think that the Russian Government have some notion, although an undefined one, of forming a separate independent State of the Province of Herat, detached from the Sovereignty of Afghanistan, and charged, in common understanding with Persia and Russia, to keep under subjection the Tekke Turkomans; or that if the constitution of an independent State should prove impracticable, they (the Russian Government) may seek to gain the entire support of Persia by holding out to the Shah the hopes of acquiring Herat and the surrounding district as a tributary State under the government of Abdool Rahman Khan, now enjoying the protection of the Russian Government at Samarcand."

The Ambassador said that he could not guarantee the authenticity of these projects, but a rumour of them had reached him from a Russian source not unworthy of credence.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 229.*]

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Mr. Tylour Thomson telegraphed on the 13th April 1874 information to the same effect, *viz.*, that the Shah, when at Tiflis, engaged with the Grand Duke Michael to take part in an expedition projected in the spring against the Turkomans of Akhal. About forty days previously the Persian Government, noting that no preparations were being made, requested the Russian Minister at Teheran to ascertain the cause from the Grand Duke Michael. The result of the reference to the Grand Duke was known early in May, when the Russian Minister called upon the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and told him that he was instructed by Prince Gortschakoff to announce that no regular expedition would be despatched that year against the Turkomans, but that wheresoever their troops or subjects were attacked by the Turkomans, they would be pursued, and that, as it was impossible to say from whence the attack would be made, for that reason the Russians could not ask the Persians to join them in the expedition when it should take place.

[Secret, July 1874, Nos. 39-42.]

If any doubt could be entertained on the subject, it would be dispelled by M. Stremoukoff's communication to Count Brunnow, enclosed in the English Foreign Office despatch dated 15th April 1874. A translation of the most important paragraphs is given below :—

"Your Excellency will perceive that an entirely peaceful programme has been prescribed for the guidance of all the military authorities who are charged with the conduct of our affairs in the country beyond the Caspian.

"Any inclinations on the part of our army of the Caucasus to undertake a movement against the Tekke Turkomans have been formally suppressed.

"There is consequently no prospect for this year of any important military operations in the Orenburg Steppe or the Delta of the Caspian. The same spirit of moderation is to be found in the replies which our Minister at Teheran has been instructed to make to the propositions on the part of the Persian Government in respect to a simultaneous and united action against the Turkomans.

"In compliance with the command of our august master, Privy Councillor Beger has been ordered to decline every proposal of that kind, seeing that co-operation with the Persians could only add fresh complications to the Turkoman question. Our Minister has also been instructed to announce to the Persian Government that we contemplated no attack upon the Tekkes, but that, in case of aggressions directed against our caravans or topographers, we should not be able to avoid repelling them by armed force, through the means of light flying detachments which we shall hold ready for that purpose."

[Secret, July 1874, No. 19.]

104. Mr. Thomson's explanation of Persian proceedings in offering to combine with the Russians in the projected expedition to Merv.—An attempt to throw light on the Persian policy in this matter was made in Mr. Tylour Thomson's despatch of 1st March 1874. He wrote :—

"The intention of Russia is to proceed with caution in her design of reducing to a state of vassalage the Tekke Turkomans of Merv, or transferring it into a Cossack colony, her present views being directed to acquiring a firm hold over those of the Akhal in conjunction with Persia.

"Persia, however, knows too well her own weakness to admit of her indulging in dreams of acquiring unaided and in opposition to the will of Russia real authority over the tribes in question. The extent of her attempt would probably be by occupying the position of Chelekeh in anticipation of the arrival of the Russian troops to work upon the fears of the tribes by placing before them the irresistible force of Russia if hostile measures were adopted by the latter towards them; and thus obtaining their consent to become Persian subjects. But even if in this Persia were successful, the pretension would only be maintained so long as Russia chose to leave it unchallenged.

"In the meantime Persia appears to have become quite reconciled to acting in concert with Russia on the line of the Attrek and of the Akhal; and, such being the case, once Russia is established on that line, it is but reasonable to assume that her posts of communication with the Caspian are intended to be permanent ones.

"The views of Persia, however, would, I think, be otherwise if she found support from England, possibly even if that support were a moral one. She has pretensions of domain over

the districts of Merv, and the city of Merv, of the Kajars of Persia, with its wall of defence, still stands, although without inhabitants."

[*Secret, July 1874, No. 37.*]

Be the explanation what it may, the fact remains, and a very awkward fact it is, that at the time when England apprehending danger both to herself and Persia from a Russian movement in the direction of Merv, the Shah's Government were not only prepared, but seemingly anxious, to lend their co-operation to such a movement.

105. Russian interference south of the *Attrek* in the summer of 1874.—Up to this point there had been nothing to indicate, if we except the incident connected with Markozoff's march, and noted on page 74, that the Russians were disposed to overstep the bounds which they themselves had laid down, and to meddle with the Shah's authority south of the *Attrek* and between that river and the *Gurgan*. But in the summer months of 1874 there happened a remarkable occurrence, to which attention must now be directed. On the 19th May 1874 Mr. Thomson telegraphed to the Viceroy:—

"The recently appointed Governor of Krasnovodsk* has addressed to the Chief of the *Attrek and Gurgan Turkoman tribes* a circular letter informing them that he has been appointed by the Grand Duke Michael their Chief and giving them advice. I am led to believe that it has been addressed to other Turkoman tribes east of the *Attrek* and *Gurgan*."

* General Llamakin.

[*Secret, May 1874, No. 117.*]

This intelligence was soon confirmed by the Persian Minister in London, who called on Lord Derby on the 3rd June and informed him that the Governor of Krasnovodsk had

"sent a proclamation to certain Turkoman Chiefs *who are Persian subjects*, inviting them to come to him and describing himself as *master of the Attrek and Gurgan*."

"The Persian Government had seen the original of this communication and had sought an explanation of it. The Russian Minister at Teheran had assured them there had been a mistake arising from their being two tribes of *Yomuds*, one near *Khiva*, another near the *Caspian*. The Russian Government had also refused to admit that the *Attrek* formed the boundary of the two countries, but declared the frontier to be on the *Kara-Su*. The Persian Government attached great importance to this strip of territory both in a military and administrative point of view."

[*Secret, July 1874, No. 104.*]

106. M. Stremoukoff's explanation of General Llamakin's action.—The next information we received was the report of conversation between M. Stremoukoff, Director of the Asiatic Department, and Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The following extracts will show what color was put on General Llamakin's proceedings by the Russian diplomatist:—

"At an interview I had with M. Stremoukoff, Director of the Asiatic Department, on the 20th instant, I enquired of His Excellency whether there was any foundation for a current report that the recently appointed Governor of Krasnovodsk had addressed a circular letter to the Chiefs of the *Attrek* and *Gurgan* tribes informing them that he had been appointed by the Grand Duke Michael their Chief and giving them advice.

"His Excellency stated that General Llamakin, who had been formerly Governor of *Mangyshlak* District, and had been on amicable terms with the nomad tribes there, had been lately appointed Governor of Krasnovodsk.

"On his arrival there he had addressed a letter to the Chief of the Turkoman tribes who inhabited the country between *Khiva* and the *Caspian*, as well also as to those who periodically visited the districts south of the *Attrek* and extended their wanderings even as far north as Krasnovodsk, in which he expressed the wish to be on friendly terms with them, and the hope that they would abstain from acts of disorder or obstruction to the commerce of the steppe. It was, M. Stremoukoff said, a mere friendly letter, with a view of inducing these tribes to abstain from plunder and marauding expeditions.

"To this letter a very satisfactory answer had been received by General Llamakin in the sense of peace and order."

There were certain inaccuracies in the statements which had appeared in the English newspapers. M. Stremoukoff was anxious to correct these inaccuracies, and he enumerated them as below :—

“*First*, the General had not visited the Attrek or met the Chiefs of the tribes between the Attrek and the Gurgan. General Llamakin had received them at Ashurade, where the Russian Government had a naval station.

“*Secondly*, there was no promise exacted or given from the Tekke Turkomans of allegiance to Russia. His Excellency then stated that the object of General Llamakin in meeting these Turkoman Chiefs was solely to establish relations of amity and good understanding with them, and to induce them to abstain from lawless acts of plunder on the caravans crossing the steppes. The assurances they had given were satisfactory, and he trusted that in future there would be peace and a friendly feeling between them.

“M. de Stremoukoff said that a Russian artilleryman had been captured on the right bank of the Amu Daria during the raids of the Yomuds in November last, and was supposed to be a prisoner at Merv. The Chiefs of the Tekke tribe were requested by General Llamakin to effect his release, which they promised to do.”

[*Secret, August 1874, No. 63.*]

107. Opinion in Persia regarding the scope and object of General Llamakin's address to the Turkoman tribes.—These modest and pacific assurances were not by any means consistent with the local accounts of what took place between the Governor of Krasnovodsk and the Turkoman tribes, as will be perceived from the narrative submitted by the Astrabad Agent to Mr. Thomson on the 30th May 1874. Mr. Thomson evidently accepted the report as a faithful record of events, for he informed Lord Derby that the intention of the Russian Government with respect to the Turkoman tribes were no longer doubtful or concealed, that they were then the subject of open discussion in the province of Astrabad, and that the minds of the Persian, as well as of the Turkoman, populations appeared to be already prepared to receive with submission whatever General Llamakin might dictate. The Astrabad Agent's letter was as follows :—

“The Russian General has recently landed with a number of soldiers at a place called Shah Kadem, which is eight stages distant from Astrabad, and has encamped there. *He has addressed a circular to the Chiefs of the different tribes of the Yomud Turkomans, saying that from the Jerjan**, which is three fursakhs distant from Astrabad, as far as Khiva, belongs to Russia, therefore each tribe must send

* Gurgan.

several persons to him that he may arrange matters with them, as in future Russian merchants and couriers would travel by this route, and arrangements ought to be made for their safety. The Turkomans brought the said letter to the Governor-General, who sent it on to Teheran, but several of their elders went to the Russian Commander. In the first place he paid them 4,000 toman on account of the camels which had previously been taken by force from them, and secondly, he asked for five or six thousand more camels, adding that those parts belonged to Russia, and he had been appointed to organise them; therefore, whoever accepted the rules he was about to enforce was to come and get a passport and reside in peace, but such as were not disposed to accept those regulations were to leave the Russian territory. The elders asked for several days' time, and have reported the circumstance to Teheran. Several days after, the Russian General sent three Agents to all the said tribes demanding an answer. A conference was held at Moossa Khan's encampment, and after much discussion they informed the Russian Agents that they (the Turkomans) had referred to Teheran and were awaiting a reply. If the Persian Government required them it would retain them, or else inform them to the contrary; in that case they would be ready to submit to Russia. The Turkomans then addressed a letter to the Governor-General, requesting him to obtain a reply to their application from the Capital by telegraph, saying that the Russian Government was a powerful Government, and they were afraid of it, and did not dare to give a false reply. The Governor-General telegraphed these details, and an answer was received on the 26th instant; it was to the effect that from the other side of the Attrek, which is eight fursakhs distant from Astrabad, was Russian territory, and they (the Russians) had no right to interfere with such tribes as reside on the banks of the Gurgan, and that he (the Governor-General) was not to stir up matters, but to see what course events would take. The Turkomans are at heart well disposed towards the Russian Government on account of the great promises of gain which have been held out to them.”

[*Secret, September 1874, No. 8.*]

108. General Llamakin's circular. Extracts showing that he asserted Russian supremacy over the Turkoman tribes.—We have

besides a translation of General Llamakin's circular to refer to. The copy obtained by Mr. Thomson was addressed to the Ak Atabai branch of the Yomud tribe. "Atabai" is apparently synonymous with "Jonee," one of the two main divisions of the Yomuds. The Atabai division is again sub-divided into a great number of branches of which the "Ak" form one. According to the same authority from which the above particulars are derived, the Ak Atabai reside within two *fursakhs* of the town of Astrabad, and they must therefore be located south of the Gurgan River and close to the Kara-Su. But if Mr. Thomson's information is trustworthy, this is a small matter, since he declared in his despatch to Lord Derby, dated 28th May 1874, that he had been informed on good authority that the circular had been addressed to the whole of the Turkoman tribes occupying the line of country lying between the Caspian Sea, Merv, and the Oxus at Charjoe. The general exhortations contained in the circular are not on the whole inconsistent with M. Stremoukoff's assurances, but there can be no explaining away the following passage:—

"Prince Michael, brother of the Sovereign of Russia, and General-in-Chief of the Army of Daghestan and of the whole of the Caucasus, has by command of the Sovereign and has appointed me to be the supreme authority on the *Attrek* and the *Gurgan*."

By these words General Llamakin formally repudiated the *Attrek* boundary and announced the supremacy of Russia over both the rivers.

The following is doubtless the passage on which Mr. Thomson relied as corroborative of the report that the proclamation was intended to cover a very wide area:—

"He (Prince Michael) has instructed me to make known to all the Turkoman tribes that the commands of the great Sovereign are that unity and concord and loyalty should be established so that there may be tranquillity and comfort in these steppes; there should be security, so that good may be derived from one another. *There should be no rebellion; there should be friendship, but no strife. The roads to Khiva should be safe and secure, &c., &c.*"

[*Secret, September 1874, No. 6.*]

109. Attention of Her Majesty's Government called to the encroaching policy indicated by General Llamakin's proclamation.
—Matters having advanced so far, the Government of India thought it necessary to draw the attention of Her Majesty's Government to these fresh indications of encroachment on the part of the Russian military authorities, and the following despatch was accordingly sent to the Secretary of State on the 8th September 1874 last:—

"General Llamakin's circular, of which Mr. Tylour Thomson has forwarded a copy, claims 'supreme authority' on the *Attrek* and *Gurgan* by command of the Emperor of Russia. The

* See enclosure of Mr. Tylour Thomson's letter to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, No. 7, dated 12th January 1874.

circular purports to be addressed to the Ak Atabai, a branch of the Yomud tribe of Turkomans, whose habitation is in the neighbourhood* of Astrabad, and Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran states that he has been informed on good authority that the circular has been sent to the whole of the Turkoman tribes occupying the line of country between the Caspian Sea, Merv, and the Oxus at Charjoe.

"Your Lordship is aware that in March 1873, in the course of a conversation on the subject of maintaining the integrity of Persia, M. de Stremoukoff placed in the hands of Lord Loftus a memorandum, in which, after reviewing what had passed on the subject in 1835 and 1838, he referred to Lord Palmerston's note of 20th December 1838 as sufficiently proving that England and Russia were of one mind as to the necessity of maintaining the integrity

† *Secret despatch from Secretary of State, No. 73, dated 9th May 1873.*

of the Shah's possessions. In Lord Granville's instructions† to Mr. Tylour Thomson regarding the reply he was to give to a request preferred by the Sadr Azem that a formal assurance regarding the integrity of Persia should be obtained from Russia through the intervention of Her Majesty's Government, that conversation was referred to as indicating the inexpediency of making any observations to Russia which might imply a doubt as to the continued validity of the understanding of 1834.

"If, however, the copy of General Llamakin's circular be genuine, and the information furnished to Mr. Tylour Thomson is correct, the Persian territory between the *Attrek* and the *Gurgan* is now practically annexed to the Russian dominions, and authority is assumed in respect to the whole Turkoman country to the borders of Afghanistan. We are of opinion that these proceedings cannot fail to excite uneasiness and alarm in the minds of our Persian and Afghan allies, and that they demand the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government."

[*Secret, September 1874, No. 10.*]

110. **Nature of the understanding of 1834-38 on the subject of the integrity of Persia.**—In order to appreciate the argument of the Government of India, as also the rejoinder of the Russian Statesmen, it is necessary to ascertain what was the nature of the understanding of 1834 between England and Russia in respect to Persia. In 1833 took place the death of Abbass Mirza, who had been recognised as crown Prince by the Treaty of Turkoman-chai. His father, Futteh Ali Shah, died in October of the following year, and there immediately appeared three competitors for the Crown—Mahomed Mirza (son of the deceased Prince), and his uncles Hassan Ali Mirza (the Firman Firman or Governor-General of Fars), and the Zil-es-Sultan (Governor of Teheran). Mahomed Mirza was the rightful claimant both by descent and by the choice of the late Futteh Ali Shah. He also received the support of England and Russia. On the 16th June 1834, three months before Futteh Ali Shah's death, Lord Palmerston had held a conversation with Prince Lieven, the Russian Ambassador, on the affairs of Persia. Lord Palmerston dwelt on the importance, to both Russia and England, of maintaining the tranquillity of Persia, and offered to recommend the Shah to settle the crown upon his grandson, Mahomed Mirza. Count Nesselrode (the Russian Foreign Minister) had previously expressed the willingness of his Government to come to an understanding with England as to a joint exertion of the influence of the two Powers in Persia in favor of some one candidate, but from want of information England had hitherto declined the offer.

Lord Palmerston also spoke to Prince Lieven on the subject of the crore of tomans which still remained due of the indemnity stipulated by the Treaty of Turkoman-chai to be paid by Persia to Russia. He objected to the injustice of imposing on a conquered State so heavy a pecuniary burden as to be almost as fatal to its independence as territorial cessions would be, and alluded to the report that, in default of the payment of the crore of tomans within a certain time, Russia would occupy the province of Ghilan and hold it in pledge till the payment should be made, as a matter which must necessarily attract the serious attention of all the Powers interested in maintaining the integrity of the State. As Prince Lieven could give no information on the subject, enquiries were made through the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who reported on the 2nd July 1834 that Count Nesselrode viewed with satisfaction the unanimity of opinion, which animated the two Governments regarding the succession of Mahomed Mirza, but vindicated the right of the victor to exact from the attacking party the expenses of the war:—

“Count Nesselrode added—‘I might assure Your Lordship, in the most positive and unequivocal manner, that there never had been the least question either of demanding the cession of the province of Ghilan, or of even threatening to take possession of it; that the Russian Envoy could never have used the language which had been attributed to him on this matter; and that the reports which had reached Your Lordship to this effect were utterly unfounded.

“I said that I should have much pleasure in conveying to Your Lordship these satisfactory assurances, and Count Nesselrode closed the conversation on this head by saying that he was glad I had by merely reading to him Your Lordship's despatch obviated the necessity of his returning a more formal answer (which might have led to unpleasant discussion) to some of the observations mixed with a question, upon which there appeared so fair a prospect that we should be agreed, if the Shah could be persuaded to nominate Mahomed Mirza as his successor, and thus to obviate in a measure the dangers which must ensue from his leaving the throne of Persia a cause of dispute to all his descendants.”

[Vide *Correspondence sent with Despatch from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 23rd July 1834.*]

On 5th September 1834 Lord Palmerston wrote to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg as follows:—

“His Majesty's Government are gratified to find that the Governments of Great Britain and Russia are acting with regard to the affairs of Persia in the same spirit, and are equally animated by a sincere desire to maintain not only the internal tranquillity, but also the *independence and integrity of Persia*. His Majesty's Government will at all times find a real pleasure in co-operating with that of Russia for such purposes.”

111. Count Nesselrode refers in 1838 to the understanding of 1834 on the subject of Persia.—The ambitious designs of the Shah and his attempts to seize possession of the Afghan province of Herat led to a rupture between England and Persia. Foiled in his aggressive efforts, the Shah sought the intervention of the Russian Government; and Count Nesselrode in his despatch of October 20th, 1838, to the Russian Ambassador in London, while urging that the British demonstration against Persia should cease, enforced his argument by an appeal to Lord Palmerston's despatch of 5th September 1834. His words were—

“Your Excellency will find a copy of it annexed. With this document in your hand you will have the goodness.....to make known to Lord Palmerston that the same sentiments which guided us in 1834, and which led us at the time to desire a friendly understanding with England upon the affairs of Persia, are also now the motive of the present step..... Assuredly it will rest with that (British) Government alone to re-establish between the Missions of Russia and of Great Britain at Teheran that happy agreement of views and of actions which we had so much at heart to form in 1834, and which had at that time been attended with consequences so beneficial for the consolidation of the internal tranquillity of the Persian monarchy.”

Lord Palmerston's reply was written in the same friendly spirit. He said that the British Government accepted as entirely satisfactory the declarations of Russia that she harboured no designs hostile to the interests of Great Britain in India, and that her policy with regard to Persia remained unchanged and was the same which in 1834 the two Powers agreed to adopt.

[*Vide Papers relating to Persia laid before Parliament in 1839, pages 3-191-192.*]

112. Attempts made in 1873 by Persian Statesmen to obtain an assurance that the integrity of their country would be respected.—Before returning to the subject of General Llamakin's circular, it must now be shown how the Russian Government in 1873 handled the agreement of 1834 for the purpose of averting awkward enquiries respecting the integrity of Persia.

The first attempt of the Persian Statesmen to sound the British Government on this question was made by Malcolm Khan, who, in February 1873, imparted to the British Ambassador at Vienna his satisfaction with what had been accomplished for Afghanistan, and expressed a hope that Her Majesty's Government might also be disposed to exert more ostensibly their influence in favor of the integrity and independence of Persia.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 127.*]

On the 27th of the same month, February 1873, the Persian Minister in London called on Lord Granville and informed him that the tone which had been taken by the Press on the subject of Central Asia had given rise to much pre-occupation in Persia, and he had been instructed to ask whether Persia might be easy on the subject. Lord Granville replied that he did not quite understand the bearing of the question, to which the Persian Minister rejoined that the integrity of Persia was as important as that of Afghanistan: the position was nearly the same. He wished to know whether the time was come when the integrity of Persia would be recognised: what the Persian Government desired was that the present good understanding between Russia and England should be taken to come to a similar agreement with regard to the boundaries of Persia as in the case of Afghanistan; he was aware of an interchange of assurances between Russia and England in 1834 that neither country would destroy the integrity of the Persian Empire, but he believed his Government was not aware of it.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 131.*]

Communications to a similar purport were received from Teheran. Mr. Thomson wrote on the 26th February 1873 to say that the Persian Govern-

ment had received a telegram from London to the effect that in the correspondence which had recently taken place between the British and Russian Governments respecting Central Asia, Russia had declared that she recognised the integrity of Persia. The Sadr Azem enquired whether Mr. Thomson had received any intelligence to that effect.

"He observed," continued Mr. Thomson, "that the Shah and his Ministers would feel grateful to Her Majesty's Government if they had succeeded in obtaining an assurance of this nature from the Russian Government. It required very little reflection, he said, to enable any Persian to understand that Russia was the natural enemy of Persia, and that England on the contrary, in her own interests, must desire to maintain the independence of this country. He considered that the only chance of safety for Persia was for her to ally herself with England and seek the friendship and support of Her Majesty's Government. The policy, therefore, which he had adopted when he came into office, and which he was now earnestly endeavouring to carry out, was in a few words this: to "*Ménager la Russie*," and secure the confidence and good-will of England. His views and opinions on this subject had been fully explained to the Shah, who approved of them, and although the British Government, he knew, had been brought to regard Persia with distrust owing to a different policy having been pursued by former Ministers in this country, he hoped to succeed in removing that distrust from their minds and to gain their confidence and moral support.

"The policy of Her Majesty's Government, he continued, had always been to strengthen Persia as much as possible and maintain her integrity; and the present appeared to him to be a favorable moment, while the boundary line in Turkistan was being agreed upon, for securing that object by obtaining a formal assurance from the Russian Government that the Persian territory should not be encroached upon. A formal declaration in this sense made by Russia to Her Majesty's Government would be received with great satisfaction by Persia; but, if it could be so arranged that the assurance given by England should be also formally repeated by Russia, or be officially communicated to other European Powers at the same time, it would offer an additional guarantee and be still more reassuring to the Persian Government.

"Count Dubsy, the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Teheran, has assured the Sadr Azem that his Government will endeavour to assist the Persian Government in carrying out this object; and he has also stated to me that Count Andrassy would be disposed to act in concert with Her Majesty's Government with a view to obtain from Russia some guarantee for the maintenance of the integrity of Persia.

113. Use made by M. de Stremoukoff of the understanding of 1834-35 to avert enquiries regarding the intentions of Russia towards Persia.—The opportunity, therefore, appeared favorable for an effort in behalf of the Shah's Government. But such a move, if it was ever seriously thought of, received a skilful check from M. de Stremoukoff. An official article had appeared in the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* referring to the agreement between England and Russia on the subject of the integrity of Persia. M. de Stremoukoff, in the course of a conversation with Lord A. Loftus on the 4th March 1873, mentioned this article, and placed in the Ambassador's hands a memorandum which he had prepared, and which purported to give an historical analysis of the circumstances leading to the understanding of 1835 between the two Governments in respect to the affairs of Persia. The following is a close translation of the memorandum:—

"Towards the close of 1833 the Shah of Persia, Futteh Ali Shah, entertained the idea of turning his arms against Herat. Informed of this determination, the Imperial Government left nothing undone to dissuade the Shah from the enterprise.

"Mr. MacNeill, then English Minister at Teheran, saw in this projected campaign against Herat a concerted plan for extending the influence of Persia in Afghanistan, and for creating a political system which would be in a position to menace the British possessions in India. Seeing that the war did not cease, England attempted to induce the Shah to suspend hostilities by declaring that she would otherwise despatch a fleet to the Persian Gulf and land troops there. Shortly afterwards the island of Karak was, in fact, occupied by the English. Alarmed at this naval demonstration, the Shah considered it necessary to make a direct appeal to the Emperor. In the meantime Lord Palmerston, of his own accord, drew the attention of our Ambassador in London, Count Pozzo di Borgo, to the position of affairs in Persia, and to the apprehension entertained by the East India Company in consequence of the expedition to Herat. Then followed an exchange of ideas between the two Governments in regard to the integrity of the territory of Persia. No *formal agreement* on the subject has been signed. Neverthe-

less the note of Lord Palmerston to Count Pozzo di Borgo, dated 20th December 1838, sufficiently proves that England and Russia were of one mind as to the necessity of maintaining the integrity of the Shah's possessions."

The Indian Foreign Office does not possess a copy of the above cited note to Count Pozzo di Borgo: but the argument of M. de Stremoukoff is sufficiently plain. England and Russia, being of the same mind in 1838 respecting the necessity of maintaining the integrity of the Shah's possessions, and those sentiments remaining unaltered, there was no need to raise any question on the subject in 1873.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 136.*]

114. Lord Granville acquaints the Sadr Azem with the nature of the understanding of 1834 and deprecates doubts of of Russia's intentions.—Such at any rate was precisely the view adopted by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. On the 24th April 1873 Lord Granville replied to the communication from Teheran of the 26th February 1873 in the following terms:—

"You will state to the Sadr Azem that, without expressing an opinion as to the present bearing of what passed in 1834, Her Majesty's Government think it would be highly inexpedient to make any observations to Russia which might imply a doubt as to the continued validity of the understanding of that year. Her Majesty's Government consider that it would not be desirable without special cause, such as does not exist at present, to do anything to show to Russia that her intentions were doubted, and, by doing so, leave her free to consider herself unfettered in regard to her future policy towards Persia.

"Her Majesty's Government are strengthened in this opinion by the fact that M. de Stremoukoff recently referred in conversation with Lord A. Loftus to the understanding of 1834."

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 139.*]

Lord Granville's views were more fully expressed when the Shah and his Minister arrived in London. The Sadr Azem, on the 30th June 1873, sent a letter to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which it was said—

"It has come to our notice through various publications that there have passed between England and Russia certain documents (*actes*) acknowledging the necessity and the mutual duty of maintaining the integrity of Persia.

"Such documents possess a weighty interest for the Persian Government, and evince especially the grave solicitude of the two friendly Powers for the independence of Persia. I should therefore be very grateful to Your Lordship if you would communicate to the Government of His Majesty the Shah all that has passed between England and Russia on this subject."

Lord Granville's reply of the 2nd July 1873 is given below—

"Although no formal treaty or agreement exists by which the two countries mutually agree to respect the integrity of Persia, yet in the year 1834 an understanding was arrived at between the two Governments on the occasion of the nomination of Mahomed Mirza as successor to the throne of Persia. That understanding was based on the sincere desire of the two Governments to maintain not only the internal tranquillity, but also the independence and integrity of Persia, and in the year 1838 Count Nesselrode adverted to the agreement entered into by the two Governments as still subsisting in full force, as it was also acknowledged to do by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

"Her Majesty's Government, as they recognise for themselves the principles which guided the general policy of Great Britain and Russia in favor of the independence and integrity of Persia in the year 1834, have reason to believe from information which they have received from Lord Loftus, Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that the Russian Government refer with satisfaction to the mutual assurances which were made on this subject in 1834 and 1838.

"Her Majesty's Government consider that the best mode of confirming both Powers in those sentiments is that Persia, while steadily maintaining her rights as an independent Power, should studiously fulfil in all respects her treaty engagements with each, and so ensure the continuance of the friendship which both Powers, even for their own interests, should desire to maintain with her."

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 139.*]

115. Lord Granville's communications with the Sadr Azem in respect to the integrity of Persia were made known to the Russian Ambassador in London.—The substance of these communications was imparted in conversation by Lord Granville to Count Brunnow, the Russian Ambassador in London, who expressed satisfaction. If therefore the Russian Government differed from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as to the scope of the understanding concluded in 1834, it might have been supposed that an early opportunity would have been taken to state the Russian view of the case.

[*Secret, April 1874, Nos. 144-146.*]

It may be added that the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg drew attention on the 13th May 1873 to the recent assurances given by Prince Gortschakoff regarding the recognition of the Attrek boundary, and stated his opinion that it would be extremely impolitic of the Persian Government to raise any question which might imply any distrust of Russia, or any doubts as to her intention of respecting the integrity of Persia.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 174.*]

116. General Llamakin's visit to Astrabad in June 1874. His pacific professions discredited.—And, now, to resume the thread of the narrative regarding Russian movements among and against the Turkoman tribes. On the 20th June 1874 General Llamakin paid a visit to Astrabad, where he was cordially received by the Persian Governor-General of Khorassan. His object was to allay the apprehensions excited by his recent circular to the Turkomans. He assured the Persians:—

"We are ready to assist you, whenever it may be necessary; we are ready, as we have 21,000 troops. We have no other motive but friendship and unity. We do not want the produce of this plain. All we want is to preserve order. Many things are said among the Turkomans; but, as they are ignorant of the real objects in view, all such statements are groundless. We hope that you (the Governor-General) will also take measures for the protection of this plain."

The above extract is taken from the Astrabad Agent's letter to the British Minister at Teheran, dated 10th July 1874, but the General's professions found little credence.

"He said," wrote Mr. Thomson, "his intention was simply to give them good advice with a view to the preservation of peace and tranquillity on the frontier, but his language failed to produce any impression either there or here, his announcement having been so explicit that he had been appointed by the Grand Duke Michael, under orders of the Emperor, to be supreme Commander (Sabib Ikhtiar) over the Turkoman tribes of the Attrek and Gurgan."

[*Secret, September 1874, Nos. 52-54.*]

117. Rumoured submission of Tekkes to Russia in October 1874. Mr. Thomson's opinion of the weakness of Persia.—On the 3rd October last Mr. Thomson telegraphed further particulars of General Llamakin's proceedings. The General was said to have made the following communication to the Governor of Astrabad:—

"I state to you that on the 24th July I was informed by the Khan of Khiva and Colonel Ivanoff, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian troops on the Oxus, that the Chiefs of the Tekke Turkomans presented themselves to the Colonel and demanded that they should be received as Russian subjects engaging in future to abstain from plunder. I have also received assurance from the Turkoman tribes between Arjumend and Kizzil-Arvat that they will become Russian subjects."

Mr. Thomson's comments on the above are significant—

"The Shah instructed Minister of Foreign Affairs to reply on this matter judiciously, which, as I read it, means not to admit pretensions of Russia, nor to claim Persian sovereignty over them. *In my opinion Persia is now totally unable to resist unaided any serious demand of Russia, even if it should be abandonment of the province of Astrabad.*

[*Secret, November 1874, No. 45.*]

118. Kazeo Syud Ahmed's version of Llamakin's speech to the Persians at Astrabad.—Another version of General Llamakin's address will be found in the Diary of Kazeo Syud Ahmed, who, however, seems to have thought that the grand meeting and entertainment at Astrabad came off in August 1874. General Llamakin is described as having delivered in Russian the following speech which was rendered into Persian by the interpreter:—

“Persian Government Officers and subjects,—Be it known to you that there is a great amity and friendship between your Government and ours, and the object of our Government is to inflict a punishment on the Turkomans who have been troubling you in many ways from time immemorial. The reason why we have taken possession of this *Sahra* (plain) is, that whilst we protect you against the raids of the Yomuds, we should proceed to the Tekke country and take vengeance on them for the damages they have caused to your Government when Hashmat-ood-dowlah invaded Merv, and at the same time restore peace and tranquillity throughout Russian Turkistan and achieve many other objects, &c., &c.”

[See annexure to Captain Napier's letter dated 4th January 1875.]

119. Lord Derby's instructions to the Ambassador at St. Petersburg on the subject of General Llamakin's circular.—The remonstrance of the Government of India on the subject of General Llamakin's circular (*supra* page 89) was sent to Lord A. Loftus with Lord Derby's despatch, dated November 6th, 1874. Her Majesty's Ambassador was instructed to call the attention of the Russian Government to that portion of the circular in which General Llamakin styled himself Commander over the Turkoman tribes of the Attrek and the Gurgan, and to point out that the territory between the Attrek and Gurgan was unquestionably Persian territory, on which General Llamakin would not be justified in interfering. A hope was to be expressed that the Government of the Emperor would impress on General Llamakin *the expediency of abstaining from molesting the tribes who frequent the country to the south of the Attrek.*

(Enclosure of India Office despatch No. 143, dated 27th November 1874.)

120. Reception by Russian authorities of British remonstrances regarding General Llamakin's circular.—The arguments with which the Russian authorities met the observations of the British Ambassador, and the attempt made to explain away the so-called “understanding” of 1834-38, demand careful attention. It will be observed from the following extract of the conversation reported in Lord A. Loftus' despatch, dated 17th November 1874, that, according to M. Westmann's views, the question was one between Persia and Russia alone, and that in such question, even though *ex hypothesi* it might affect the integrity of Persia, there was no room for a third party to interfere:—

“In fulfilment of Your Lordship's instructions I had the honor of an interview yesterday with M. Westmann, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the absence of Prince Gortschakoff, when I read to him Your Lordship's despatch, as also the despatch from the Government of India which was enclosed therein.

“On terminating their perusal M. Westmann stated that the incident of General Llamakin's circular, to which Your Lordship referred, had been a *mal entendu* which had given rise to a correspondence between the Imperial and Persian Governments, and that the explanations given by the Imperial Government had been perfectly satisfactory to the Persian Government. His Excellency admitted that General Llamakin, in lieu of naming the tribes to which he referred by their proper appellation, had generalised them in the terms he used, and he observed that the tribes referred to were in the habit of repairing for a portion of the year to Russian territory.

“The whole circumstances, His Excellency said, had been misrepresented consequent on an incorrect translation from the original Tartar text of General Llamakin's circular, but this misrepresentation had been happily and satisfactorily rectified with the Persian Government.

“Having made this statement with regard to the incident referred to, His Excellency then stated that he must express his surprise that an explanation should have been asked for

by Her Majesty's Government of an incident of so little importance in itself, and which solely concerned Russia and Persia. It was not customary, His Excellency observed, to interfere in the international relations between two independent States, and he could not comprehend in what way the incident referred to could affect Great Britain.

"I replied to His Excellency that he must not forget that Great Britain was equally with Russia an Asiatic Power, ruling over an Empire of above 200 millions of people, and that it was the duty of the Government of India to watch over and safeguard the interests of that Empire.

"The interests of the neighbouring States were more or less mixed up with those of the Indian Empire, and both Persia and Afghanistan might be considered as limitrophe States to India.

"I further observed that the advance of Russia in Central Asia of late years was a subject of watchful interest, although it was not one either of jealousy or fear to the Government of India. There was a large tract of country, inhabited by independent Turkoman tribes, extending along the frontiers of Afghanistan from Khojah Saleh on the Oxus to the Persian frontier, of which Merv was the central point. Any foreign influence, seeking to act on these tribes, would necessarily attract the attention of the Government of Afghanistan, and His Excellency would therefore see that the Government of India was fully justified in calling attention to a question which so nearly concerned the interests of its ally.

"But, furthermore, I observed to His Excellency that not many years ago the question of Persia formed the subject of diplomatic discussions and of a friendly understanding between our respective Governments, and I referred to the correspondence which had been exchanged between Lord Palmerston and Count Nesselrode in 1834 and 1838, in which both Governments agreed on the necessity of maintaining the integrity of Persia.

"I did not therefore comprehend the surprise expressed by His Excellency on the communication I had made.

"M. Westmann replied to these observations, that the correspondence to which I had alluded referred to the question of the succession to the Persian throne, on which the two Governments had happily agreed, and he did not doubt that under similar circumstances the same understanding would take place. He instanced the friendly offices in which the two Governments were now engaged in regard to the Turko-Persian frontier question; but in the present instance he repeated that the incident referred to in Your Lordship's despatch was a question which solely regarded Persia, in which he could not admit the right of a third Power to interfere."

[Vide *Enclosures of India Office Despatch No. 154, dated 18th December 1874.*]

121. Lord Derby's correction of M. Westmann's error regarding the scope of the understanding of 1834-38.—It was not to be supposed that the British Government would allow the understanding of 1834-38 to be interpreted from time to time in various ways so as best to suit the convenience of Russian Statesmen. Accordingly, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in his despatch dated 16th December 1874, instructed Lord A. Loftus to take an early opportunity of pointing out to M. Westmann that he had fallen into an error in stating that the understanding come to between England and Russia in 1834 and 1838 respecting the maintenance of the integrity of Persia had reference to the question of the succession to the Persian throne,—a statement which Lord Derby pronounced to be "altogether incorrect," quoting Lord Granville's despatch No. 161, dated 10th July 1873, in which, as noted previously on page 94, it was noted that the British interpretation of the understanding of 1834-38 had been communicated to, and received with satisfaction by, the Russian Ambassador in London.

122. M. Westmann denies intention of explaining away the understanding of 1834-38.—M. Westmann recognised the fact that his position was not tenable, or perhaps it was deemed imprudent to throw away so useful an argument as that of the "understanding," when the exigencies of the case were not sufficiently pressing to demand such a sacrifice. At any rate,

in the conversation reported by the British Ambassador in his despatch dated December 1874, M. Westmann completely shifted his ground. He said that

“it had been no wise his intention to disavow or discard the understanding which was then (in 1834-38) come to between the two Governments in respect to the maintenance of the integrity of Persia.

“His Excellency fully admitted the existence of that understanding at the periods alluded to, and its validity at the present moment: he maintained, however, that the integrity of the Persian territory had not been menaced by the circular of General Llamakin, and he further observed that it was Persia who was aggrieved and who was entitled to seek an explanation.”

M. Westmann added, not of course in the light of recrimination, that when the frontier differences between Persia and Afghanistan had been lately arranged by Great Britain, and a portion of Seistan awarded to Afghanistan, no communication had been made to Russia, though Persian territory was affected by the adjudication. Lord A. Loftus replied that the Seistan award was simply a matter of disputed frontier, the arbitration of which had been confided to Great Britain by the parties interested in carrying out the arbitration. To which M. Westmann rejoined that, although Russia would not have been called upon to participate in the arbitration, yet, according to the “understanding” to which reference had been made, namely, the maintenance of the integrity of Persia, Her Majesty’s Government, when the arbitration was finally settled, might have communicated to the Imperial Government the changes which had been agreed upon in regard to Persian territory. From the above rejoinder, to which Lord A. Loftus appears to have made no reply, it will be perceived that, in M. Westmann’s experienced hands, the “understanding” of 1834-38 is useful for attack, as well as for defence.

[See *Enclosures to India Office Despatches Nos. 26 and 27, dated 5th February 1875.*]

123. Further advances of General Llamakin towards the Turkoman country at the close of 1874.—General Llamakin has shown other signs of activity besides his circular to the Turkoman tribes. The Tekkes having steadily resisted all invitations to bow their necks to Russia, the *Turkestan Gazette* of the 22nd October 1874 announced to the world that Major-General Llamakin, commanding the Trans-Caspian Division, intended to “pacify” the Tekke Turkomans by means of two military expeditions, one starting from Chikishlar to the Attrek, and the other from Michael Bay to the Little Balkan Hills. It was expected that these measures would awe the Turkomans, for the Russian columns would advance from 100 to 120 *versts* towards the Tekke forts, and thus show the nomads that Russian troops could at all times come suddenly upon them in their encampments.

[*Secret, January 1875, No. 61.*]

124. Russians march on Byati-i-Haji at end of 1874. Description of the locality.—The next thing heard was that it was intended to despatch three companies of infantry early in October 1874 to Chikishlar by sea. From Chikishlar the troops were to proceed up the Attrek to Hadji-Bayat-Olum, where they would stay until the end of the year, keeping a watch over the Yomud and Tekke Turkomans, and surveying the steppes. This place, better known as Byat-i-Haji, is a pasture about 12 or 14 *fursakhs* from the sea. It is on the direct road from Hussun Kooli, the settlement of Ojurgilly Turkomans, on the north shore of the Attrek estuary, to the Chat-i-Attrek, which is about 90 miles (22 *fursakhs*) distant. The Russian force is said to have advanced without opposition through the pasture of the Yomuds, from whom they got camels and all needful aid. The ground along the river bank and about Byat-i-Haji was surveyed.

[*Secret, December 1874, No. 39; and Captain Napier’s Memorandum on the East Alburz Tract.*]

125. Mr. Thomson telegraphs probable advance of Russians to Kareekala, and recommends support of Persian protest.—The abovementioned expedition was obviously only the prelude to a further advance into the Turkoman country, and the British Government were not left long in doubt as to the direction in which the advance would be made. On the 25th November 1874 Mr. T aylour Thomson reported that a Russian regiment was said to have arrived at Kizzil-Soo and to have encamped within four miles of the Attrek; and on December 1874 the following telegrams were exchanged between Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran and the Earl of Derby:—

From MR. THOMSON to LORD DERBY, dated 7th December 1874.

“ Persian Government have received intelligence that General Llamakin has reached the Attrek with 600 men and 2 guns, and it is believed that he will occupy Kareekala. Persia ready to protest against Russians occupying any post in the interior on the line of the Attrek, if her protest, after communication to Her Majesty's Government, should receive their support. By “ support ” is meant the employment of remonstrances similar to those addressed to Russia in favor of Afghanistan.”

From MR. THOMSON to LORD DERBY, dated 8th December 1874.

“ With reference to my telegram of yesterday, I venture to observe that as Persia, if unsupported, will not and dare not protest against occupation of a strategic point on the Attrek by Russia, and viewing the certainty of danger to British interests which the advance of Russia on the Attrek entails, I am of opinion that this is an opportunity which might be successfully taken advantage of by Her Majesty's Government by giving their support to the Persian protest, to arrest the determination of Russia of bringing the Turkoman tribes under her subjection, and which, if allowed to pass, will probably not recur.”

From LORD DERBY to MR. THOMSON, dated 10th December 1874.

“ With reference to your telegram of 7th instant, Kareekala appears on the map to be on the north of the Attrek, some distance from the river itself, and not on the boundary line or within Persian territory at all ”

From MR. THOMSON to LORD DERBY, dated 14th December 1874.

“ In reply to Your Lordship's telegram dated 10th instant, Kareekala is, as Your Lordship observes, to the north of the Attrek, but I would beg to remark that it appears to be of minor importance whether the place to be occupied is on the north or south side of the river. As regards British interests it is a strategic point, and the occupation of a strategic point on the line of the Attrek means the occupation within a certain space of time of Merv and constant intrigue in Afghanistan.”

Mr. Thomson added that Kareekala had been at one time taken by Persian troops, and that the place had always been considered by Persia as belonging to her.

[See Enclosures of India Office Despatch No. 24, dated 5th February 1875, and connected papers.]

126. Sir Henry Rawlinson's views on the occupation of Kareekala by the Russians, January 1875.—Sir Henry Rawlinson, who was consulted on the subject of this correspondence, wrote the following memorandum, dated 2nd January 1875:—

“ There is no evidence to show that Persia has ever accepted the line of the Attrek as the northern frontier of Khorassan. What she has accepted, or rather what has been forced upon her by Russia, is an admission that the Attrek is the boundary between Russian and Persian territory on the Caspian. But Russia has hitherto never claimed anything beyond a zone or margin extending along the Caspian Coast, of uncertain limits, but not exceeding at most 30 or 40 miles in width. All beyond that margin has been, and still is, regarded as independent Turkoman steppe, and it was in reference to this particular tract of country that the Persian Government in December 1869, at the same time that it acquiesced in the adoption of the Attrek as the frontier line on the sea coast, invited the Russian Minister at Teheran, M. Beger, to come to a distinct understanding as to what was recognised as the Persian boundary line along the frontiers of the Turkoman country.

"The answer to this invitation, which was, I believe, dated December 29th, 1869, has never been reported to Her Majesty's Government, but I was told by the Grand Vizier that it was to the effect that Russia was not concerned in fixing a boundary between Persian and Turkoman territory, but merely adhered to the *Attrek* as the boundary between Russia and Persia. The Grand Vizier further said that, as the Perso-Turkoman boundary was thus left an open question, it was clear that the *Attrek* frontier line could only apply to the lower course of the river, below the confluence of the *Simbar* or *Kareekala* branch. It was, indeed, he added, the intention of Persia, whenever the question came on for discussion, to claim the watershed of the *Attrek* as the true territorial boundary, the valleys of the streams flowing from the *Attrek* northward belonging to the independent *Tekkes*, while the valleys of the streams flowing from the *Attrek* southward into the *Attrek* were the property of the *Yomuds* who were dependent on Persia. *Kareekala* on the *Simbur* is one of these *Yomud* settlements south of the *Attrek*, and belongs therefore to Persia. It was taken by Persian troops in 1869, and has remained tributary to *Boojnoord* ever since.

"At the same time I can see no great object in Persia's protesting against a Russian occupation of the place. Any such protest would be a mere *brutum fulmen*, and would not cause a day's delay in the march of the Russian troops if it was really considered of importance to garrison the post; but why Russia should desire to occupy an isolated and badly supplied post like *Kareekala*, when there are so many other more favorable sites, such as *Kizzil-Arvat*, or *Kabriz*, or *Ashkabad* to the north of the *Attrek* and on the direct line from *Krasnovodsk* to *Merv*, I cannot understand. *Kareekala* is certainly of no strategical importance compared with the posts to the north of the *Attrek*, or with those between the *Attrek* and the *Gurgan*.

"There is, however, real danger in allowing *the line* of the *Attrek* to be recognised as the true Russo-Persian frontier, for the main stream of that river flows through the rich *Manah Valley*, within a few miles of *Boojnoord* to its source at *Shirvan*, and if the right bank of this stream were ceded to Russia, she would thus be brought into the heart of *Khorassan*. It should, therefore, clearly be understood that the *Attrek* forms the frontier line only as far as the confluence of the *Simbar*.

127. The British Government recognise the danger of a Russian advance to the Turkoman country, but decline to protest on the subject of Kareekala.—The instructions of Her Majesty's Government were conveyed to Mr. Thomson in Foreign Office despatch dated January 8th, 1875:—

"Her Majesty's Government" it was said "cannot but regret any inroad of Russia into the territories of the *Tekke Turkoman* tribes as likely to give rise to frontier disputes with Persia on the one hand and *Afghanistan* on the other, upon which a misunderstanding between England and Persia might not impossibly ensue.

"With a view to prevent any such contingency, you are aware that Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed in January last to point out to the Russian Government the danger of a Russian occupation of *Merv*. Satisfactory assurances were given by the Emperor and Prince *Gortschakoff* to the effect that Russia had no intention of attacking the *Turkomans* except in self-defence, and that Russia had no wish to occupy *Merv*.

"Her Majesty's Government have, moreover, lately instructed Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg to call the attention of the Russian Government to that part of General *Llamakin's* circular in which he styles himself Governor over the territory lying between the *Attrek* and *Gurgan*; and *M. Westmann* assured Lord A. Loftus that the expression used by General *Llamakin* was purely accidental * * * *. In the instance, however, of the advance of a Russian Expedition to *Kareekala*, Her Majesty's Government fear that in the present ill-defined state of the Persian frontier some difficulty might arise in exercising the right of protest.

[See *Enclosures of India Office Despatch No. 24, dated 5th February 1875.*]

128. Russians have a cause of quarrel with the Tekkes of Merv who have kept a Russian Soldier in captivity.—Such is the present aspect of the *Attrek* and *Merv* question. And it may be added that, if the Russians wish to pick a quarrel with the *Tekkes* of *Merv*, they have a cause ready to their hand in the detention of a Russian captive at that place. Captain *Napier* in his memorandum on the *Turkoman* tribes of *Merv* states that this man, a Russian soldier, was carried off last year by a large body of the *Tekkes*, who plundered a caravan proceeding from *Khala Ata* to *Petrovsk*. Efforts had been

made by the Persians to procure his release, but without success, and Colonel Ivanoff, the Russian Commander in the Amu Daria District, had also entered into communication with the Chief of Merv, only to be met by a demand for ransom and defiance. This account agrees in the main with what is to be gathered from other sources of information. Some reference has been made to this subject on pages 81 and 88, and it may be added here that from information supplied by Mr. Thomson the captive appears to have written to Behbood Khan, Governor of Kelat-i-Nadiree, to beg that he might be ransomed. The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed Mr. Thomson that orders had been issued to redeem him, but the Tekkes held out for an excessive ransom. We know also, on the authority of the *Journal de St. Petersbourg*, that up to October 1874 the Russian soldier captured by the Tekkes had not been released from captivity but was still at Merv.

[See *Napier on Merv*; also *Polit. A.*, July 1874, No. 139, and *Secret*, February 1875, No. 87.]

129. Latest Russian views on the importance of the Attrek.

—This Chapter may be appropriately closed with the following translation of a leading article which appeared in the *Vedomosti* of the 14th to 26th January 1875, which gives the latest Russian view of the importance of the Attrek Valley. It is a significant comment on the measures undertaken by General Llamakin:—

“In order to exercise effectual influence over the Turkomans, and to force them to abstain from pillage, such influence must be extended by Russia over all the Turkoman tribes, and our threats must, when needful, be carried into execution. Under existing conditions we are not in a position to do this, inasmuch as the Turkomans possess a place of refuge where they find themselves beyond the reach of our arms. It consists, namely, of that part of the steppe which lies beyond the Attrek, and forms part of the territories of Persia, a locality inhabited by the wildest, and at the same time, the most skilful and daring of the Turkoman tribes, that of the Tekke, the perpetrators of the late massacre of the Yomuds at Derwera Aul.

“Although the natural boundary of Persia on the east is the River Kara-Su, which falls into the extreme south-eastern angle of the Caspian, where the luxuriant vegetation of the littoral zone of Persia terminates, together with the Persian population, and the steppes occupied by the Turkomans commence, its political boundary, however, is drawn along the course of the Attrek, which thus is the limit beyond which the influence of Russian arms cannot extend. Persia jealously guards her rights to the portion of the steppe, notwithstanding that it entails considerable losses to her. For some reason or other she is apprehensive of a Russian invasion of her territory, and is consequently in many respects far from being well disposed towards us.

“In proof of this the article cites the stealthy construction of Mian-Kali fort on Potemkin peninsula by Persia, and the erection of stone buildings on Ashurade island, in both of which cases Persia is alleged to have been influenced by her natural timidity and suspicion.

“The Turkomans are of course acquainted with the timidity of the Persians, and take advantage of it, not only in their relations with Persia, but also with respect to other neighbours, feeling convinced of their immunity from all punishment.

“Such a state of things, however, seriously affects the development of Russian trade. Trading caravans will avoid landing on the shores of the Caspian so long as they are exposed to pillage by the Turkoman tribes, of which the most depredatory are those frequenting the course of the Attrek. It is, therefore, necessary now to direct special attention to this point and to establish ourselves firmly on it, as far as it is possible.

“The signification of the Attrek is so clear that it is useless to dwell on the subject, and we therefore turn our consideration to another question—the possibility of erecting a fort or even colonising the banks of the river.

“In view of the construction of Mian-Kali by the Persians, we need not of course feel any delicacy in erecting a fortification of our own on the Persian frontier, more especially as it would be directed against Turkomans and not the Persians. It is important to take the natural conditions of the locality into consideration.

“We already possess a fort, that of Krasnovodsk, on the eastern coast of the southern portion of the Caspian, but its situation presents considerable inconvenience in regard to the support of its garrison, and consequently to its existence. It is true that Krasnovodsk Bay is

a very good harbour, but then the bare cliffs of basalt and gypsum, the surrounding arid steppes, the absence of all vegetation, and even of water (necessitating the construction of an evaporating apparatus, on the breaking down of which the occupants of the fort are deprived of all water), together with the distance from other populated points, render the colonisation of this place by a commercial and industrial population impossible. But, if the maintenance of this fort be considered feasible, then there can be no question of difficulties attending the establishment of a fortification on the Attrek, particularly as the conditions here are entirely different. There is a river here, and therefore there can be no want of fresh water. Good land, which it is said yields abundant crops, extends along the banks. An agricultural colony could then be founded close to the fort, which might be formed of Russian Trans-Caucasian dissidents and German Mennonites. A proposal to colonise the Attrek, with exemption from military service, would meet with a ready response on their part, and the adjacent steppes would soon be converted into rich fields by these laborious, honest, prosperous, and clever people. The colonisation of the Attrek would reduce the cost of maintenance of the garrison, and would more especially enliven the trade with Persia and the steppes.

“The only weak point of the Attrek is the absence of a good harbour, as Hussun-Kooli Bay cannot be entered by large vessels; but this harbour may be dispensed with, as another exists at a short distance, namely, Ashurade, our naval station, from which daily communication with the Attrek might be maintained by means of vessels of light draught. Thus, this is the point on which we must establish ourselves if we are seriously resolved on elevating the Trans-Caspian region, terminating the Turkoman depredations, developing trade, and *exercising influence* over Khiva, and *partly over Persia*,—a point, moreover, which presents the greatest facilities for colonisation along the whole eastern coast of the Caspian.”

[Vide *Enclosure of India Office Despatch No. 48, dated 19th March 1875.*]

CHAPTER IV.

TURKOMAN RAIDS UPON PERSIA THROUGH HERAT TERRITORY.

130. Turkoman raids through Herat a possible cause of complication between Persia and Afghanistan.—Some account has been given in the preceding chapter of the relations between the Turkoman tribes and the Persians, with especial reference to the importance of the Attrek valley line and the settlement of Merv. There is, however, another phase of the Turkoman question which possesses interest for the Indian Government, inasmuch as the unchecked passage of raiders through the territory of Herat into Khorassan may lead to complications between Afghanistan and Persia. The enmity of the Tekkes towards their Persian neighbours is ancient and traditional. There is the hatred of race and of religion. The Tekke moreover is a marauder and man-stealer by profession; so much so indeed that, unless he has been belied, a Sunni captive is only less welcome to him than an infidel Sheeah. The agricultural population of the north-east border of Persia offers to the Tekke a field for the exercise of religious zeal as well as for the gratification of his lust for booty. Besides, it will be seen from Captain Napier's interesting memorandum given in Appendix II that there is a long tale of injuries done and suffered on either side from the days of Nadir Shah to the present time.

131. Roads open to Turkoman raiders into Persia.—Now, looking at the map of north-east Persia, and remembering these two facts—*1st*, that on the direct road from Merv to Meshed the Persians hold the military post of Sarakhs, *2nd*, that further to the north-west the frontier is protected by the fortress of Kelat-i-Nadiri and colonies of warlike Koords, it will be evident that the "Allamans" had only two favorable openings for their forays, either from their settlements on the Koppet Dagh mountains over the Elburz chain down into the districts of Subzwar, Bostan, Shahrood, and even the neighbourhood of Astrabad, or by a circuitous route from Merv down the Murghab, and through the Afghan districts of Ghorian and Kohsan, into the southern tracts of Meshed and the parts below.

132. Raids into the districts south of the Elburz Mountains.—As a matter of history these are the two routes which have been adopted until lately by the Turkoman raiders. Captain Napier in his letter to the Government of India dated 19th August 1874 writes:—

"The districts of Subzwar, Shahrood and Bostan, though separated from the Turkomans by the main chain of Elburz, have suffered up to recent times more perhaps than any other part of the border.

"The Elburz, though rising to a considerable height, have always an easy slope and present little difficulty to the active Turkoman horsemen. Small parties can pass anywhere, and larger bodies have the choice of several good passes which the weakness of the Persian local Governments and the indifference, if not worse, of the border Chiefs leave habitually unguarded.

"The pass behind Jah Jarm is the one usually selected by the 'Allamans' or large plundering parties. Clearing the pass they enter on an open plain from which they can sweep westward on to the fertile villages of Shahrood and Bostan, eastward into the Jouven valley, and southward on to the main caravan route to Meshed. This road passes from Mayamai as far as Mazenan, a distance of 70 miles through low ranges of hills of such easy slope as to offer no obstacle to the movements of horsemen and yet affording the most perfect cover."

And we learn also from a memorandum by the same authority on the topography of the Eastern Elburz tract, that prior to the seizure of their stronghold, Kareekala, by the Russians the Turkomans used a bridle road leading

over the mountains to the very plain of Gurgan. Recently the forays in this direction have ceased, chiefly no doubt because the tribes have been sufficiently occupied with the dangers which threatened themselves. The advance of the Russians to the upper valley of the *Attrek* would effectually bar a descent from the north.

133. Raids on the Eastern Districts of Persia by the route from Merv and down the Murghab.—The road from Merv to the south-west, however, lies open, and the facility with which it may be used depends upon the action which the authorities of Herat may adopt. The following is the account given by Captain Napier in his letter to Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran dated 18th August 1874:—

“The whole Persian border from the Koordish districts as far south as the valley of Mud in the Ghaynot, a line of 350 or 400 miles, bounding the districts of Meshed, Turbut-i-Hyderi, Tubbus, and the Ghaynot is exposed constantly to the ravages of parties of Turkoman horsemen.

“The northern part of the Meshed district is protected from direct attack by the low hills skirting the plateau of Kelat-i-Nadiri, and also by the occupation of the old fort of Sarraks, which deprives the Turkomans of the advantages of a good base for their operations, and drives them more to the west towards the Murghab River.

“The southern part of the Meshed district and the northern part of Turbut-i-Hyderi are open to their attacks through the great plain of Surjam, stretching from the mountains of Bakherz to the Murghab and Merv, and connecting with the plain of Bevajan which extends into the district of Nishapoor. Thence the whole tract known as the Turbutain, Bakherz, and Khaff has a thoroughly exposed border line to the east.

“From the Khaff plain a break in the chain of hills bounding it on the west gives access to the Gunabad valley of the Tubbus district and the villages on the edge of the ‘Kavir’ (salt desert). The Khaff plain again is separated from the Reg Amrani plain by mountains through which there are many easy passes: by this route the valleys of Numbolae and Ghain and other parts of the Ghaynot are reached.

“The Turkoman tribes on this border are the Tekke, Sarrak, and Salor: the former located at Merv; the two latter to the south-west on the Herat border of Afghanistan.

“Their raids are made in parties of from 20 to 600 and 700, and the speed and endurance of their horses enables them to reach points at a distance of 50 farsakhs or nearly 200 miles from their base, and ordinarily to evade pursuit.

“Before the occupation of the town and fort of Sarraks by the Persians, the Tekke and the Sarraks, who had their settlements there, used to pass directly into Persian territory, but they are now compelled to act from a distant base, either Merv on the Murghab or to pass westward through Afghan territory.

“The Persian authorities allege that the *passage* of the raiders is permitted by the Afghan border guards and connived at by the Afghan authorities at Herat, and that they are supplied with provisions, &c., by the Afghan villagers, and thus enabled to extend their incursions to the great distances to which they are now carried.

“The Persian Government maintain for the protection of the border a force of several thousand irregular cavalry, chiefly Hazaras. These are stationed at points in the Meshed district, and in the districts of Khaff and Bakherz. The two last districts are more exposed to attack than other parts of the border, both from their position and because through them lies the road to many fertile valleys in their rear.

“Opposed to them on the Afghan side are the small States of Ghorian and Kohsan held by Khans under the Herat Government, who have each a force of 300 or 400 cavalry constantly employed on the border. The Persian authorities complain that not only do these give no assistance by keeping their own border, but frequently join with the raiders, and always receive a share of the booty.”

134. Persian complaints in 1872 that raids upon Khorassan were permitted by the people of Herat.—The complaints that the people of Herat were concerned in the incursions of the Turkomans are supported by the official papers which have reached this Department. In October 1872 the Government of India was informed by the Chargé d’Affaires at Teheran

that the Persians had remonstrated against raids being made into Khorassan with the connivance of the Herat authorities through that territory; and the Sadr Azem was anxious that the Ameer of Cabul should be moved by the British Government to take efficient measures for restraining the raiders.

[*Political A.*, November 1872, No. 151.]

This communication was followed by Mr. Thomson's despatch to Lord Granville, No. 83, dated 13th November 1872, forwarding letters from the Meshed Agent, in which it was said that the Prince Governor of Khorassan had despatched an Agent to Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan, at that time Governor of Herat, complaining that Herat horsemen had suffered the Turkomans to obtain a safe passage and even exacted fees for their complaisance. Yakoob Khan was said to have flatly denied the truth of the charge, and to have declared that the authorities were most attentive to their duty. But according to the Meshed Agent's account a strong report prevailed that several Afghans were acting as guides to certain Turkomans who raided on the district of Kayn; and an instance was given in which 300 of these robbers had entered Khorassan from the Herat frontier at Kohsan and Kahriz and plundered Tubbus, the Kayn district, Toorbut and Mahvilasht.

[*Political A.*, February 1873, No. 129.]

On the 5th December 1872 the Hissam-us-Sultaneh sent two noblemen to the Meshed Agent to inform him that Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan's proceedings had been reported by spies. The Sirdar was charged with having collected 1,000 Turkoman horse and other troops for the purpose of plundering Kayn: his father Ameer Shere Ali Khan had strictly forbidden any such expedition, and thereupon Yakoob had dismissed the Turkomans and bid them go and plunder Khorassan themselves; they, nothing loth, had fallen on the districts of Tubbus, Khaff, and Kooh Bund. The message of the Hissam-us-Sultaneh ended with the request that the matter might be reported to the British Chargé d'Affaires; and retaliation on Herat was threatened.

[*Secret*, May 1873, No. 25.]

135. Reports that Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan favored the Turkoman raiders.—Intelligence received from other quarters corroborated the Persian reports that Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan favored the Turkomans. Thus, the Candahar news-writer stated on the 3rd April 1873 that

“the Morees and Toorkees, Turkoman tribes, muster stronger in the neighbourhood of Herat than in former years, as Sirdar Yakoob Khan is very kind to them.”

And in a subsequent letter dated 22nd April 1873—

“There are two tribes of Turkomans who live close to Herat, their country being divided by San and Kurriah* hills. Sirdar Yakoob Khan

* Probably Ghorian.
has allowed them to settle in the above hills, Afghan territory, on the following terms: that they would respect his ryots and zemindars, who in return would be at liberty to supply them with wood, grass, and other necessaries, further, that they would commit constant raids on the following places:—*Khainate (Caynote); Khaff, Tubbus, Torshish (Turshiz), Turbut and Meshed.*”

[*Political A.*, June 1873, Nos. 27-28.]

In May 1873 the complaints were renewed. The Governor of Khaff had written to the Governor-General of Khorassan asserting that the Turkomans were permitted to pass through Ghorian of Herat to raid on Persian territory,

and that they had received aid from the Afghans. The Prince Governor had informed the Meshed Agent that he had been solicited to sanction acts of retaliation, but had declined out of consideration for the friendly efforts of the British Government.

[*Political A., July 1873, No. 369.*]

136. View of the Punjab authorities in June 1873 that though the Turkomans and Herat horsemen understood each other, the former were not incited to raid by Yakoob Khan.—Notwithstanding all this accumulation of evidence, the opinion held by the Punjab authorities was, that, however kindly disposed Yakoob Khan might be towards the Turkomans, he did not actually incite them to aggression on Persian territory. Their view of the case, is unfolded in Mr. Macnabb's letter forwarded with Punjab despatch No. 197C., dated 16th June 1873. Mr. Macnabb wrote:—

“ I think I can give as good an explanation of the understanding between the Turkomans and the Ruler of Herat as our Agent at Cabul is likely to afford.

“ A man recently returned from Herat, and I questioned him on this very point. He said that the Sirdar Yakoob Khan had made a point of securing the good-will of the leading spirits among the Turkoman borderers on his border by sending for them, making them small presents, and appealing to them as Sunnis not to molest his Sunni subjects again. There can be no doubt that the Herat horsemen are better able to cope with the Turkoman robbers than their less hardy neighbours on the Meshed side of the border; so it is natural enough that the Turkomans should prefer to raid where they have least reason to expect opposition.

“ I think it highly improbable that Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan has actually incited the Turkomans to raid on the subjects of the Governor of Meshed, as it has been his cue lately to keep up friendly relations with him. Any direct action of that kind would have become known at once, and would have led to prompt complaints. I think, however, that the Herat picquets of horsemen in the neighbourhood of Gharian, who are supposed to be placed there to check the robbers, must have a tacit understanding with the latter that each should let the other alone. Otherwise we should certainly hear occasionally of conflicts between them, as they cannot get down to their favorite raiding fields without taking that route either going or returning.

“ You may remember that some four months ago the Agent sent copy of a correspondence that had passed between the Governor of Meshed and Sirdar Yakoob Khan on this very subject, and was forwarded by the latter to the Ameer. His Highness at that time desired the Sirdar to enjoin more watchfulness on the part of the officers in charge of their frontier outposts, and greater alacrity in attempting to check these robber troops.”

[*Political A., July 1873, No. 372.*]

137. Further raids through Herat in the summer of 1873 and complaints of the Persian Government.—Whatever may have been the cause, the raids through Herat territory continued unchecked by the Afghans. The Meshed Agent reported on 8th July 1873, that in the previous month 120 Turkomans had burst into the neighbourhood of Kayn, and had been beaten off with loss by the son of Yoosuf Khan of Hazareh. Another body of robbers had entered the same district; but on Yoosuf Khan sending horsemen to oppose them, they had fled, escaping across the Herat river. In bringing these facts to the notice of Her Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tylour Thomson remarked that when pressed by the Persian troops the Turkomans had sought and found shelter by crossing the Herat frontier. He added that it appeared highly desirable that some timely arrangement should be made by the Herat Ruler to prevent these plundering expeditions from passing through Afghan territory when proceeding on or returning from their unprovoked acts of aggression.

Yakoob Khan's method of dealing with such marauders as had the temerity to attack his own country was very different indeed. In July 1873 the Heratee horsemen caught some eight or nine men and horses of a plundering party which had raided in the neighbourhood of Herat and carried off a few captives and some flocks. The Sirdar immediately caused two of the

prisoners to be blown from guns and two of them to be put to death by executioners.

[*Political A.*, October 1873, Nos. 161 and 526.]

138. Telegraphic communication with Mr. Thomson regarding Turkoman raids in January 1874. Ameer of Cabul said to be attempting to strengthen his Government.—Again at the beginning of the year 1874 Mr. Tylour Thomson telegraphed to the Viceroy:—

“Turkomans, in consequence of former routes having been stopped by Persian troops, recently made raid through the Herat territory in direction of Seistan and carried off 50 or 60 camels captive. Persian Government request that steps be taken to prevent these expeditions, and allege that the Ruler of Herat is not ignorant of the Turkoman plans.”

The Government of India replied:—

“Ameer is doing what he can to strengthen his Government, but it is a matter of time, and the Turkomans are not easily controlled, as Persian Government know. Sowars through whose negligence raids on Herat occurred are reported to have been dismissed from service.”

139. Herat sowars dismissed by Yakoob Khan for neglecting to oppose raids into his territory.—This last statement was based on the Cabul Diary from 28th November to 1st December 1873, in which it was reported, on the authority of a Candahar news-letter dated 5th November 1873, that some Turkomans had made an inroad on the Herat territory, and in consequence of the supineness of his cavalry, Yakoob Khan had been unable to adopt measures against them, and that the Sirdar in displeasure with the sowars had given orders for their dismissal.

[*Political A.*, March 1874, Nos. 352-353, and *Secret*, March 1874, No. 20.]

140. Prince Governor of Khorassan deputed an Agent at the end of 1873 to remonstrate with Yakoob Khan on the subject to the Turkoman raids.—At length the Prince Governor of Khorassan determined to see whether some arrangement could be made by deputing a special Agent on his part to represent Persian grievances to the Ruler of Herat. The circumstances which led to the mission of Mirza Mahomed Ali with the above object to Herat are set forth in the following notes submitted by the Meshed Agent to Mr. Tylour Thomson:—

“9th December.—A servant of Yoosuf Khan of Hazareh has by his orders brought a letter to the Governor-General of Khorassan from Bakherz, stating that intelligence had reached him that 500 horse of the Sarak and other tribes had assembled on a plundering expedition. They halted on their way and sent a message to Mahomed Yakoob Khan (Governor of Herat) asking him which quarter he would permit them to plunder. Yoosuf Khan thereupon sent two spies to ascertain their number and the nature of Yakoob Khan’s reply. The Herat frontier guard recognized the emissaries, pursued them, captured one of them, and conveyed him to Mahomed Yakoob Khan, to whom he was denounced as a spy. By His Excellency’s orders the man was blown from a gun.

“There exists at present a very hostile feeling between the Governments of Khorassan and Herat and between their respective frontier authorities.

“Yoosuf Khan adds that his guards had desried 100 Turkoman horsemen carrying off a number of captives: but it was not known what place these captives belonged to.

“12th December.—A report has reached this from Bakherz that 500 Turkoman horsemen were returning from Kayn with a large number of captives, horses and cattle.

“5th January 1874.—As correct intelligence is constantly reaching this that when the Turkomans enter Khorassan the Heratees in most instances afford them a passage, that the Turkomans halt and rest on the mountains and borders of Herat, that the Heratees furnish them with provisions, and that on the return of the Turkomans from their incursions they give a share of their plunder to the Heratees,—the Governor-General of Khorassan, with the approval of a number of the Khans (of this province) and of Heratee residents, amongst whom may

specially be mentioned Syud Server, the Afghan merchant, who considers himself as a friend and correspondent of Mahomed Yakoob Khan, has sent Mirza Mahomed Ali Mustowlee, native of Kayn, who three months ago came to Meshed in consequence of the ill-treatment he experienced from the Ameer of Kayn on a mission with a friendly letter to Mahomed Yakoob Khan."

[*Political A.*, April 1874, No. 230.]

141. While the Khorassan Governor's Agent was at Herat another raid was made through that territory on Kayn.—The Governor-General of Khorassan, however, gained little by the deputation of the Mirza to Yakoob Khan; for, writing on the 21st April 1874, Mr. Thomson reported that the Persian Agent was still at Herat awaiting a reply to the letters which had been addressed to the Ameer by the Prince Governor, and meantime the Turkomans had made another raid on Kayn, the party returning with their booty and 17 captives by way of Ghorian.

It appears moreover that Mirza Mahomed Ali failed to obtain any substantial satisfaction from Sirdar Yakoob Khan. He is said to have recovered only a small proportion of the value of the property claimed. The Governor of Herat denied that any Afghans were engaged in the raid on Khaff (which was the proximate cause of the Mirza's mission), and threw the whole blame on the Turkomans, who were not his subjects, and could not be restrained by him. He paid as compensation 200 tomans, the value of about 300 sheep; whereas the booty was said to have consisted of 7,000 or 8,000 sheep and horses, and to have been divided by the Turkomans with their Herat accomplices.

[*Political A.*, July 1874, No. 99, and *Captain Napier's letters dated 18th and 19th August 1874.*]

142. Cessation of raids through Herat since Yakoob Khan's downfall.—The suspicion that the late Governor of Herat winked at, or even aided, these outrages on the subjects of Persia is strengthened by the comparative cessation of raids since Herat has been pre-occupied by its own troubles, and especially since the downfall of Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan. The latest raids upon Khorassan of which reports have reached the Government of India are those mentioned in the Meshed Agent's letter of 14th August 1874. On the 23rd July a body of Turkoman horse had been intercepted by Ismail Khan, son of Yoosuf Khan of Hazara, ten *fursakhs* from Meshed, and defeated with great loss. And on the 11th August the horsemen of Khaff had beaten off a band of raiders between Khaff and Ghorian, taking ten Turkomans alive and one head.

[*Political A.*, November 1874, No. 219.]

The injury already done to Khorassan was noticed by Colonel Venioukoff in the Russian *Invalid* among the leading events of 1874:—

"The north-east frontier of Persia in the neighbourhood of Meshed was the scene of great disturbances occasioned by the Tekke Turkomans who have long been the enemies of the Persians. The Government of Teheran has evidently resolved to take up arms and to punish them, and even to annex Merv, the rallying point of these robbers. Having within the last year purchased 60,000 Chassepôt rifles of Prussia, the Persians are of course capable of vanquishing the Turkomans in open battle, although the latter also have been acquiring English rifles from some quarter. At the same time the Persian Exchequer is empty, and Khorassan is so very much ruined by the Turkomans and by its own rapacious administration, that the Persians will hardly be able to prosecute a lengthened campaign on their remote confines against their untiring and comparatively brave enemies. The Turkomans are well able to conduct a partisan warfare, which is dangerous even to European regular troops, and consequently more so to ill-disciplined Persian forces."

[*Secret*, February 1875, No. 71.]

It is not a matter of surprise that Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan should have done what he could to conciliate and win to his side the neighbouring Turkoman tribes. His relationship to the powerful Turkoman Chief, Khan Aga Jamshedee, rendered such intercourse more easy, and it could not be foreseen that the Jamshedee would desert the cause of his son-in-law in the hour of need. In fact, shortly before Yakoob's departure for Cabul and imprisonment the following information tending to inculcate the Sirdar was supplied to the British Government by a confidential writer, who possesses accurate and trustworthy knowledge of affairs in Afghanistan :—

“ Yakoob Khan is said to have about six thousand troops of all arms at Herat, and he could, if necessary, collect a similar number of irregulars from the district dependent on Herat. *He has established a friendly understanding with the Turkomans and the people of Merv, and can rely on support from them if necessary.*”

And it was even mentioned as one of the reasons why Ameer Shere Ali Khan hesitated to march upon Herat and reduce his contumacious son to submission,

“ that Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan had with him ten thousand, if not more, Turkomans and men of the Eymak tribe who had fled from the Russo-Bokharian frontier, and as the Sirdar treated them hospitably, he was sure of their assistance.”

The consolidation of the Ameer's power in the western dependency of his kingdom gives reason to hope that, as there will now be no excuse for neglect to fulfil the duties of a strong and friendly power on the borders of Persia, so the temptation to court the friendship of plunderers and man-stealers by encouraging their misdeeds will no longer exist.

CHAPTER V.

CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO BOKHARA.

143. **Preliminary remarks.**—A note of previous papers connected with the kingdom of Bokhara, including Samarcand, Shahr-i-Subz, and the neighbouring petty States, will be found on pages 131 to 163 of Mr. Wynne's Central Asian Précis for the period 1867-72.

Since the capture of Samarcand in 1868 and the occupation of the Zar-afshan Valley by the Russians, nothing has occurred to disturb the peaceful relations subsisting between the Ameer of Bokhara and his powerful neighbours. Samarcand, it is true, remained in the grasp of the Czar for the reasons explained by Prince Gortschakoff to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg in February 1873, namely, that although the engagement to restore Samarcand had taken the shape of a formal promise, and although it had been the sincere and firm intention of the Imperial Government to fulfil that promise, yet, "after an occupation of Samarcand of four years' duration, and in view of the advantages which had been conferred on the population of that city, the Imperial Government found that they could not, with credit to themselves, nor in justice to the inhabitants, restore that city to the Government of Bokhara, and on these grounds the Imperial Government had retained possession of it." [*Secret, May 1873, No. 88.*] On the other hand, the Ameer was indebted to the Russians for the suppression of a formidable rebellion raised by his eldest son, the Kette Tora, and for the subjection of his unwilling dependencies, Shahr-i-Subz and Karshi.

144. **Evidence as to favorable feelings towards the Russians in Bokhara.**—As to the feelings with which the supremacy of the Czar is viewed by the Prince and people of the Khanate, there is considerable variety of evidence. The opinion given by Khwaja Kazee Abool Hai was on the whole favorable. This person was formerly Kazee ool Kazat or Chief Judge in Samarcand. He held the same post in Karshi, and became eventually a Councillor of Bokhara. He was selected in 1871 to undertake a confidential mission through India to Constantinople. On his return to India in 1873 he visited the Punjab, and there, in the course of interesting discussions, which will be noticed more fully hereafter, informed Mr. Thornton, the Secretary to Government, that the Russians were not unpopular, or rather were popular, with (1) the trading classes, who appreciated the protection afforded by them to commercial interests; (2) ~~the~~ the peasantry, owing to their having reduced the land revenue to one-fifth of the gross produce, whether taken in kind or at a money valuation, whereas in Bokhara itself two-fifths of the produce of all irrigated lands were taken. Moreover, the Russians had gained the character of being perfectly tolerant in religious matters: and the Envoy had been told by General Ignatieff in Constantinople that orders had been issued to defray the cost of repairing mosques from the public exchequer. But the Russian Government was unpopular (1) with the upper classes and officials whose emoluments were destroyed or diminished, (2) with the *Milkdars* and *Wukfdars* (terms which appear to mean assignees of the Government revenue for secular or religious purposes), because these persons had now to pay land revenue like others.

[*Secret, June 1873, No. 364.*]

A similarly favorable view will be found in *Le Neva* of 16-23rd December 1872, though the writer attributes the result rather to the combined power and moderation which Russia has displayed—

"In 1870," he says, "when after a sanguinary struggle our troops seized the towns of Shar and Kitab, the Russian Government took advantage of the opportunity to prove its

desire to live in peace with the Ameer of Bokhara. It therefore summoned the Royal troops to Kitab, and restored to them the towns which we had just subdued. But before the cession could be completed, and while our soldiers still held Kitab, the people presented themselves in crowds before Major-General Abramoff in command of the detachment, and begged that they might be allowed to remain subjects of Russia. Two years have elapsed since these events, and the people of Shar and Kitab still show sympathy for Russia. A number of instances of the same kind might be cited: these facts are all in favor of the reputation which we enjoy in Central Asia, though the Russian occupation dates no farther back than seven or eight years."

Then after mentioning the firm yet friendly policy with which Kokand had been managed, the writer goes on—

"The same course has been pursued in respect to Bokhara, and if our peaceful relations with that country have not reached the degree of development which characterises our connexion with Kokand, it is because Bokhara, owing to the geographical situation in which it is placed, is less open to our influence. The greater part of the frontiers of the country adjoin territories which are but little known. Besides, in taking Samarcand, we could not fail to arouse the mistrust of the Ameer and his Government. In 1868, and subsequently to the conclusion of the treaty with Russia, the son of the Ameer rebelled against his father, and the troubles which were the natural consequence could not but re-act on our possessions. It was then that a Russian detachment by mastering the centre point of the rebellion succeeded in re-establishing order. The conquered country was made over anew to the Bokharian Government. In 1870 we were able to give a fresh and still more striking proof of our anxiety to maintain a good understanding with Bokhara. To the south of the valley of Samarcand, and beyond the mountains, lies the opulent province of Schachrisiabs. The two principal towns Shar and Kitab are surrounded by walls 120 versts long. The people of this province under the guidance of active leaders had revolted, and the expeditions sent against them had met with no success. The Russian Government remained inactive until the moment when the Begs of Schachrisiabs turned also against us. It was then necessary to deal with this state of affairs. In 1870 the two towns of Shar and Kitab were taken after a sanguinary contest and restored to their lawful ruler, the Ameer of Bokhara. Facts of this kind have naturally tended to shake the mistrust with which we were regarded by the Bokharian Ameer and other independent sovereigns of Central Asia. * * * * *

"At the same time our relations with Bokhara have sensibly improved. The journey of the Ameer's son to St. Petersburg and the Russian Embassy sent from Tashkend to Bokhara gave a fresh impulse. The treaty, which at first was a dead-letter, is now real and in active operation. Such is the confidence which we inspire that it is contemplated to nominate commercial agents at Bokhara and Kokand."

[*Secret, March 1873, No. 82.*]

There is, moreover, the fact that during the Khivan campaign the attitude of the Ameer of Bokhara was so friendly as to produce a very favorable impression on the Government of the Emperor. Prince Gortschakoff informed the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg on 21st May 1873 that the Ameer had sent an Envoy to greet General Kaufmann, had offered any assistance he might require, and had replaced a certain number of the camels which had perished on the march.

[*Secret, August 1873, No. 165.*]

145. Evidence showing that the kindly feeling of Bokhara for Russia is only apparent.—On the other hand there is evidence to show that the reconciliation of Bokhara to Russia is hollow, and that beneath a seeming cordiality there lies a strong current of national dislike. Mr. Eugene Schuyler indeed in his report on Russian-Turkistan calls in question the sincerity of the Ameer when tendering his good offices to General Kaufmann:—

"The surrender both of Shahr-i-Subz and of Karshi was made against the wishes, and in spite of the protests of the population, who much preferred to remain under Russian rule than to return again to that of the Emir. In spite of these benefits conferred upon the Emir, of numerous embassies, and of other means taken to assure him of the friendliness of the Russians, the Emir likes them no better in his heart, though his experience of their strength leads him as far as possible to avoid causes of conflict. When the Khivan expedition started there was general fear in Bokhara that it was directed also against that city, and merchants even sent away their property and came to Samarcand, to be out of harm's way. At one time the terror was so great that the population proposed to seize upon the

Emir, and deliver him up to the Russians. The Emir, however, professed friendliness to the Russians, met them at the frontier with messengers and presents, and sent an envoy with the expedition. He furnished a certain amount of provisions and camels, though, with the exception of a small present, these were sold at high prices, and not given away. He further held himself ready to take advantage of any circumstance favorable to himself, and while he was sending kind words and worn-out camels to the Russians, he was giving his blessing and opening his purse to those Turkoman Chiefs who left Bokhara for Khiva. The Russian authorities considered it best, however, to wink at his conduct, and to reward his friendliness and the equanimity with which he regarded the re-establishment of a Russian fortress—St. George—at Kbalata, within the Bokharan territory, by bestowing upon him a narrow strip of country on the right bank of the Oxus which was in dispute between him and Khiva.”

[*Secret, October 1874, No. 23.*]

In the Russian *World* of the 27th November 1872 appeared a communication from M. Raievski, said to be a well-known authority on the subject of the relations between Russia and the Khanates of Central Asia. The writer charged the Ameer of Bokhara with duplicity: “He maintains constant friendly relations with Afghanistan which, as is well known, is used as a weapon of English policy in Central Asia.” There were rumours that Bokhara was prepared to cede Kolab and Kerki to Afghanistan. The Bokharian Agent at Tashkend had been heard to say to a native who reproached him for humiliating himself in the presence of the “infidel dogs,” that, with the help of the Almighty, circumstances would soon be changed.

[*Secret, February 1873, No. 226.*]

In October 1872 news was received by the Commissioner of Peshawur from a merchant at Bokhara that the Uzbegs of Mian Kalat, a tributary of Samarcand, had written letters to the Ameer saying that, if he came into collision with the Russians, they would afford him assistance secretly: other Mahomedans also in the Russian Empire had sent similar communications. His Majesty, however, was maintaining *the same outwardly friendly* relations towards the Russians which they displayed towards him.

[*Secret, October 1872, No. 41.*]

The Meshed Agent also, on the 13th January 1873, communicated to the British Minister at Teheran a statement which, if true, is significant as showing the reluctance of the Ameer to have more intercourse than he can help with his new friends.

“Whenever,” the Agent wrote, “the Ameer hears that Russian Officers intend visiting Bokhara as they generally do in parties of ten to twenty, he appoints a Mehmandar to receive them, and goes out on a hunting excursion and *remains out in the country until they leave, when he returns.*”

[*Secret, April 1873, No. 74.*]

146. Illustration of the discontent and alarm caused by the control which the Russians exercise over the water supply of Bokhara.—Besides the dislike necessarily felt by a fanatical population towards conquerors of an alien race and creed, there is an ever-present source of apprehension and distrust arising from the fact that Russia by holding the valley of the Zar-afshan is mistress of the water which supplies the life of Bokhara. This subject is noticed by M. A. Petrovski in his narrative of a tour in Bokhara during the spring of 1872. He writes:—

“Before our arrival at Samarcand, the Bokharian Ambassador Meerakhor and my interpreter had informed me that the want of water in the States of Bokhara, and especially the reconstruction of the “*Tuye tartare, arik*,”* had given rise to loud complaints among the population of Bokhara against the Russians. According to the accounts which reached Meerakhor on the road the inhabitants of the town of Bokhara had gone to Karshi to complain

* “*Arik*” seems to mean what in Northern India would be called a “*rajbaha*,” i.e., a conduit or water-course.

to the Ameer that water was held back from them in the district of Samarcand, and had begged him to make an end of the business once for all. But rumours derived from Samarcand and from the retainers of Meerakhor—rumours which penetrated as far as my servants—credited the Ameer with having left Bokhara fearing the discontent of the people. * * * * The information which I have been able to collect on the subject convinces me that the Bokharian States are really in want of water, but that the fault lies not with the district of Samarcand, but with the Government itself. The question of a regular supply of water for the Bokharian States was discussed some months ago at Samarcand in accordance with the orders of Government by a special Commission, composed of members of the administration of the Samarcand district and of two representatives of the Bokharian Government. By the decision of this Commission the Government of Bokhara being directly interested in the matter, undertook to inform the Chief of the Samarcand district twice a year whether Bokhara lacked water or not. In case of need all the *ariks* of the district must be closed for a fortnight; otherwise they are opened and closed at the pleasure of the people themselves. This year the Government of Bokhara had not sent notice by the time agreed upon, and consequently all the *ariks* of the Samarcand district remained open, and the water in the Zar-afshan failed.

Whether the traveller was right or wrong about the cause of the drought in Bokhara we may be quite sure that the Russians got all the discredit of the calamity.

[*Secret, February 1874, No. 70.*]

147. Unfavorable account of the moral conduct of the Russians in Samarcand.—Moreover, unless the Russians in Samarcand are much maligned by one of the principal journals of their country, their character is not such as to inspire the natives with affection, or even with any other kind of respect than that which proceeds from fear. A correspondent of the *Golos* of 7th November 1872 gives a very unfavorable account of the condition of the Russian inhabitants of that town, who are divided into three distinct and antagonistic classes. The interests of these classes came into collision on the occasion of a survey of the town which was made for the purpose of appropriating sites for the erection of European dwellings. Each class considered itself entitled to exclusive consideration in the matter. In the preceding September a Commission had been appointed, consisting of two representatives of each class, which proceeded to expropriate plots of ground which they overvalued for the most part in an arbitrary manner, the native occupants being driven out of their dwellings with their wives and families, and ordered to establish themselves elsewhere. One of the members of the Commission obtained permission to appropriate some marble tombstones, and was succeeded by a person “who is not likely to quit his post from any fear of condemnation.”

It appears that the morality of the Russian inhabitants of Samarcand has not improved since soldiers' wives were permitted in the autumn of 1871 to establish themselves in one of its suburbs :

“Almost every soldier's wife is a prostitute, the husbands themselves co-operating in their degradation; drunkenness and debauchery prevail to an incredible degree; morality is in general at a very low ebb. Many have established harems; others, and unfortunately very many, have given themselves up to a vice which is very prevalent among the brutalised races of the East. In this manner many of the refined Europeans, who have been educated at centres of civilisation, have become worthy rivals of the Sarts.”

[*Secret, January 1873, No. 136.*]

148. Commercial Treaty of 1868 and remarks of the Russian Press thereupon.—The commercial transactions of the Russians with Bokhara until recently rested on the basis of a treaty negotiated by General Kaufmann in June 1868. The *Messenger Officiel* of 31st October 1872 published the text of this engagement with prefatory remarks, of which the following is a translation :—

“From the time when successful efforts had been made to re-establish the wished-for tranquillity in our Kirghiz steppes, and to introduce into them a regular system of government,

our trade with the Khanates of Central Asia grew to a considerable extent—thanks to the comparative safety of the caravan routes. Up to the capture of Tashkend this trade was almost exclusively confined to the Bokharians and Kokandians, that is, to foreigners who came to Russia to seek the industrial products of which they had need, and enjoyed not only entire safety for their persons and goods, but even certain advantages over our traders. As regards our merchants, if it so chanced (which was very rarely the case) that they betook themselves to the neighbouring Khanates, they were subjected to every kind of vexation not only at the hands of their competitors, the native merchants, but specially at the hands of the local Governments themselves. The latter exacted double the duties fixed by the *Shariat* for Mussulmans, not to mention other annoyances which our countrymen underwent and the unbridled tyranny to which they had to submit from Customs House officials and Municipal authorities. Thus it became a matter of absolute necessity to effect a change in a state of things which was so injurious to our traders and so unworthy of the dignity and power of Russia.

The writer, then, after stating the measures adopted in respect to Kokand, continued :

“More difficulty was encountered in dealing with the Ameer of Bokhara. At the time when it was first proposed to him to agree to the improved engagements, which did no more than secure to our traders privileges which Bokharian merchants had long enjoyed in Russia, he still indulged in dreams of avenging the defeat which we had inflicted on him in 1866. While the discussions with his envoy were going on at Tashkend during the autumn of 1867-68, he was actively preparing for a fresh struggle with Russia. The disastrous campaign of 1868 brought him sufficiently to his senses, so that he accepted the new terms which were proposed to him, and which were similar to the engagements agreed upon with Kokand. But this convention remained for some time, as it were a dead-letter, until the time when we restored to the Ameer the town of Karshi (November 1868) and the province of Shahr-i-Subz (August 1870), two arguments which were sufficiently powerful to convince the Ameer of the sincerity of our wish to live on friendly terms with him and to avoid any extension of our possessions.”

149. Text of the Commercial Treaty of 1868 between Bokhara and Russia.—The following is a translation of the commercial stipulations which were proposed by General Kaufmann and sealed by the Ameer of Bokhara at Karshi on the 18th June 1868 :—

“I.—All Russian subjects to whatever religion they belong are entitled to resort for purposes of trade to Bokhara, as well as to all towns of Bokharia, in precisely the same way as subjects of the Ameer of Bokhara have always been permitted, and will in future be permitted to trade through the length and breadth of the Russian Empire.

“II.—The illustrious Ameer undertakes to keep a vigilant watch over the complete safety of Russian subjects being within the borders of his territorial possessions, as well as the safety of their caravans and generally of everything that belongs to them.

“III.—Russian merchants will be allowed to have, in all towns of Bokharia where they may wish for them, caravanserais which they will be able to use as exclusive depôts for their goods. Bokharian merchants will enjoy the same privilege in Russian towns.

“IV.—Russian merchants are entitled, if they shall so desire, to have in all towns of Bokharia their commercial agents (*caravanbashi*), whose duty it will be to look after the regular course of trade and the lawful exaction of Customs House dues; Bokharian merchants enjoying the same rights in the towns of Turkistan.

“V.—All goods entering Bokhara from Russia, or *vice versâ*, will be subject to a tax equal to that which exists in Turkistan, and which is fixed at 2½ per cent. *ad valorem*; in no case must it exceed the figure of the tax exacted from Mussulman subjects of Bokhara.

“VI.—Russian merchants and their caravans are at liberty to traverse freely and in security the territory of Bokhara in order to pass into countries bordering on that State. Bokharian caravans will enjoy the same advantages with the view of passing through the territories belonging to Russia.”

[*Secret, January 1873, No. 139.*]

150. Mr. Schuyler's comments on the Commercial Treaty of 1868 and the Bokharian slave-trade.—Mr. Eugene Schuyler appears to attach little importance to the conclusion of such engagements, unless

care be taken to enforce their fulfilment. He writes in his memorandum on Russian Turkistan :—

“ Nothing had been said in the commercial treaty with regard to slavery or the slave-trade, but it was impressed upon the Bokharian authorities that the Russians disapproved of this shameful traffic, and desired its cessation. In consequence of this, the Bokharians gave out to the Russians that the trade in slaves (the slaves here are all Persians) had entirely ceased, and dust was thrown in the eyes of the Russian officials who came to Bokhara, so that the diplomatic *employé* made a report to General Kaufmann some two years ago, in which he stated that, after careful investigation, he was convinced that, in deference to the wish and principles of Russia, the slave-trade had entirely ceased. Merchants, however, who had better opportunities of seeing, knew that it was going on in full force, but these reports were disbelieved in Tashkend. Mr. Petroff-sky, the agent of the Ministry of Finance, was in Bokhara in 1872, and, having seen with his own eyes the sale of Persian slaves at the bazaar, he made a strong report to General Kaufmann, but no notice was taken of it.

“ When I was in Bokhara in August, I also saw the open sale of slaves at the bazaar, and openly purchased one. The authorities, however, became alarmed at this, knowing that I could thus prove their duplicity to the Russians, and took him away from me. I therefore bought another through one of my servants, and brought him with me to Tashkend, and subsequently to St. Petersburg. This caused a great scandal at Samarcand and Tashkend, as it occurred at the very time when the news came that General Kaufmann had caused the release of Persian slaves at Khiva, but the act was viewed with favour by most persons, official and otherwise, for it was considered that I had given the Government actual proof of the existence of the forbidden traffic. Some of the more outspoken partisans of the Governor-General were displeased, thinking that my action was intended as an innuendo against him. After the return of the Russian troops from Khiva, it was found necessary to make a new treaty with Bokhara with regard to the cession of the small strip of land on the Oxus already spoken of, and an article was inserted in the Treaty by which the slave trade was henceforth utterly abolished in Bokhara. At the same time the commercial treaty was renewed, granting the Russians additional privileges in the Khanate. It is, however, not the making of treaties in these countries, but the enforcement of them, which is important, and it remains to be seen whether the present treaty will be kept any better than the preceding ones.”

[*Secret, October 1874, No. 23.*]

151. New treaty with Bokhara of September 1873.—Subjoined is a English version of the new treaty to which Mr. Schuyler referred :—

RUSSIAN TREATY WITH THE AMEER OF BOKHARA, DATED SEPTEMBER 28TH, 1873.

“ *Clause I.*—The frontiers between the possessions of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, of all the Russias and His Worship the Ameer of Bokhara remain unchanged.

“ The Khivese territory on the right bank of the Amoo having been embodied with the Russian Empire, the former frontier between Khiva and Bokhara, from the oasis of Kholat to Gugertli, is altered in this wise :—The possessions of the Ameer of Bokhara are augmented by the addition to them of the lands between the former Khiva-Bokhara frontier on the right bank of the Amoo, from Gugertli to Meschekli, and from Meschekli to the point where the former Khiva-Bokhara frontier met the frontier of the Russian Empire.

“ *Clause II.*—In consequence of the right bank of the Amoo being severed from Khiva the caravan roads going from Bokhara north to the Russian possessions traverse Bokharese and Russian territory exclusively. The Russian and Bokharese Governments each in its own territory will watch over the safety of these caravan roads and the commerce along them.

“ *Clause III.*—Russian steamers and other vessels, whether belonging to the Government, or to private persons, will have the right to navigate without let or hindrance the Bokharese portion of the Amoo, equally with Bokharese ships.

“ *Clause IV.*—Any locality on the Bokharese banks of the Amoo which the Russians may select for the construction of piers or storehouses may be used by them for this purpose, the Bokharese Government being responsible for the safety of the erections thus established. The final and definitive selection of these localities depends upon the supreme Russian authorities in Central Asia.

“ *Clause V.*—All the towns and villages of the Khanate of Bokhara will be open to Russian commerce. Russian merchants and caravans will be allowed to travel freely in the whole Khanate, and will enjoy the special protection of the local authorities. The safety of the Russian caravans on Bokharese territory is expressly guaranteed by the Bokhara Government.

" *Clause VI.*—On all merchandise belonging to Russian traders, whether imported from Russia to Bokhara, or from Bokhara to Russia, an *ad valorem* tax of 2½ per cent. will be levied in Bokhara. In the Russian province of Turkistan, the goods mentioned in the preceding sentence are to pay a tax amounting to one-fortieth of their value. No other tax, duty, or impost whatsoever will be levied upon merchandise of the description mentioned.

" *Clause VII.*—Russian merchants will be entitled to send their goods through Bokhara free of transit dues.

" *Clause VIII.*—Russian merchants will be entitled to have caravanserais for the storing of merchandise in all Bokharese towns. The same right is accorded to the Bokharese merchants in the towns of the province of Turkistan.

" *Clause IX.*—The better to direct the course of commerce, insure the levying of the above tax, and regulate their relations with the local authorities, in mercantile matters, Russian merchants are accorded the right of keeping commercial agents in all towns of the Khanate. The same right is accorded to the Bokharese merchants in the towns of the province of Turkistan.

" *Clause X.*—Commercial engagements between Russians and Bokharese must be considered as sacred, and be unconditionally carried out by both parties. The Bokhara Government promises to look after the honest fulfilment of commercial engagements, and the fair and conscientious conduct of commercial affairs generally.

" *Clause XI.*—Russian subjects will enjoy an equality of right with Bokharese subjects in carrying on in Bokharese territory all branches of industry and handicraft allowed by the law of Sharigat. A corresponding right is accorded to Bokharese subjects on Russian territory with regard to the exercise of all trades and handicrafts permitted by the Russian law.

" *Clause XII.*—Russian subjects are permitted to possess houses, gardens, arable lands, and every species of real property in the Khanate, such property to be subject to the land-tax assessed on Bokharese property. A corresponding privilege is accorded to Bokharese subjects in the whole territory of the Russian Empire.

" *Clause XIII.*—Russian subjects are admitted to the Bokharese territory when provided with permits signed by the Russian authorities. They may travel freely in the whole Khanate, and are placed under the special protection of the Bokharese authorities.

" *Clause XIV.*—In no case will the Bokharese Government receive on Bokhara territory persons arriving from the Russian territory, whatever nationality they may belong to, unless provided with a special permit duly and satisfactorily signed by the Russian authorities. If criminals who are Russian subjects should take refuge on Bokharese territory, they will be arrested by the Bokharese authorities and delivered to the nearest Russian authorities.

" *Clause XV.*—With a view to the maintenance of direct and permanent relations with the Supreme Russian authorities in Central Asia, the Ameer of Bokhara will appoint one of his intimate Counsellors to be his resident envoy and plenipotentiary at Tashkend. This plenipotentiary will live at Tashkend in the house and at the expense of the Ameer.

" *Clause XVI.*—If it chooses to do so, the Russian Government may keep a permanent representative at Bokhara, attached to the person of His Worship the Ameer. As the Ameer's representative at Tashkend, so the Russian plenipotentiary at Bokhara, will live in the house and at the expense of the Russian Government.

" *Clause XVII.*—To please the Emperor of all the Russias and enhance the future glory of His Imperial Majesty, His Worship the Ameer Seid Mustafa of Bokhara has determined as follows:—The traffic in human beings, being contrary to the law which commands man to love his neighbour, is abolished for ever in the territory of the Khanate. In accordance with this resolve, the strictest injunctions will be given by the Ameer to all his Beys to enforce the new law, and special orders will be sent to all border towns where slaves are transported for sale from neighbouring countries, that should any such slaves be brought there, they shall be taken from their owners and set at liberty without loss of time.

" *Clause XVIII.*—His Worship the Ameer Seid Mustafa being sincerely desirous to strengthen and develop the amicable relations established five years for the benefit of Bokhara, approves and accepts for his constant guidance the above 17 clauses, constituting an agreement relative to the friendship between Russia and Bokhara. This agreement has been made out in two copies, each copy in the two languages—Russian and Turkish. In proof of his having sanctioned this agreement and accepted it for his own guidance, as well as for the guidance of his successors, the Ameer Seid Mustafa has affixed to it his seal.

" Done at Shar on the 28th September 1873, being the 19th day of the month Shayban of the year 1290, A.H."

152. **Treaties no sign of real friendship between the Russians and Bokhara.**—There is reason to believe that these engagements are only apparent indications of an approach to entire national cordiality. M. Raievski, whose opinion has been quoted previously on page 111, informed the *Russian World* that the Commercial Treaties which had been concluded with the Central Asian Khanates could not of themselves be considered to prove the existence of a sincere and friendly intercourse between the Governor-General of Turkistan and the Khans of Bokhara and Kokand. "The Treaties," he said "are only on sufferance, without speaking even of Mussulman fanaticism with which the Central Asian rulers are imbued and which is kept up among the people by the Mussulman clergy. We should not forget that during eight or nine years we have taken from them the greater part of their dominions and reduced them from the position of independent and paramount sovereigns to that of second-rate and almost vassal rulers. How can it then be expected that the vanquished and humiliated rulers should entertain friendly feelings towards those who have so humiliated them? Do not let us deceive ourselves; both the rulers and their subjects hate us equally."

[*Secret, February 1873, No. 226.*]

153. **Trade of Bokhara described by Petrovski.**—As regards the nature and extent of trade in Bokhara, some information was collected by the travelling agent M. A. Petrovski, who visited the Khanate in the spring of 1872. He arrived at the conclusion that Bokhara was the principal point of Central Asian commerce. The bazaar was five times larger than that of Tashkend, and possessed 27 enormous caravanserais and six brick-built markets. From India and Afghanistan came nearly 1,000 various kinds of the products called '*attare*' (dyes and drugs), about sixteen sorts of green-tea, a quantity of cotton stuffs, shawls, brocade, opium, crockery, metal work, and printed books. Persia supplied dyes, printed cottons, sulphur, pepper, arms, silver, and printed and manuscript books in great quantity. Khiva furnished mantles, oil, flax, tallow, wheat, rice, apples, sulphur, Russian goods, sugar, cast-iron kettles and sugarcandy. Herat sent dried fruits, furs, sheep and slaves; Merv sent Turkoman horses and arms. Finally, in the bazaar of Bokhara were found articles of local produce, such as cotton, silk, wool, yarn, furs, hides, pigments, wheat, silk and cotton stuffs, clothes, etc. On the other hand, Bokhara exported her own produce, or that of the neighbouring countries; to Afghanistan, gold, silk, goat and camel skins, madder, Russian cloth, velvet and satin, horses, asses, and even cats and nightingales; to Khiva, tea, tobacco, opium, cotton, silk, madder, drugs, and silk and cotton stuffs; to Persia, gold, lamb skin, silk stuffs, cloth and Russian velvet. M. Petrovski estimated the annual value of exchanges at Bokhara to be nearly 40 million roubles.

Russian products were found to occupy the first place. The market was glutted with Russian cottons, which were six times more numerous than those of England.

The price of nearly everything at Bokhara was lower than at Tashkend: the gravitation of trade towards the commercial centres of Russia appeared satisfactory: but one thing was to be regretted, *viz.*, that no Russian traders frequented the markets of Bokhara: the whole trade in Russian products was in the hands of natives of the country, or Tartars: for the proper protection of Russian merchants, who were under existing circumstances a prey to the dishonesty of the native traders, it was essential that Russian merchants, or at least Russian commercial agents, should reside at Bokhara.

The trade in tea at Bokhara had slipped from Russian hands. Enormous caravans, numbering as many as 5,000 camels, arrived yearly from Afghanistan,

and spread over the Bokharian provinces and the steppes of Turkistan penetrating even as far as Khiva, Kokand, and Russian Turkistan. No black tea was to be found. The stores of green tea at Bokhara were enormous, and Russian teas could not stand the competition, as much by reason of their high prices as because their place was already occupied. The above remarks referred to green tea: with tea in cakes (*thé alma*) the case was different, and there was a chance that Russian merchants might succeed in driving this kind of tea out of the Bokhara market by means of a similar tea, but of better quality coming from Kiachta.

The trade in slaves was carried on openly at a bazaar in the centre of the city. The traveller saw 100 men, and 30 women and children offered for sale, and a boy of 12 years of age fetched 120 roubles (£16) in his presence. Sales were also carried on in private houses, and not only in Bokhara, but also in many of the towns and large villages of the Khanate. The slaves were bought principally from the Turkomans, and the number annually sold in Bokhara alone was estimated at 4,000.

154. Petrovski's description of Karshi and its commerce.—M. Petrovski also visited some of the principal towns in the Khanate of Bokhara. Of Karshi he wrote—

“Since Khanikoff visited it, scarcely any change has taken place at Karshi. The town has been enriched by a bath [and three caravanserais; the occupations of the inhabitants remain the same, but I am told that they become more extensive year by year. I saw enormous plantations of tobacco and poppy, which were very well kept up. The tobacco of Karshi (of two kinds of which I got the seeds), very famous in Central Asia, is exported in very great quantities from Tashkend to Kokand, and even to Khiva. The poppy, another important product of local industry, is cultivated by the inhabitants for the sale of poppy-heads, the husks of which are used for making the soporiferous drink called *Konknar*, one of the most widespread narcotics in Central Asia. The mulberry tree abounds in Karschi: all the *ariks*, all the domes of the mosques and *medresses* (superior schools), as well as the gardens, are ornamented with them, and yet the cultivation of silk is very little developed among the Uzbegs. Almost all the silk they get is consumed in these parts, and only an insignificant portion, together with a small number of cocoons, is sent to Bokhara. This trade is unimportant from its small dimensions, and it seems to me to have no prospect of increasing, for the silk and cocoons of Karshi have to compete with the cocoons and silk of the Kischlaks round Bokhara, and therefore they are rarely sold to advantage. It is the same with cotton; the Uzbeg population use it for their own wants in the shape of cloth, *alatscha*, *kahama*, and other cotton products, but the sale of them is small. The trade in wheat, or rather grain, on the contrary, is of far greater importance. Karshi is opposite Bokhara, nearly in the same way that Aoulieta is opposite Tashkend. An enormous quantity of wheat which comes by the Kaschka-Daria is collected at Karshi, to go from there almost straight by caravan to Bokhara. The profits of this trade appear to be very considerable. On the road from Bokhara I met a crowd of caravans with wheat, and among them 164 camels bringing rice by this road from Samarcand even. Fearing they might be stopped at Katta Kourgan, the owners of the caravans had preferred to carry their rice to Bokhara by a much longer road, *viz.*, by Dyani and Tehiriktchi, only in order to sell it at Bokhara. Lastly, I ought to mention a product which is very widely consumed, that is, the rose-coloured salt, which we know at Tashkend under the name of Samarcand salt. It is found in nearly all the towns of Turkistan. I have seen it at Perovsk and at Aoulieta, which will give an idea of how extensively it is exported. They work this salt in the mountains, 10 versts to the south of Karshi. I wanted to visit the place where they work, but my curiosity was restrained by the same evasive amenities with which they opposed my intention of going to Kerki; in a word they would not let me go. According to what was told me, the salt is worked in three places, the property of the country; the outturn of salt is very considerable. The working of the salt quarries is at the disposal of all the subjects of the Government, Bokhara not excepted. Formerly it was the practice to levy a duty on consumption, 20 copecks per camel load of salt exported; now this tax is taken off; though Karshi is on the principal commercial road between Bokhara and India and Afghanistan, it has no great commercial importance; the caravans which come to Karshi from India and Afghanistan are not unpacked, but they are taken straight to Bokhara, where they pay the *zakel*, and it is only afterwards that some of these goods, such as Indian tea, are brought back to Karshi to be sold. The result is that these goods are much dearer at Karschi than at Bokhara.”

Karshi and Shahr-i-Subz M. Petrovski found to be the farthest limits towards the south for the sale of Russian manufactures. At Hissar there were no Russian goods: and they were only met with rarely and accidentally beyond Karshi. At Shahr-i-Subz English stuffs held the market. Indian green tea abounded, but there was an entire absence of black tea. Rice from Peshawur penetrated as far as Shahr and Karshi: the Peshawuri *pillaw* was a fashionable dish (*signe de bon ton*). From the latter facts the writer drew the inference that since it was worth the merchant's while to convey to such a distance so heavy and cheap an article as rice, it must be possible to do a profitable business in other kinds of merchandise, including English goods, provided there were a sufficient demand.

[*Secret, February 1874, No. 60.*]

155. Native accounts of the Bokharian trade in 1870-71.—A party sent out by Captain Grey in 1870-71 also visited Bokhara and brought back the following details relating to trade. The imports from Hindoostan were—

Cotton cloth of every kind (English), crockery and metal goods (English), indigo, brocades, broadcloth, saccharine produce, spices, tea, cochineal, sal ammoniac, horses, camels, madder, carpets, silk, loongees, chintz, gold coins, drugs, copper, pearls, gold lace, and wire.

Cloth of every kind, except muslin and cotton cloth, was imported from Russia. Notwithstanding the obstacles thrown in the way of the export trade by the Russians, the merchants managed to export secretly by desert routes immense quantities of English cloth, tea, and opium to Kokand and the countries beyond.

The tea brought from Russia was esteemed much inferior to English tea.

[*See Report of Captain Grey's Party, No. 4.*]

156. Russian views as to the commercial routes most favorable for the trade of Bokhara with Russia and other countries.—While attention is turned to the Bokhara trade it may be useful to quote the subjoined extract from the *Turkestan Gazette*, dated 3rd October 1872, giving a geographical comparison of the routes by which Russian and foreign commerce might pass into Central Asia:—

"From Nijni-Novgorod to the markets of Bokhara the Russian trade proceeds in the following way;—(a) to Samara, and Orenburg, (b) by the Volga and the Caspian Sea to Astrabad. The transport by the first route is defined by a term of three to five months, and the price for the carriage from two to four roubles per poud.

"From Mangyshlak to Khiva thirty days of caravan route are required; from Nijni-Novgorod to Mangyshlak, by river and sea route, we suppose less than thirty days. Finally from Nijni-Novgorod to Astrakhan and to Astrabad the transportation of the goods is effected by the Volga on light steamers in five days, and on tug-boats in twenty days. Then from Astrabad to Bokhara there are 1,300 versts, which require about 2½ months of caravan route. The cost of the transport from Nijni-Novgorod to Astrakhan on board of light steamers is from 50 to 80 copecks, and on tugs from 20 to 30 copecks per poud, and from Astrakhan to Astrabad about 50 copecks. Consequently in all, from Nijni to Astrabad, from 60 to 110 copecks silver.

"Now, let us follow the sea-foreign routes to the Persian Gulf or India, and afterwards the territories from Bunder Boushir through Persia, or by the Indian railways to Peshawur, and thence through the Himalayan chain into Central Asia.

"With the digging of the Suez Canal the length of the passage has diminished in a very great degree. With regard to the caravan route from Peshawur to Bokhara, it can be defined by a term of 40 days. The second sea route is directed on Poti, through the trans-Caucasian province to Bakou, Astrabad, and caravan route to Bokhara. In taking, for the point of a departure for the English trade, London, we calculate the passage to Astrabad in the following way:—

"From London to Poti 43 days.

"From Poti by the river (80 versts) to Maran, to Bakou (750 versts), from 30 to 40 days. From Bakou to Astrabad 4 days, in all from 80 to 90 days; from thence finally to Bokhara from 30 to 40 days. Consequently from London to Bokhara from 110 to 130 days, or from 3½ to 4¼ months. The cost of the transportation from London to Astrabad can be reckoned by the following figures:—To Poti, 65 copecks per poud, to Bakou, 145 copecks, to Astrabad, 25 copecks, which will form a total of 235 copecks.

"In reckoning that the port of Astrabad is equally accessible to the Volga Steam Navigation and to the Trans-Caucasian transit, we put down the time necessary for bringing out the goods, together with the cost of the transportation, and find that for the Russians it is required from 15 to 20 days, and for the English from 80 to 90 days, and that the cost for transportation for the first is from 60 to 100 copecks per poud, and for the second, not less than 235 copecks for every poud.

"The natural conditions connected with the transporting of goods by sea are as near as possible the same. The Volga freezes up, but the sailing on the Black and Caspian Seas, although it does not cease entirely, is considered excessively dangerous.

"In throwing a general glance on the Trans-Caucasian transit, we cannot but dwell on the question of the future. By the chart of the Indian Railway it is seen that the distance from Bokhara to Peshawur is evidently diminishing to that of the distance to Astrabad (from Bokhara?), whereas Samarcand proves to be a point still nearer to Peshawur. In consequence of these causes, English trade appears to be on the high road towards possession of the Central Asian markets, if not entirely, in a great measure.

"The route, however, to Astrabad and the Caspian Sea is in the hands of our traders. The exertions of the British Government to construct a railway route from the Gulf of Persia to Teheran are as yet merely an unaccomplished scheme, whereas the ridge chain of mountains separating the Iran height from the Caspian shore presents very great convenience for caravan movement from us.

"Here are the chances of success in future for this or that side.

"If after the opening of the movement by the Suez Canal should follow the erection of the railroad to Teheran, then there is no doubt that the road through the Black Sea will lose its present importance, whereby our Trans-Caucasian transit will be left apart from the most important European trading movement.

"These are, we repeat, the problems awaiting from day to day a final solution.

"We cannot, however, forget that all that we have said was founded on the system of old ways of communication in the Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus. We did not then take into account the railways of the close future, ways strikingly changing the conditions of transport as well with respect to cost as to rapidity. The expected opening of the railway from Poti to Tiflis will probably soon furnish correct figures for new calculations and more actual arguments.

"The subject of present consideration will have a more effectual form if, in parallel to the way mentioned by us, a prolongation of the railway from Rostoff should take place, then the port of Petrovsk on the shore of the Caspian will, in its turn, occupy an independent position.

"The Volga, Petrovsk, Bakou, and the non-freezing Caspian present themselves as points of departure for our future commercial route, in the same way as the railway to Orenburg serves somewhat as a new gate into Central Asia. Although the future is yet undeveloped, and our conclusions are merely simple suppositions, nevertheless we deem it just to say that in the matter of the Central Asian trade the railways of our country will be of the highest importance."

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 78.*]

157. **Conferences with the Bokharian Envoy in May 1873. Suggestions of the Envoy regarding aid which the British Government might give. Arms and a British Agent at Bokhara.**—There are only two points requiring notice in respect to relations between the Government of India and the Ameer of Bokhara. The first is the nature of the representations made by the Envoy Khwaja Kazee Abool Hai on his return to India from Constantinople in May 1873; and the second is the recent history of the refugee Afghan Sirdar Abdool Rahman Khan, whose presence near the Afghan borders has produced a disquieting effect.

The views of Bokhara as represented by the Envoy are recorded in notes of conversations held with the Lieutenant-Governor and Secretary to Govern-

ment of the Punjab on the 14th and 15th May 1873. The following are extracts from memoranda written by Mr. Thornton, the Secretary:—

Interview of 14th May.—The Envoy had two representations to make:—

“First, that the Ameer of Bokhara was greatly in need of small arms, cannon, ammunition, and military instructors, and would be glad if the English Government would assist him in procuring them.

“I observed that this would probably be regarded as an unfriendly act by the Russians, with whom we were on friendly terms.

“To this he replied that it might be done “*dar pinhancee*,” *i.e.*, secretly, or in such a way as not to compromise the British Government.

“Secondly, he had to represent that one of the objects the Ameer had in view in sending him to Constantinople was to seek the Sultan’s advice as to the best means to adopt for the security of the kingdom of Bokhara against absorption by Russia.

“The Sultan at an interview advised him that the best means the Ameer could adopt would be to place the administration of his territories in the hands of a *Sahib*, who would introduce a *régime* of law and councils (*Qanoon-o-Majlis*) in lieu of the present arbitrary system of government and would bring their military system into order. The Envoy enquired whether an English officer would be a suitable person to appoint. The Sultan replied “certainly.”

“The Ameer of Bokhara, continued the Envoy, had no option but to follow the advice of the Khalifa (*i.e.*, Sultan), so you may consider that the employment of an English officer in the administration of Bokhara will be now an object sought for by the Bokhara Government.”

Interview of 15th May with the Secretary.—The Envoy again referred to the desirability of appointing an English Consul at Bokhara, with power to settle disputes between British subjects and natives of Bokhara.

“He proceeded to remark that it would be a very desirable arrangement if Mr. Forsyth could, instead of proceeding to Yarkund *viâ* Cashmere, accompany him (the Envoy) to Bokhara, stay there a month or two, have interviews with the Ameer, and see all that was to be seen at Bokhara and its vicinity, and then proceed *viâ* Hissar and Kolab to Kashgar. By the time he got to Kolab he would be in a position to draw up a constitution for Bokhara, providing for its proper administration by means of definite laws (*qanoon*), a Council of State (*majlis*), and the appointment of a Consul. From Kolab he might depute one of his subordinates to India to obtain the sanction of the British Government to his recommendations, and the British Government might then, if the recommendations were approved, transmit them to Bokhara with an officer to act as Consul.

“Mr. Forsyth might return from Yarkund by the same route and see whether the constitution was properly carried out.

“Should the Russians enquire the object of Mr. Forsyth’s visit, the British Government might reply that the object was to arrange for the appointment of a Consul—an object to which the Russians would have no reasonable objections. Should this be impossible, he would repeat the suggestion * * * * that the tracts (*ilaquas*) of Kolab, Hissar, and Karategin be taken in hand by the Ameer of Afghanistan on behalf of the British Government.”

Interview of 1st May with the Lieutenant-Governor.—The Envoy stated that—

“when deputed by His Highness the Ameer of Bokhara to proceed to Constantinople, he was fully authorised to take counsel from the Sultan and others as to the best means to be adopted for the preservation of Bokhara from the encroachments of the Russians.

“Accordingly, at Constantinople, at an audience with the Sultan, he represented the deplorable situation of his country and asked His Majesty’s advice.

“The Sultan replied that in the time of his father the position of Turkey was similar to that of Bokhara; its army was undisciplined and its system of administration was most unsatisfactory. He accordingly took advice from European Statesmen and Ambassadors, and from the chief men of the State and the Ulema,* and eventually established a constitutional system of Government and organised a regular army in lieu of the undisciplined levies of former days. He accordingly advised the Bokhara Ruler to adopt a like policy, and with the help of the English Government to obtain new weapons, ammunition, drill instructors, and to introduce a system of regular Government† with a Council of State‡

* Note.—The Ulema are a class composed of ministers of religion and professors and interpreters of the law. They pay no taxes, their property is not liable to confiscation; their persons are sacred; nor can they be legally punished save by imprisonment. (Sd.) T. H. T.

† *Qanoon*.

‡ *Majlis*.

having control over all Departments. ‘I observed,’ proceeded the Envoy, ‘to His Majesty that up to the present time there had been no very intimate relations between the Bokhara and British Governments, but now that the latter had placed matters on a satisfactory footing in Afghanistan, it was possible they might do the same for Bokhara.’

"In accordance with the above views the Envoy suggested that Mr. Forsyth might, instead of proceeding to Yarkund *viâ* Cashmere, proceed *viâ* Bokhara, where he could discuss matters with the Ameer and see the state of the country, and make arrangements for re-organising the administration. He might then proceed on his way to Yarkund *viâ* Kolab, and from Kolab depute one of his officers to report his arrangements to the Government of India. On his return from Yarkund it might be arranged that he should be met at Kolab by an official from Bokhara, either himself, or some other person, and ascertain how the new arrangement worked. The Ameer, he said, was placed in such extremity that he must accept whatever was recommended.

"When the re-organisation of the administration had thus been put in train, the British Government might depute an officer to Bokhara, nominally as Consul, but in reality charged with a secret commission to arrange for the supply of arms and ammunition to the troops, and for seeing the reforms duly carried out. Should this scheme prove impracticable, it might be desirable to adopt a suggestion made to him by persons whom he had consulted, some of whom were of high position in Constantinople, namely, to make over the tracts as (*ilaguas*) of Hissar, Kolab, and Karategin to the Ameer of Cabul, bring back the son of the Bokhara Chief, now with the Atalik Ghazee, to Bokhara, and constitute the two tracts as feudatory dependencies of the British Government, bearing the same relation to the latter as Egypt does to the Porte. In this way the forces of Bokhara, co-operating with those of the Ameer of Cabul, in his new dominion of Kolab, &c., and with those of Atalik Ghazee from Kashgar, might deal an effective blow upon the Russians and check all further advance.

"In reply to a question from His Honor, enquiring why it was assumed that Russia intended further encroachments in Bokhara, and why, if Kokand, as was understood, accepted her position as a vassal of Russia, Bokhara could not do so too? The Envoy stated that it was true Kokand accepted her position,—but she had been a vassal before to Bokhara. Bokhara had never been. At present, moreover, the vassalage of Kokand was allowed by the Russians to be nominal, but it would not be so long; and, with regard to Bokhara, as Russia had seized one house in the street (Samarcand), it was impossible to believe that it would not soon lay hands on the rest, and annex Bokhara too. 'And when,' he added, 'the Russians have acquired Bokhara and Kokand and matured their plans for Turkish aggressions, they will turn their attention to Afghanistan and demand from her all the countries she has wrested from Bokhara, with all the arrears of revenue therefrom which the Cabul Government has appropriated.'

"In reply to a question, whether, in the event of its being impossible to comply with the Envoy's request for assistance, it could be arranged to supply the British Government with reliable news from Bokhara of what was going on in Central Asia; he said it would be quite possible; news-letters could be sent daily, or if preferable weekly, *viâ* Kilef on the Amu, to Tashkurgan, and there made over to our correspondent."

[*Secret, June 1873, No. 374.*]

158. Refusal of the Government of India to supply Bokhara with arms or to depute a British officer.—The Government of India, adhering to the policy of abstention which had been adopted in 1871-72 (see pages 160-161 of Mr. Wynne's Central Asian Précis) caused the Envoy to be informed through the Government of the Punjab that no proposal, either for the employment of a British officer at Bokhara, or for the supply of any munitions of war, would be entertained.

It may be here remarked that the Bokharian Envoy, when at Constantinople, had called upon Her Majesty's Ambassador, and urged the expediency of appointing an accredited British Agent to reside at Bokhara. He did not attempt to conceal that it was the fear of Russia which made him anxious that this step should be taken, the danger being that an unfounded accusation would be made of the ill-treatment of Russian merchants, and this would become the pretext for an attack on the independence of the Khan. The Government of India, when consulted on the subject, replied under date the 16th September 1872, that—

"Independently of many objections that might be urged against such a measure, the direct interests of British subjects at Bokhara are not of sufficient importance to render it necessary that they should be represented through an accredited agent. The proposal is one to which we can give no encouragement."

[*Secret, June 1873, No. 365; also Secret, September 1872, Nos. 191-192*]

159. Recent movements of the Afghan refugee Abdool Rahman Khan.—A full account of the history and fortunes of Sirdar Abdool Rahman Khan, the warlike and ambitious son of Shere Ali Khan's older brother, Sirdar Afzul Khan, is given in the narrative of events at Afghanistan compiled by Messrs. Wyllie and Wynne. For some years past the Sirdar has resided in Russian Bokhara or the adjacent cities, dependent on the charity of foreigners, and cherishing no friendly feelings either towards his uncle of Cabul or the British Government. In 1871 he made overtures to prove his gratitude to Russia by organising an expedition against Shere Ali Khan. He was sternly rebuffed by General Kaufmann (page 55, Wynne's Central Asian Précis).

As may readily be supposed, there have been frequent rumours and tales regarding the intentions and movement of this unquiet spirit. Towards the end of 1872, Mahomed Khoja, a native of Andijan, arrived at Lahore after travelling through Khojend, Samarcand, Katta Kourgan, Shereabad, Balkh and Cabul. He brought news—

“Sirdar Abdool Rahman Khan had solicited the permission of the Russian authorities to go to Mazar-i-Shureef in Balkh to live quietly there. The chief officer in Samarcand demanded from him a return promise to the effect that he would not create disturbances in the dominions of the Ameer of Cabul, after which permission would be given after reference to the Ameer. It was reported in Samarcand that the Ameer of Bokhara had forbidden Sirdar Abdool Rahman Khan on his way from Samarcand to halt in any place within the dominions of His Majesty. There was also a rumour at Samarcand that Sirdar Abdool Rahman Khan would go either to Kashgar or Manungra.”

[*Secret, December 1872, No. 4.*]

160. Rumours that Abdool Rahman intended to leave Samarcand and attack Budukshan towards the close of 1872.—In the *Indian Public Opinion* of 24th January 1873 there appeared the following paragraph:—

“*Frontier News.*”

“Sirdar Abdool Rahman, acting under Russian instigation, has attacked and taken the Fort of Hissar, a dependency of Cabul, and sent in the Governor to the Russians, and in the same way Sirdar Mahomed Esa Khan having succeeded in an attack upon Shereabad (also belonging to Cabul) has made over the Governor as a State prisoner to the Russians. Abdool Rahman is making the Fort of Hissar a *point d'appui* for his attack upon Afghan Turkistan.”

The above rumours reached the London papers, and on the 31st January 1873, the Secretary of State telegraphed to enquire whether it was true that Abdool Rahman Khan had left Samarcand to attack Budukshan. He was told in reply that the reported attack in Budukshan was believed to be absolutely unfounded: but the Government of the Punjab was asked to ascertain the facts. The Lieutenant-Governor answered by telegram of 14th February 1873 that he had no reason to believe the truth of the report, and that the Commissioner of Peshawur held the same opinion: further, that latest information as to the movements of Abdool Rahman Khan was quite of another tendency. General Kaufmann also informed Lord A. Loftus that, according to advices from Samarcand, dated 28th December 1872, Abdool Rahman Khan was there on that day quiet and inactive, that perfect tranquillity reigned in Bokhara, and on the neighbouring frontiers, and that the report respecting Abdool Rahman Khan was a pure invention.

[*Secret, February 1873, Nos. 15-17 and 56.*]

[*„ March „ No. 252.*]

It is nevertheless certain that towards the end of 1872 Abdool Rahman Khan was believed to be meditating some enterprise against Afghanistan. He wrote to Azim-ud-din Khan, an adherent of Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, Governor of Balkh, calling on him to uphold gallantly the cause of the faithful—“You should exert yourself in a manly manner in the propagation of our religion, because Shere Ali Khan is a servant of the English, and will ruin you the Mahomedans.”

Naib Mahomed Alum Khan was reported to have sent the Sirdar's letter to the Russian Governor-General at Tashkend, remarking that, though Abdool Rahman Khan was so distant from Afghan territory as Samarcand, he desired to shake the ties of friendship and disturb the peace enjoyed by the people; as the Ameer of Cabul out of friendship for Russia had prevented Meer Surrah Beg Khan, Ex-Governor of Kolab, to remain near Turkistan, or on the Bokhara borders, so the Russians ought to keep the Afghan refugee in a place very far from Shere Ali Khan's borders.

[*Secret, December 1872, Nos. 133-134.*]

161.—Russian assurances in regard to Abdool Rahman Khan.

—On the 25th November 1873 the British Ambassador wrote that he had been informed by a person who had just returned from Central Asia that Abdool Rahman Khan, then living at Tashkend on an allowance of 20,000 roubles per annum from the Russian Government, was maintaining an active correspondence with very numerous adherents in Afghanistan, and that he was supposed to be saving a great part of his allowance with the view of accumulating sufficient funds for the support of the claim which he intended to make to the dominions of the Ameer Shere Ali. Lord A. Loftus added:—

“I do not in any way intend to incriminate the Russian Government with complicity in the ambitious views of Abdool Rahman Khan, nor even have I any reason to suppose that the Imperial Government have any knowledge of the communications kept up by Abdool Rahman with his friends in Afghanistan.

“Both Prince Gortchakow and General Kaufmann have on a previous occasion stated to me most explicitly that if Abdool Rahman should be discovered entertaining any illicit correspondence dangerous to the peace of Afghanistan, he would be instantly removed from Samarcand and “*interné*” in the interior of Russia. I may observe that Abdool Rahman Khan is married to a daughter of Jahandeer Khan, the ex-Meer of Budukshan, who has of late been in constant movement on both sides of the Oxus.”

[*Secret, April 1874, Nos. 228 et seq.*]

162.—Native account of Abdool Rahman's circumstances and followers in 1870-71.—

An extract relating to Sirdar Abdool Rahman Khan, and taken from the report of Party No. 4 sent out by Captain Grey in 1870-71, is given below for what it is worth:—

“Sirdar Abdool Rahman Khan is now at Samarcand; he receives 25 gold tillas *per diem* from the Russian authorities. He applied for assistance for the conquest of Balkh; his application was at first rejected, but a second application of that Sirdar was forwarded to the Governor of Tashkend for orders. * * * * *

“In the month of Zeekad (February 1871) the Russian authorities at Samarcand sent two vakeels to the Ameer of Cabul, and it was asserted by the relatives of Abdool Rahman Khan that the vakeels were to settle his affairs with the Ameer of Cabul, but the real object of their commission is still undiscovered. Formerly there were 500 men with Sirdar Abdool Rahman Khan; the number has now been reduced to 50, the rest having left for Bokhara, Kokand, and Cabul, &c., on account of the difficulty in getting their subsistence allowance from the Sirdar, who has also sold a good many of the horses he had with him. (There is no doubt that he is in great distress). The most trustworthy officers, Abdool Rahim Khan Tokhee, General Nusseer Khan, and Mahomed Esa Khan, son of Mahomed Azim Khan, are still with him.

“Of the above three officers, Abdool Rahim Khan Tokhee was sent from Samarcand to Kirkee at the head of more than a hundred sowars, with the view of causing a disturbance in the Balkh territories, but the terror of the Governor of Kirkee and also of the Turkoman Lubabi tribes obliged him to return to Samarcand without gaining his end, and consequently he is mistrusted by Sirdar Abdool Rahman Khan and Russian authorities. Abdool Rahman Khan believes this failure to be the work of the Shah of Bokhara and hates him accordingly.”

163.—Abdool Rahman's opinions as to his chance of disturbing Shere Ali and the feelings of the Afghans towards the English.—Some interesting information in respect to Abdool Rahman's opinions on the feeling of the Afghans towards the English is contained in the letter from the Military Attaché at St. Petersburg to Her Majesty's Ambassador, dated 16th March 1874. The informant was an American, who had recently returned from Central Asia after visiting Kulja, Kokand, Taskhend, Bokhara, and Samarcand. At the latter place he obtained an interview with Abdool Rahman Khan, and the following is the record of the conversation which ensued :—

"Being desirous to find out the feeling entertained by the Afghans towards England, my informant, who is an American, commenced a conversation with that object. Speaking through a Russian interpreter, he first asked Abdool Rahman whether the subsidy granted by Great Britain to the Ameer of Cabul tended to any great extent to secure a feeling of friendship towards England on the part of his fellow countrymen.

"To this Abdool Rahman replied that no doubt Shere Ali received the subsidy with pleasure and gratitude, but that all the riches of India would never be able to soothe the feeling of hatred with which the English are regarded by the Afghans.

"My friend then enquired whether, in the opinion of Abdool Rahman, the Afghans would be willing to fight against England in the event of her being engaged in a war with some other great Power.

"The Russian interpreter objected to the form in which this question was put, saying that any mention of war had better not be mooted. Abdool Rahman, who, since his residence at Samarcand, has acquired some slight knowledge of the Russian language, here interposed and said,—'Were England at war with any other great country—as, for instance, with America,—Afghanistan would willingly attack the English in India on the sole condition that no harm should be inflicted on the natives of India itself, but that the war should be exclusively against the English.' Abdool Rahman appeared to entertain great hopes of being able to subvert the power of his cousin in Afghanistan, where he said that he was himself most popular among the natives, but that what he required was money."

The Military Attaché added :—

"As Your Lordship is aware, Abdool Rahman receives an annual donation of 25,000 roubles from the Russian Government, and I am told that of this income he scarcely spends 5,000 roubles a year.

"Some three years ago, as I am informed, in an interview which he had with General Kaufmann, he requested that officer to pay him 100,000 roubles down in lieu of his annual pension, saying that he would then return to Afghanistan, and guaranteed that within two months he would rule in the place of his cousin, in which case he would be in a position to render great services to Russia.

"General Kaufmann expressed his regret at being unable to comply with the wishes of Abdool Rahman with regard to this matter. It appears that on many occasions Abdool Rahman has begged for permission to visit St. Petersburg, where, in his opinion, he would be in a position to expose his views to the authorities, and thus benefit his cause. He has, however, in every instance, been put off by excuses on the part of General Kaufmann."

[*Secret, June 1874, No. 21.*]

164.—Miscellaneous information : The Ameer's family : Bokharian views of the Afghan frontier : Disaffection in Bokhara : Afghan account of affairs : Mission to Russia : Civilities between Cabul and Bokhara.—Information of a miscellaneous sort relating to Bokhara is scattered about the official papers submitted to Government, and may be summarised under the following heads :—

I. *Family of the Ameer Syud Ameer Mozuffer Khan.*—The age of the Ameer himself was said by the Bokharian Envoy to be 45 years in May 1873. He had a large number of sons and daughters.

The eldest son was Abdool Malik Khan, aged 21—then with the Atalik Ghazee at Kashgar, and on bad terms with his father.

The second son, Noorodeen Khan, aged 18, was Governor of Charjoe; on good terms with his father, and his intended successor.

The third son, Abdool Mooneer Khan, aged 16, was Governor of Karshi, and on good terms with his father.

The fourth son, Abdool Ahad, was Governor of Karmina.

The Envoy anticipated that trouble would occur on the death of the Ameer, as the eldest son had many partisans.

II. *Bokharian views on the Afghan frontier.*—The Bokharian Envoy, when informed of the arrangements recently made with Russia in respect to the northern Afghan frontier, took no exception, and added that, if the Ameer of Afghanistan were to occupy Hissar, Kolab and Karategin, it would be advantageous.

[*Secret, June 1873, No. 364.*]

III. *Disaffection against the Ameer of Bokhara.*—In November 1873 a traveller just returned from Central Asia, and whom the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg deemed worthy of implicit confidence, stated that, while at Tashkend, in September 1873, he had obtained proof of a design on the part of certain influential people at Bokhara to depose the Ameer Syud Mozuffer. The traveller was shown a letter from the chief astrologer of Bokhara reporting that great disaffection prevailed, and that, unless General Kaufmann or the Emperor of Russia caused the Ameer to be replaced, the Bokharians would take the matter into their own hands. The astrologer begged that General Kaufmann might be advised to annex the Khanate of Bokhara permanently to the Russian Empire, but in any case to depose the present ruler who had made himself very obnoxious to his subjects by his licentious conduct. No resolutions had been taken on the subject by the Russian authorities when the Ambassador's informant left Tashkend.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 231.*]

IV. *An Afghan account of Bokharian affairs.*—In May 1873 Mirza Mahomed Tahir Khan, Confidential Agent of the Ameer Shere Ali Khan, left Cabul for Bokhara with a complimentary letter and presents for the King. On the 1st January 1874 he sent the following information to Shere Ali:—

“Telegraphic communication has been established between the Russian head-quarters and Tashkend, and the Russians are making arrangements for the construction of a road as far as that city. As the road between Samarcand and Jazakh *via* Tashkend is not in their opinion sufficiently good, they are constructing a new road, and work every day at it. In the neighbourhood of Samarcand is a demolished city, which was probably built by Afrasiab, and which now exists in the form of ravines and mounds. During the course of levelling the remains of this city to the ground, an entrance was discovered, and, on going into it, they found some buildings. They went to some distance into it and then returned, and after closing the entrance placed a guard over the place and submitted a report about it to their ruler. At present the levelling of this place has been held in abeyance, but the construction of the road is going on. It is supposed that there is treasure hidden inside this entrance.

* * * * *

“When Astaradi, a Russian Officer, waited on the King of Bokhara at Shahr-i-Sulz, he expressed three objects of his mission in a friendly manner, *viz.*, (1) that a Bokhara Agent should be appointed in St. Petersburg and a Russian Agent at Bokhara; (2) that the Russian traders, who hitherto paid a tax of 5 per cent. on the value of their goods brought to the city of Bokhara, should now be allowed to pay at the rate of 2½ per cent., like other merchants; and (3) that the trade in slaves should be discontinued. The King kindly expressed his assent to all these three applications and sent with Astaradi one of his agents, Abdool Kadir Beg, commanding one *dasta* of infantry troops from Shahr-i-Sulz, and he has gone to St. Petersburg at the instance of the Governor of Tashkend. * * * When the King returned to Bokhara afterwards on the 7th Zilkad, he issued the following order in regard to the trade in slaves:—

“Within ten days from this date, the 7th Zilkad, the traders in the city and its neighbourhood should sell all the slaves and slave-girls. If on the eleventh day any person is found practising this trade, both the purchaser and the seller will be strictly held responsible. From to-day any slaves or slave-girls, who can pay to their master the amount of their purchase money within ten years, will be released as soon as the payment is made, and those who are unable to make such payment within ten years will be set at liberty without this pay-

ment after the expiration of this period.' These orders have been notified in the Bokhara city and forwarded by hand of sowars to the Governors of different provinces with injunctions that the trade in slaves has been prohibited. His Majesty has also given orders that in future Russian merchants should be taxed at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on the value of their goods. When the Russian Governor-General returns from St. Petersburg a Russian Envoy will be despatched to Bokhara, and on return of Abdool Kadir Beg, the King will appoint one of his agents as his permanent representative at St. Petersburg; it remains to be seen what kindness will be shown to the King as Astaradi gave him great hopes of expecting it from the Emperor of Russia."

[*Secret, July 1873, No. 54.*]

[*„ March 1874, „ 76.*]

[*„ July „ „ 66.*]

On his return to Cabul in May 1874, the Agent informed Shere Ali that, on account of the unscrupulous conduct of the Russians, the King was in a most distressed condition, and that in the end the result of the Russian policy would not be favorable to Bokhara.

V. *Bokharian mission to Russia.*—The mission mentioned by the Afghan Agent attracted the attention of the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who reported on 25th January 1874 that Abdool Kadir Beg, Envoy Extraordinary from the Ameer of Bokhara, accompanied by two Secretaries, Isman Achmut Omrani and Mirza Abdool Ajan, had arrived on a complimentary mission from his Sovereign, and had been received by the Emperor of Russia. The alleged object of the mission was to congratulate His Majesty on the success of the Khivan expedition, and to return thanks for the territory taken from Khiva and ceded to Russia, with professions of amity, &c., but the Ambassador added:—

"I am unable to inform Your Lordship what influences, whether of fear or love, have dictated this extraordinary mission of the Ameer of Bokhara, but I should be rather inclined to attribute them to the former."

[*Secret, March 1874, No. 170.*]

VI. *Afghan and Bokharian courtesies.*—The interchange of civilities between Bokhara and Cabul has been the subject of comment in Russia. Colonel Venioukoff remarked in the pages of the *Russian Invalide* how constantly communication had been kept up by the Ameer of Bokhara with Shere Ali Khan, and how, after receiving Meer Mahomed Tahir, Shere Ali's Agent at Karshi, the Ameer of Bokhara had despatched Khoja Abdool Wakhhab to Cabul. So far, however, as the object of the deputation has been disclosed, it was simply to congratulate the Ameer Shere Ali Khan on the nomination of Sirdar Abdoola Jan as his heir-apparent, and to deliver presents in return for those sent to Bokhara. Still there can be no doubt that the two Governments are at present on an apparently cordial and friendly footing.

[*Vide Secret, July 1874, No. 88, and February 1875, No. 15.*]

F. H.—14-5-75.

CHAPTER VI.

RECENT EVENTS IN THE KHANATE OF KOKAND.

165. Original extent of the Khanate of Kokand.—Mr. Saville Lumley, in his letter to Lord Stanley dated 15th June 1867, stated, on the authority of a Russian writer, Williamoff Surmoff, that the Khanate of Kokand comprised nine districts:—

- 1.—Ancient Fergana, lying between Karategin and the left bank of the Amu Daria (Oxus).
- 2.—Namangan, extending from the right bank of the Syr to the Alatau Mountains.
- 3.—Khojend, formerly an independent State, but united to Kokand for the last 50 years.
- 4.—Uratife, between Khojend and Bokhara, conquered in 1813.
- 5.—Kurama, a small territory on the right bank of the Syr, between Khojend and Tashkend.
- 6.—Tashkend.
- 7.—Hazret Turkistan, the northernmost district, extending to the Hungry Steppe.
- 8.—The country between Lake Balkash and the source of the Syr, inhabited by the black Kirghiz and other nomads.
- 9.—The eastern slopes of the Belur Tagh, a territory which, though lying in Chinese Turkistan, is claimed by Kokand. The Provinces of Karategin, Darwaz, Kolab and Shignan are said to have been conquered by Kokand in 1830. Though now scarcely connected with the Khanate, they are considered by Russia as appertaining to the territory of Kokand.

As a proof that the above territorial distribution had been studied by the Russian Generals, Mr. Lumley cited the fact that, when on the taking of Tashkend General Kryzhanofsky declared the independence of that city, he claimed as territory belonging to it, first, the surrounding country within a radius of 20 versts, and afterwards extended it to 50 versts, including Chinaz on the Syr, which was the extent of territory placed under the jurisdiction of the Kushbegi of Tashkend in 1850.

[*Secret, August 1873, No. 163.*]

166. Brief re-capitulation of the recent history of Kokand.—The course of events by which Kokand has been shorn of the greater part of her territory, and reduced to the position of a dependent on Russia, is sufficiently known.

“By the capture of Tashkend,” writes Mr. Eugene Schuyler, “the adjoining country, and of Khojend, a Kokand city, but then under Bokharian rule in 1866, the Khan of Kokand was restricted to a very small portion of his former territory, his sway having previously extended to the mouth of the Syr-Daria, and he was left to govern a small but fertile territory, completely surrounded by mountains except on the western side, near Khojend. It was at first also expected to take the province of Namangan, confining Kokand to the mouth of the Rivers Naryn and Syr-Daria, and General Romanoffsky was exceedingly desirous of rounding off his conquests by the occupation of the city of Kokand and the conquest of the whole country, but shrewd advice given to the Khan made him send congratulations to the Russians on the capture of Khojend; and as there was no cause for war, General Romanoffsky was reluctantly compelled for the time to desist. He was soon after removed, and as the policy indicated at St. Petersburg has been always against fresh conquests, and nothing occurred on the side of Kokand to render advance absolutely necessary in that direction, the country has been untouched since that time.”

167. Negotiations for a Commercial Treaty between Kokand and Russia in 1868.—The bond of union between Russia and Kokand has acquired apparent strength from the Commercial Treaty concluded in 1868. As remarked by the *Messenger Officiel* of the 31st October 1872, the Khan of Kokand, thanks to the geographical situation of his possessions, was the first to yield to the moral influence of Russia and to recognise the futility of opposing her. Accordingly, after brief negotiations, he gave his consent to the conditions which had been proposed to him in respect to the liberty of trade. After some hesitation, aroused by the war-party, Khodayar Khan set his seal on the 3rd February 1868 to two copies of the treaty, one of which was conveyed to Taskkend.

“Thus was laid the basis of a reconciliation with this Khanate, and of the development of our trade with it. More than four years and a half have elapsed. In the meantime our friendly relations, not only with Khodayar Khan, but also with the population of Kokand, have gathered appreciable strength, and have induced them, as we believe, to value our proximity and friendship, and to consider such a state of things as expedient for themselves and as insuring their safety.”

168. Articles of the Commercial Treaty of 1868, translated into English.—An English version of the Commercial Treaty is given below :—

Reciprocal engagements between Russia and the Khanate of Kokand.

I.—All towns and villages in the Khanate of Kokand shall be open to Russian traders, in the same way as all Russian markets are accessible to Kokandian merchants.

II.—Russian merchants shall be permitted to hold in the towns of Kokand, wherever they please, their caravanserais, in which they shall enjoy the exclusive right of storing their goods. The same privilege is granted to Kokandian traders in the towns of Russia.

III.—Russian merchants have the right, if they wish, to establish in all the towns of Kokand their commercial agents (*caravan-bashi*), whose duty it will be to watch over the regular course of trade and the lawful demand of customs duties. Kokandian merchants shall enjoy the same privilege in the towns of Turkistan.

IV.—All merchandise proceeding from Russia to Kokand, or from that country to Russia (European or Asiatic), will be subject to a tax similar to that which exists in Turkistan, and which is fixed at $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. *ad valorem*. Under no circumstances shall the rate of duty exceed the rate levied from Mussulman subjects of Kokand.

V.—Russian merchants and their caravans may traverse in perfect freedom and safety the lands of Kokand in order to pass into the bordering territories. Kokandian caravans shall enjoy the same privileges for traversing the territories belonging to Russia.

[*Secret*, January 1873, No. 139.]

169. Russian views as to the advantages derived from the Treaty of Commerce.—Alleged growth of cordiality between the two countries.—The views entertained by M. Raievski as to the value of such conventions have been noticed *supra* on page 116. Those views were subjected to some criticism in an article published by the *Voix Public* in January-February 1873.

The writer argued that civilisation needed commerce; but commerce must be regulated: this had been done, and though the Khans might at first regard the proceedings with hostility, the issue might be safely left to self interest :—

“The first commercial conventions were concluded with Kokand: at the beginning they were far from being honestly observed; then little by little they acquired vigour; and now

Russian merchants and agents move about this country on business as freely as do the people of Kokand in Russia with the same object. Further the important fact to be noticed is, that the inhabitants of Kokand are rapidly growing rich, and that every sort of industry in that country is visibly developing. It matters little to us whether the Kokandians regard us with feelings of affection or not; it is enough that their situation should be improved in consequence of the relations which they have with us: this is the best pledge of their peaceful disposition towards Russia."

And in a similarly contented strain the *Neva* of the 16th—23rd December 1872 wrote—

"The Khan of Kokand, being conquered by us, has signed a treaty of peace and a commercial convention; but it is not all of a sudden that we have succeeded in gaining the freedom of access which we now enjoy. Two or three years ago the Russian traveller in Kokand was much worse off than he is at present. The continual residence of a *Chargé d'Affaires* for Kokand at Tashkend has helped very happily to drive away all misunderstanding. Now-a-days our traders enjoy every possible freedom in Kokand, and the natives are becoming used to their presence. Our travellers have succeeded in visiting nearly the whole country, and, thanks to the work of Lieutenant Krivtsov, we have photographs of the more important towns, as well as of the localities and people in the valley of Ferghana; we have even the picture of Khodayar Khan, the sovereign himself. The arrival at Tashkend of the heir-apparent, the Khanzada of Kokand, the favorable impression which he derived from the journey, and his first attempts to bring into Andijan, the chief town of his administrative circle, what he had seen amongst us,—are undeniable proofs of the growth of our influence. The swift spread of our friendly dealings with Kokand is an unquestionable fact: this ground was not gained at the very minute when the treaty was signed, but little by little, and founded on that treaty."

[*Secret, May 1873, No. 80; March 1873, No. 82.*]

170. Recent internal commotions in the territory of the Khan of Kokand. Fedchenko's experiences in 1871.—Of late, internal commotions in the Khanate of Kokand have gravely menaced the stability of Khodayar Khan's rule. The contentions between the nomadic Kipchaks and Kara Kirghiz and the Sarts or Tajiks of the Khanate are of old standing. They date from the revolution of 1841, when the Kipchaks placed Shere Ali on the throne of Kokand and from the sanguinary suppression of the rebellion in 1849, when Mussulman Kul, to whom Khodayar Khan owed his throne, was beheaded, with 10,000 of his Kipchak followers. Khodayar Khan, though a Kara Kirghiz by descent, has thrown in his cause with the Sarts, and has thereby incurred the lasting resentment of the nomads.

When M. Fedchenko visited the Khanate in the summer of 1871, he was unable to penetrate into the province of Karategin owing to disturbances which had broken out among the nomads inhabiting the southern range of mountains. In Khojend he was informed that the rising had been suppressed with much barbarity. One of twelve captured insurgents had been put to death in the following cruel manner. On one bridge the nose of the prisoner was chopped off; he was then led to another bridge, where his ears were cut off; on a third his hands were lopped off; and on a fourth his head was severed from his body. But, when the traveller approached the southern settlement of Sokh, he found that the road leading over the passes into the Karategin was closed by the insurgents, and he was told that, if the party attempted the Karakazuk Pass, an attack would probably be made by the people from the other side, "even if it were for the simple reason of giving annoyance to the Khan of Kokand for publicly encouraging a scientific expedition through the Khanate." His guides positively refused to conduct him further than within two miles of the head of the *davan* or pass, though he had reason to believe that there was no real ground for apprehending a hostile demonstration.

As regards the province of Karategin itself, he found that such relations as there were between it and the Khanate were hostile. As an illustration of the turbulent conduct of the Kirghiz Kipchaks, M. Fedchenko mentioned that, on his journey through the Little Alai Mountains, the nomads and his men quarrelled over some barley which the latter had cut. The Kokandian *djigits* expressed their astonishment at the resistance offered by the Kirghiz, saying it

was not an unusual thing to seize the sheep of those people, but quite a novelty for the Kirghiz to protect their property—a naïve admission which goes some way to explain the disturbances.

[*Secret, February 1873, No. 71.*]

171. Outbreaks among the Kipchaks in 1873 and 1874. Various accounts as to the causes of the discontent.—Since M. Fedchenko's journey matters have become worse. M. Eugene Schuyler, who visited the Khanate in July 1873, attributed a fresh outbreak among the Kirghiz of the southern mountains to illegal* taxation. He wrote:—

“The troops were sent out by the Khan, and the rebels were worsted in one or two skirmishes; but they soon gathered head again, and, owing to the immense number of summary executions by the Khan, found partisans everywhere. They captured Ush, Andijan, Uzgent, and other cities, and were prepared to join the Kipchaks, a tribe living in the north, also indisposed to the Khan. At this juncture the Khan sent to Tashkend for Russian aid, but it was refused. At the same time the Kirghiz intimated to the Russians that they would be much better pleased to be under Russian rule than under the Khan, and begged the Russians to march in. No step however was taken, and, as the cold weather approached, the Khan again got the upper hand. During the winter all seems to be quiet, but it is expected that in early spring the affair will burst out again, and it is very doubtful whether the Khan will be able to retain the throne, from which he has already been twice driven.”

[*Secret, October 1874, No. 23.*]

Again in the spring of 1874 a formidable insurrection broke out among the Kipchaks. According to reports recorded in the Ladakh diaries from 7th to 13th September and 12th to 18th October 1874, the insurgents were headed by Nazar Beg, a nephew of the late Mabab Khan, who was a half-brother of Khodayar Khan, and who fell a victim to his cruelty in the struggle which ensued. This person seems to be the same Nazar Beg, son of Sufi Beg, mentioned by M. Fedchenko as a pretender to the throne.

172. Venioukoff's explanation of the insurrection in Kokand.—The following is a narrative of the rebellions published by the well-known Russian authority in the *Invalides* of the 30th July (11th August) 1874:—

“The cruelties of Hudoyar Khan, and his constant levy of contributions from his people, enraged all the tribes and classes in the Khanate to so great a degree that, at last, his overburdened subjects conceived the idea of ridding themselves of the hated yoke. The old foes to the Khan's power, the Kipchaks and Kara-Kirghizes, found allies among the urban population, and even among the people of the Khan's suite. About 50 conspirators joined together, and the principal ringleader was Batyr-Khan Tiuré, whom it was intended to elevate to the throne. On or about the 20th March (O. S.) the conspirators proposed to fall upon Hudoyar, when the latter was on an excursion into the country. One of them, however, betrayed the secret, and Batyr-Khan and 16 of his coadjutors were consequently arrested, bound, and carried into the Khan's inner apartments, after which no one saw them again. It is presumed that they were drowned in a marshy pool behind the Khan's palace.

“Although frustrated in their design, the Kipchaks and the malcontents in the towns did not lose all hope. First of all, they required some one individual under whose banner they might rally for operations against Hudoyar. They soon raised a pretender, in the person of Abul-Kerim, a youth of 16 years of age, and a nephew, twice removed, of Hudoyar Khan. But in anticipation of any further disturbances, this youth was conveyed by our (Russian) authorities to Tashkend, a proceeding which, of course, quieted Hudoyar. Nevertheless the Khan has become excessively suspicious, and keeps himself always surrounded by a body-guard, composed of 400 picked youths brought up to that service in his palace. The Khan never sleeps, unless he is lulled by the sounds of the voices of three of these youths who are bound to keep guard in a room adjoining his own dormitory. No one, not even the Khan's wives or his children, dare to enter his room without application for admission to his faithful servant Nasim-Toga. Hudoyar's favourite son is Urman-Bek, who occasionally obtains from the Khan a commutation of some heavy sentence. His relations with his eldest son, Nasir Hodja-Bek, the Governor of Andijan, have cooled very considerably of late, and the Khan has

* It appears from an article in the *Geographical Magazine* of November 1st, 1874, that the slumbering enmity of the nomadic tribes was aroused by a tax imposed upon fruit trees growing wild in the forests.

attached two of his own spies to his person. Besides the above-named Nasim-Toga, the Khan has made a great favourite of a certain Mir-Alim, a rich Kokand merchant, who, by means of his numerous agents, collects for the Khan all the news in and out of the cities, lends money to the Khan when the latter is in want of funds, and also informs against all those statesmen who may be unfavourable to himself.

“The dissatisfaction of the people, and of the nomads in particular, has, however, found expression in open insurrection. One of the well-known leaders of the Kara-Kirghizes, by name Mamyr-Becha, attacked the town of Uzgent last spring with a body of 2,000 horsemen. He was, however, soon compelled to retire into the mountains, from whence he descends to ravage the country around Andijan. On the other hand, the Kirghizes immediately south of the city of Kokand have also risen, and the Khan has sent a force of 2,000 Sarbazes against them. But the reliance on the Sarbazes is not great; the Khan maintains his army very badly, and he is not liked by the troops.”

[*Secret, September 1874, No. 33.*]

173. Russian account of the insurrection and its causes.—From another Russian version of the story given by the military journal, the *Invalide Russe*, it appears that the later disturbances formed simply the continuation of the revolt which had broken out in 1873 amongst the Kirghizes and the Kipchaks of the Khanate, and which was repressed by Khodayar Khan by acts of barbarity and numerous executions.

In the course of this revolt the Kokand Kirghizes made an attempt to emigrate in a body into the neighbouring districts of the provinces of Semiretchensk and Syr Daria. In the autumn of 1873 more than a thousand tents of these nomads were transported for the winter into Russian territory, but in the spring of 1874 the Kirghizes returned to their encampments in the Khanate. In violation of the promise of a complete amnesty which the Khan had made them, the Kirghizes were plundered by the troops sent to meet them, so that a part of the nomads returned for the second time to the district of Tokmak. Khodayar Khan affirms that, after their return into his territory, these Kirghizes joined the insurgents, and hence he was obliged to have recourse to severe measures against them.

The agitation which was caused amongst the nomads influenced to a certain extent the sedentary population of the Khanate, who were already irritated by the cruelty and oppression of the Khan. Attempts to overthrow the established government were renewed at Kokand during the whole of the winter of 1873, but without leading to an armed revolt. In the spring the disturbance took a more decided character. The Kokand Kirghizes made several attempts to induce the nomads subject to the Russian power, among whom they have several relatives, to join the insurrection. Owing to the measures taken by the authorities of Turkistan, these attempts were baffled, though some of the Russian Kirghizes joined the insurgents of the Khanate.

In the month of May a Kirghize of Andijan, who had been one of the rebel chiefs in the preceding year and who had taken refuge in Kashgar, gave the signal for hostilities by invading the territory of Kokand at the head of his former comrades, and with the object of making himself master of Andijan; but, defeated by the troops of the Khan, he took refuge amongst the Russians, and was admitted into one of the northern districts of the province of Semiretchensk with the view of keeping him from the centre of the insurrection, and of preventing him from forcing the Russian Kirghizes to take part in the disorders of the Khanate.

A month later another rebel chief made his appearance, *viz.*, the Kokand Kipchak Moussoulman-Koul (a relative of the former sovereign of Kokand, the celebrated Alim-Koul), who attempted to re-organise the rebel forces by setting up a youthful relation of Khodayar Khan as pretender to the throne of the Khanate. A body of about 10,000 Kirghizes was drawn up on the banks of the River Chatkal (the north-western frontier of the Khanate) under the orders of Moussoulman-Koul. This body of men, taking with them the young pretender, crossed the mountains and descended into the

valley of the Syr Daria, where they were joined by the Kirghizes of the Ktai tribe. The rebels attempted to plunder the villages in the vicinity of the city of Kassan, and attacked one of the tax collectors of the Khan. The chiefs of the neighbouring forts sent against them a detachment of troops, who were, however, routed, and the Kirghiz occupied the city of Kassan.

Khodayar Khan marched against the insurgents 7,000 of the troops cantoned about the city of Kokand, who entirely dispersed the Kirghiz band; Moussoulman-Koul was killed, 300 of his companions-in-arms made prisoners, and the young pretender fled into the mountains of the north-west. The spark of the insurrection did not travel further than the city of Namangan, which was not even besieged. This decisive blow, inflicted on the insurgents, saved Khodayar Khan from the danger which threatened him. The remainder of the scattered band collected their forces and attempted to continue the struggle, but they suffered a decisive defeat at Kizzil Toghai in the mountains north of Namangan.

[See *Journal de St. Pétersbourg*, 18th October 1874.]

174. Though Khodayar Khan succeeded in putting down the insurrection, a recurrence of these troubles is predicted.—From the narrative which has been given above it would seem that the Khan had successfully stamped out the disturbances which threatened his authority; but the elements of discord still exist, and a general impression prevails that opportunity is only wanting to re-kindle the flames of civil war in the Khanate. Thus, the *Novre Vremea* (New Times) of the 5th—17th December 1874 stated that, according to the most recent and reliable information, disturbances had for the present terminated in Kokand, and that Khodayar Khan was occupied in organising festivities in his own honor at the cost of the Beks and inhabitants. The future peace of the country, however, was far from being secured, inasmuch as general discontent against the Khan prevailed among all classes, and was attributed to the general massacre of the Kipchaks by order of the Khan twenty years ago. Among those put to death at that time was Mussulman-Kulla, brother-in-law of the Khan. The son of the former still exercised great influence among the Kirghizes, and only waited for a convenient opportunity for revenging his father's death. Moreover, the settled population was much exasperated on account of the heavy and yearly increasing taxation imposed by the Khan. A relative of the latter, who resided in Khiva, was a popular pretender to the throne of Kokand. Another aspirant of still greater influence was Mozuffer Beg, son of Mahomet Ali and former Ruler of Kokand, put to death in 1841 by order of Nasar-oolla Bahadoor, Ameer of Khiva.

175. The Russians assume an attitude of abstention and expectancy during the troubles in Kokand.—The attitude assumed by the Russians throughout these disturbances has been one of “abstention and expectancy.” It is true that on 14th May 1873, Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported the publication of an announcement in the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg*, stating that the Emperor had been pleased, on the recommendation of General Kaufmann, to address a rescript to the Khan of Kokand, thanking him for his “constant, peaceful and friendly relations” with Russia. In the rescript the Khan was addressed for the first time by the title of “Serene Highness:” the title previously used in communications with the Khan having been only that which is generally applied to the Kirghiz Sultans, and which is also bestowed in Central Asia upon Russian traders. The misconduct of Khodayar, however, and the disturbances which were the natural consequences of his tyranny, soon alienated the sympathies of the Khan's powerful neighbours. M. Westmann informed the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg on the 2nd September 1873 that reports had been received of the

occurrence of disturbances in Kokand, that some of the tribes had refused to pay tribute and had seized the treasury of the Khan, but that they had been suppressed and order restored. In June 1874, M. de Stremoukoff told Lord A. Loftus that there was anxiety and rebellion in Kokand. The Khan, who was described as an usurper, had been acting in a most cruel and relentless manner, decapitating numberless victims and raising against himself the vengeance of the whole population. He was, said M. de Stremoukoff, under the delusion that the Russian Government would at any price support and maintain him and it had been found necessary to address him a very serious warning that if such disorders and cruelties continued, the Russians would be compelled to intervene. "All we desire," said M. de Stremoukoff, "is to support order and good government, but we cannot tolerate such cruelties and such disorder as the present Khan of Kokand is exercising, and should he be deposed by his own subjects, we shall be prepared to support any Government *de facto*, which offers elements of order and stability."

A further exposition of Russian policy in this quarter was given by M. de Westmann (Lord A. Loftus) towards the end of September 1874:—

"In reply to my enquiry today as to the official information received from Kokand, M. de Westmann stated that very confused and conflicting reports had reached the Minister of War, from which it was not easy to make out who had really been the victors in the struggle which had taken place between the rebels and the adherents of the Khan.

"His Excellency stated that the Khan was a merciless despot, who was under the impression that he would be supported by Russia. The Imperial Government, however, could not give their sanction to cruelties and exactions such as those exercised by the Khan, but that in these internal disorders the Governor of Turkistan had not interfered, and the policy pursued had been one of abstention and expectancy.

"I am privately informed that the instructions sent to the Russian General Commanding in Turkistan are to abstain from intervention, *unless he should perceive any movement or intention on the part of the Ameer of Kashgar to take part in the internal disorders of Kokand.*"

The reports were indeed conflicting, for on the 9th September 1874 a telegram had been received from General Kolpakoffski at Vernoe stating that the rebels had been signally defeated by the Khan of Kokand, and that the Russian Kirghiz leader from Aulieta, who had aided the rebels, had been captured and punished; while on the 10th September a person just returned from Kokand to Tashkend had telegraphed to the Russian Governor that the rebellion was in greater vigour than ever. Captain Wellesley, from whose letter, dated 20th September 1874, the above particulars are taken, added that *the Kokand Envoy, Mirza Hakim, after receiving numerous telegrams from his country, had left St. Petersburg to side with the insurgents.*

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 174.*]

[" *May* " 54.]

[" *August* " 63.]

[" *December* " 37.]

176. **Exactions and Mis-Government in Kokand.**—As an illustration of the exactions which have driven the people of Kokand to revolt, the following particulars given by Colonel Veniukoff will be found interesting: In the first place, all public works are performed without any cost to the Khan, the people being invariably made to work for nothing, when the lazy are beaten with sticks, killed, or even buried alive. Half of all the fuel brought to the bazaars is appropriated to the Khan, and the officials immediately afterwards sell it back to the owners. The sale of leeches to be taken only from the Khan's ponds is the Khan's monopoly. Horned cattle and sheep in the bazaar are taxed at the rate of 6*d.* and 3*d.* per head respectively. Over and above the customary 2½ per cent. duty imposed on all imports into the Khanate, a charge is made of 5 per cent. A charge of 5*s.* is imposed on every camel's pack of cotton or silk. On every article of dress sold, a royalty of from 1*d.* to 6*d.* is collected. On every *cherek* (a very small measure of grain) the vendor has to pay a tax of 1*d.* An *araba* (two-wheeled

cart) of vegetables or fruit is charged from 6*d.* to 1*s.* 6*d.* over and above the ordinary "*tanap*" and "*heradj*." On milk and butter the vendors pay $\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* per cup; on fowls, $1\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* each. The owners of cattle pay a *zeket* of $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent., besides 1*s.* on every camel and 6*d.* on every horse or ass. The Khan keeps learned dogs and bears which are sent to the bazaars, where every master of a shop is obliged to pay one farthing for the exhibition. The Khan's musicians going from house to house exact the donation of a *khilat* from each master of a house, and are obliged to pay the Khan from 15*s.* to 35*s.* after their rounds. During public promenades a collection is usually made for the Khan of from £35 to £875. When the Khan takes a fancy to any house or garden or plot of land, he appropriates it, paying any price he may himself fix, or the price at which it sold some score of years back. Each Mollah, on his appointment to a *Mesjed*, pays the Khan 2*s.* 6*d.* Besides all this, the several posts, commands, and offices in Kokand are farmed out. With all this the Khan cannot afford to maintain his army, and is obliged, Colonel Veniukoff says, to borrow money. The provincial revenues are almost entirely absorbed by the several Governors, who are absolute masters within their respective spheres of administration.

[*Secret, September 1874, No. 33.*]

177. Indefinite territorial claims of Kokand as affecting Russian policy towards the Khanate.—It would be out of place to speculate here upon the causes which have induced the Russians to refrain from annexing the Khanate of Kokand. But, bearing in mind the ancient divisions of the country, which have been noticed on page 127, the remarks made by Mr. Saville Lumley in his letter dated 15th June 1867 suggest one of many explanations. He pointed out that sovereignty over ancient Fergana involves a claim over the left bank of the Amu Daria and the branch which flows from Karakul: there is, besides, a dormant title to Sirikool, and through Shignan and Darwaz to the tracts bordering on the dominion of the Ameer of Cabul; not to mention the protecting authority which the Khan of Kokand has sought to exercise over that part of the population in Kasbgar which is composed of Andijanees and other emigrants from the Khanate. It is easy to see that rights which are but shadowy when claimed by a weak and distracted State, like Kokand, might prove embarrassing to a power bound by its own dignity to enforce them.

CHAPTER VII.

THE PROVINCE OF ILI OR ZUNGARIA.

178. **Recapitulation of recent events.**—Some information on the subject of this Province will be found in Mr. Wynne's *Central Asian Précis*, Chapter XI, pages 282 to 293. But, before noting the purport of more recent correspondence, it may be well to recapitulate briefly the events of the past twelve years:

"The province of Kulja," says Mr. Schuyler, "is a very rich and fertile valley, lying on both sides of the river Ili, and enclosed between the different ranges of the Thian-Shan. The inhabitants are of very different races. There were the native Kalmuks and Dungans, the latter a race Chinese by origin, and using the Chinese language and wearing the Chinese dress, but by religion Mussulmans since many hundred years; Taranchis, who were simply the ordinary Turki-Mussulmans, originally captives, colonised over from Kashgar or Chinese Turkistan after its occupation; and various Chinese colonists, Solons and Shibos, brought there from other parts of the Chinese Empire, and the Chinese Manchu soldiers and office-holders of every grade. The country was very wealthy, and the population enormous. When the Dungan insurrection broke out in Eastern Turkistan, it extended to Kulja, where the Taranchis united with their co-religionists in throwing off the Chinese rule. After a struggle of two years, the rebellion was entirely successful."

[*Memorandum on Russian Turkistan, Secret, October 1874, No. 23.*]

179. **Population of the Ili Valley. The Taranchees and Tunganees.**—It appears from an article published in the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg* of the 1st (13th) March 1874 that the Kalmuk Zungors form the basis of the population of the Ili Valley. They are Buddhists. Up to 1754, they were tributaries, but not subjects, of the Chinese Empire, and, equally with the Mongols, enjoyed complete independence. The Governor of Peking had no representatives in the Ili country, and there was no permanent colony of Chinese there.

In 1754, perpetual discord between the Kalmuk tribes forced the Chinese to interfere in their affairs, and brought about the final conquest of the State which, up to that time, was simply a vassal of the Middle Empire. The occupation of the valley of Ili in 1758 by the Chinese was preceded by the massacre of more than a million Kalmuks. The country was reduced to a Chinese province; a Governor-General (*Zan-Zoun*) was placed there, and in 1764 the Chinese founded the town of Kulja, formerly called Khoi-iouan-tchen. At the same time, in order to give stability to the Chinese rule, and to prevent any attempts on the part of the natives to revolt, a colony of 16 banners of Manchoos, Solons, and Shibos, entirely devoted to the Government and always disposed to help the *Zan-Zoun*, was planted among them. These colonists brought with them into the country all the elements of a settled and sedentary life,—fixed establishments, commercial agencies, and agricultural works.

Kulja being the Chinese settlement which is farthest from Peking, the Government made it a place of exile and deportation. Thus, after 1828, several thousand Kashgarians who had revolted, were confined here and condemned to hard labour. They were designated by the name of "Taranchees" or "men under punishment and hard labour," and these are the people who until lately were employed in work in the fields and in all coarser kinds of labour to the profit of the garrison of Shibos and Solons.

The origin of the Tunganees was more respectable. They are said to be descendants of emigrants sent to remote parts of the Empire at the time when the spread of Islam first struck dismay into the hearts of the Chinese. The emigrants were originally settled in Kansu, but at a later period spread over all the other provinces of China under the name of "Toun-gans," an abbreviation of "Toun-gan-si," *i. e.* "the same as in Gan-si."

Among the Chinese who came to settle in the province of Ili (the ancient Zungaria) towards the middle of last century, after the conquest of the country, there was a certain number of Toun-gans; like that of the Chinese, commerce was the object of their settlement. The whole road from Gouï-khoua-tchen to Kulja was speedily lined with Chinese villages and small towns, and Kulja became the out-post, and farthest point of the great commercial northern road (*bei-lou*) with Central Asia. At the same time, Ourumtsi, situated at the point of contact of the southern road (*nan-lou*) with the northern, became the principal trading town for all the commerce between China and Central Asia. This country was soon populous and flourishing, and the Tunganee inhabitants of Ourumtsi amounted, it is said, to a number of 200,000 souls. The Tunganees did not busy themselves with commerce only; there were numbers of them in Government employ, and all the customs officials are said to have been Tunganees; moreover, it was they who kept the inns and wine shops, and who sold Chinese products and goods retail.

180. Military colonists settled in Zungaria, the Shibos and Solons, and their settlements.—As regards the Chinese colonists, interesting particulars are given in Radloff's paper on the Insurrection in the Province of Ili (*Russische Revue*, Vol. ii., pp. 209-230):—

"The Daur military colonists were settled in 16 towns, situated on one side or the other of the Ili River. The immigration took place some 90 or 100 years ago from Manchuria proper, and seems to have consisted of three separate tribes of Tungusian speaking people—the Shibos, Dachor Solons, and Onkor Solons. The Shibos are true Manchus; they speak the Manchurian written language with such purity that the tribe must be regarded as the founder of that language.

"The Onkor Solons speak a widely different Tungusian dialect much akin to the Maniagir; whilst the Dachor Solons use a Mongolian dialect greatly intermixed with Tungusian words. At the same time that the Shibo colonists became acclimatised in the Ili Valley, and their numbers increased from year to year, those of the Solons were constantly diminishing, so that the Government, after about thirty years, found themselves compelled to import a large number of southern Shibos to fill up the thinned ranks of the Solon Contingent. These were settled on the right bank of the river (Ili) and thus became officially known as Solons, because they belonged to the Solon Contingent.

"Each of the two colonists, as before observed, consisted of eight "*banners*" or towns, which together formed one army corps or contingent; and each of these contingents was commanded by a *Mejen-Amban* or General, whose head-quarters were in Kulja. The General was usually a Manchu, though not unfrequently Shibos or Solons attained to that rank. On the whole, both Shibos and Solons regarded themselves as the equals of the Manchus in point of being the ruling class, and their officers appear often to have commanded Manchu divisions. Each of the *Mejen-Amban* had a Court of Justice (*Yamun*) in Kulja, which was the supreme tribunal for the eight settlements under his Government both in civil and military matters. The administration of the colonies was as follows:—Each army corps was commanded by an *Ucheri-da* (Colonel), who had immediately under him an *Ilchi-da* (Lieutenant-Colonel) and a *Niru Dschangin* (Major). Each two settlements, or *banners*, were commanded by a *Dschergi Dschangin* (Captain) and each separate one by a *Fundu-Boschko* (Lieutenant). All these officers, with the exception of the *Mejen-Amban*, were Shibos or Solons.

"The settlements of the Solons were as follows: (1st), Turgen, the most westerly, and situated on the Borogudsir River. It was surrounded by a fortified wall and consisted of about 300 houses, the inhabitants being Onkor Solons and Shibos. It belonged to the right wing of the army and carried a blue-fringed banner; (2nd), Samar, called by the Kirghis Dscharkent or shore town. This consisted of about 250 houses and was also inhabited by Onkor Solons and Shibos, whilst its banner was a red-fringed one; (3rd), Tschischkon [or Tischkon in Kirghiz] which lay about ten *li* to the eastward and was composed of some 300 houses;

this place was similarly inhabited to the others, but its banner was plain red; (4*th*), Tshed-schi, called Ak-kent by the Kirghiz, consisted of 200 houses, was inhabited by Onkor Solons and carried a plain yellow banner; its position was about 15 *versets* to the eastward of Tschisch-kou.

Some sixty *li* to the eastward of Tshed-schi begin the four settlements of the left wing of the army; thus, (5*th*), Chorgos, inhabited by Dachor Solons, consisting of 300 houses and bearing a fringed yellow banner; (6*th*), Fuseku, about five *li* to the eastward of Chorgos, with 300 houses of Dachor Solons and a plain blue banner; (7*th*), about ten *li* to the eastward of the last stood Ke, numbering 400 houses of Dachor Solons carrying a plain white banner; and (8*th*), Almtro, seven *li* from Ke, which consisted of 300 houses of the same inhabitants, but wearing a white fringed banner.

"The eight Shibo settlements to the south of the river were generally called after the number of the squadron they formed; thus Udschun Niru, first squadron; Dschai Niru, second squadron; and they were so distributed that Nos. 1, 3 and 4 stood together in a group to the south-west of Chinese Kulja, Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 lay several *versets* further from the Ili, and exactly opposite the two Kuljas; whilst No. 2 was close to the river and south-west of Tartar Kulja. The most important town of these latter eight settlements was the fifth, where the Ucheri-da and Ichi-da had their head-quarters, and where besides there was a large temple, where a high Llama and a number of priests resided. As already remarked in my former article, the chief employment of these military colonists was agriculture, and I will here only explain that the Solons mainly cultivated millet, whilst the Shibos grew wheat and garden vegetables. The Shibos of the southern colonies, however, had far too little land, and were therefore obliged to rent their fields to a great extent from the Taranchis dwelling on the south of the river.

"Both the Solon and Shibo divisions had to muster 1,300 men annually, of whom 300 were sent to the 'six cities' (the Kasghar district), whilst the remaining 1,000 served in the Ili Valley. This latter service was an exceedingly easy one for them, for they sent out chiefly boys and old men unfit for hard work, and who obtained higher wages during their term of service than they could possibly have earned at home. Thus, it is scarcely a matter of wonder that the military colonists were chiefly remarkable for their opulence."

181. Course of the Mahomedan insurrection in Zungaria: Havoc caused: The Russians occupy Kulja in 1871.—The Mahomedan rebellion in the province of Ili extended over three years. The first outbreak occurred in January 1863, and was crushed by the Manchoos. In the summer of 1864 a second rising was similarly suppressed: but by the autumn of the same year news of the progress of the insurrection in Eastern Turkistan added fuel to the flames, and thenceforward to January 1866, when the Tunganees stormed the Fort of Kulja and the Chinese *Zan-Zoun* blew himself and his companions into the air, the record is one of ceaseless struggles, in which sometimes one party and sometimes the other were victorious, but ending in the isolation of the Chinese from the rest of the empire and in the destruction of the greater part of the non-Mahomedan people, both soldiers and colonists, excepting such as were fortunate enough to find an asylum in Russian territory. Radloff, who visited Ili on two occasions before and after the rebellion, gives a vivid picture of the havoc and misery caused by this internecine war. In 1862 he found the valley flourishing and blooming, like an industrial oasis. In 1868—

"the orchards were withered, the canals dried up, and in place of the waving corn-fields, the half-green rice crops, and the cheerful gardens, was everywhere bleak, arid steppe. Instead of neat rows of houses, one's view was met by tottering walls and charred beams."

Above all, the fanatical insurgents had succeeded not only in annihilating the unbelievers, but in trampling commerce and industry under foot.

The troubles of Ili ended not with the expulsion of the Chinese, for the Taranchees and Tunganees, who had hitherto acted in concert, now quarrelled amongst themselves; and the former, being the more numerous in Zungaria, fell upon their rivals, massacred them in Kulja, and drove the rest from the Ili Valley.

The disorder which ensued, the ceaseless contests between Taranchees, Tunganees, and Chinese marauders, and the consequent interruption of Russian traffic on one of the most important lines of commerce, could have but one

issue. Accordingly in the summer of 1871 the Russians intervened; Kulja was occupied; and the Taranchees, as General Kaufmann told them, became subject to the will of the white Tsar *for ever*.

182. Russian version of the insurrection in Ili and the occupation of Kulja. Nomination of a new Governor by the Chinese in 1872.—The Russian version of the story, which, as the Ambassador at Saint Petersburg said, must be taken *cum grano salis*, is contained in a letter from Semipolatsinsk, published in the *Journal de Saint Pétersbourg* dated 17th—19th June 1872. The following is a translation:—

“The authority of China in Zungaria was established towards the middle of last century after the fall of the independent Kalmuk kingdom. This success in Chinese policy was attained subsequently to a terrible massacre of the Zungarians, accomplished with the help of the Kirghiz. In 1863 there arose an insurrection which ended in the complete destruction of the Chinese settled in Zungaria. In the parts of the country adjacent to Russia this insurrection arrived at its culminating point in 1866, in which year took place the fall of Chuguebak and of the Kulja citadel.

“Two years previously, the position of the Chinese in this part of Zungaria had already become in other respects so precarious that, departing from their customary pride, they asked help from Russia. The application met at that time with a refusal, seeing that it proceeded from provincial officers and not from the authorities at Peking. Since then the authorities at Semiretchensk witnessed for seven years the unavailing efforts of the Chinese Government to re-establish its rule over Kulja and Tarbagatai. The expenses involved in the maintenance of troops on the frontier and the arrogance of the Sultan of Kulja, Abil Ogly, rendered it necessary at last to adopt measures for putting an end to this state of things, and Kulja was occupied by Russian troops. Thenceforth,—that is to say, since the 26th July 1871,—complete peace and safety prevail in Western Zungaria, and caravans pass unharmed through places where formerly horsemen, armed to the teeth, had barely ventured to show themselves.

“You are aware that the Chinese Government declined to allow their troops to occupy Kulja simultaneously with the Russian forces. They reckoned apparently upon establishing their rights, after all should have been ended and the country tranquillised with the aid of Russian arms. This is exactly what has happened. The inhabitants of the military circle of Kulja had scarcely submitted to our soldiers, when they betook themselves quietly to their avocations, and paid without murmur and with due punctuality the taxes laid upon them. Their trust in the Russian troops was so great that they continued trading without interruption, and kept open their shops even on the days on which various towns were attacked by our forces. Scattered over a space of 1,000 square miles, they submitted without resistance to the authority of four Russian officials, and that so completely that during the ten months which have elapsed since the occupation of Kulja these officials have not once found it necessary to apply measures of severity: the officials reside in this recently subdued country with as much safety as a Justice of the Peace would enjoy in the interior provinces of Russia. The Chinese were much vexed at this. Without saying a word about the occupation of Kulja by Russian troops, the Peking Government decreed the nomination of Young-Chuan as Governor of that town, and immediately despatched into Northern Mongolia a grand staff of officials whose duty it should be to increase the dignity of the new *Zianzin* in the eyes of the Russians. Meantime the mere rumour of the possibility of the return of the Chinese to Kulja produced the greatest excitement among all the tribes settled on the banks of the Ili. It is said that they have even begun to send addresses to the Governor of Semiretchensk to demand the final union of their country with Russia, and to declare that, as soon as the Russians leave, they will murder all the Chinese. Such is the actual state of the Zungarian question.”

[*Secret, September 1872, No. 104.*]

183. Russian taxes in Ili: system of administration.—About the same time the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg* published another letter from their Semiretchensk correspondent, giving details regarding the taxes imposed on the Province of Ili and the administrative measures introduced. After mentioning the tranquillity of the country and the painful feeling aroused among the Taranchee people by the proposed transfer of Kulja to the Manchoo Government, the writer said:—

“The tax in money which it has been deemed necessary to lay upon the Natives as a contribution towards the Government of the conquered country has been completely levied. The sum total of the tax for the year 1871 had been fixed at 64,495 roubles, without reckoning payments by the nomad tribe of Targous, who have come in from Kashgar to ask our aid.

The administration of the four cantons of which the country of Kulja is composed has been fully organised. It is placed under the direct orders of the Government of Semiretchensk. The cost of the administration reaches 22,272 roubles 29 copecks. The revenue estimated for the current year should exceed 75,000 roubles.”—

[*Secret, September 1872, No. 115.*]

184. Description of Kulja under Russian rule.—Let us now see what picture the town of Kulja presents under Russian rule. The *Journal de St. Pétersbourg* dated 2nd—14th September 1872, gives the following description:—

“Kulja at the present day contains 1,298 buildings, of which 1,257 are inhabited dwellings. There are in the town an Orthodox and a Catholic Church, two Chinese temples, and 36 Mosques. The population numbers 7,700 souls; this number comprises 1,000 Russians (including the garrison) and about 6,700 Natives, of whom 3,900 are Taranchees, 400 Tunganees, 1,750 Chinese. The rest are Kalmauks, Kirghiz, Manchus, Sarts, etc.

“Classed according to religion, the town reckons 1,000 orthodox inhabitants, 150 Catholics, 4,900 Mahomedans, and more than 1,600 idolaters. The number of shops is 650. The goods imported from Russia consist of printed cloths of superior quality, cotton stuffs, cotton velvet, broad cloth, and articles of metal. Goods coming from Kashgar and other towns of Asia are a peculiar stuff called *mata* and turbands. Tea comes from Ourumtsi and other provinces of China. The exports consist of sheep, for which there is a special demand at Kashgar, furs of Astrakhan, leather, pottery, fruit, etc.

“The town contains six schools, one of them being installed in a Chinese temple. The others are Mussulman schools. There are 25 scholars in the Chinese schools, and altogether 173 in the Mussulman. The people are remarkable for a gentle, peaceful, and quiet disposition.”

It cannot be denied that the above compares favorably with the state of things in 1865, when Lieutenant Reinthal found the finest quarter of the town a mere row of ruins and dust heaps.

[*Vide Secret, January 1873, and Radloff's Pamphlet, pages 14 and 15.*]

185. Position of Zungaria in reference to North-Western Chinese trade.—In order to understand the policy of the Russians in occupying and retaining the Valley Ili, it should be borne in mind that Zungaria lies directly in the natural course of Russian and Western Chinese traffic, which is now diverted to circuitous routes through Mongolia. Zungaria pacified, and Kashgar controlled by Russian influence, the revival of trade in the direct line might surely be looked for, and very much to the advantage of the Russian possessions in Turkestan would such a revival be. The following extract from a sketch of Chinese trade routes to Russia and Central Asia illustrates this remark:—

“Of all the trade routes leading from Russia and Central Asia into the various parts of Western China, those through Mongolia are at the present moment the only ones open to traffic.

“Before the outbreak of the Tunganee rebellion in Shansi, some eleven years ago, there were two other principal lines, and while they existed those through Mongolia were looked upon as of an entirely secondary character, and were indeed only used as feeders, or distributing channels, for unimportant desert settlements.

“The most northerly of these two great arteries was the shortest and most direct for the Shansi and Peking traders, and though sometimes rendered somewhat less practicable than the others on account of physical obstructions, such as floods, snow, &c., was yet much used by the northern traders requiring to perform rapid marches. It was known under the name of the Ala-Shan route, but it is nowhere, that I am aware of, alluded to as a whole by either the Jesuits of the 17th century or the earlier European travellers, though Marco Polo himself traversed a portion of it on his first arrival in China. The port (if one may use the term) of entry and departure on the border of China proper was Kwei-hwa-cheng, a large walled town belonging to the province of Shansi, but situated some 80 miles without the great wall, at a distance of about 50 miles from the nearest point of the Yellow River, and 12 marches from Peking. To this place were brought, by various cart roads, the produce and manufactures of the neighbouring districts, or the merchandise from Peking and the coast ports; here camels were hired and caravans were formed for the voyage. The route led up the valley of the Yellow River, round the outskirts of the Ala-Shan Mountains and across a portion of

the Gobi to Barkul, a fortified town advantageously placed on the northern slopes of the Tian-Shan, and forming the last link, towards the east, of a long chain of Chinese governed towns and villages, constituting the settled portion of Zungaria. The trade, thus carried on, was chiefly one of export from China, the one-sided character of which it was rendered possible to maintain solely by reason that in all the Zungarian settlements it was in the hands of Chinese merchants who had commercial relations with Turkistan and the southern Tian-Shan settlements, and whose system of trade was, as in their own country, superior to mere barter. The inhabitants of Zungaria whom it was necessary to supply were, besides the Chinese, Manchus of different tribes that had been settled there by the Government as soldier colonists, nomadic Mongols and Hassaks from the neighbouring plains, and a sprinkling of Turkistani or Kokandi Mussulmans of various races, who were more frequently caravan traders than settlers. Their requirements from the north of China were chiefly cotton manufactures, iron utensils, agricultural implements and cutlery, saddles, opium and many minor articles of luxury either for food or dress; the few returns consisting mainly of horses from Ili, a small quantity of gold and certain medicines. Their most essential article of import however,—tea,—reached them by another thoroughfare, generally known as the Kia-Yu-Kwan road, which was in every respect the more important of the two.

“The point of departure from China for this second route, looked at in a commercial rather than in a geographical light, was far within the borders of the empire, at Si-Ngan-Fu, the capital of the province of Shensi.

“By means of numerous roads and rivers converging here from all parts of the middle and southern provinces of China, a sort of natural depôt or collecting centre for Central Asian trade was formed, and indeed to some extent also for Central Asian military administration; for this was the only official or post road, and was consequently regarded by the Government as the only one worthy of protection, and that it was the natural channel for trade between east and west is obvious from a glance at the physical geography of the region as presented to us by the indefatigable Jesuit Missionaries, who are the only Europeans that have ever described it with accuracy. The line by which it connected the richest provinces of China with the most populous and commercial of the dependencies in the west, was not only the shortest, but it conducted through the greatest section of fertile and inhabited land and the least section of desert, and also ascended to the central highlands by the easiest gradients. By no other route, moreover, could so mild and dry a climate have been secured—a matter that in the present highly developed condition of trade in Western States may be thought of but little moment, but one that amongst Eastern nations, employing only the most primitive means of intercommunication, is felt in many ways to be of great importance, not only in its effects on human beings, but on the beasts of burden thus utilised. During all periods of the year it was open to traffic, and though in exceptional seasons forage was scarce along some portions of it, still sufficient to keep open communication was always obtainable from the inns or post-houses established for the purpose at certain intervals.

“Taking Si-Ngan-Fu then as the point of departure or gate of China in this direction, the road leads through Lan-Chau, Kan-Chau, and other important cities of the provinces of Shensi and Kansu to the Kia-Yu gate in the great wall (32 marches), and then entering on the desert traverses it in a north-westerly direction for a distance of 16 marches to Hami or Kumul, a fortified town on the southern slopes of the Tian-Shan Mountains, and distant from Barkul, the terminating point of the Ala-Shan road on the opposite slope, only $3\frac{1}{2}$ marches. Thus, here the two roads may be said to converge, and though they diverge again in proceeding towards the west, still for purposes of trade the junction here was of much importance, as by the Kia-Yu-Kwan route was imported all the tea to be distributed throughout Zungaria as well as Turkistan, whilst by the Ala-Shan road such merchandise from Northern China as was destined for Turkistan here took the more southerly branch.

“The continuation from Hami of the southern or Turkistan road is now so well known from Colonel Yule’s exposition of the accounts of Benedict Goës and other early travellers that it would be superfluous to describe it here. The small kingdom of Hami, of which the present fortified town was the capital, was the first of the States beyond the desert to fall under the dominion of China, having been conquered in the early part of the last century by the Emperor Kang-hi, who however left the subjection of those further west to his grandson Kienlung, an equally energetic monarch, who in a war which lasted from 1755 to 1759 subdued them all as far as Kasbgar and Yarkund, and kept up his communications throughout by means of the road we are speaking of. At the close of the war the towns along this line were fortified and garrisoned, stations or post-houses were erected at moderate distances in the intervening spaces, and a system of relays was organised, for the use of officials and letter-carriers, extending throughout its whole length of some three thousand miles. No actual road was built, and beyond the collection of certain dues at some of the larger towns, commerce was, as is usual with the Chinese, very wisely left to take care of itself. In spite of a want of made roads however, and of any special ‘encouragement,’ the security offered to travellers by the mere tenure of the country was sufficient to cause a trade to flow which, for over a hundred years, constituted the main support of Chinese power

in the west, and which was only cut off by the uprising of the native population in 1864, and the almost entire expulsion of its former conquerors.

"At present Lan-Chau and some minor towns on the banks of the Yellow River, about half way between Si-Ngai-Fu and the Kia-Yu gate, constitute the limit to Chinese trade in the direction of this once prosperous road; and, though it is true the two most easterly of the Tian-Shan towns, Hami and Barkul, still remain to the Chinese, yet they must no longer be regarded as of Western China or Zungaria, but as of Mongolia, because both of the above direct means of communication with their ruling country having been cut off, they are now only accessible by a circuitous route."

186. Circuitous route followed by trade between China and Zungaria since the insurrection.—Under existing circumstances the most favorable commercial route from Western China is the West Mongolian road. This route, like that leading to Eastern Siberia, starts from Kalgan, a bustling, business-like place stretching along several miles of an unnavigable tributary of the Han River up to the foot of the escarpment of the table-land and distant from Peking five marches by the road, and from Tientsin, the nearest sea-port-seven marches. From Kalgan nine marches lead to Kwei-hwa-cheng, described as the collecting centre for the export trade of Northern China. Thence—

"The main line, or artery, leads north-westerly from Kwei-hwa across the desert until entering the Kangai Mountains, and then continues in a general westerly direction, through Uliassutai and down the valley of the Jabkan, to Kobdo, and thence by one of two almost parallel tracks to Chuguchak or Tarbogotai on the frontier of the Russian Government of Semipolatsk, making a total distance of 1,800 miles. And from this main road there branch off several minor ones; the most notable being—(1st), one from Uliassutai to Barkul and Hami, now the only two places in the Tian-Shan open to Chinese trade; (2nd), an almost parallel line from Kobdo to Manas and Urumtsi (now closed), and another from Kobdo, 10 marches to the west-north-west, to the Russian border post of Suok in the Altai Mountains; (3rd), southward from Tarbogotai, a track of 18 stages, leads to Kulja, the terminus of the old Zungarian road, and the former capital of Ili under the Chinese, but now in Russian occupation. Nearly the whole of the trade carried on by means of this West Mongolian route and its tributaries is one of barter, and the principal commodity is, as before, brick tea. This is manufactured in the Yangtse provinces, and is composed of the coarsest leaves, twigs, and dust compressed by the aid of an ill-flavored glue into a solid mass of about 16 inches by 8 inches and 3 inches thick, and weighing about 13lbs. 5 ozs. The cost in the producing district is about 1½d. per lb., but the expense of packing in bamboo baskets, or bales, for camel carriage, the boat freight up the Han River to Fanchêng, and mule hire thence to Kwei-hwa-chêng, combined with other charges, brings up the cost at the latter place to about 4d. per lb., at which value it then commences the desert journey, reaching Uliassutai and Kobdo at a value of about 9d. to 10d., and Tarbogotai at perhaps 1s., more or less according to the season and the abundance or otherwise of transport. Unlike the Kalgan and Kiachta route, this west Mongolian line is not traversed by carts and drays, and its course is marked by no permanent intermediate settlements, and consequently there is little or no roadside trade carried on between the towns I have enumerated above; and, unlike it also, it has no great Russian mart for a terminus to and from which a direct through commerce can be maintained: thus, we find the Russians from the one side and the Chinese from the other engaged, not in supplying each other's wants, but in conducting a mere barter trade with the natives of the soil.

"At Uliassutai, the first town from the side of China, and distant from Kwei-hwa-chêng about 1,030 miles, is found a settled population of some 700 or 800 Chinese, 2,000 soldiers of various Tartar races, and perhaps 1,000 Mongols, to which the Chinese caravans bring, besides the tea above spoken of, cotton cloth, flour and millet, tobacco, &c., and those of the Russians a few English woollen goods, furs, sugar, brassware, cutlery, &c., the whole of which is paid for in live-stock, skins and wool, the only products of the region.

"The Civil Governor of Western Mongolia, with a comparatively large staff of Manchu and native officials, resides here and levies an insignificant tax upon the trade.

"At Kobdo a somewhat larger number of inhabitants have settled, some 6,000 in all, but the trade is of a precisely similar nature, whilst at Tarbogotai, with a population said to be greater than that of Kobdo, it begins to feel the effects of Central Asian influences, and is of a nature equally suited to the semi-civilised Kirghiz and Usbeks as to the roving Mongolian nomads. Though a large section of the population of these latter places is composed of Mongols, there being no great monastic establishments, but a small proportion (comparatively) of these are Lamas."

“By the branch or tributary roads are conducted—at Uliassutai an export of tea and other usual Chinese commodities to Barkul and Hami, besides horses and supplies for the troops garrisoning those places, whilst the imports consist of small quantities of flour from the former and dried fruits from the latter; at Kobdo, the entire Russian traffic from Bisk and Semipolatsk; and at Tarbogotai the now revived trade with Kulja and neighbouring districts of Zungaria, which under Russian superintendence already begins again to ramify into Kokand and Eastern Turkistan.”

187. Extension of Russian power in Zungaria.—The narrative may now proceed to deal with such recent correspondence as serves to throw a light on the intentions of the Russian Government respecting this province.

In his despatch No. 137, dated 13th June 1872, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported, on the authority of the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg*, that “the Captain of Cossacks, Guorassimow, Chief of the 2nd District of Kulja, had visited in the month of September 1871 the Chinese districts of Takiang and Djen-Ho, which had acknowledged the protectorate of Russia. Djen-Ho was said to be a small town of 250 families surrounded by a fortified wall, and of which the inhabitants were wealthy. The town of Takiang, composed of 75 houses, was inhabited by a population reduced to poverty by the Doungans.”

[*Secret, August 1872, No. 113.*]

188. Russian demands that China would either re-occupy Ili or cede the province.—On the 22nd July 1872 Mr. Wade wrote that M. Vlangaly, the Russian Minister at Peking, who was to have started some days previously for Chefoo, had been detained by the discussion of a Russian frontier question which seemed likely to end “in annexation of the large territory north of the Tengiri Range known as Ili, Zungaria, or East Turkistan.” The Russians, after the capture of Kulja, had immediately pressed the Chinese to re-occupy the country, in order to secure the common frontier against brigandage; and the Chinese had authorised some movements of troops which served to indicate an intention to re-establish the Imperial authority. The attempt, however, had been so far from serious as to bring on them a second appeal from the Russians, who were then calling on them “with some peremptoriness” to decide whether they would restore the Government or allow Russia to undertake it. Mr. Wade added:—

“I do not believe that the Chinese Government would care to part with the territory which during the century it has belonged to China has always been a source of trouble and expense; but a formal cession would be humiliating at any time, and if effected under the Regency, might hereafter be made matter of serious complaint against the ministry of the day. The Chinese representatives, sent ostensibly to discuss the question on the spot, have been found, as usual, to possess no powers in our sense of the word.”

189. M. de Stremoukoff's retrospect of events in Ili: Russia ready to surrender the province, if the Chinese could guarantee peace and tranquillity.—The above quoted letter from Mr. Wade was sent to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who on the 13th November 1872 gave the following account of recent Russian and Chinese politics in reference to Zungaria:—

“It is extremely difficult to obtain any correct information here as to what is passing in the territory of Ili or Zungaria; and, as the whole of the Mussulman population of that country has been for some time in open rebellion against China, and as the Chinese Government no longer maintains any authority over that country, it appears to me very doubtful whether the Chinese Government are themselves informed of the real state of affairs in that distant province.

“I had some conversation the other day with M. de Stremoukoff on this subject, when His Excellency entered into an interesting narrative of the events which had preceded the occupation of Kulja by Russia, and of the present state of their negotiations with China in reference to it.

"M. de Stremoukoff said that it was now eight years since the population of Zungaria, composed of tribes of various races, mostly Mahomedans, rose against the Chinese authorities. After much bloodshed, having first exterminated the Chinese and then fought among themselves, they made raids on Russian territory for the sake of plunder, till at length, having completely cut off the Russian trade, which at that time was considerable, and seized Russian subjects and made slaves of them, the Russian Government were obliged to assume the offensive and after several encounters the Russian troops occupied Kulja.

At that time Yakoub Beg, who had placed himself at the head of the Mussulman population south of the Thian-Shan Range in rebellion against the Chinese Government, gave signs of moving towards the north, and had occupied some of the passes of the Thian-Shan Range. The Imperial Government remonstrated against the apparent design of Yakoub Beg, and obliged him to retire and give up all idea of extending his conquests in that direction.

"Since that period the Imperial Government, M. de Stremoukoff said, had repeatedly called upon the Chinese Government to re-occupy the province of Ili and its capital Kulja with a sufficient force to put down insurrection, and to maintain peace and order on the frontier, promising at the same time their support and assistance.

"General Boguslavsky, formerly first Russian Dragoman at Constantinople, was despatched to Kulja in the early part of the year in order to meet a Chinese Plenipotentiary and to concert with him for the re-occupation of Kulja by the Chinese. On his arrival there the Chinese Plenipotentiary had neither sufficient powers to treat with General Boguslavsky, nor was he supported by an efficient force to re-establish the authority of the Chinese Government. He was only attended by some flag-bearers, stating that a force of some 1,500 men were on their march to join him. In the meantime the inhabitants of Kulja, who had enjoyed peace and order during the Russian occupation, besought the Russians not to leave them to be exposed to fresh pillage or massacre. Finding that the Chinese Plenipotentiary had no powers to negotiate and was unable to resume the Government of Kulja if delivered up to the Chinese, General Boguslavsky was then instructed to proceed direct to Peking in order to report to the Russian Minister there the state of affairs, and to concert with him as to further negotiations with the Chinese Government.

"The Imperial Government profess their readiness and even a great anxiety to restore Kulja to the Chinese, provided they can have the assurance that they will be able to maintain peace and order. But they are unwilling to continue the present state of things in which they are acting as policemen for China, and which imposes on them the maintenance of peace and order at a considerable cost and sacrifice without any counterbalancing advantage.

"It appears that the Chinese Plenipotentiary proposed that their troops should march to Kulja by a circuitous road traversing the Russian frontier; but the Russian Plenipotentiary declined this offer, urging that it would be useless and dangerous for them to have an insurgent province in their rear, and he accordingly suggested that they should march their troops through the insurgent provinces direct on Kulja, thus re-establishing their authority on the whole line of march. This was no doubt very sound advice, but when it was given it was probably known to the Russian Plenipotentiary that the Chinese Government had neither the necessary troops to send, nor would it be in their power to march through a hostile population direct on Kulja.

"From the nature of the Russian reports, it would appear that the whole province, embracing a very large tract of country, is in permanent insurrection against the Central authority at Peking; that constant fighting and massacres are taking place between the different races interspersed through that country, and that the Chinese Government are not in a position to subdue and re-occupy it. Their object apparently was to reach Kulja by a circuitous route with a trifling force, and counting on the support of the Russian military force, to make a feint of re-establishing their authority."

[*Secret, February 1873, Nos. 32 and 37.*]

190. Boguslavsky sent to Peking in 1872 to negotiate with China on the subject of Ili.—On the 1st October 1872 the British Minister at Peking reported that the Russian General M. Boguslavsky, who had been vainly endeavouring to negotiate some arrangement under which the Chinese would guarantee the maintenance of order in East Turkistan had been invited to Peking and had arrived there.

"M. Boguslavsky is a General of Artillery, reported a considerable Oriental scholar. He has been for some eight or nine years at Constantinople as the Senior Interpreter of his Government. Notwithstanding his acquaintance with orientals, however, he seems somewhat astonished that the Chinese do not accept any terms that may be offered them in any negotiation."

Mr. Wade then showed that the annexation of Ili was inevitable, and had in fact been accomplished; adding—

“I do not myself see what Russia can do but annex the territory. There is, I firmly believe, nothing of which to make a Native Government, and even were there no desire on the part of Russia to extend her Central Asian frontier, the necessity of extending it appears to me as inevitable as we have often found the same necessity in India and in South Africa.”

191. Appointment of a new Zan-Zoun for Ili in September 1872, a sign that the Chinese would not cede their claims.—As an illustration of Chinese tenacity, it was mentioned that the *Gazette* of the 29th September 1872 had published a memorial from Yung Chuan, who was titular Military Governor of Ili, as well as of East Turkistan, representing that certain presents which had been forwarded to him and his principal subordinates in the Mahomedan cities had not reached their destination.

“The publication of the memorial at this moment,” wrote Mr. Wade, “I take to be a hint to the Russians, General Boguslavsky and the rest, that China is not prepared formally to yield them any ground now recognised as Chinese territory. If, as is more than probable, Russia annexes Eastern Turkistan, China is utterly powerless to oppose the annexation, but she will take no step that her own people must accept as an assent to the cession proposed. It will continue to be assumed that the Russians are merely aiding the Chinese Government to maintain order in the province.”

192. Failure of Boguslavsky's negotiations with the Chinese. He predicts the annexation of Ili.—The negotiations with the Chinese, whether for the purpose of prevailing upon them to maintain order in Zungaria, or for arranging a formal cession of the province, proved abortive. The double failure is described in the following extract from Mr. Wade's despatch to the Viceroy dated 18th November 1872:—

“Since the occupation of Kulja, or Hinguan, the capital of Zungaria or East Turkistan, by their troops, the Russians have continued to press the Chinese Government so to re-assert its authority in the above territory as to keep in order the Kirghiz or other nomads which form its population, and the incursions of which into Russian territory furnished the occasion referred to for action on the part of Russia. The Chinese Government moved a force, declared by the Russians to be ill-armed and inadequate, into the Uliassutai country, and instructed the General Yung Chuan, who is titular Commander-in-Chief of all the Ili country north, as well as of the Mahomedan country south, of the Tien Shan or Tengiri Mountains, to meet the Russians at Sergiofol as Commissioner.

“The Commissioner was found to have no powers that would enable him even to refer a question to his Government; but, after some negotiations here, General Vlangaly, Minister of Russia at Pekin, did, as I understand him, obtain the accordance of such powers to the Commissioner as would have admitted of discussion on the spot.

“Almost at the same moment General Vlangaly received intelligence from St. Petersburg of the mission of General Boguslavsky, not to the Chinese, but to himself, for the purpose of supplying him with information. General Boguslavsky was to remain here but ten days, and in effect did stay little more than that time. He departed extremely dissatisfied, and if I am not misinformed, the Chinese have since repeated the arguments they used when he was here in support of their determination to make no cession of territory.

“That which Russia requires is, I believe, something like the valley proper of the Ili River; but of this I am not perfectly certain.”

General Boguslavsky had affirmed that the Chinese would never recover either Ili or Kashgaria,

[*Secret, February 1873, Nos. 40, 41 and 43.*]

193. Boguslavsky's return to St. Petersburg. Views of Russian Statesmen regarding the failure of his negotiations and the future of Ili.—General Boguslavsky's return to St. Petersburg and the

view taken of the failure of his mission by the Russian Government are thus described in the British Ambassador's letter No. 365, dated 24th December 1872:—

"General Boguslavsky, who had been sent to treat with a Chinese negotiator at Kulja,
* * * * * has returned to this capital.

"M. de Stremoukoff informs me that the negotiations with which he had been charged have led to no practical result. The Chinese Government were full of promises, and spoke of the subjection of their revolted provinces as if it was easy of accomplishment and a mere question of time. In reply to my enquiry, His Excellency said that the idea of any cession of territory was never entertained by the Chinese Government, who appeared to be under the happy illusion that the revolted provinces in Zungaria, as well as in East Turkistan, were still subject to their rule.

"Under these circumstances His Excellency said the Imperial Government had no other course to pursue but to hold the province of Ili which they now occupied, for, if they retired, the same anarchy and bloodshed would recommence which their occupation had put an end to.

"M. de Stremoukoff did not deny the probability of its annexation to Russia, but he did not appear anxious for it. He stated that if the Chinese Government should be in a position to reduce to subjection the district lying between China proper and the province of Ili, and should afterwards be enabled to re-occupy Kulja with sufficient force to ensure the maintenance of peace and order, the Russian Government would be perfectly ready to retire and restore to them that province. But I believe that there are no apparent hopes of the Chinese Government being enabled to do so, and therefore the Russian occupation will be continued until a favorable opportunity arises for its formal annexation to Russia.

"The report given by General Boguslavsky of the internal state of China is very unsatisfactory. M. de Stremoukoff considers the Chinese Empire to be in a state of progressive decay, and that it will eventually break up into separate states. He is of opinion that this change will be beneficial to Europe and to the Chinese themselves, as it will break down those barriers which have hitherto resisted all change and impeded all improvement."

[*Secret, March 1873, No. 57.*]

194. Feebleness of the Chinese power in Zungaria in 1872-73.—The display of Chinese weakness in this remote province of the Empire was indeed such as to dispel any expectation that the Manchoo rule would be restored. The new *Zan-Zoun* or Military Governor Yung Chuan established himself in the citadel of Clugutchak which had remained in ruins since the Tunganees sacked the town and destroyed the Russian factory in 1865. But the force at his disposal was altogether contemptible. There were 500 half-armed Kalmuks and Shibos posted near Shiko. This place on the road between Kulja and Manass had been provisionally occupied by a garrison of Russian soldiers, who were withdrawn at the solicitation of the *Zan-Zoun*. At Ouliassatai the Chinese held 500 men. In Kobdo there were about 600 soldiers of various nationalities. With these miserable forces the Manchoo authorities failed to secure the tranquillity of the trade routes. In the autumn of 1872 a party of Kulja merchants fell into the hands of brigands between Shiko and Manass and were put to death with horrible barbarities. In November 1872 the Tunganees assailed the garrison of Kobdo, who were barely able to defend the citadel, while the suburbs were given up to plunder. In revenge for this disaster the Amban of Guchen decreed the massacre of 230 Tunganees who were settled in that place and engaged in peaceful trade. The natural result appeared in hostile demonstrations by the Mahomedans of other towns, especially of Ourumtsi where an oath was sworn to avenge the death of the men of Guchen, and to exact from the Chinese "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." No wonder then that Mr. Wade, writing from Peking on 4th June 1873, pointed to this weakness of the Imperial authorities as very important, because, as he said, "it pledges Russia to more energetic action, not only in Ili which she now holds, but also possibly in the territory south of Ili."

[*See Journal de St. Pétersbourg of 2nd—14th August 1872, and Secret, January 1874, No. 191.*]

195. Dis-organisation of Tarbagatai under Chinese rule.— Since the events last mentioned there has been little or no change for the better. On 2nd April 1874 Mr. Wade wrote that a Chinese official recently returned from Tarbagatai or Chuguchak (belonging properly to the Government of which the Military Chief should reside at Ili or Kulja) reported the Tarbagatai country as free from war, but internally in an unsatisfactory state. Kulja being in the hands of the Russians, who proposed to occupy Ili until the Chinese could guarantee its permanent tranquillity, the Military Governor, Yung Chuan, remained at Tarbagatai, which is eighteen days' journey from Ili. Tarbagatai was also the head-quarters of a Commissioner, but the incumbent of the office, by name Fuho, had been stripped of his rank for embezzlement and denounced by Yung Chuan for having some time previously crossed into Russian territory to avoid a conflict with Mahomedan rebels. Russian traders had established themselves at Tarbagatai. Mongolia was still disturbed, and the means of locomotion were so much out of gear, that it took Mr. Wade's informant five months to travel from Tarbagatai to Peking.

(*Political A., May 1874, No. 122.*)

196. Report that the Chinese had offered to buy back Ili.— On 30th November 1874 Mr. Shaw, the British representative in the dominions of the Atalik Ghazee, communicated a report which had been spread by a merchant from Vernöe that the Chinese had demanded Kulja back from the Russians, who refused to give the country up except on payment of 18,000 *kurs* (about £300,000) which the Chinese were ready to pay. But there appears to be no reason for believing that this rumour rests on solid foundation.

(*Secret, February 1875, No. 13.*)

197. Mr. Wade's advice to the Chinese to make a formal cession of Ili: Chinese objections.— Of late indeed the British Minister in Peking, taking advantage of the influence which he had gained by his interposition between China and Japan, has very earnestly pressed on the Imperial Ministers the propriety of ceding their claims to these remote provinces. The advice given was more especially directed towards the claims on Kashgaria, which will be noticed in a subsequent chapter: but Mr. Wade also counselled the Chinese authorities that the territory in Russian occupation and but a century ago acquired by China should be surrendered to Russia, and Mr. Mayers was instructed to broach the subject to General Li in the following terms:—

“There is a Russian occupation in the far west of the Empire, friendly in form, but based and protracted on conditions that reflect on the dignity of China. Does the Governor-General appreciate the necessity of closing, if possible, that question, I say, even if China sacrifice the territory she annexed in the reign Kienlung but a century ago?”

Mr. Mayers, however, was encountered by the familiar objection that, though Mr. Wade was right, no one would be so bold as to recommend in writing to the Emperor any abandonment of territory. “He would ask what one meant by suggesting that the conquest of his ancestors should be relinquished at the very moment when the Empire has just been pacificated within its provincial limits.” And, though Mr. Mayers referred to a projected Railway from Ili to Hami as showing how unlikely it was that Kulja would be recovered by the Chinese, nothing in the way of assent was gained. Mr. Wade was forced to admit that his representations only drew from the Ministers an affirmation that, allowing his views to be practically just, no one would venture to submit propositions of the kind to the throne. It may be added that the Secretary of State for India considered Mr. Wade's advice to be in a general sense suited to the state of affairs in these regions of Central Asia.

[Vide *Enclosures of Secretary of State's Secret Despatch No. 38, dated 5th March 1875.*]

198. Recent disorders in the neighbourhood of the outpost Shiko.—The most recent intelligence derived from Russian sources discloses the same state of anarchy and rapine on the borders of the tracts which still acknowledge the sway of China. According to the *Exchange Gazette* of the 28th January—9th February 1875, the caravan trade on the Western Chinese frontier had received a check from the authorities at Shiko, who drove away a Russian commercial agent from the place and prohibited the natives from buying his goods. The neighbourhood of Shiko had relapsed from a condition of unwonted peace and security into disorganisation, and had again become the scene of conflicts between the Tunganees and Chinese. Marauding bands from Ourumtsi, joined, it is said, by sepoyes of the Atalik Ghazee, attacked various Chinese settlements and villages in the vicinity, and had the hardihood to plunder a Russian caravan. One of the bands was intercepted by a detachment of the Shiko garrison; and in the conflict which ensued forty Tunganees were slain and some were taken prisoners. Of the latter, nine were executed and two remained in prison at Shiko. It is the usual tale of acts of rapine on the one side and savage retaliation on the other.

[*Enclosure of Secret Despatch No. 43, dated 12th March 1875.*]

F. H.,—19-5-75.

CHAPTER VIII.

EASTERN TURKESTAN OR ALTISHUHUR.

199. Preliminary remarks.—This Chapter will be divided into three sections :—

I.—Relations of the British Government with the Ameer of Kashgar.

II.—Recent policy of Russia in respect to East Turkestan.

III.—Attitude of the Chinese towards the Ameer of Kashgar.

As regards the geography, internal history, and commercial statistics of the country, reference may be made to the report of Sir T. D. Forsyth's Mission, which is about to be published.

SECTION I.

RELATIONS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WITH THE AMEER OF KASHGAR.

200. Brief summary of negotiations with Kashgar in 1870-71.—From pages 255 *et seq.* of Mr. Wynne's Central Asian Précis it will be seen that in 1870 Mr. Forsyth was deputed to Yarkund as the bearer of a friendly letter from the Viceroy to the Atalik Ghazee. Owing to the absence of the latter on the distant frontiers of his dominions, the British Envoy was compelled to return to India without obtaining an interview. In 1871 the Ameer again opened friendly negotiations by sending Ahrar Khan Torah with letters to the Queen and the Viceroy. It was gathered from conversations with Ahrar Khan that the Atalik Ghazee regretted having been prevented by circumstances from receiving Mr. Forsyth, and that a return Envoy would be honorably treated. The Government of the Punjab were accordingly instructed to give a verbal hint to the Envoy that, if the Atalik Ghazee expressed a desire to receive an English Officer of rank and gave proper guarantees for his safety and honorable reception, such an Officer would be deputed, but that otherwise a Native of rank and experience would be sent.

201. Arrival of a Yarkund Envoy at Ladakh in December 1872, and his proposed visit to Jummoo in January 1873. Separate negotiations with Cashmere not permitted.—On the 26th December 1872 the Government of the Punjab communicated a telegram which had been received from Dr. Aitchison, British Joint Commissioner in Ladakh, stating that Syud Yakoob Khan Torah, Envoy from Yarkund to the British Government, had arrived at Ladakh on the 3rd of that month. Dr. Aitchison feared that the Envoy would have difficulty in crossing the passes, as snow had fallen. Instructions were thereupon issued by telegram of the 28th December 1872 that, if the Yarkund Vakeel succeeded in crossing the passes, arrangements should be made for his proper reception and treatment while in British territory, for which purpose an Officer was to be deputed. The Government of the Punjab were also requested to ascertain and report the object of the Envoy's visit. Syud Yakoob Khan crossed the passes in safety and reached Srinuggur on the 24th December 1872. It was found that he brought letters for the Viceroy, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and Maharaja of Cashmere. On the 4th January 1873 the Government of the Punjab telegraphed that the Envoy had left Srinuggur for Jummoo. He intended to remain at Jummoo for a few days, and then to proceed *viâ* Sealkote to the British Camp of Exercise. The Government of India directed by letter No. 29P., dated 7th January 1873, that *no separate negotiations should be entered into between the Maharaja of Cashmere and the Envoy, and that the Maharaja should report fully to the Punjab Government all communications which might take place with the Envoy.*

[*Political A., January 1873, Nos. 101-110.*]

202. Alleged discourteous treatment of the Envoy in Cashmere. Proposed visit to Jummoo abandoned.—The proposed visit of the Envoy to Jummoo was not paid. As before stated, the Envoy arrived at Srinuggur on the 24th December 1872, accompanied by Sheikh Kurreem Buksh, Moonsee, attached to the British Joint Commissioner at Ladakh. He exchanged presents with Wuzeer Punnoo, the Governor of Cashmere, and met the Wuzeer at Shergashi, where a durbar had been arranged for his reception. At this durbar not a single individual of whatever rank rose to receive him, nor were arms presented by the troops, and Wuzeer Punnoo himself only rose when the Envoy approached, and shaking hands with him both sat down. Full of resentment at the discourteous bearing of the Cashmere authorities, Syud Yakoob Khan changed* his plans, gave up the journey to Jummoo, and determined upon proceeding to visit the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, *viâ* Mozufferabad and Abbottabad.

[*Political A*, January 1873, Nos. 369-373.]

203. A native letter explaining the policy of the Cashmere authorities towards the Yarkund Envoy.—The news-writer at Jummoo, in a letter dated 6th January 1873,—a letter by the way which was believed to have been inspired by the Jummoo Durbar—reported that a communication had been received from the Yarkund Envoy at Naura, one march beyond Srinuggur, addressed to Dewan Kirpa Ram. In this communication it was stated that the Syud had been deputed by the Atalik Ghazee to wait on the Maharaja, after seeing whom he would proceed to visit the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. Kirpa Ram advised the Maharaja not to see the Envoy before the latter had visited the Lieutenant-Governor, but to request that the letter from the Atalik Ghazee should be made over to His Highness' *Motamid*, Dewan Gohur Sahai, who was in attendance on His Honor. This advice was given by Kirpa Ram on the ostensible ground that Yakoob Kushbegi was reported to have entered into an alliance with the Russians. The Durbar also professed to have received secret intelligence that a revolution was expected to occur shortly, either among the subjects or the troops of the Ruler of East Turkestan.

[*Secret*, March 1873, Nos. 220 and 221.]

204. Contents of the letters exchanged between the Atalik Ghazee and the Maharaja of Cashmere.—The letters exchanged between the Atalik Ghazee, and the Maharaja of Cashmere on this occasion were confined to expressions of friendship. The following is a translation of the Atalik's letter, dated October 1872 :—

“Thanks to God that my subjects are happy and comfortable.

“Ere this, certain presents were received from the Khalifa of Room by the hands of my nephew, Syud Yakoob Khan Torah. It was necessary to depute at once a principal officer to convey my thanks for the imperial favor; but at that time I was engaged in war; and on this account the deputation of such officer was postponed up to the present time. Now that I am perfectly rid of the anxiety on that account, and all disturbances have been extinguished, I have despatched the bearer of this friendly letter to convey the thanks of this Government, which was necessary to be done.

“And whereas old friendship exists between me and yourself, I ordered the Envoy in the course of his journey to convey to you my friendly message. Whatever the Envoy may represent in this respect should be credited as reliable.

“Owing to certain untoward incidents, the return of Abdoolla Khan† has been delayed. He will soon receive permission to return honorably; and he will reach you after the bearer of this friendly letter.”

* This is the explanation given by Kurreem Buksh: but see the Syud's own story *infra* page 152.

† Abdoolla Khan was an Envoy despatched from Cashmere to Yarkund about the time of Mr. Forsyth's visit in 1870. He wrote to Syud Yakoob Khan from Leh, desiring him to postpone his departure from Cashmere till his own arrival, when they could both present themselves to the Maharaja together.

The Maharaja replied—

“I have received Your Highness’ letter, intimating the deputation of Syud Yakoob Khan Torah. Having learned of Your Highness’ good health and successes, I have paid thanks to God Almighty. May he preserve you for ever in good health and prosperity on the throne of good fortune.”

[*Secret, March 1873, No. 138.*]

[*„ January 1874, „ 169.*]

205. Deputation of Mr. Forsyth to take charge of the Envoy.—On the 21st January 1873 instructions were issued to Mr. Forsyth to proceed at once to meet the Envoy at the Lieutenant-Governor’s Camp at Hussun Abdul, to take general charge of him and of the arrangements for his reception and proper treatment, and to act as the medium of communication between the Envoy and the British Government. Mr. Forsyth was to receive instructions from the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab so long as the Envoy should remain in that province, and to report to the Government of India through the Punjab Government. But from the date of the Envoy’s departure from the Punjab, reports were to be addressed direct to the Government of India. It was at the same time arranged that during his deputation on this special duty Mr. Forsyth should receive the pay of a Commissioner of Oudh, *viz.*, Rupees 2,500 per mensem *plus* 20 per cent. thereon, or in all Rupees 3,000, together with *boná fide* travelling expenses.

[*Progs., Poll. A., January 1873, Nos. 363 and 364.*]

206. Arrival of the Yarkund Envoy at the Lieutenant-Governor’s camp. The object of his mission explained.—Syud Yakoob Khan reached the Camp of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab in the beginning of February 1873. On the 3rd of that month he was received with due ceremony in Durbar, after which he explained to the Lieutenant-Governor the object of his mission, and the substance of what he said was as follows :—

Commercial Treaty between Yarkund and Russia.—Since the deputation of Mr. T. D. Forsyth, C.B. Yarkund to in 1870, the position of affairs as regards the Russian and Yarkund States had undergone some change. In the preceding spring an embassy consisting of ten members, of whom two were military officers, two merchants, and six soldiers, forming the escort, visited Kashgar. They brought with them a letter from the Russian Governor to the effect that Russia desired that all its neighbours on its southern and eastern borders should be on good terms with them, and required them to declare whether they would be friends or enemies. If the former, well; but if not, the Russian Government would treat them as enemies. Friendly conduct was to consist in—

Firstly.—That in the same manner as Yarkund merchants had full permission to enter and trade within Russian Territory, Russian merchants should have free permission to enter and trade in Yarkund Territory; that this permission should extend to the whole of Yarkund, and not only so far as Kashgar.

Secondly.—That the maximum duty leviable upon Russian merchandise entering Yarkund should be 2½ per cent.

Thirdly.—That for every kafila a certain person should be appointed on behalf of the merchants, to collect the duty ratably from them, and to be responsible for its payment to the Yarkund authorities.

Fourthly.—That similar arrangements regarding serais and camping grounds for the convenience of travellers should be undertaken in Yarkund as in Russia, and that, should merchants desire to build serais for their own accommodation and as a warehouse for their merchandise, they should be permitted to do so.

The Envoy, however, stated that only one kafila during the year was expected to arrive, but that the agreement made no condition that more should not be sent. No caravan had hitherto come by way of Kulja.

The Russian letter went on to say that, should the Atalik Ghazee not accede to these terms, he would be considered as an enemy, and his country and power be destroyed.

The Atalik Ghazee, in replying, said that he was desirous of remaining on good terms with their Government. He was aware that a refusal to accede to the terms would be tantamount to a declaration of enmity with the Russian Government, while, should he agree, he still apprehended that the time would not be far distant when Russian interference would become greater and greater, and eventually result in an open rupture. He accordingly answered generally that the relations which the Russians desired to enter into with Yarkund were precisely those which had for a long time past existed with the English Government, and that he had no objection to agree to them. The terms were then agreed to; duplicate treaties were signed, one copy being taken by the Embassy and the other retained by the Atalik Ghazee. Two Yarkund officials were sent to accompany the Embassy on their return, who were similarly accompanied by two Russian agents, who were hospitably received and entertained for fifteen days, although seven days was the limit fixed for their stay, and were then suffered to depart in peace. No caravan had under the terms of the Commercial Treaty yet reached Kashgar, nor could one arrive till spring some four months later.

The Atalik Ghazee's power and feelings in regard to Russia.—The Envoy further stated that, with this exception, the country was in the same condition as when Mr. Forsyth had visited it. The Atalik Ghazee was strong; his country was in a state of good order, and he had no fear of internal dissensions. All he desired was security against Russia, and that the Russians might plainly perceive that they had nothing to expect [*na umed*] from Yarkund; and seeing this might cease all interference. The Yarkund inclination was entirely towards the British Government.

The Envoy added that he had himself travelled much, and had resided for some time in Constantinople and elsewhere, where he had heard much of the character of the Russians. His counsel had thus been sought by his master, whom he had advised never to trust the Russians. They were people who behaved well for four days and who deceived you on the fifth. His advice was that the Atalik Ghazee should lean on the British Government and have nothing whatever to do with that of Russia.

The Envoy also stated that two years before he returned from Constantinople in 1869, the Atalik Ghazee had detained certain Russian merchants and forbidden them to trade. Their goods were sold for them in such a manner as to give them no profit, and they were then directed to leave the country. No further intercourse took place with Russia till 1871, when one Russian trader of the Nogai tribe visited Kashgar. There was no prohibition against trade with Bokhara coming by way of Kokand, which was under the rule of Khoda Yar Khan.

Objects of the deputation of the Envoy.—In answer to the special enquiry of the Lieutenant-Governor as to the particular object for which the Atalik Ghazee had deputed him to India, the Envoy said that the first object was that he might fully explain that the Commercial Treaty with the Russians was not in any way induced by desire to weaken the friendship which existed between England and Yarkund, and that Yarkund policy had in this particular undergone no change whatever; *secondly*, that the Atalik Ghazee desired the Russians might fully understand by observing the friendship between Yarkund and England that they had no chance of being able to interfere successfully there or of obtaining any hold on Yarkund. For sixty years it was notorious that the British Government had been on friendly terms with Yarkund, and that State considered itself connected with England by

interest; that their feelings were towards England, and in no degree towards Russia. No boundary dispute existed at that moment between Russia and Yarkund.

Envoy's account of the general position of affairs in Yarkund.—The Atalik Ghazee about a month before the Russian Embassy arrived at Kashgar had returned there from his expedition to the north, there being now complete peace on the Urumchi border, where for so long the Atalik had been engaged in hostilities with the Tunganees, who were fighting on behalf of the Chinese Government. These tribes had been reduced to complete subjection and the principal towns captured. The eldest son of the Atalik, by name Kuli Beg, was now on his return journey to Kashgar, having taken the towns of Manass, Lashan, and others. Towards the north-east, in the direction of Kulja, the Russians had not made any perceptible advances. The line of country from Turfan to Sairam and Kucha was still in the hands of the Atalik Ghazee, and the Russian border was from Aksu distant about eight days' march. The road was described as mountainous and often impassable on account of snow. The Atalik Ghazee proposed moving to Aksu early in the spring. His army was cantoned in different parts of the country, but the greater part of it was stationed at Aksu and Kashgar. The Envoy represented that the reason of the Atalik Ghazee's anxiety was that he felt it was impossible to trust the Russians, and that this was the general impression in Central Asia that the Russians were not to be trusted. The good results of friendship with the British Government were, on the other hand, well known in the case of Afghanistan, which had entered into such intimate relations with the British Government as to be almost considered as part of the British Empire, thus being secure from all attacks.

Friendly communications were kept up with Bokhara, Kokhand and Budukshan, but rarely Sir-i-kool; the Envoy himself had never visited it. He was, however, certain that the district belonged to the Atalik Ghazee, who had a Governor there. The brother of the Atalik Ghazee was himself Governor during the past year; but the villagers complained of his exactions and he was consequently removed.

The route to Hindoostan from Yarkund *viâ* Chitral and Swat passed through Sir-i-kool.

Treatment of the Envoy while passing through Cashmere. With reference to his change of route and proceeding to India by way of Abbottabad, instead of Jummoo as he had at first intimated, the Envoy said that it was his intention in the first place to go to Jummoo. This had, indeed, been the instruction which he had received in Yarkund from the Atalik, but he was so convinced of the advantage of abstaining from communication with a subordinate power and dealing direct with the British Government, that after full consideration he determined in Srinuggur to proceed first to wait on the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. He had been received in Srinuggur by the Cashmere authorities with all politeness, and had nothing to complain of. Abdoolla Khan, an Agent of the Cashmere Government, had written to him to wait for him at Srinuggur and accompany him to Jummoo. This Abdoolla Khan was some three years ago sent by the Maharaja of Cashmere as an Envoy to Yarkund. He accompanied Mr. Forsyth's party from Cashmere. He brought a letter to the Atalik Ghazee, the purport of which the Envoy was unable to give, as he had not seen more than the cover of the letter, which was sent on to the Atalik Ghazee, who was at that time absent from his capital. What was stated in reply to this communication of the Maharaja, the Envoy did not know. He believed that a letter was given by the Atalik Ghazee to Abdoolla Khan; but this man left Yarkund after his departure, and his letter, to which reference was above made, reached the Envoy at Srinuggur while Abdoolla Khan was at the Zoggila Pass. The Envoy did not, however, pay any attention to the advice of Abdoolla Khan, and set out for Abbottabad without waiting for his arrival. Abdoolla Khan was in Yarkund at the time of Mr. Forsyth's visit. Both then and since, he had advised the Envoy to

make no alliance with the British Government, but rather to make friends with Cashmere, who, if necessary, would furnish him with any troops that he required.

In conclusion, the Envoy observed that the fact that the British Government had made over Cashmere to the Maharaja was a source of inconvenience in dealing with Central Asia, since the Kulu road to Yarkund was constantly impeded. He was disposed to enlarge upon this subject, but was not encouraged by His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor.

Main objects of Syud Yakoob Khan's deputation.—As observed by the Government of the Punjab the principal objects which the Atalik Ghazee had in view in deputing an Envoy to India were, (1st,) to convince the British Government that the Commercial Treaty lately concluded with Russia in no way lessened the desire of the Atalik for friendship with England, and (2nd,) by displaying the cordiality subsisting between himself and the British Government to induce the Russians to abstain from interference in his dominions.

[*Secret, March 1873, Nos. 222 and 224.*]

207. Letters from the Atalik Ghazee to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and the Viceroy delivered by the Yarkund Envoy.—The following is a translation of the letters of which Syud Yakoob Khan was the bearer:—

TO THE LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR [DATED END OF OCTOBER 1874].

“ PRAISE is due to God that my subjects are in every respect happy and prosperous and repose in the cradle of security and the bed of comfort, and in the enjoyment of perfect peace of mind.

“ Ere this I was honored by the receipt of certain presents from His Majesty the Khalifa of Room by the hands of Syud Yakoob Khan Torah. It was appropriate that I should have deputed one of my principal officers at once to convey my thankfulness for the imperial favor, but as I was then engaged in warfare, the deputation of the Agent was postponed up to the present time. Now that I have been released from all anxiety on that score, and disturbances have been extinguished, I have deputed the bearer of this friendly letter for the sake of discharging the obligation of paying thanks which this Government was under; and whereas there exists old friendship between myself and the British Government, I have directed the Envoy to strengthen in an appropriate way the relations of friendship and union. Whatever the Envoy may represent in this respect should be credited.

“ My Envoy, Syud Ihrar Khwaja Torah, has returned after being treated with great honor by the British Government, and has described the friendship of that Government, for which I am much obliged and happy.”

TO THE VICEROY [DATED 5TH OCTOBER 1872].

“ BE it known that, by the favor of the Most High and the power of this Government, the people of these parts are reposing on the couch of ease and tranquillity, and are in the enjoyment of unbroken peace.

“ Some gifts and royal presents from the high and noble Kaliph of the exalted Ottoman Government have recently been sent to me by the hands of my Envoy,* Syud Yakoob Khan, and I have been duly honored with their receipt. On the arrival of these presents it was incumbent on me to despatch at once one of my confidential and trusted officers to return thanks for the favors thus shown to me. But, as I was at that period engaged in an arduous campaign against certain rebellious and evil-disposed persons, performance of this duty has been postponed until the present auspicious time. Now that the flame of sedition and rebellion has been quenched by the sword, and the enemies of this Government having been exterminated, peace once more reigns supreme, I have deputed the Syud Yakoob Khan Torah, in order to communicate my sentiments of gratitude for the regal favors manifested towards me.

“ Since I entertain a strong and sincere attachment for the British Government, I have instructed the abovementioned Envoy to convey my acknowledgments for the kindness and friendship shown, to confirm the usages of union and friendship, and to place on a firm basis the foundation of union and accord between both parties, after which he will proceed on his journey.

“ The presents despatched by the British Government have been duly delivered by the bearer of the letter of friendship, according to the list of Mr. Shaw.

"Whatever the bearer of this letter may propose as regards the strengthening of the edifices of union and friendship, consider as coming from myself without the intervention of a third party. The sentiments which he will express are those with which Mr. Forsyth inspired the said Envoy."

[*Proceedings, Secret, March 1873, Nos. 225 and 228.*]

208. Yarkund Envoy's arrival at Calcutta. Interview with the Foreign Secretary on 27th February 1873.—Syud Yakoob Khan Torah, arrived in Calcutta on the night of the 23rd February 1873, and on the 27th of the same month an interview took place between him and the Foreign Secretary. The substance of the conversation was as follows:—

Objects of the Mission from the Atalik Ghazee to the Government of India.—The Foreign Secretary began by informing the Envoy that the Viceroy would appoint an early date for his reception at a private interview, but that previous to the formal reception His Excellency had desired the Secretary to ascertain what were the precise objects of the Envoy's deputation, and what were the proposals he was empowered to make.

The Envoy replied that, in the course of several conversations with Mr. Forsyth during that gentleman's visit to Yarkund, the question of maintaining friendly relations with England had often been discussed, and he (the Envoy) had been much impressed by Mr. Forsyth's views on the subject. During the course of his travels he had acquired a more exact knowledge of the position and power of the British Government than he had before possessed, and Mr. Forsyth's conversation had confirmed these impressions and convinced him that it was essential for the safety and well-being of Yarkund to maintain friendly and intimate relations with the British Government. When the Envoy arrived with Mr. Forsyth's party at Yarkund, the Atalik Ghazee was engaged on a campaign, and it was not until some time subsequently that he had an opportunity of seeing him and urging these views upon him. He had represented to the Atalik that under the beneficent rule of the British Government were to be found various Princes and Chiefs, all enjoying the utmost peace and security, and all feeling themselves perfectly safe from aggression either from without or from the paramount power.

These arguments had convinced the Atalik Ghazee, who had now deputed him to strengthen the bonds of amity and friendship that existed between the two Governments. As the Atalik was obliged to send a return Mission to Turkey to acknowledge favors conferred by the Sultan, it had been decided to make the necessary communications to the British Government under cover of the ostensible object of the Mission.

Powers given to the Envoy by the Atalik Ghazee.—Being asked to state whether he had been empowered by the Atalik to make any definite proposals with regard to the manner in which the friendship existing between the two Governments could be made patent to the world, the Envoy replied that he had been empowered—

(1.) To offer the fullest facilities for the promotion of commercial intercourse with Yarkund.

(2.) To offer that a representative on the part of Yarkund should always be maintained at the head-quarters of the British Government.

(3.) To request that on the return of the Envoy to Yarkund he might be accompanied by a British Mission, who would be received with every distinction and hospitality by the Atalik.

(4.) To request that a British representative should be permanently sanctioned at Yarkund.

In reply to an enquiry as to whether he had been empowered to conclude any written engagement, the Envoy said that no definite instructions to that effect had been given him. The Atalik had simply conferred upon him full power to cultivate friendly relations with the British Government, and what-

ever he might do with that object would be agreed to by his sovereign. It was left entirely to the British Government to determine whether this should be done by means of an engagement or by a simple interchange of views. The Envoy distinctly affirmed, in reply to an enquiry, that any engagement entered into by him would be ratified and confirmed by the Atalik, and he referred to the concluding portion of the letter to His Excellency the Viceroy, of which he was the bearer, in proof of this statement. In the passage referred to, the Atalik requested that any communications made by the Envoy should be considered as coming from himself.

Position of a British or Native Officer in Yarkund. Safety of traders.—When asked whether the Atalik would guarantee the safety of any Envoy sent to Yarkund, Syud Yakooob replied in the affirmative. He was reminded that, though the Atalik and the officials of Government might be willing to do all in their power to ensure the safety of the British representative, it was nevertheless possible that evil-disposed persons might be led into acts of violence which might create serious complications. The Envoy rejoined that the whole country of Yarkund was completely under the control of the Atalik, without whose orders none of his subjects could even dare to move from one place to another. Such being the case, it was impossible, with the precautions that would be taken, that any harm could possibly reach a British representative.

The Secretary next remarked that he was not in a position to say what view His Excellency the Viceroy might take of the suggestions made by the Envoy, but he enquired whether, in the event of it being decided to maintain a British representative at Yarkund, a native of Hindoostan would be acceptable, or whether a British officer would be preferred. The Envoy replied that the latter would be preferred, but if it were decided to send a Native of Hindoostan, no objection would be made, provided that the person selected were one in whom both parties could repose implicit confidence. Natives of India, he observed, were to be trusted only when under proper supervision; when removed from such supervision they were apt to misrepresent matters, and to act in a manner prejudicial to their employer's interests.

The Secretary next brought to notice that increased facilities given to trade would probably result in a considerable influx of traders to Yarkund, among whom there might occasionally be some Europeans; and he enquired whether the safety of these traders could be ensured. The Envoy replied that as regards natives of India no apprehensions whatever need be entertained; there were already numbers of natives of India in Yarkund, both traders and residents, and their presence excited no remark. It would doubtless be the case, he observed, that the advent of Europeans would arouse considerable curiosity throughout the country, but no danger need be apprehended. At first it would be advisable to restrict Europeans to certain routes, and to appoint Officers to meet them at the frontier, and it would be the duty of such Officers to secure them from all molestation.

The Envoy was next asked whether, in the event of it being decided to conclude a commercial treaty, he would propose that it should be negotiated before or after his visit to Constantinople, or whether such a treaty could best be concluded at Yarkund after the arrival there of the suggested British Mission. The Envoy replied that the treaty might be concluded in India under the full powers with which he was vested by his sovereign. He was prepared, if the British Government considered it necessary, to conclude a commercial engagement at once, but considered that it might be more expedient to defer the matter until his return from Constantinople. His object in going there, he said, was to explain precisely to the Sultan the state of affairs in Yarkund, and obtain the formal sanction of that potentate to the establishment of an open and acknowledged friendship with the British Government. Having secured this sanction, he would be in a better position to conclude a commercial treaty.

Objects of mission to Constantinople.—Being further interrogated as to the precise objects of his mission to Constantinople, the Envoy said that

besides being the bearer of a friendly letter and messages on the part of his sovereign, he had no other object in view. On being asked what course he would pursue if the Sultan refused to accord the required sanction to the intimate relations suggested between Yarkund and the British Government, he replied that he would formally appeal to the Sultan to assume the protectorate of his country. Knowing the helpless condition of Turkey, he felt sure that this request would be refused, upon which he would represent the absolute necessity of securing the friendship of the British Government, and then take without further reference to Turkey such action as the interests of Yarkund might require.

Yarkund relations with Russia.—The Envoy said that the request for a commercial treaty came from Russia. On the proposal being made, the Atalik Ghazee, after consultation with the Envoy, replied to the effect that four years previously communications had been opened for the British Government, having for their object the extension of trade and the promotion of free intercourse between the subjects of both countries. This being the case, the Atalik proceeded to say that no objections were entertained by him to extend similar facilities to Russian subjects. The result of these communications was the conclusion of a treaty, which was purely commercial and contained no reference to political arrangements. The treaty was arranged with a Russian Mission that visited Yarkund for the purpose, and on the return of this Mission to Russia they were accompanied to Tashkend by a deputation on the part of the Atalik Ghazee. A Russian Officer returned to Yarkund with this deputation, under strict orders from his Government not to remain there longer than eight days. His stay extended to fifteen days, during which time he was honorably treated and sent back to his country. No Agents had as yet been appointed to reside at Yarkund, nor had any Russian caravans entered the country subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty.

No proposals, said the Envoy, had been made by the Russians with regard to any cession of territory, or the location of military posts within Yarkund territory. *It was, however, generally understood that Russia coveted possession of Sir-i-kool.* The interpreter employed by the Russian Mission at Yarkund, during their negotiations regarding the commercial treaty, had personally informed the Envoy that the Russians were continually alluding to Sir-i-kool.

A map being produced, the Envoy pointed out the boundaries of Yarkund, which he said terminated towards the north-east at Ourumtsi, which had been recently conquered by the Atalik. The northern boundary is the chain of lofty mountains south of the Naryn, which river, he said, formed at present the Russian boundary. The nomad Kirghiz subjects of the Atalik were, however, frequently in the habit of crossing the Naryn and occupying the pastures north of that river. The Russians occupied the country south and east of the Issik-Kool. The passes leading through the northern mountain range were occupied by the Atalik's outposts; one of these passes, which follows a considerable stream intersecting the range, was passable for cattle, but not for carts.

Sir-i-kool, its position and advantages.—The district of Sir-i-kool, the Envoy said, was a portion of the Atalik's dominions. It was governed by an officer appointed by the Atalik, and a considerable revenue was derived from the districts. Its importance consisted in the fact of its being so placed as to command several important trade routes. From thence radiated the several routes leading to Budukshan, to Yarkund, to India *via* Chitral, also the routes to India *via* Gilghit in one direction and Ladakh in another.

The Envoy had never visited Sir-i-kool, but had always heard that the Chitral route was easy and practicable for wheeled vehicles; there was only one difficult pass to cross: of the other routes also he had no personal knowledge.

Trade routes and matters relating to trade.—On being asked his opinion as to the relative superiority of the Chang-Chemmo and Karakorum routes, the Envoy said that each possessed peculiar advantages, the former in point

of ease and the latter in point of distance. There were only two formidable passes on the Chang-Chenmo line, but its greater length told unfavorably against it, as the expense of transporting merchandize was of course increased by the additional cost of transport. At present difficulties were found as regards forage, &c., but when grazing and camping grounds had been properly marked out, and supplies laid in at certain known stages, he had no doubt that traders would take advantage of the Chang-Chenmo line, although the Karakorum was generally preferred.

The Envoy was quite aware of the arrangements that had been entered into with Cashmere for the furtherance of the Turkestan trade. He described Leh as admirably situated for an exchange mart for traders from both directions. The effect of locating a British Commissioner at Leh had been, he said, most beneficial to trade, but it was a great pity that the Commissioner did not remain there the whole year round, instead of being withdrawn during the winter months, trade being by no means at a stand-still for that period. The Cashmere Joint-Commissioner had desired the Envoy to represent to the British Government the inability of keeping up a Commissioner at Leh, but the Envoy had ascertained from inquiries among the Yarkund merchants, whom he assembled privately for the purpose of ascertaining their sentiments, not only that his presence was positively beneficial, but that his withdrawal would altogether ruin their trade.

Obstructions placed by Cashmere in the way of the Eastern Turkestan trade.—The conversation then turned on the obstructions placed by Cashmere in the way of the Eastern Turkestan trade, to which the Envoy had in the course of the conversation alluded. The Envoy was unable to state specifically what were the precise grievances complained of by the Yarkundee traders, not having, he said, made minute enquiries on that head, but he was able to say generally that they suffered from various exactions and oppression, especially during the winter months. Of one fact he could speak from personal knowledge. At Leh supplies were procurable only from the Cashmere Government store, which thus enjoyed a complete monopoly, and prices had recently been raised fourfold.

The Envoy said that Mirza Shadee had been induced by the Cashmere Government to refuse to accompany Mr. Forsyth's Mission *via* the Chang-Chenmo, and it was only on the representation of the present Envoy that he at length gave way.

The opposition of the Cashmere Government was not, said the Envoy, due to the Maharaja himself but to one of his Dewans, a Hindoo, whose name had escaped him.

Communications held by Cashmere with Yarkund and Russia.—It was generally believed, said the Envoy, throughout Yarkund that the Maharaja of Cashmere was an independent and powerful sovereign. Everything was done by the Cashmere Government to keep up this illusion, and to prevent direct relations with the British Government. Pains were taken to magnify the power and military resources of Cashmere; offers of military aid were freely made to the Atalik to deter him from seeking for aid elsewhere. During his last visit to India the Envoy had ascertained precisely the true position of Cashmere. He had explained matters to the Atalik and showed him the absurdity of entering into relations with a feudatory State, which was powerless to act without permission.

Communications had frequently passed between the Cashmere Government and the Atalik, and an Envoy from Cashmere, named Abdoolla Khan, who had been deputed to Yarkund about the time of Mr. Forsyth's visit, had only recently been permitted to return to India. What were the precise objects of his mission, and the nature of the communications between Cashmere and the Atalik, he did not know, but he believed the communications were merely of a friendly character.

This same Abdoolla Khan wrote from Leh to the Envoy, desiring him to postpone his departure from Cashmere till his own arrival, when they could both present themselves to the Maharaja together. The Envoy, however, did not care about seeing the Maharaja and took no notice of the request. There were no Cashmere Agents at that time in Yarkund.

Abdoolla Khan was at Yarkund when the Russian Mission arrived there, but the Envoy did not know whether any communications had taken place between them.

It was generally known and reported that the Cashmere authorities were in the habit of holding communications with the Russian Government. On his recent journey to India the Envoy was overtaken on the other side of Leh by a traveller, who was travelling without tents or baggage towards Cashmere. The fact struck the Envoy as remarkable, and on subsequently conversing regarding the occurrence with one Guffoor Shah, Nukshbandee, the latter informed the Envoy that this traveller had confessed to him that he had been the bearer of communications with the Russian Government. He ascertained from Guffoor Shah that the name of this traveller was Khalikjoo, and he seemed to be a well-known man in Cashmere.

The Envoy professed himself to be unacquainted with a man called Baba-ood-deen Mirza. He did not know whether, on the departure of the Russian Mission from Yarkund, they were accompanied by any person besides those deputed by the Atalik. The following of these latter being considerable, it was quite possible that a man might have been with them.

[*Secret, March 1873, Nos. 220-233.*]

209 Interview between the Viceroy and the Envoy from Yarkund, 8th March 1873.—The next interview at which His Excellency the Viceroy was present took place on the 8th March 1873.

The Envoy states the object of his Mission to the Viceroy.—His Excellency the Viceroy commenced the conversation by observing that he had been made aware of the purport of the conversation that the Envoy had held with the Foreign Secretary regarding the objects of his mission, and was prepared to hear any observations which he might now wish to make on the subject.

The Envoy replied that the primary object of his mission was to promote and cement a friendly alliance with the British Government in a manner so public as would convince the world of the intimate union between the two Governments, and would serve to deter any other power from entertaining designs hostile to the peace of his sovereign and dominions. The Atalik Ghazee, he continued, was quite willing to throw open his country to English merchants and travellers, provided that they could produce a duly authenticated certificate of their nationality: such a passport was only required to prevent subjects of other powers passing themselves off as Englishmen. English travellers or merchants would be permitted to reside in any place and travel in any direction that they might wish.

The Envoy said he had been deputed to be the bearer of friendly messages to the Court of Constantinople. When appointed to this duty, he had represented to the Atalik Ghazee that it was of primary importance to secure the friendship of the British Government, who were, from their geographical position, more able to afford that support which was needed by Yarkund. The Atalik Ghazee had assented to these views, and one object of the Envoy's present mission was to proceed to Constantinople and obtain the formal consent of the Sultan to the establishment of the desired relations with England.

Friendly assurances given to the Envoy.—His Excellency the Viceroy observed that the confidence expressed by the Envoy in the friendly dispositions of the British Government was not misplaced. That Government entertained no designs whatever of extending its dominions in any direction, and was only desirous of living in friendship with all neighbouring States. With regard to

the declared willingness of the Atalik Ghazee to throw open his country to Englishmen, His Excellency observed that the promotion of trade and unrestricted intercourse offered the readiest means of bringing about those friendly relations which it was the object of the Envoy to establish. His Excellency added that from what the Envoy had said he understood it to be the wish of the Atalik Ghazee to enter into some formal arrangements for the promotion of commercial intercourse in accordance with the practice prevailing among nations.

The Envoy replied that he was quite prepared to enter into preliminary negotiations for a commercial treaty, which might be finally concluded either at once in India, or hereafter at Yarkund, on his return, if a British Mission accompanied him.

Remarks regarding a British Mission to Yarkund, commercial treaty, and residence of representatives.—His Excellency the Viceroy proceeded to observe that he would be glad to hear the sentiments of the Envoy with regard to certain other points which had been touched upon in the course of his conversation with the Foreign Secretary, *viz.* :—

(1).—The deputation of a Mission on the part of the British Government to the Ruler of Yarkund.

(2).—The permanent residence of a Yarkund Representative in India.

(3).—The permanent residence of a British Representative at Yarkund.

The Envoy replied that these measures had been suggested by him as being in his opinion those best adapted to secure the attainment of the objects of his mission, but he left it to His Excellency and the British Government to determine the precise manner in which the desired friendly relations might best be established.

Taking up *seriatim* the several representations made by the Envoy, His Excellency, alluding first to the subject of the commercial treaty, remarked that, as the Envoy was about to proceed to Constantinople, it was desirable that the preliminaries should be discussed before his departure so that they might be fully considered before he came back; and His Excellency suggested that the Envoy should place himself in communication with the Foreign Secretary for this purpose. His Excellency then intimated that, in compliance with the request preferred, it was His Excellency's intention to despatch a return mission to accompany the Envoy to Yarkund, and that this mission would be charged with the final execution of the treaty in question.

As regarded the deputation of a representative of Yarkund to reside permanently in India, His Excellency expressed the pleasure that it would afford him to receive a representative from the Atalik Ghazee. Arrangements as to his location and other details could, His Excellency observed, be subsequently made.

The matter of the deputation of a British representative to reside permanently at Yarkund would be, His Excellency said, a question to be arranged after the return of the Mission that was about to be despatched to Yarkund.

The Viceroy explains British relations with Russia on matters affecting Central Asia.—In his opening remarks the Envoy had alluded to the recent Russian Mission to Yarkund, which had resulted in the conclusion of a Commercial Treaty between the two Governments, and had expressed some apprehension as to the lasting effects of this Treaty. With reference to these remarks, His Excellency observed that he thought it right to inform the Envoy of the exact state of British relations with the Russian Government on matters affecting Central Asia. With the aid of a map His Excellency proceeded to point out the line of the Oxus from Sir-i-kool (Wood's Lake to Khoja Saleh, and thence to the neighbourhood of Herat, which, in the course of the recent negotiations with Russia, had been defined as forming the northern boundary of Afghanistan. His Excellency continued that the Russian Government had, on many recent occasions, repeatedly disavowed any idea of further extensions

of territory, and that there was at present a good understanding between the Governments of England and Russia on Central-Asian questions.

Such being the case, the Viceroy observed that it did not fall within his province to discuss the relations of Yarkund with Russia; but he was glad to hear of the conclusion of a Commercial Treaty with Russia by the Atalik Ghazee, as the best guarantee for the peace and safety of Yarkund lay in the cultivation of trade and peaceful intercourse with both its powerful neighbours.

The Envoy replied that he perfectly understood the position of the British Government towards Russia. In the event, however, of any further discussions between the British Government and Russia with regard to the boundaries of Central-Asian States, he hoped that the opportunity would not be lost of obtaining a definition of the boundaries of Yarkund. The integrity of a Central-Asian State, he continued, was often dependent on the life of one individual, and it was only by such a definition that it would be practicable to guard against that disintegration which too commonly resulted on the death of a reigning sovereign.

The Envoy recommends the permanent location of a British Commissioner at Leh.—In reply to an enquiry, the Envoy said that he had no further representations to make with regard to the immediate objects of his mission. As affecting, however, the question of extending commercial intercourse with Turkestan, he desired to bring forward a matter which touched the interests of both nations. He referred to the permanent location of a British Commissioner at Leh. It was highly desirable that an Agent should be stationed there all the year round, instead of remaining for the summer months only, as was the case at present. Such a measure was essential for the interests of traders, and it would also, he added, prevent the communications that are now being carried on by Russian agents with Hindoostan.

His Excellency replied that the representation made by the Envoy would receive due consideration.

The Viceroy observed that he would refrain from any observations regarding the Envoy's mission to Constantinople.

[*Secret, March 1873, No. 230.*]

210. Interview of 11th March 1873 between the Foreign Secretary and the Yarkund Envoy. Basis of the Commercial Treaty.—On the 11th March 1873 the Foreign Secretary again received the Yarkund Envoy at the Foreign Office, Calcutta. The object of this interview was to ascertain the views of the Envoy with regard to the provisions that should be concluded in any Commercial Treaty that might be negotiated with Yarkund. The various points brought forward for consideration, and the substance of the Envoy's remarks thereon, will be found in the following paragraphs:—

I.—*Levy of duties on trade with Yarkund.*—As regards the duties that would be levied on articles imported into Yarkund, and the rates which would be charged, the Envoy said that 1 in 40, or $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., was the rate at which Russian imports were allowed to pass into Yarkund, and that this rate should be that fixed in the English Treaty. He added, in reply to an enquiry, that there would be no objection to discussing at Yarkund the question of admitting certain goods duty free, although it was not the custom at present to admit any goods duty free.

II.—For the levy of these duties the Envoy said proper arrangements would be made. By the Leh route for instance, on arrival at the frontier, a caravan would be met by a Yarkund official, who would enter in a list the number of loads of which the caravan consisted. One copy of the list would be furnished to the merchants and another sent on to Yarkund, or the place to which the goods were consigned. No packages would be opened until arrival at Yarkund, or their place of destination, where goods would be

examined and duties levied by an official of the *Zukat Khana* or Custom-House. Similar arrangements would be made on other trade routes. Goods destined for Kashgar, for example, would only be opened and duties on them levied at that town.

III.—The usual most favored nation clause was then explained to the Envoy, and on his being asked whether in case of more favorable terms being conceded to other Powers the same privileges would be extended to the British Government, the Envoy said there was no likelihood of more favorable terms being conceded to other Powers, but in any case the Atalik Ghazee was willing to accord to the British Government greater privileges than those accorded to the most favored of other Powers.

IV.—*Trial of cases in which British subjects should be concerned.*—With regard to the decision of civil suits or criminal cases in which British subjects were concerned, the Envoy said :—

(a.) In civil suits where both plaintiff and defendant were British subjects, whether Native or European, the suit should be tried by the British Representative or his deputies.

(b.) Where either plaintiff or defendant was a subject of Yarkund, the other party to the suit being a British subject, the case should be tried by the Cazeer in presence of an officer deputed by the British Representative.

(c.) Criminal cases in which both parties concerned were British subjects should be tried by the British Representative.

(d.) When, however, either prosecutor or defendant was a Yarkund subject, the case should be triable in the Court of the Hakim in presence of an officer deputed by the British Representative.

(e.) Both criminal and civil cases where the parties concerned were British subjects and the subjects of any Foreign Power (other than Yarkund) should be tried in the Yarkund Courts, if any of the parties were Mahomedans; if not Mahomedans, the British Representative might dispose of the case, provided the parties consented; otherwise the Yarkund Courts would settle them.

(f.) As regards appeals from the decision of the Cazeer in civil suits, it would be open to the British Representative, if he considered that justice had not been done in any particular case, to represent the matter to the Atalik Ghazee, who would appoint another Cazeer to re-try the case. The decision passed after such re-trial to be considered final.

V.—*Future privileges of British traders in Yarkund, restrictions, passports.*—Land would be granted, the Envoy said, to traders for the purpose of building houses and depôts, and they would be at liberty to purchase such houses and depôts. There would be no objection to a stipulation in the proposed Treaty providing that the Yarkund authorities should not be permitted to enter by force the dwelling-houses or warehouses in the occupation of British subjects unless accompanied by an officer deputed by the British Representative.

VI.—Being sounded as to the probability of goods destined for countries beyond Yarkund and not breaking bulk in Yarkund territory being allowed to pass duty-free, the Envoy replied that no occasion had previously arisen for granting such exemption, but there could be no objection to the matter being brought forward at Yarkund and discussed.

VII.—It was pointed out to the Envoy that it was desirable to provide for the utmost freedom of action for the traders, and hence any restrictions placed in the way of their departure from Yarkund territory after they had disposed of their goods would be apt to discourage them. The Envoy said that at present it was the custom for the Atalik Ghazee to proclaim at a stated time, generally about the month of June, that the routes are open and that traders are at liberty to leave Yarkund. Of this general permission traders are allowed to avail themselves according to their convenience until the routes are again declared to be closed. When, however, the provisions of the

Treaty should be discussed at Yarkund, the Envoy saw no objection to proposals being made with the view of securing British traders liberty to leave the country at any time, provided of course that they should be prohibited from following any route leading through a part of the country that might happen to be in a disturbed condition.

VIII.—As regards exaction of illegal dues on the road, the Envoy said such practices were not permitted, although of course robberies and thefts might occur. The Atalik Ghazee, while doing his best to prevent such things, could not guarantee traders against them, but they would be entitled to the same protection as Yarkund subjects.

IX.—All English travellers, the Envoy said, should be provided with passports certifying to their nationality. Such passports were unnecessary in the case of Native British subjects, though it would be of advantage to them also to be similarly provided.

X.—*Application of Treaty to Native Indian States.*—The position of the British Government towards its feudatory Chiefs was explained to the Envoy, and it was pointed out to him that the provisions of any Treaty that might be concluded would apply equally to subjects of all Native States owing allegiance to the British Government, and that therefore it was both unnecessary and inexpedient that separate treaties or engagements should be concluded with the Rulers of such States. The Envoy replied that he quite understood the position of the British Government towards its feudatories, and that the subjects of Native States would be admitted on precisely the same footing as British subjects, and the Native States would not be permitted to make separate terms.

XI.—*British Representative at Yarkund.*—The Envoy said that full liberty would be given to the British Government to appoint a Representative at the Court of the Ruler of Yarkund, with deputies subordinate to him, at such places as might be thought proper. The Representative at Yarkund would have diplomatic powers and might be called a "*Sufeer*," his deputies being styled "*Naib Sufeer*."

XII.—*Exportation of arms and ammunition from India to Yarkund.*—In conclusion, the Envoy requested that in the proposed treaty a clause should be entered permitting the Yarkund Representative in India to purchase a certain quantity of cartridges, and if necessary of arms, annually for exportation to Yarkund. The Secretary replied that he was unprovided with instructions on this point, but after taking the orders of His Excellency the Viceroy would communicate further on the subject.

With regard to the last request preferred by the Envoy, it was subsequently suggested to him by the Foreign Secretary, at a personal interview on the 13th March, that a general clause should be included in the treaty providing that subjects of Yarkund should be freely permitted to make purchases in the markets of India, subject only to the same conditions as would be applicable to British subjects. The Envoy expressed himself as quite satisfied with the proposed provision.

[*K.-W. Pros., Secret, March 1873, Nos. 220-233.*]

211. The Secretary of State informed of the result of the conferences with the Yarkund Envoy.—Copies of the memoranda of the conversations noted above were forwarded on the 14th March 1873 to the Secretary of State, who had been informed on the preceding day by telegraph that the Yarkund Envoy's object was to establish open and acknowledged relations of friendship by the negotiation of a commercial treaty and the deputation of a return Mission to Yarkund: the Envoy was going to Constantinople: the details of the treaty were to be considered during his absence, and on his return the Viceroy proposed to send a Mission with him and to give

full powers for the conclusion of a treaty of commerce: arrangements would also probably be made for a permanent British Agent at Yarkund and a Yarkund Agent in India.

[*Secret, March 1873, No. 231.*]

212. **Departure of the Envoy.** Payment of his passage to Suez.—Syud Yakoob Khan Torah, the Envoy from Yarkund, left Calcutta for Bombay on the 14th March 1873 *en route* to Constantinople. At Bombay a question arose as to whether Government should pay his passage to Suez, as had been done in the case of the Envoy from Kokand. After some discussion it was resolved that the passage should be paid, but on the 8th April 1873 the Bombay Government were instructed that—

“free passages should not in future be granted to Foreign Representatives beyond Indian limits, except under very exceptional circumstances and with the special sanction of the Government of India.”

[*Secret, March 1873, Nos. 220-33, Political A., April 1873, Nos. 122-26.*]

213. **Reception of the Envoy from Yarkund in Egypt and at Constantinople.**—The Envoy reached Egypt towards the end of April 1873, bearing a letter of recommendation to the British Consul General from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India. Colonel Stanton informed the Egyptian Government of the Envoy's arrival, and requested that the facilities usually extended to travellers of distinction might be accorded to him. In compliance with this request, orders were at once given by the Khedive that a special train should be placed at the disposal of Yakoob Khan to convey him from Ismailia, where he was waiting, to Cairo, and that a palace should be prepared for his residence whilst in Egypt. The reception given to the Envoy by the Khedive was most courteous.

The journey was then continued to Constantinople, where Syud Yakoob Khan arrived on the 12th May 1873. Her Majesty's Ambassador having, as requested by the Viceroy of India, notified the Envoy's arrival to the Porte and suggested that he should be suitably received, he was conveyed with his suite to a house previously prepared for him. And on the 15th May 1873 the following telegram was sent from the Foreign Office in England to the British Ambassador at Constantinople:—

“Show every attention to the Envoy of Atalik Ghazee of Yarkund during his visit to Constantinople. The ostensible and perhaps the sole object of his visit is complimentary in return for the presents made by the Sultan, and also to obtain the formal sanction of the Sultan to the establishment of friendly relations with the British Government. But it will be well to ascertain what passes with the Porte or Russian Ambassador. You will acquaint Viceroy of India with everything of interest that you may hear, as well as Her Majesty's Government. The Envoy will return to India to negotiate there a Treaty for intercourse between the Viceregal Government and Atalik Ghazee.”

[*Secret, January 1874, Nos. 77-107-80 and 78.*]

214. **Measures taken by the Government of India in preparation for a Mission to Yarkund.**—As will be seen from the sequel, the Yarkund Envoy remained three months in Turkey. But before noting such information as we have in respect to his doings there, it will be well to show the steps taken by the Government of India in furtherance of the professed objects of the Mission.

On the 12th February 1873 the Secretary of State had already telegraphed asking whether any communications were going on or in prospect with the Atalik Ghazee in view to commercial intercourse with Eastern Turkestan, and the Viceroy had replied that no negotiations were at that time contemplated,

but that the question might be raised on the arrival of the Envoy, who was shortly expected in Calcutta. The issue of the conferences with the Envoy has been previously mentioned on pages 154 to 162. The attention of the Secretary of State was drawn on the 8th May 1873 to the propriety of inviting suggestions with reference to the commercial and scientific objects of the Mission from the Royal Geographical and other Societies in England, and from such commercial corporations as it might be deemed advisable to consult. And by letters of the 6th idem the Chambers of Commerce at Calcutta and Bombay were informed that Government contemplated the despatch of a mission to Yarkund with the object of concluding a Commercial Treaty with the Atalik Ghazee. Government requested the favor of any suggestions or remarks as to the development of trade with Yarkund, more especially in regard to the conditions on the subject of trade which should form the subject of negotiation with the Yarkund Government.

[*Political A.*, February 1873, Nos. 206-207; *Secret*, May 1873, Nos. 56-57.]

215. Suggestions of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce regarding trade and Commercial Treaty with Yarkund.—The reply of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce was written on the 31st May 1873. The Chamber observed that the trade between India and Yarkund had been somewhat insignificant—scarcely amounting in value to three or four lakhs a year. But the physical and other obstacles existing were so great, that it was almost a marvel there should be any trade at all; and only a people thoroughly imbued with a passion for trading could have carried it on in the face of so many difficulties and dangers. There were two serious obstacles in the way of a development of trade between the two countries namely—

- (1) The want of good means of communication;
- (2) The heavy transit dues which were levied.

As regards the transit dues, the Chamber remarked that the heaviest appeared to be levied in Cashmere, where the exactions had long been a source of the most serious complaint by those concerned in the Central Asian trade.

The suggestions of the Chamber in respect to the proposed Commercial Treaty were—

- (1) That if Government could not secure entire freedom for goods exported from India to Yarkund, the duties levied should at any rate be light, and should be levied with as little trouble and annoyance to traders as possible;
- (2) That no duty should be levied in India on imports from Yarkund.

The Government of India in its reply to the Bombay Chamber of Commerce dated 24th June 1873 pointed out the mistake of fact into which the Chamber had fallen regarding the levy of transit duties in Cashmere. Attention was drawn to the 8th Article* of the Treaty concluded with the Maharaja of Cashmere on the 2nd April 1870 by which His Highness agreed to levy no duties on goods for the Turkestan market taken in bulk through his territories.

In respect to communications between India and Yarkund the Government of the Punjab was informed that after Mr. R. B. Shaw's arrival at Leh he should be directed to submit a special report on the subject of the route to Yarkund as far as that town, showing what have been done, and what still remained to be done, to render the route practicable for traders. Mr. Forsyth,

* "Article 8.—The Maharaja agrees to levy no transit duty whatever on the aforesaid free highway; and the Maharaja further agrees to abolish all transit duties levied within his territories on goods transmitted in bond through His Highness' territories from Eastern Turkestan to India, and *vice versa*, on which bulk may not be broken within the territories of His Highness. On goods imported into or exported from His Highness' territory, whether by the aforesaid free highway or any other route, the Maharaja may levy such import or export duties as he may think fit."

to whom the conduct of the Mission was about to be entrusted, received instructions to submit a special report, at leisure after his arrival in Yarkund, on the state of the trade routes to that country, with suggestions for their improvement, and with special regard to the means by which the road over the Karakorum Pass might be made fairly practicable for traders.

[*Secret, June 1873, Nos. 133-136.*]

216. Advice of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce in respect to trade with Yarkund.—The reply of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce was not received until July 1873. The Chamber advised (1st) that all traffic from Calcutta to Yarkund should be as much as possible untrammelled by intermediate duties, and that the levy of a moderate rate at the place of consumption should be the maximum amount of duty for the purpose of local customs revenue; (2nd) that it would be extremely desirable to procure a collection of the various fabrics worn by the people of Yarkund, a general description of the merchandise which they consume, a statement of prices ordinarily ruling, and any information that might lead to the markets of that country being supplied with their requirements from Calcutta. In forwarding a copy of this letter to Mr. Forsyth he was asked to give effect to the suggestion regarding the collection of patterns and ascertainment of the ruling prices. The Chamber were thanked for their remarks, and told that it was hoped that an *ad valorem* export duty of 2½ per cent. levied once for all on the frontier would be agreed to by the Atalik Ghazee, although nothing definite could yet be said on the subject.

[*Secret, September 1873, Nos. 75-76.*]

217. Objects for scientific observation suggested by the Asiatic Society of Bengal.—To the Asiatic Society of Bengal the Government of India was indebted for a valuable paper on the subjects for scientific observation, to which the attention of members of the approaching Mission to Yarkund should be particularly directed. This memorandum will be found printed in Appendix IV.

218. Suggestions received from England. Remarks of the Bradford Chamber of Commerce on trade with Yarkund.—Besides the abovementioned papers which were communicated in India, the Government received from time to time the remarks of commercial corporations in England. Thus on the 12th February 1873 the Bradford Chamber of Commerce wrote to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs urging on Her Majesty's Government to seize the present opportunity of meeting the friendly overtures of the Atalik Ghazee. Apprehension was expressed that if this was not done, Russia, according to her invariable practice, would obtain for her produce from the independent Princes in Central Asia either the entire monopoly of trade or such exclusive privileges by means of differential rates as would virtually exclude that of other countries.

The Chamber subsequently addressed the Secretary of State for India on the 10th July 1873 pointing out the desirability of obtaining accurate information as to the number and condition of the population, the productions of the country, and the distribution of wealth. They continued thus:—

“ We ask for no special privileges, and believe that a most favored nation clause, not limited by time or conditions, should be the first Article in this, as in every other treaty with a friendly country. In fact, this Council believe that the best assurance of our future relations with Eastern Turkestan being placed upon a permanent footing will be found in a friendly co-operation with Russia, whose influence with the Ruler of the country is said to be very great, and whose commercial interests should be identical with ours.

“ Another condition should give the assurance that British subjects with their property shall be thoroughly protected from local exactions and vexations while residing or travelling in the country.

“ With regard to duties, it is recommended that they may be framed upon the model of the Chinese tariff, simple and with few categories, not exceeding $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. *ad valorem*, but reduced to specific rates, subject to revision after five years, if experience should then have shown them to be onerous. Strict stipulations will be required to prevent local impositions or squeezes, so that one payment of duties on the frontier may exempt from all further impositions.

“ A very useful guide for future commercial operations would be secured by the Mission obtaining a good account of the already existing fair at Palumpoor, of the class of men who meet there, and of the merchandise they are in the habit of supplying and demanding.

“ With reference to the special interests of this district, it would be extremely useful if large samples of the sheep's wool and goats' hair grown in the country could be sent here, with information as to quantity and price. A number of entire fleeces should be obtained sufficiently to test their value.

“ It would also be well to ascertain at what cost the coarse hairs, which were hitherto found to be mixed with the wool of that region, could be removed by native labor—a process which would greatly enhance its value in this market.

“ Silk waste is another article of great interest to this neighbourhood, and the fullest information would be acceptable. Samples of pierced cocoons (*viz.*, cocoons out of which the worm has made its exit), and also the waste made in winding the silk off the cocoons, with their prices, and a statement of the quantity obtainable, would be extremely useful.

“ A collection of patterns and samples of the articles used by the natives for male and female attire would be a very good guide for our manufacturers and merchants.

“ A small but very instructive collection of garments, principally of those worn by the upper classes in Turkestan, was exhibited by Mr. Shaw during his visit to Bradford, and it proved that many of our tissues already found their way into Central Asia through the medium of Russian traders, at a cost enormously increased by the land carriage and the great number of intermediate profits.

“ This Council therefore hope for a great increase of consumption of our tissues of wool and of wool mixed with cotton or silk, when a better knowledge of the wants of the country shall have enabled our manufacturers to produce suitable articles, not only for the rich, but for all classes, and the cost of these articles to the natives shall have been materially reduced by direct communication, while the purchasing power of the country must necessarily be greatly augmented by its produce rising in value by the same means.”

[*Secret, May 1873, No. 64.*]

219. Opinions of the Manchester and Derby Chambers of Commerce on trade with Yarkund.—The Manchester Chamber of Commerce expressed a general concurrence in the proposal to send a Mission to Yarkund.

The Derby Chamber observed that the measures adopted for abolishing transit duties could not but fail of their full effect until the last step in the same path should have been taken, namely, the opening to British India of the Eastern Turkestan markets, for the sake of which they had all been undertaken. It was suggested that arrangements should be made, as soon as possible, with the Atalik Ghazee, whereby (1) proper securities and facilities might be obtained for the British trade in his dominions, providing also for the due representation of grievances and complaints, and (2) an engagement might be secured binding the Atalik not to increase the existing moderate duty of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. levied in Eastern Turkestan, or, if possible, to grant to England the advantages of the most favored nation.

[*Secret, May 1873, No. 70, June 1873, No. 87.*]

220. Organisation and estimated cost of the Mission in the summer of 1873.—In the mid-summer of 1873 steps were taken to organise

the Mission. Mr. T. D. Forsyth, C.B., was appointed leader, and under him were the following officers:—

Lieutenant-Colonel T. E. Gordon, Bengal Staff Corps, 2nd in command of the Mission.

Dr. H. W. Bellew, C.S.I., Bengal Medical Department.

Captain E. F. Chapman, R. A.

Captain H. Trotter, R.E.

Captain J. Biddulph, 19th Hussars, Aide-de-Camp to the Viceroy.

Dr. F. Stoliczka.

With the exception of Mr. Forsyth, it was decided that the officers composing the Mission should receive, from the date on which orders were issued formally constituting the Mission, an addition of 20 per cent. to the total salaries then drawn by them. Mr. Forsyth's pay was fixed at Rupees 3,125 per mensem, *i. e.*, his pay proper as a Commissioner, *plus* 25 per cent. These rates were exclusive of *bonâ fide* travelling expenses, which were defrayed by the Government of India. The total cost of the Mission for a period of 15 months was estimated at Rupees 2,69,703.

[*Secret, Gazette Notification No. 2033 P., dated 5th September 1873, also Pros. Political B., June 1873, Nos. 27-28.*]

221. Credentials given to Mr. Forsyth as leader of the Mission to Yarkund. Letter from the Viceroy to the Atalik Ghazee.— The text of the credentials which Mr. Forsyth took with him is subjoined:—

“From His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, to His Highness Atalik Ghazee Yakoob Khan, Ruler of Yarkund, dated 18th August 1873.

“By the hands of your Envoy and Plenipotentiary, Syud Yakoob Khan Torah, I have forwarded a reply to Your Highness' friendly letter of 30th Shaban 1289H., corresponding with 5th October 1872, in which I have informed Your Highness that on the request preferred by Syud Yakoob Khan on Your Highness' behalf I had deputed Thomas Douglas Forsyth, Esq., Companion of the Most Hon'ble Order of the Bath, as my Envoy and Plenipotentiary, with a Staff of six European Officers, to Your Highness' Court.

“Mr. Forsyth is the bearer of this letter, which he will deliver to Your Highness in person. Whatever representations Mr. Forsyth may make, consider as coming from myself.

“I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for Your Highness.”

The following letter was also written on the same date in reply to the letter from the Atalik which had been brought by the Yarkund Envoy. The Viceroy's reply was sent to its destination by the hands of Syud Yakoob Khan Torah on his return from Constantinople:—

“The Envoy and Plenipotentiary, Syud Yakoob Khan Torah, deputed to me by Your Highness, reached Calcutta in the month of February last, and I had the pleasure of receiving from his hands your friendly letter of 30th Shaban 1289H., informing me that peace now reigns throughout Your Highness' dominions, and requesting me to consider as coming from yourself whatever the Envoy might propose for the strengthening of the edifices of union and friendship.

“I congratulate Your Highness very sincerely on the extinction of the flames of sedition and rebellion throughout your entire dominions. May the peace which, through the blessing of God, has been happily restored continue unbroken either by rebels within or by enemies from without! It is the wish of my heart that you may long be spared to rule over a loyal and contented people, and that the prosperity of your dominions may be increased. The friendly messages brought to me by Syud Yakoob Khan Torah have been a source of much satisfaction. In compliance with the request preferred by him on Your Highness' behalf I have deputed Thomas Douglas Forsyth, Esq., Companion of the Most Hon'ble Order of the Bath, an Officer high in the service of this Government, as my Envoy and Plenipotentiary, with a Staff of six European Officers, to Your Highness' Court. He will communicate to Your Highness certain proposals for strengthening the ties of friendship and promoting neighbourly intercourse. Whatever Mr Forsyth may represent, consider as coming from myself.

"Mr. Forsyth is also the bearer of a Royal letter from Her Majesty the Queen of England and Empress of Hindostan in reply to Your Highness' letter of September 1871.

"I forward for Your Highness' acceptance some specimens of European arts and manufactures. I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for Your Highness.

[*Secret, January 1874, Nos. 69 and 70.*]

222. Instructions given to Mr. Forsyth on the 18th August 1873 relating to the conduct of the Yarkund Mission.—At the same time Mr. Forsyth received instructions for the guidance of his conduct as leader of the Mission. He was given a copy of memoranda of the conversations with Syud Yakooob Khan Torah, and a rough draft of a Treaty indicating generally the nature of the arrangements which the Government of India would desire to see established, but full discretion was allowed to modify the draft both in language and terms in such way as might be found necessary to secure the main objects which the British Government had in view. The letter then continued :—

"It is important that the maximum import duty to be levied in Yarkund on British goods should be limited to 2½ per cent., and that the Treaty should contain the usual most favored nation clause. The Envoy considered that there would be no objection to discuss the proposal that British goods generally, or goods of a certain class, should be admitted into Yarkund duty-free. His Excellency in Council does not entertain much hope of your being able to secure this. You are, however, authorised to broach the question, and if the Atalik Ghazee agrees to the proposal, provision should be made for it in the Treaty, and for the admission into British India on similar terms of Yarkund goods imported over the Himalayan passes. The limitation in regard to the route of importation is necessary to prevent claims being raised by other nations with whom the British Government has Commercial Treaties to import goods on the same terms by sea or by routes to which different conditions apply.

"You should also endeavour to secure a provision that British goods destined for countries beyond Yarkund, and not breaking bulk in Yarkund territory, should be allowed to pass duty-free. This point, however, is one which you should not press if any marked reluctance to it be exhibited on the part of the Yarkund Government, nor should you allow it in any way to interfere with the main objects of your Mission, which are to facilitate the extension of trade and commerce with Yarkund, to arrange for the proper protection of traders, the due representation of grievances and complaints, and the levy of such duties as may be agreed upon with as little trouble and annoyance to merchants as possible.

"Another matter of importance to which your special attention is invited is the advantage of securing for traders liberty to leave the dominions of the Atalik Ghazee at any time and by any route. The restrictions at present placed on the departure of merchants from Yarkund are very discouraging, and His Excellency in Council trusts that you will be able to get them removed. The point, however, is not of such importance as to justify the sacrifice of the other points of the Treaty for it.

"If the Atalik Ghazee agrees to the appointment of a British Representative at his Court, and you are satisfied that the state of the country is such that a European Officer could remain there without undue risk, and if the Atalik Ghazee should be willing to guarantee his protection, you should at once summon Mr. Shaw, now Joint Commissioner at Leh, whom His Excellency the Viceroy has selected for the appointment, and instal him in his office before you leave Yarkund.

"You should carefully explain to the Atalik Ghazee the nature of the arrangements recently made with the Maharaja of Cashmere for the development and protection of trade with Yarkund, and you should inform His Highness that for the furtherance of these objects it is the intention of His Excellency in Council that the Officer who is now stationed at Leh during the summer months shall be kept there all the year round. The provisions of the Treaty which you are authorised to conclude will apply to Cashmere and to other protected States in India, and no separate terms in regard to them are needed.

"Your party is a large one, and the provision for it involves considerable expense. It is the wish of His Excellency in Council that as few charges as possible on account of the Mission should be thrown on the Atalik Ghazee and his officers. Whatever hospitality the custom of the country requires to be shown to you, must of course be courteously accepted, but, as far as may be consistent with a due observance of the social and official etiquette of the countries you visit, the Mission should be self-supporting.

"His Excellency in Council has been informed by the Atalik Ghazee that peace at present prevails throughout his dominions, and there is therefore every reason to believe that the Mission will not be subjected to any risks from external war or internal disturbances. Syud

Yakoob Khan moreover has intimated to His Excellency in Council that the Atalik Ghazee would guarantee the safety of any Envoy sent by the British Government to Yarkund. You should therefore inform the Envoy who accompanies you from the time you cross the Yarkund frontier that you place yourself and your whole party under the Atalik Ghazee's protection. Should circumstances arise requiring more than ordinary precautions, you should apply formally to the Yarkund Government for such protection as the circumstances of the case may require. Whether you should under such circumstances continue in Yarkund or return to British territory is a matter which must be left to your discretion. Everything will depend on the nature of the case and the risks the Mission will run by remaining. No general instructions to provide for such contingencies can be given, and His Excellency in Council has every confidence that you will exercise with wisdom the discretion vested in you. You will, however, be particularly careful in no way to mix yourself up in the internal politics of Yarkund. Should the Atalik Ghazee ask your private advice as a friend in regard to such matters, you are at liberty to give it; but you are on no account to volunteer such advice, or to give it on the part of the British Government.

"Should the Atalik Ghazee consult you in regard to his relations with Russia, you should repeat to him the language held by His Excellency the Viceroy to the Envoy in Calcutta, that the conclusion of the Commercial Treaty with Russia is a satisfactory arrangement; that the best guarantee for the peace and safety of Yarkund lies in the cultivation of trade and peaceful intercourse with its powerful neighbour; and that the Atalik Ghazee should endeavour as far as possible to avoid all cause of quarrel with, or interference in the affairs of, countries beyond his own frontier. If you think it advisable, you are further at liberty to inform him of the statement made by Prince Gortschakoff as reported in Sir A. Buchanan's letter to Lord Clarendon of 2nd November 1869, *viz.*, that 'the Atalik Ghazee has nothing to fear from Russia, and that Russia has no hostile intentions towards him, or any desire to make conquests in his territories.' You will however, as far as you can, endeavour to avoid being drawn into any discussion regarding the relations between Russia and Yarkund. At the same time it would be desirable to ascertain the object with which the Envoy, who is reported now to be in St. Petersburg, has been despatched. It is left to your discretion to make enquiries on the subject.

"His Excellency in Council particularly desires that you will endeavour to obtain, with the Atalik Ghazee's permission, the fullest and most accurate information regarding the actual boundaries of the whole of the Atalik Ghazee's dominions, the state of affairs in the north-east provinces of Yarkund, and the territories bordering thereon, more especially the Ili Valley. Any officer of your Staff who may for this or other purposes be deputed on detached service or on survey duty or work of that kind should be accompanied by a responsible officer of the Atalik Ghazee, by whose advice he should be guided in his proceedings.

"It is possible that the Atalik Ghazee may prefer a request that some understanding should be come to between England and Russia in regard to his boundaries, similar to the arrangements regarding the northern boundaries of Afghanistan. Any such suggestion must not be originated by you. Should the Atalik Ghazee, however, prefer any specific request of this kind, you may inform him that you will represent the request to the Viceroy.

"In proceeding to Yarkund it is desirable that you should take the Karakoram route, deputing the officers of your Staff to make explorations of other routes if you think proper. If the country is undisturbed, and circumstances are in your judgment favorable for the exploration of the route by the Pameer and Budukshan, you should communicate with the Atalik Ghazee, and ascertain whether there is any objection to your returning to India by that route, and whether the Mission can traverse that part of the country without undue risk. If necessary also you should, with the Atalik Ghazee's permission, communicate with the local Chiefs with a view to your protection on the way. After such enquiries if you think it desirable that you should take the route by the Pameer and Budukshan you should report your views to Government and await instructions, unless you have in the meantime received official information that arrangements for your journey through Budukshan have been made with the Ameer of Cabul. If that route be decided on, you will of course procure all the information you can bearing on the various unsettled questions of geographical and scientific interest relating to the Pameer, and also regarding the boundaries of Yarkund and Afghanistan in that direction, the strategical value of the Sirikol territory, &c., and you will take the opportunity to inspect and report specially upon the recently settled boundary of Afghanistan to the north. You will be careful not to enter any territories either under the direct government of or owing allegiance to Russia without the permission of the local Russian authorities."

A resolution summing up the main facts of the negotiations and explaining the objects of the Mission was written on the 18th September 1873 and sent to the Secretary of State on the 23rd idem.

[*Secret, January 1874, Nos. 71 and 75.*]

It will be observed that while the Mission was to proceed to Yarkund by the Karakorum pass, a suggestion had been thrown out that it should return

to India *viâ* the Pameer and Budukshan. The object was mainly geographical, to clear away the uncertainty prevailing as to the country between the frontiers of the Kashgarian and Afghan territories. A collection of papers on this subject is printed in Appendix V.

223. Treaty with Yarkund drafted. Arrangements proposed for mutual observance of excise and municipal regulations.—The draft of the proposed Commercial Treaty with Yarkund as framed in communication with the Legislative Department will be found in Appendix VI. In regard to Article IV on the subject of the import of goods from Yarkund and the sale of them in British territory some discussion had arisen.

It was originally proposed that in return for the concessions to be made by the Atalik no duty other than the usual octroi duties should be levied on goods imported into British India from Kashgar territory over the Himalaya mountains. But there were objections to this course, because under the regulations prescribed in the Punjab no person is allowed to deal in *churrus* except the authorised contractors, who purchase the monopoly annually from Government and to whom alone importers must dispose of their *churrus*. If therefore this system were maintained, the traders would only be able to realise such prices as the contractors chose to give; and in the face of such restrictions it was apprehended that it would be very difficult to obtain any concessions of importance from the Yarkund Government. With the view of obviating this difficulty the Punjab Government were asked if a system of licenses could be substituted in the Punjab for the present farming system, and if so, whether it would be practicable to impose an import duty on *churrus*, leaving the importers to make their own terms with the licensed vendors. Meanwhile before the receipt of a reply from the Punjab Government the question ceased to have much importance. A draft clause (noted at foot) providing for reciprocal observance of excise and municipal regulations and duties had been framed and forwarded to Mr. Forsyth, and the only thing therefore needed was the improvement in British territory of the arrangements regarding the passes granted to traders in the drug.

The Government of India finally expressed approval of the following proposals, which had been recommended by Mr. Melvill, Commissioner and Superintendent of Jullundur:—

- (1.) That the existing system of monopoly of the sale of *churrus* should be maintained.
- (2.) That with reference to the existing system of passes for *churrus* measures should be taken to prevent merchants from being compelled to renew their passes in each district through which they journey.
- (3.) That passes should in future be granted to enable traders to traverse districts or large tracts of country during a period of six months from the date of the pass and sell any portion of the *churrus* at any district, head-quarters, or tehsil station within the specified tracts.
- (4.) That the Joint Commissioner should be empowered to issue passes at Leh for the transport of *churrus*, which should be valid within British territory.

[*Secret, January 1874, Nos. 195-203.*]

Draft of Article IV. of Treaty between the British Government and the Atalik Ghazee of Yarkund.

"On goods imported into British India from the territories of the Atalik Ghazee by any route over the Himalayan passes which lie to the south of His Highness' dominions the British Government engages to levy no import duties. On goods imported from India into the territories of the Atalik Ghazee no import duty exceeding 2½ per cent. *ad-valorem* shall be levied. Goods imported as above into the dominions of the contracting parties may, subject only to such excise regulations and duties and to such municipal or town regulations and duties as may be applicable to such classes of goods generally, be freely sold by wholesale or retail and transported from one place to another within British India and within the dominions of the Atalik Ghazee respectively."

224. Progress of the Mission through Cashmere to Shahidulla. The camp joined by Syud Yakoob Khan Torah.—The successive stages of the progress of the Mission on their march to Yarkund may be passed over rapidly as a subject falling within the scope of the report by Sir Douglas Forsyth. Captain Biddulph, accompanied by Captain Trotter and Dr. Stoliczka, started from Murree on Tuesday the 15th July 1873 for Cashmere, the remainder of the party leaving on the 19th idem. Nothing of importance occurred during the march to Srinuggur. On Monday the 4th August the main party joined Captain Biddulph and his companions, and occupied themselves in making preparations for their onward journey, with the aid of the Cashmere officials. On Wednesday the 6th August Captain Biddulph and his party set out for Leh. On the 29th August Mr. Forsyth arrived at Srinuggur, and the party started for Leh on the 3rd September. Leh was reached on Saturday the 20th September. At Leh Mr. Forsyth received from the Dadkhwah of Yarkund a friendly reply to a letter which he had written announcing the approach of the Mission.

Ibrahim Khan, an Inspector of Police attached to the Mission, who had been sent on in advance, in forwarding the Dadkhwah's letter from Shahidulla, reported that he had reached Yarkund on the 21st August and had been treated with great consideration by the Dadkhwah. He added that exaggerated reports had reached the Dadkhwah to the effect that a force of 4,000 men was accompanying the Mission.

At Leh a deputation of Yarkundee and Punjabee traders waited on Mr. Forsyth. The Yarkundee traders presented a petition praying—(1) that the caravans between Yarkund and Leh might be allowed to pass to and fro without let or hindrance, as the delay in granting passes at the former place caused great impediment to trade; and (2) that bonds and notes of hand given in one country might be valid in the other. The Punjab traders complained of the restrictions placed upon the sale of churrus.

[*Secret*, October 1873, No. 80.]

By the 17th October 1873 the Mission had reached Shahidulla. There they were met and entertained by the Yarkund officials; and Mr. Forsyth wrote to the Atalik Ghazee and the Dadkhwah announcing his arrival. On the 18th October the camp was rejoined by Captain Biddulph, who had been detached to explore the route from Leh to Shahidulla *via* Chang Chenmo and the Lingzi-Thung plain down the Karakosh valley. On the evening of the 23rd October the Yarkund Envoy Syud Yakoob Khan Torah arrived, and arrangements were immediately made for the onward march.

225. Excellent arrangements made by the Cashmere Officials. The Maharaja thanked, and Mr. Johnson's services rewarded.—Before giving an account of Syud Yakoob Khan's doings at Constantinople and of his return journey through India, it may be well to mention here that the arrangements made in Cashmere for furthering the progress of the mission were pronounced excellent by all concerned. The roads were found in good repair; the supplies abundant; and the Maharaja's officials most obliging and attentive. The two names especially mentioned by Mr. Forsyth were Mr. Johnson, Wazeer of Ladakh, and Mehta Shere Sing, on whom had fallen the heaviest part of the burden in providing carriage and laying out supplies in the sterile mountains between Leh and Karakosh. The good offices of the Maharaja of Cashmere were acknowledged in a letter written by the Viceroy to His Highness on the 24th November 1873. The Maharaja was informed of the gratification which his efforts to facilitate the journey of Mr. Forsyth and the Yarkund Envoy had afforded His Excellency; and it was added:—

“ It is to these arrangements made under Your Highness' direction that I mainly attribute the successful accomplishment by the Yarkund Mission of their arduous journey at a season of the year when considerable difficulties might otherwise have been anticipated.”

To this letter the Maharaja sent a courteous and friendly reply.

It was also thought proper to present Mr. Johnson, Joint Commissioner at Ladakh, with some suitable reward in return for his useful exertions. The Maharaja of Cashmere, who was in the first instance consulted, raised no objections, and a rifle was accordingly presented to Mr. Johnson. He received a gift of Rupees 5,000 from the Government of India.

[*Secret, January 1874, Nos. 78, 176, 179, 181, 182.*]

226. Proceedings of Syud Yakoob Khan Torah while at Constantinople.—It has been said above that Syud Yakoob Khan Torah, Envoy from Yarkund, joined the camp of the British officers on the 23rd October 1873. But it was not without much trouble that he was induced to leave Constantinople in sufficient time to admit of his travelling with the Mission. Regarding the negotiations which took place in Turkey some information has been recorded. In a letter written by the British Ambassador at Constantinople to the English Foreign Office on the 20th May 1873 it is said :—

“The Grand Vizier told me yesterday that he had a visit from Syud Yakoob Khan, the Envoy of the Atalik Ghazee of Yarkund, who had not upon that occasion done more than convey complimentary messages to the Sultan and expressions of respect to the head of the Mahomedan religion.

“His Highness was still ignorant of any further negotiations which might be in view, but he said he had already become aware that in certain quarters, alluding to the Russian Embassy, attempts were being made to inspire the Envoy with distrust of the Porte. He asked me if I was aware of the object of the Mission, and also what attitude it would be proper for the Porte to adopt so as to be agreeable to Her Majesty’s Government.

“I replied that I could not inform him what had been the motives of the Mission, but that His Highness’ object should be to satisfy the Yarkund Envoy of the cordiality of the relations existing between the Sultan’s Government and that of Her Majesty, and in letting him understand that the Sultan as Caliph sees with satisfaction everything tending to cultivate and improve the intercourse of the Mahomedans of the East with Her Majesty’s Indian Government.”

[*Secret, January 1874, No. 82.*]

227. The Envoy from Yarkund explains the object of his mission to the Ambassador at Constantinople.—On the 19th June 1873 Her Majesty’s Ambassador reported to the Government of India the proceedings of the Envoy up to that date. It was said :—

“He expresses himself as much gratified with the reception he has met at the hands of the Sultan’s Government, whom, according to Your Excellency’s desire, I had requested to listen favorably to his proposals.

“He called upon me as soon as he had been received by the Sultan, and I returned his visit a few days after, when he told me that his object in getting from the Sultan some mark of interest in his country had been fully attained, and that it was agreed that the Atalik Ghazee should hoist the Ottoman flag together with his own.

“In reply to my question whether this was intended to imply any political subjection to the Sultan, or was merely a formal recognition of His Majesty as the Caliph of the Mussulmans, he said it was solely to be looked upon in the latter light and as the sign of a spiritual, but not material, superiority.

“He had, he said, been encouraged by the Porte to cultivate the closest relations with Her Majesty’s Indian Government, and to conclude a convention with them with that object.

“He had, on the other hand, been warned by the Russian Ambassador against putting too much trust in us, for as the only danger which threatened his country came from the side of India, he would best secure its interests by leaning upon the support of the Emperor.

“He did not at first call upon the Russian Ambassador, and had not intended to do so, but His Excellency having heard of his having paid me a visit, and having commented on his neglect to do so to himself, the Grand Vizier had recommended him to repair the omission.

“This was confirmed to me by the Grand Vizier, but of the warning against reposing too much confidence in Your Lordship I can say nothing but what Yakoob Khan told me.”

[*Secret, July 1873, No. 123.*]

228. Efforts made at Constantinople to elicit from the Yarkund Envoy the issue of his negotiations with the Porte.— Before the departure of the Yarkund Envoy from Constantinople Sir H. Elliot requested M. Pisani, the 1st Dragoman of Her Majesty's Embassy, to ascertain from Syud Yakoob Khan what recognition had been made of the authority of the Sultan on the part of the Atalik Ghazee, and whether Yakoob Khan was satisfied that the Porte regarded with pleasure the friendly terms he was on with the British Government. M. Pisani was also directed to enquire if the Russian Embassy had been occupying itself about the Mission. The following was M. Pisani's report :—

"In pursuance of Your Excellency's instruction of this day's date I called on the Yarkund Envoy, presented him your compliments, and wished him a prosperous journey. Having asked him when he expected to reach Bombay, he replied that if he do not meet with any impediments on his way, he hopes to be there in three weeks.

"I endeavoured to ascertain what recognition of the authority of the Sultan he was engaged to make on the part of Atalik Ghazee, and whether he goes back satisfied that the Porte sees with pleasure that he is on good terms with Great Britain.

"With reference to the first question, he replied that what he said to the Sultan was merely that both his master and the nation recognised His Majesty as their Caliph and, as true believers, were submitted to his spiritual authority. As to the second question, he observed that, according to what he could elicit from his various interviews with the Grand Vizier and other Ministers, the Porte seems to approve of their intercourse with Great Britain, and His Highness repeatedly advised him to draw closer if possible their relations with her, and cultivate their amity and good dispositions.

"Yakoob Khan then informed me that, besides the "Onnanieh," sabre, &c., the Sultan had been pleased to send by him to Atalik Ghazee two hundred breech-loading rifles, as also three rifle breech-loading cannons. Two officers of the Turkish army have been appointed to proceed to Kashgar for the purpose of drilling the troops of Atalik Ghazee, and will leave to-day with the Envoy. Upon the whole he seems satisfied, and considers his mission as a successful one.

"Having enquired if the Russian Embassy has latterly been occupying itself about him, he acquainted me that it exerted itself to the utmost to find out the real object of his mission through an Italian Doctor whom he suspects to be a Russian spy, but he had been very cautious not to let anything transpire. Yakoob Khan expressed regret that he was not able to come and pay his respects to Your Lordship."

[*Pros., Secret, January 1874, No. 107.*]

229. The Yarkund Envoy leaves Constantinople on 13th August 1873, bearing a letter from the Sultan to the Atalik Ghazee.—In the meantime every effort was being made to induce the Envoy to set out upon his return journey to India. Frequent telegrams were sent pressing upon him the necessity of returning as soon as possible, but without effect. The delay was caused, partly by difficulty in getting ready the presents to be sent by the Sultan to the Atalik Ghazee, and partly by the Sultan's usual dilatoriness in signing the letter prepared for the Atalik. It was feared that the delay might be disastrous to the Mission, and on the 28th July 1873 the following telegram was despatched by His Excellency the Viceroy to Sir Henry Elliot :—

"Inform Yarkund Envoy that unless I hear of his having started at once preparations for Mission will be stopped. Preparations were commenced at his request, and serious responsibility will be incurred by further delay. Do all you can to get him to start. Matter now becoming very serious."

The Envoy at last left Constantinople on the 13th August for Bombay, having received from the Porte £1,000 for the expense of his journey. A free passage to Alexandria was also provided for him. Besides the personal presents of which he was the bearer, Syud Yakoob Khan took with him from Constantinople a few small mountain guns, 200 breech-loading rifles, and 400 ordinary muzzle-loaders. He carried an autograph letter from the

Sultan to the Atalik Ghazee, in which the latter was styled "Hookumdar," *i.e.*, Sovereign or Potentate of Kashgar. A list of the persons whom the Envoy brought back with him from Constantinople was furnished by Captain E. Molloy, and will be found in Appendix VII.

[*Secret, January 1874, Nos. 86, 90, 91, 106 and 170.*]

230. Journey of the Yarkund Envoy from Constantinople to Bombay, where he was met by Captain Molloy.—On the 18th August 1873 the Yarkund Envoy arrived at Alexandria upon his return journey to India, and Her Majesty's Acting Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, according to instructions received from the Government of India, informed him that the Viceroy was expecting him at Simla, and offered to do everything in his power to hasten the voyage. At Cairo the Envoy had a conversation with the Acting Consul Mr. Vivien, in the course of which he expressed the greatest dislike to, and suspicion of, Russia, and the most sincere friendship and esteem for England, whose history he had thoroughly studied. England, Turkey, and Egypt were the real friends of his country, and these sentiments were thoroughly shared by neighbouring States.

By the 12th September 1873 the Envoy was in Bombay, where he was met by Captain Molloy, especially deputed for that purpose. Captain Molloy, who was Adjutant of the 6th Goorkha Regiment, received a deputation allowance of Rupees 10 per diem in addition to his military pay and allowances and his actual travelling expenses.

[*Vide Resolution No. 2238P., dated 20th September 1873; also Secret, October 1873, No. 70, and January 1874, Nos. 104-114.*]

231. Owing to the lateness of the season the Envoy was unable to visit Simla on his return journey.—As soon as the Envoy's arrival was reported, a letter was written to him congratulating him upon his return to India, but stating that, as the season was so far advanced, difficulty and possible danger might be anticipated to himself and the British Mission if any further delay in his journey back to Yarkund were suffered to take place. Under these circumstances the Viceroy expressed his regret that he was unable to have the pleasure of seeing the Envoy at Simla. To this Syud Yakoob Khan sent a friendly reply regretting that he had not the chance of seeing the Viceroy. He hoped Mr. Forsyth had been told to do everything after mature consideration and not in haste; and added:—

"In Constantinople I described the good understanding existing between the British Government and that of ours in such glowing terms as have led the Government of Constantinople to believe the countries between the west of Kashgar and London to be within one and the same border, and to consider the Governments to be one and the same."

[*Secret, January 1874, No. 138.*]

232. The Yarkund Envoy arrives at Umballa on 16th September 1873. Conversation between him and the Foreign Secretary regarding his visit to Turkey.—Syud Yakoob Khan rapidly continuing his journey arrived in Umballa on the night of the 16th September 1873. There he was met by the Foreign Secretary, who had been deputed to deliver to him a letter to the Atalik Ghazee, and to inform him of the arrangements made for the despatch of a British Mission to accompany him to Yarkund, and to express to him the Viceroy's hope that his visit to India would result in the strengthening of the friendship so happily established between the two countries and in the promotion of commercial intercourse.

The conversation which took place at Umballa is thus described in a demi-official letter from the Foreign Secretary to Mr. Forsyth:—

“The *main* thing is that the Envoy was immensely pleased with all that had been done for him, and he attributed all his success at Constantinople to our influence and good offices, and rightly so. Had it not been for our communications to Sir H. Elliot, both direct and through the Foreign Office, the Envoy would have had difficulty in attaining his object and might have been kicking his heels now at Istamboul. He did not at all take amiss our pushing him on so fast; indeed he seemed to be eager to overtake you and ready to push on at any inconvenience to himself, provided only he were sure of his heavy baggage. I relieved his mind on this score by telegraphing to Egypt to our Consul-General, and before the Envoy left Murree I was able to inform him that everything had left Suez except some kegs of gunpowder which no ship can be got to carry. The bulk of the packages reached Bombay on the 4th, and were sent on at once with his servants, and the Bombay Government have instructions to clear and forward the remainder as soon as they arrive.

“The Envoy gave me a long account of the attempt of the Russian Minister at Constantinople to poison his mind against us. He told him we were an unreliable and ambitious people, and that our proposals about trade were only pretexts to cover the advance of our armies; that we should first open up trade routes, then establish telegraphs, and then would come the final end of Yarkund independence. The Envoy replied that he did not believe it; that the British Government had been a friend of the Atalik for ten years; that there was nothing his master desired so much as extension of trade, &c., &c. He then said:—

“When I was coming through India I told the Governor-General of the treaty we had concluded with you. The Governor-General approved of it and said it was a very good thing, and advised me to cultivate trade and friendship with Russia. In India I heard nothing but good-will expressed by the English towards Russia. Why then do you try to poison my ear against them?”

“Thereupon, said the Envoy to me, Ignatieff ‘*Khamoosh mand*’ (became silent)! The Russians then endeavoured to get him to change his route and return by Russia, promising him all sorts of help and convenience for the journey; but the Envoy was not to be tempted, and replied that he must return *via* India as he could not appear before the Atalik Ghazee without the Viceroy’s reply to the Atalik’s letter.

“His gratitude to us went beyond mere words. He expressed it in so many ways that I have no doubt of his sincerity, and when we parted he took both my hands in his and hoped I would never forget him and the interests of his country. In the course of conversation he spoke of his master’s desire that India, Yarkund, Persia, Turkey and England shall all be considered as one country. On that subject, however, I went no further than general expressions of friendship, &c.

“So far as I could judge, everything augurs well for the success of the Mission. I enclose translation of a letter he wrote in answer to one of welcome from the Viceroy. He seemed anxious that you should not press your negotiations too suddenly, but feel your way gradually. You will see he alludes to that in the letter.”

[*K. W., Secret, Jan. 1874, Nos. 77-107, and Secret Pros., Jan. 1874, Nos. 108 and 136-138.*]

233. Syud Yakoob Khan conducts the Mission from Shahidulla to Yarkund. His conversations with Mr. Forsyth.—Syud Yakoob Khan lost no time in proceeding to join the Mission. Mr. Forsyth entrusted him with the charge of the party at Shahidulla Khoja; and he conducted them safely to Yarkund, which was reached by Saturday the 8th November 1873. At Kashtak on the 2nd November Mr. Forsyth had received a letter of welcome from the Atalik. The reception at Yarkund was cordial. On the way from Shahidulla to Yarkund it was natural that Syud Yakoob Khan should have imparted to Mr. Forsyth what passed at Constantinople and given his views as to the future. A confidential memorandum of the conversations which took place will be found in Appendix VIII. It will be seen that General Ignatieff was said to have attempted to tamper with the Syud’s allegiance to his sovereign, and to have offered to aid him in getting possession of Budukshan and Cashmere. The other points to be specially noticed in the memorandum are: *first*, that the Syud complained of not being allowed to see Dewan Kripa Ram at Srinuggur, except in the presence of an English official; *second*, that the Maharaja of Cashmere was anxious that consideration should be given to the interests of his country in the approaching negotiations with the Atalik; *third*, that the Envoy doubted whether the Atalik would consent

to the residence of a British Officer as ambassador at Kashgar, mainly because the Russians would immediately demand the same concession; *fourth*, that the Syud approved highly of the plan that Mr. Forsyth should return to India *via* Budukshan, and professed himself glad of the opportunity to enter into friendly communication with Afghanistan.

234. Orders passed on the memorandum of Mr. Forsyth's conversation with the Envoy on the way to Yarkund.—The orders of the Government of India on the subject of the conversation referred to above were contained in letter to Mr. Forsyth No. 2948P., dated 27th December 1873.

Explanation as to the Envoy's private interview with Kripa Ram.—The facts regarding the Envoy's wish to have a private interview with Dewan Kripa Ram were explained by the following extract from a demi-official letter from Mr. LePoer Wynne, Officer on special duty in Cashmere, to the Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 4th October 1873:—

"The Envoy had expressed to Captain Molloy a strong desire to see Kripa Ram and question him as to what was really the policy of the Maharaja. I said there could be no objection, but that (not of course from any feeling of distrust) to prevent the mischievous rumours which a private interview would certainly create, it would be better that either Captain Molloy or I should be by. He replied that he quite understood my motive, which he said was kind and considerate, but that as Kripa Ram would certainly not speak openly if either of us were present, he hoped I would waive my objection to a private interview.

"I replied that in order to remove from his mind any possibility of a thought that there was distrust in mine, it should be as he wished, though I still foresaw ill consequences. He expressed himself very grateful, but three hours later sent for Molloy and said he had been thinking over my objections and appreciating their force, and had abandoned all wish for any interview at all."

Cashmere to share with other protected States in the advantages of the Treaty.—With regard to the interests of Cashmere, Mr. Forsyth was reminded that the provisions of the Treaty which he had been authorised to conclude would apply to Cashmere and the other protected States of India: and it was suggested that a suitable opportunity should be found of explaining to the Envoy that in respect to trade, protection, and the like the people of Cashmere would enjoy the advantages secured by the Treaty to the subjects of the British Government.

Residence of a British Officer in Yarkund.—On the subject of establishing a British Resident at Yarkund, Mr. Aitchison, the Foreign Secretary, wrote the subjoined remarks, dated 18th December 1873:—

"Mr. Forsyth should certainly not press for a European Representative at Yarkund. If Article VI of the Treaty be agreed to, and probably it will be, as it is reciprocal in its terms, the question of having a European Representative must depend on circumstances. Mr. Forsyth has been told in paragraph 9 of his instructions that *if* the Atalik Ghazee agrees to the appointment of a British Representative, and *if* Mr. Forsyth is satisfied that the state of the country is such that a European officer could remain there without undue risk, and *if* the Atalik Ghazee should be willing to guarantee his protection, Mr. Shaw may be summoned. It is only in the event of these *ifs* being satisfactorily solved that Mr. Shaw is to go up, and in discussing the question there will be abundant opportunity of testing the Atalik Ghazee's feelings on the subject. If he be opposed to a European officer and object to guarantee his protection, the subject may be dropped at once; and if the clause of the Treaty be secured in the general language in which it has been framed, or in something akin thereto, there is nothing to prevent a European being sent up as our Representative hereafter if circumstances prove favorable. A European would certainly be a greater security to the Atalik Ghazee himself than a Native, and the example would probably facilitate our having Europeans in Afghanistan. But however desirable it be from our point of view, Mr. Forsyth must be content with what he finds himself able under all the circumstances to obtain."

In accordance with the above suggestions Mr. Forsyth was informed that the residence of a European Resident at Yarkund was a point which should not be unduly pressed, and that if Article VI of the draft Treaty were accepted, the question whether the Representative of the British Government should be a European or a Native of India might be left for determination

thereafter according to circumstances. If the Atalik Ghazee should agree to the appointment of a British representative, and if Mr. Forsyth should be satisfied that the state of the country was such that a European officer could remain there without undue risk, and the Atalik Ghazee should be willing to guarantee his protection, on those conditions only was Mr. R. B. Shaw to be summoned.

Proposed return by Budukshan. The Envoy's schemes.—Finally Mr. Forsyth was told that there was little or no probability of his being able to return *via* Budukshan. This last subject will be noticed more fully hereafter: but it should here be observed that, as reported in a memorandum by Mr. Forsyth, dated 11th November 1873, one of Syud Yakoob Khan's objects in promoting the return journey through Budukshan was to take the opportunity of Mr. Forsyth's presence in Afghanistan to enter into friendly relations with the Ameer of Cabul. He said that the Atalik would undoubtedly receive in a friendly way an officer of the Cabul Government, supposing one was sent to arrange for Mr. Forsyth's return that way. He had frequently expressed his desire to bind all the Mahomedan Princes in one bond from Kashgar to Constantinople, and it would be part of his scheme to enter into close friendship with Afghanistan. It will be seen further on that this is a day-dream of the Syud at the present time.

[*Secret, January 1874, Nos. 165, 168, 210, 211, 212, 212A. and K.-W.*]

235. Departure of the Mission from Yarkund. Arrival at Kashgar. Change in the Atalik's title. Formal reception at Kashgar on the 11th December 1873.—Mr. Forsyth and his party remained at Yarkund until the 28th November 1873. Some trouble was caused by the attempts of evil-disposed persons, especially Bunyad Ali and Faiz Buksh, to excite a religious feeling against the Hindoos. There were also intriguing Cashmerees, headed by a man named Kassim Akoon, who did their best to complicate matters. But on the 4th December 1873 the officers of the Mission after a pleasant journey of a week from Yarkund reached Kashgar, and were cordially received by the Atalik Ghazee himself. It was arranged that the letters from the Queen and the Viceroy should be delivered on the 11th December 1873, and Syud Yakoob Khan had been careful to announce that his master had assumed the title of Ameer, and had exchanged that of Beg for Khan, so that thenceforth he would be addressed as Ameer Yakoob Khan. The name of the Sultan would be used in the Khutba, and coins would in future be struck with the name of Ameer Yakoob Khan on the face, and with that of the Sultan on the reverse. This change of title was recognised in letter from the Government of India, No. 512P., dated 24th February 1874. The formal reception of the British Envoy took place on the 11th December 1873 as arranged. The ceremonies observed on the occasion are recorded in the memorandum printed as Appendix IX.

[*Secret, February 1874, Nos. 102-107.*]

236. Draft Treaty presented to the Ameer on the 20th December 1873.—On the 20th December 1873 Mr. Forsyth again visited the Ameer, and presented to him the draft Commercial Treaty, which he received with the exclamation "*Mubarak.*" A short conversation ensued, Mr. Forsyth expatiating on the advantages of commerce, and the Ameer dwelling upon his friendship for the English:—

"I am a poor man," he said, "and I look to the English for everything. I am a Mahomedan and a man of few words, but I mean what I say. I place all my hopes in the English. I have perfect confidence in them, and feel secure in their friendship. I cannot say more than this."

[*Secret, March 1874, No. 92.*]

237. The Treaty with Yarkund not concluded by the Ameer until the 2nd February 1874.—Some time elapsed before the Commercial Treaty was concluded by the Ameer Yakoob Khan. As observed by Mr. Forsyth in his letter of the 9th January 1874, it was not the custom of this or any other Asiatic Ruler to appear to be in a hurry. Moreover it was believed that the Treaty had been sent to some of the Ameer's confidential courtiers, and probably to Mahomed Yoonas Dadkhwah of Yarkund. In the meantime the officers of the Mission occupied themselves in seeing as much as they could of the country, and observing the manners of the people. It was not until the 2nd of February 1874 that the Treaty was signed and sealed at Kashgar.

The following is the text of the Treaty as ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India on the 13th of April 1874:—

Text of the Treaty with Yarkund as concluded.

Treaty between the British Government and His Highness the Ameer Mahomed Yakoob Khan, Ruler of the territory of Kashgar and Yarkund, his heirs and successors, executed on the one part by Thomas Douglas Forsyth, C.B., in virtue of full powers conferred on him in that behalf by His Excellency the Right Hon'ble Thomas George Baring, Baron Northbrook of Stratton and a Baronet, Member of the Privy Council of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Grand Master of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council, and on the other part by Syud Yakoob Khan Torah, Member of the 1st Class of the Order of the Medjidie, and in virtue of full powers conferred on him by His Highness.

Whereas it is deemed desirable to confirm and strengthen the good understanding which now subsists between the high contracting parties, and to promote commercial intercourse between their respective subjects, the following Articles have been agreed upon:—

ARTICLE I.

The high contracting parties engage that the subjects of each shall be at liberty to enter, reside in, trade with, and pass with their merchandise and property into and through all parts of the dominions of the other, and shall enjoy in such dominions all the privileges and advantages which are or may be accorded to the subjects of such dominions, or to the subjects or citizens of the most favored nation.

ARTICLE II.

Merchants of whatever nationality shall be at liberty to pass from the territories of the one contracting party to the territories of the other with their merchandise and property at all times and by any route they please. No restrictions shall be placed by either contracting party upon such freedom of transit, unless for urgent political reasons to be previously communicated to the other; and such restriction shall be withdrawn as soon as the necessity for it is over.

ARTICLE III.

European British subjects entering the dominions of His Highness the Ameer for purposes of trade or otherwise must be provided with passports certifying to their nationality. Unless provided with such passports they shall not be deemed entitled to the benefit of this Treaty.

ARTICLE IV.

On goods imported into British India from territories of His Highness the Ameer by any route over the Himalayan Passes which lie to the south of His Highness' dominions the British Government engages to levy no import duties. On goods imported from India into the territories of His Highness the Ameer no import duty exceeding $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. *ad valorem* shall be levied. Goods

imported as above into the dominions of the contracting parties may, subject only to such excise regulations and duties and to such municipal or town regulations and duties as may be applicable to such classes of goods generally, be freely sold by wholesale or retail and transported from one place to another within British India and within the dominions of His Highness the Ameer respectively.

ARTICLE V.

Merchandise imported from India into the territories of His Highness the Ameer will not be opened for examination till arrival at the place of consignment. If any disputes should arise as to the value of such goods, the Customs Officer or other Officer acting on the part of His Highness the Ameer shall be entitled to demand part of the goods at the rate of one in forty in lieu of the payment of duty. If the aforesaid Officer should object to levy the duty by taking a portion of the goods, or if the goods should not admit of being so divided, then the point in dispute shall be referred to two competent persons, one chosen by the aforesaid Officer and the other by the importer, and a valuation of the goods shall be made; and if the referees shall differ in opinion, they shall appoint an arbitrator, whose decision shall be final, and the duty shall be levied according to the value thus established.

ARTICLE VI.

The British Government shall be at liberty to appoint a Representative at the Court of His Highness the Ameer, and to appoint Commercial Agents subordinate to him in any towns or places considered suitable within His Highness' territories. His Highness the Ameer shall be at liberty to appoint a Representative with the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and to station Commercial Agents at any places in British India considered suitable. Such Representatives shall be entitled to the rank and privileges accorded to Ambassadors by the law of nations, and the Agents shall be entitled to the privileges of Consuls of the most favored nation.

ARTICLE VII.

British subjects shall be at liberty to purchase, sell, or hire land or houses or depôts for merchandise in the dominions of His Highness the Ameer, and the houses, depôts, or other premises of British subjects shall not be forcibly entered or searched without the consent of the occupier, unless with the cognisance of the British Representative or Agent and in presence of a person deputed by him.

ARTICLE VIII.

The following arrangements are agreed to for the decision of civil suits and criminal cases within the territories of His Highness the Ameer in which British subjects are concerned:—

(a).—Civil suits in which both plaintiff and defendant are British subjects, and criminal cases in which both prosecutor and accused are British subjects, or in which the accused is a European British subject mentioned in the 3rd Article of this Treaty, shall be tried by the British Representative or one of his Agents in the presence of an Agent appointed by His Highness the Ameer.

(b).—Civil suits in which one party is a subject of His Highness the Ameer and the other party a British subject shall be tried by the Courts of His Highness in the presence of the British Representative or one of his Agents, or of a person appointed in that behalf by such Representative or Agent.

(c).—Criminal cases in which either prosecutor or accused is a subject of His Highness the Ameer shall, except as above otherwise provided, be tried by the Courts of His Highness in presence of the British Representative or of one of his Agents, or of a person deputed by the British Representative or by one of his Agents.

(d).—Except as above otherwise provided, civil and criminal cases in which one party is a British subject and the other the subject of a foreign power shall, if either of the parties is a Mahomedan, be tried in the Courts of His Highness. If neither party is a Mahomedan, the case may, with consent of the parties, be tried by the British Representative or one of his Agents; in the absence of such consent, by the Courts of His Highness.

(e).—In any case disposed of by the Courts of His Highness the Ameer, to which a British subject is a party, it shall be competent to the British Representative, if he considers that justice has not been done, to represent the matter to His Highness the Ameer, who may cause the case to be re-tried in some other Court in the presence of the British Representative or of one of his Agents, or of a person appointed in that behalf by such Representative or Agent.

ARTICLE IX.

The rights and privileges enjoyed within the dominions of His Highness the Ameer by British subjects under this Treaty shall extend to the subjects of all Princes and States in India in alliance with Her Majesty the Queen; and if with respect to any such Prince or State any other provisions relating to this Treaty or to other matters should be considered desirable, they shall be negotiated through the British Government.

ARTICLE X.

Every affidavit and other legal document filed or deposited in any Court established in the respective dominions of the high contracting parties, or in the Court of the Joint Commissioners in Ladakh, may be proved by an authenticated copy, purporting either to be sealed with the seal of the Court to which the original document belongs, or in the event of such Court having no seal, to be signed by the Judge or by one of the Judges of the said Court.

ARTICLE XI.

When a British subject dies in the territory of His Highness the Ameer, his movable and immovable property situate therein shall be vested in his heir, executor, administrator, or other representative in interest or (in the absence of such representative) in the Representative of the British Government in the aforesaid territory. The person in whom such charge shall be so vested shall satisfy the claims outstanding against the deceased, and shall hold the surplus (if any) for distribution among those interested. The above provisions *mutatis mutandis* shall apply to the subjects of His Highness the Ameer who may die in British India.

ARTICLE XII.

If a British subject residing in the territories of His Highness the Ameer becomes unable to pay his debts, or fails to pay any debt within a reasonable time after being ordered to do so by any Court of Justice, the creditors of such insolvent shall be paid out of his goods and effects, but the British Representative shall not refuse his good offices, if need be, to ascertain if the insolvent has not left in India disposable property which might serve to satisfy the said creditors.

This Treaty having this day been executed in duplicate and confirmed by His Highness the Ameer, one copy shall for the present be left in the possession of His Highness, and the other after confirmation by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India shall be delivered to His Highness within twelve months in exchange for the copy now retained by His Highness.

Signed and sealed at Kashgar on the second day of February in the year of our Lord 1874, corresponding with the fifteenth day of Zilhijj 1290 Hijri.

"Whereas a Treaty for strengthening the good understanding that now exists between the British Government and the Ruler of the territory of Kashgar and Yarkund, and for promoting commercial intercourse between the two countries, was agreed upon and concluded at Kashgar on the second day of February in the year of Our Lord eighteen hundred and seventy-four, corresponding with the fifteenth day of Zilhijj twelve hundred and ninety Hijree by the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Government of India and of His Highness the Ameer of Kashgar and Yarkund, duly accredited and empowered for that purpose. I, the Right Hon'ble Thomas George Baring, Baron Northbrook of Stratton, &c. &c., Viceroy and Governor-General of India, do hereby ratify and confirm the Treaty aforesaid.

"Given under my hand and seal at Government House in Calcutta this thirteenth day of April in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-four.

(Sd.) NORTHBROOK."

238. Discussions preliminary to the conclusion of the Treaty.—Mr. Forsyth's account of the discussions which preceded the conclusion of the treaty and his explanation of certain changes in the wording of the draft are set forth in his letter from Kashgar, No. 138, dated 2nd February 1874. He wrote:—

"It will be seen that the Treaty concluded differs very slightly from the draft which was submitted to His Highness for acceptance.

"In Articles I and II, I have added the word '*property*' after merchandise; so as to include ordinary travellers other than merchants, the word '*therein*' after '*may be accorded*' was struck out, as, in the Persian translation, it caused a redundancy to which the Syud objected.

"In Articles IV and V the words '*mal-i-tajarat*' have been used in the Persian translation for both goods and merchandise. In the English Treaty the word '*merchandise*' was intended by me to have been substituted for '*goods*;' but I find too late that I have only done so in the beginning of the 5th Article; no harm, however, will result from this omission, for as the Yarkund officials will be guided by the Persian translation, all goods other than merchandise will not be subject to examination or duty.

"The words '*on which duty not exceeding 2½ per cent. is to be levied*' in Article V were cut out, as considered redundant and '*not more than one fortieth*' were changed to '*at the rate of one in forty*,' there being no inclination on the Syud's part to admit any description of goods at a lower rate or free of duty.

"Article VI was, for some time, opposed, and I considered it advisable to consent to call the officials subordinate to the British representative '*Commercial Agents*,' and added the words '*considered suitable*' after '*places*' and '*in British India*.'

"The reluctance displayed at first to the admission of a British representative, arose from no unfriendly feeling towards our Government or nation, nor from any fear for his safety; but solely because it afforded a precedent which might be taken advantage of by other nations.

"With reference to the 17th paragraph of your letter No. 1851, dated 18th August 1873, I think the state of the country is such that a European officer could remain here without undue risk, and His Highness the Ameer shows every disposition not only to protect but to treat him with the greatest honor.

"Article VIII gave rise to a great deal of discussion, and the idea of allowing European British subjects to be tried by our representative was stoutly combated to the last. The Syud said that if an Englishman committed a criminal offence against a Mahomedan subject of the Ameer, the injured party would at once go to the Kazee and demand justice, and would not submit to see his case disposed of by a foreigner; he anticipated that there might be a fanatical disturbance in such a case. I could not give way, and said that the result of their refusal to accept this would be that His Excellency the Viceroy would grant no passports unless he was assured of the good treatment of his countrymen. It was finally agreed to leave the clause in, and to add the words '*in the presence of an Agent of the Ameer*;' this would probably be the Kazee, and thus the feelings of the Mahomedans would be propitiated, whilst justice would be secured to our countrymen.

"But with reference to this discussion, and the possible influx of Europeans, it is right that His Excellency the Viceroy should be informed of the state of parties here. There are conservatives in Eastern Turkestan, and though they are, for the present, in a minority, yet here, as elsewhere, they command attention and respect for their opinions. Though this party partakes in the general feeling of friendship displayed towards our Mission, it by no means follows that they are ready to see their country flooded with European civilization; and even we, with all the prestige of being the '*King's guests*,' have had occasionally to acknowledge

that the Ameer's omnipotence has limits. The Ameer and his chief adviser, Syud Yakoob Khan, have wisely determined to initiate a liberal policy; but they are taking a step far in advance of Asiatics, and they have to consider the religious prejudices and time-honored customs of their fellow-countrymen, and we, I think, may rest satisfied with the very great concessions made to us, without hastening to enforce the conditions of the Treaty to the utmost extent.

"Undoubtedly the presence of Europeans is welcomed by the common people, but their unrestricted license to travel about is apt to be viewed with some jealousy by the conservative class of officials and mullahs, whose priestly influence is a very important element to be taken into consideration.

"It is very probable that European travellers other than merchants would find themselves much thwarted and obstructed. Wholly ignorant of, and insensible to, western science, these people cannot understand how European servants and lovers of sport and romance can wander over the world without some political object; and, in fact, the more simple the character of the traveller, the deeper they imagine his designs to be. It is a matter then for the serious consideration of His Excellency the Viceroy how far it will be advisable to extend the grant of passports to Europeans.

"For the next year or two, and until Mr. Shaw can give a satisfactory opinion to the contrary, I would advise the most sparing grant of passports, and those given should be accompanied with stringent conditions, binding the holder to place himself entirely under the orders of the British representative.

"In the last clause of Article VIII I have given a wider power of representation to the British Agent than was contemplated in the draft Treaty, as I can quite conceive occasion arising for the interference of our representative in criminal cases.

"In Article IX I have altered the wording to suit the wishes of the Syud, who objected to the draft as somewhat too peremptory.

"In Article XI I have added a reciprocity clause at the request of the Syud.

"I understand from the Syud that arrangements will at once be made for opening out the Kogyar route, and if Mr. Shaw took it in his journey to Yarkund, he would practically inaugurate its adoption. The Ameer will probably establish a small fort at or near Kulalong on the south of the Yangi Dewan Pass for the protection of traders, though the fear of the Kunjootee robbers, which formerly existed, need be no longer entertained.

"In one of my reports submitted from Yarkund I mentioned that Hindoos had been subjected to an enhanced rate of duty on their merchandise and had been deprived of their turbans, and were not allowed to ride in the city. These disabilities are swept away by the Treaty, and the Dadkhwah of Yarkund, who had lately enforced the prohibition against turbans, has recently presented one to a Hindoo merchant."

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 45.*]

239. Omission of certain words from the Persian version of Article IX of the Treaty with Yarkund.—Before noting the orders of the Government of India on the treaty as concluded by Mr. Forsyth, it is necessary to mention a matter which seems of trivial importance, and which nevertheless has led to further discussion. In the Persian version of the last clause of Article IX, certain words have been omitted, and the omission had the effect of rendering the clause meaningless. Literally translated, the Persian version of Article IX ran as follows:—

"The rights and privileges which by this treaty have been attached to and acquired by subjects of the British Government in the territories of His Highness the Ameer shall be regarded and observed with regard to the subjects of those Princes and Chiefs of the friendly States of Hindoostan who are united in the bonds of alliance with Her Majesty the Queen; and if in this matter or in any other question which may be considered desirable in connection with the aforesaid Chiefs and Princes shall be carried out through the medium of the British Government."

[*K.-W. Secret, April 1874, Nos. 44 to 49.*]

A correct translation of the Article from English into Persian was prepared in the Indian Foreign Office, and sent up to Yarkund, as will be subsequently noticed.

240. Orders issued by the Government on Mr. Forsyth's report of the conclusion of the Treaty at Kashgar.—Mr. Forsyth's letter

of the 2nd February and the treaty concluded with the Ruler of Kashgar and Yarkund were delivered in Calcutta on the 1st April 1874, by the messenger Havildar Gul Ahmed of the Guides. On the 16th April 1874 orders were issued to Mr. Forsyth, and the following were the points to which his attention was directed :—

“(a).—In Article VIII, clause (c), there is a clerical error, the word “excepted” being inserted for “except.” The necessary correction has been made, and if a similar clerical error exists in the duplicate of the treaty, which is in the Ameer’s possession, it should be rectified with the proper verification.

“(b).—The necessary action will be taken in the Legislative Department to provide for the due operation of the reciprocity clause which has been added at the close of Article XI.

“(c).—In the Persian version of the concluding clause of Article IX, * * * there is an apparent omission, which renders the meaning unintelligible. I am to request that, when ratifying the treaty, His Highness the Ameer may be moved to state in a separate document how that Article should be read. It will be necessary to see that the meaning is open to no misinterpretation.

“The treaty, so guarded against possible misinterpretation, has been ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, and a duplicate being kept in this Office, the ratification is herewith sent for presentation to His Highness the Ameer. It should be exchanged for a document of a similar purport on the part of His Highness the Ameer.

“The opportunity should be taken to convey the acknowledgments of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council for the readiness with which His Highness the Ameer has acceded to the various provisions of the draft treaty proposed for acceptance. It is the firm trust and earnest hope of His Excellency in Council that the arrangements now concluded will form the basis of extended intercourse between the territories of Her Majesty the Queen and those of His Highness the Ruler of Kashgar and its dependencies, resulting in unmingled benefit to the inhabitants and the Governments of the two countries concerned.”

Then after conveying the acknowledgments of Government to Mr. Forsyth, Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon and Dr. Bellew, the letter proceeded :—

“The treaty having been thus early concluded, you will probably have found it needless to prolong your stay in Kashgar.

“If, therefore, as will probably be the case, the present letter with its accompaniment reaches you after you have left Kashgar, it will be unnecessary for you to return thither. In that case the charge of presenting the ratification to the Ameer, and of procuring one in return, should be committed to Mr. Shaw, who has been prepared for the possibility of such a deputation, or else to Colonel Gordon, whom you may have found it expedient and possible to leave in Kashgar.

“I am to add for your information (in case, by the time this letter arrives, you have not received the intelligence to the same effect with which your messenger Ibrahim Khan is charged) that the aspect of affairs in Afghanistan, consequent on the attitude taken by Mahomed Yakoob Khan, is at present such as, in the opinion of Ameer Shere Ali Khan, to render your return through the Afghan territory inexpedient.”

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 47.*]

It must now be shown how it was that the plan of a return journey through Budukshan had to be abandoned, and why the Ameer of Cabul declined to assent to the arrangement proposed. The messenger sent to ascertain the wishes of the Ameer Shere Ali Khan was the Police Officer Ibrahim Khan, who, as stated previously on page 171, had preceded the British party to Yarkund.

241. Deputation of Ibrahim Khan from Kashgar to Cabul. His journey through Pamir, Budukshan, and Balkh.—Ibrahim Khan started from Kashgar for Cabul by the Sir-i-kol and Punja route on the 1st January 1874. He was the bearer of letters to the Ameer Shere Ali Khan, Syud Noor Mahomed, and Atta Mahomed Khan, the British Agent at Cabul. He also carried letters for the Meer of Wakhan and Naib Mahomed Alum, the Governor of Afghan Turkestan, with suitable presents. His journey is thus described in his own words :

“On the 1st January 1874, accompanied by two sowars of the Ameer of Kashgar, I started therefrom and reached Sir-i-kol, the frontier of the Yarkund territory, on the 9th idem.

Having left that place, I proceeded by the Pamir-Khoord route and reached the Punjab Fort (the place of Meer Futteh Ali Shah, Meer of Wakhan) on the 18th January, whence the two sowars who had accompanied me returned to their country. From Punjab I, with a servant of the said Meer of Wakhan, came to Faizabad, the capital of Budukshan. From Fyzabad I proceeded to Balkh, whence with a servant of Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, the Governor of Balkh, I went to Bameean, and thence proceeded by the mountainous route called Shaikh Ali in Hazara, as owing to the great fall of snow, the Punj Peelan road was closed. I arrived on the 18th February 1874, and sent the khurceta to the Ameer by Sirdar Atta Mahomed Khan, the Government Vakeel. The road through the territory of the Ameer Sahib is in every respect safe. The revenue of Budukshan was being collected. The Meer of Wakhan sent by the hands of his son his quota to Naib Hafiz-olla Khan, the Governor of Budukshan."

[*Secret, March 1874, Nos. 38 and 167.*]

242. Reception of Ibrahim Khan by the Ameer of Cabul on the 18th February 1874.—Immediately on Ibrahim Khan's arrival he was summoned to Durbar by the Ameer, to whom he delivered two letters, one from Mr. Forsyth, and the other from Dr. Bellew. Shere Ali Khan's observations at this first interview foreshadowed his subsequent refusal to give the Mission a passage through his territories:—

"Yarkund," he said, "lies at a vast distance from the territories of the British Government, and is close to the confines of the Russian possessions. I cannot understand what advantage is looked for by the establishment of this intercourse, but I suppose the officers of the British Government see some prospect in view of results favorable to the interests of their Government."

Atta Mahomed Khan, the British Agent, on whose authority the above remarks are quoted, also sent a copy of the letter from Mr. Forsyth to himself. In this letter the Agent was requested to explain to Syud Noor Mahomed Shah that Mr. Forsyth confidently believed the authority of the Ameer to be all powerful in the countries through which the Mission would have to travel, that is to say, from Sir-i-kol to Wakhan and Killa Panja. There was only the Pamir desert, which was under the authority of the Meer of Wakhan, a tributary of Budukshan; all the rest of the way from Faizabad to Kundooz and Khulm, and on to Cabul there were frequented roads, through a populous country, and it would be possible to make arrangements for carriage, &c., from place to place, with the assistance of the local Governors.

[*Secret, March 1874, No. 89.*]

243. The refusal to permit the return journey through Budukshan probably a foregone conclusion. Discussions with the Cabul Envoy on this subject.—There can be little doubt that Shere Ali had resolved not to give way in the matter of the return journey through Budukshan long before Ibrahim Khan reached Cabul. When his Envoy, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, visited Simla in July-August 1873, the Foreign Secretary suggested to him that the deputation by Yarkund afforded an opportunity for adopting a plan, which the Envoy himself had suggested, that a British Officer should proceed, and inspect the northern and western boundaries, with reference to the arrangements lately agreed to by Russia. The Envoy, however, thought it better that the Officer, if sent, should go round by Candahar to the eastern extremity of the northern limit, returning thence to Cabul to confer with the Ameer. When asked whether, in the event of Mr. Forsyth's Mission returning *via* Budukshan, the Ameer would be able to arrange for supplies, &c., Syud Noor Mahomed Shah replied that in the absence of any precise information he could give no specific assurance. The Foreign Secretary then suggested that the Ameer might be asked to allow a British Officer to proceed to the north-east frontier *via* Cabul in anticipation of the arrival of the Mission, in order to make the necessary arrangements for them. But the Envoy adhered to his previous advice that an Officer going round by Candahar should be carried out. If, he said, on arrival at Cabul this Officer found that the Ameer entertained

no objection to the location of an Envoy there or elsewhere, there would, of course, be equally no objection to the Mission returning *viâ* Budukshan. On the other hand, if there were difficulties about the appointment of an Envoy, it would still be open to Government to allude to the return of the Yarkund Mission *viâ* Budukshan. He would suggest that in that case the Ameer should be addressed on this subject in such a manner as neither to imply the possibility of refusal of permission, nor, on the other hand, as if the Mission would take that route without permission.

The deputation of an officer *viâ* Candahar to collect information on the subject of the northern frontier of Afghanistan was prominently noticed in a memorandum of the points discussed with the Cabul Envoy, and the attention of the Ameer was invited to this and other proposals by the 7th paragraph of the Viceroy's *khureeta*, dated 6th September 1873. The Ameer's reply was unsatisfactory. In his letter dated 13th November 1873 to the Viceroy he mentioned a proposal that Colonel Baker should pass through Afghanistan on his way from Teheran to India in the following terms:—

“My Envoy at interview and conversations with Your Excellency explained *the many objections that exist to men like Colonel Baker and others travelling in Afghanistan*, I therefore do not think it necessary to allude to the subject further.”

[Vide *K.-W. Secret, September 1873, Nos. 118-139; Secret, September 1873, Nos. 123-132, and Secret, March 1874, No. 63.*]

244. Deliberations in Cabul as to return-journey through Afghanistan. Final decision adverse to the proposal.—It is therefore plain that the request preferred through Ibrahim Khan could have been no surprise either to the Ameer or his councillors. But it was probably deemed expedient to make some show of deliberation before refusing the solicited permission; accordingly we find from the Cabul Diary of the 20th to 23rd February 1874, that Ibrahim Khan had an interview with Noor Mahomed Shah, who asked for information as to the requirements of the Mission. Meanwhile the Ameer declined to give any definite reply as to the return of the Mission *viâ* Budukshan until after careful consideration. Then followed secret debates in Council, and the British Agent, in his letter dated 5th March 1874, informed the Commissioner of Peshawur that the opinion of the Durbar was divided:—

“Some of the Members adhered to the opinion that lest any injury should be caused to him (Mr. Forsyth) it is not advisable that he should return to India *viâ* Cabul in such a time of danger, because if any untoward accident happens, it will under all circumstances tend to the disgrace of the Cabul Government. Others observed that formerly permission for the return of Colonel Baker *viâ* Cabul was declined, and that, as notwithstanding the refusal of that permission, application has been received for Mr. Forsyth being allowed to return *viâ* Afghanistan, it will not be open to objection if this permission be now given, but that it is necessary that the disturbed state of the peace of the kingdom should be taken into consideration.”

The disturbances were those created by the Ameer's rebellious son Sirdar Mahomed Yakob Khan, Governor of Herat.

After this followed more private councils, as reported in the Cabul Diary of 7th to 9th April 1874, the general feeling of the Durbar being against compliance with Mr. Forsyth's request. And on the 10th April 1874, the Ameer sent to the Viceroy the following substance of the letter from Mr. Forsyth and of His Highness' reply remarking thereon—

“It is certain that Mr. Forsyth has not been informed of the objections of Afghanistan, and the conversation which took place between Your Excellency and my Envoy. Your Excellency will certainly inform Mr. Forsyth.”

Substance of Mr. Forsyth's letter to the Ameer of Cabul and the Ameer's reply.

“After reminding the Ameer of the previous occasions in which he had seen His Highness, and expressing regret at no opportunity having been afforded him of a further meeting, Mr. Forsyth says that His Highness was doubtless aware that when Syud Noor Mahomed

was at Simla in the middle of last year, he (Mr. Forsyth) had been deputed to conduct a Mission to Yarkund. He had then mentioned to the Syud that in order to gratify his desire for a meeting with the Ameer he had resolved to return to India *viâ* Budukshan.

"Mr. Forsyth then informs the Ameer that the Mission has arrived and of his intention after its business was concluded to proceed *viâ* Sir-i-kol and Budukshan, and present himself to the Ameer.

"As His Excellency the Viceroy had ordered that the return of the Mission by Budukshan was to be dependent on the will and pleasure of the Ameer, therefore Mr. Forsyth expressed a hope that arrangements might be made, and he proceeds to explain the nature of these arrangements.

"The Ameer's reply to Mr. Forsyth is that the latter cannot be aware of the nature of the communications between His Excellency and Syud Noor Mahomed, but doubtless he would be informed of the same."

At length on the 11th April 1874, after two days' private discussions, Ibrahim Khan received permission to return to Mr. Forsyth *viâ* Balkh and Budukshan. The issue of the deliberations was thus reported by the British Agent:—

"The Sadr-i-Azem observed to me privately as follows :

'As regards Herat matters, if, through misfortune (*'na-saadat mandi'*) Sirdar Mahomed Yakooob Khan fails to arrive at a right conclusion (literally straight road, "*rah-i-rast*") the Cabul Government will be constrained to send troops against Herat. In such case the Cabul authorities do not consider it advisable that Mr. Forsyth should return to India *viâ* Cabul, especially because when Sirdar Mahomed Yakooob Khan took flight from Cabul he put off his uniform outside the city, and with a view to collecting short-sighted people ("*kotah-andesh*") he gave out that the Ameer on his return from India after the Umballa conference had abandoned the Mahomedan religion and that he (the Sirdar) intended to wage religious war against His Highness with the aid of the Mussulmans of the country. If, therefore, Mr. Forsyth should come to this kingdom at a time when it is proposed that troops should proceed to Herat, the Sirdar will undoubtedly make ignorant people believe his former statement, and will thus find an opportunity to support his designs for raising disturbances, and the Cabul authorities will feel great anxiety lest any injury shall befall Mr. Forsyth.

"The Ameer then desired me to insert his observations in Persian in this letter as follows:—

"While replies were being written to the *murrasillas* received from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and Mr. Forsyth, the members of the Durbar observed that it would be proper if it were written (to British Government) that the statements made by Meerakhor Ahmed Khan, Moolla Yabaya and Khalifa Abdool Rahman, who have lately arrived from Herat, confirm the representations of the Cabul Envoy made before His Excellency the Viceroy at Simla about the obstacles (in the way of a safe journey) of Afghanistan, but that it is not advisable to make mention either colloquially or in writing of such matters from which no advantage can be derived.'

"The Ameer has written a friendly *murrasila* to Dr. Bellew, and the Sadr-i-Azem one to Mr. Forsyth, to the effect that the views of the Cabul Durbar will become known to him from the Ameer's *murrasila*."

[Vide *Cabul Diaries quoted, and Secret, May 1874, Nos. 85—88.*]

245. Journey of Ibrahim Khan to Balkh and back to India via Cabul Jelallabad.—Ibrahim Khan set out on his travels again on the 13th April 1874, taking the road to Balkh *viâ* Charikar, and accompanied by Mirza Abdool Hadi Khan, Agent of the Governor of Afghan Turkestan. The Naib had received orders to make arrangements for escorting him as far as Sir-i-kol, and to submit a receipt of his safe arrival at that place. But he never got so far as Sir-i-kol. On the 26th April 1874 he wrote from Tashkurgan in the province of Balkh to Colonel Gordon, who was then returning to Yarkund from his trip to Pamir and Wakhan, saying that, as the reply of the Ameer of Cabul forbade the return journey of the Mission by Budukshan, and the British officers would have left Yarkand before he could arrive there, he had decided on returning from Balkh to Cabul, and thence proceeding to Peshawur. Accordingly he made his way back to Cabul, where he arrived in the second week in May 1874, and received permission from the Ameer to return to India *viâ* Jelallabad.

[Vide *Cabul Diaries 10th—13th April and 8th—11th May 1874; also Secret, July 1874, No. 114.*]

246. Preparations for the return of the Mission.—Obstacles thrown in the way of excursions. But treatment of British Officers favorable compared with that of the Turks.—In the meantime Mr. Forsyth had ascertained that the proposed journey through Budukshan was approved by the Ameer of Kashgar, who saw in it an opportunity for cultivating the friendship of Afghanistan. Ibrahim Khan was expected back in Kashgar by May, and the Mission would probably start thence on the homeward journey in June or July. Events, however, hastened the departure of the Mission. Colonel Gordon had made an excursion to Chakmak and Chatyrkul; Captain Biddulph had visited Maral-Bashi, and Mr. Forsyth himself had traversed Artysh. But towards the middle of March 1874 it became evident that, notwithstanding the conclusion of the treaty, the roaming propensities of the British officers were not viewed with satisfaction. A proposal to visit Aksu and Khotan was negatived. Dr. Stoliczka desired to inspect certain mines from which specimens had been brought, but no one knew where the mines were: the excursion to Chatyrkul was mentioned as having caused trouble with the Russians, who had made unpleasant enquiries regarding its nature and object: even Dr. Bellew's benevolent work among the people, who flocked to his dispensary, was interfered with. At length, on the 9th March, Syud Yakoob Khan and Ihrar Khan came together to inform Mr. Forsyth that the Ameer was only detained at Kashgar by his presence, and that, as soon as the Mission were gone, His Highness would set out for Yangi Hissar and Aksoo. This was a hint too broad to be disregarded, and the Mission immediately prepared for departure. The Syud and Ihrar Khan, after taking the orders of the Ameer, informed Mr. Forsyth that every arrangement would be made for escorting the party to Sarhad-i-Wakhan, while the baggage would be sent by the Sanju route to Ladakh and India.

"No further allusion" says Mr. Forsyth "was made to our possible return from Sir-i-kol *via* Yarkund to Ladakh, but the meaning of the Syud was unmistakeably to the effect that having taken the Sir-i-kol route we were to pass on and not appear again in the plains of Yarkund."

In short, the utmost readiness was shown to speed the parting guest, and yet Mr. Forsyth consoled himself with the reflection that, however embarrassing might be the distrust of the Ameer and the vacillations of his people, the treatment accorded to the British officers was exceptionally favorable.

"The treatment we have received contrasts markedly with that accorded to the Turkish officers brought by Syud Yakoob Khan from Constantinople. He expected that his master would employ them in drilling his troops and in making guns, &c., but from the date of their arrival they have remained unemployed and under surveillance.

"They have only seen the Ameer once and are cut off from intercourse with the officers of his Court. This treatment is all the more surprising, inasmuch as the Ameer has taken the very decided step of placing himself and State under the wing of Turkey, and has coined money and recited the *Khutba* in the Sultan's name.

"Their advent could not but be most unwelcome to the officers of the Ameer's Court, for they see in these Turks formidable rivals, who in all military matters would quickly prove themselves superior to self-taught Asiatic Generals.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 144; May 1874, No. 44.*]

247. Mr. Forsyth to stay at Yangi Hissar pending receipt of news from Ibrahim Khan.—The letter from which the above particulars are taken was written on the 16th March 1874, by which time Mr. Forsyth had received the Cabul Diaries showing how little likelihood there was that he would be permitted to return through Afghanistan. He consulted the Syud, offering to halt at any place he liked to name, until definite news should arrive from Ibrahim Khan. The Syud was opposed to any change of arrangement, and Mr. Forsyth then decided to adhere to the plan of going to Sir-i-kol, leaving future movement to be guided by circumstances. This plan did not fall in with the Ameer's views. On the 16th March 1874, the day of the

parting interview, His Highness sent Syud Yakoob Khan to inform Mr. Forsyth that he wished the Mission to halt at Yangi Hissar, as long as they chose, to give time for Ibrahim Khan to arrive with the looked-for despatches, but that if Mr. Forsyth liked to send any of his officers to Sir-i-kol, he was at perfect liberty to do so. The Syud added that *from information received there he did not think there was much chance of the Mission being able to prosecute their intention of going through Budukshan.*

248. Final interview with the Ameer of Kashgar on the 16th March 1874. Mr. Forsyth's address and the Ameer's reply.—The following is Mr. Forsyth's account of what took place at the final interview:—

“After the usual complimentary salutations, I addressed His Highness in the following terms:—

“The time for our departure having arrived, I wish to offer on behalf of all the officers present and of myself our thanks for all the kindness, hospitality, and comfort we have received from Your Highness since we entered this country, also for the attention and civility shown us by all Your Highness' officials, and for the liberty accorded to us to visit Chakmak, Artvsh, and Maralbashi. I hope that nothing has been done by any of my party to give the slightest cause of offence. On this the Ameer expressed his entire satisfaction.

“I then concluded by wishing His Highness peace from all external foes, and that the internal prosperity of his country might increase; that he might enjoy long life and happiness, &c.’

“The Ameer then expressed himself much flattered by the notice taken of him by Her Majesty and the Viceroy, whom he likened to the sun, spreading its warming influence on the smallest object. His desire, he said, was to render any service whatever that was in his power, and he hoped that the British Government would, in return, give all the assistance in its power.

“As this remark had a somewhat wider significance than was altogether proper for me to respond to, I record the exact Persian words I gave in reply through the medium of Dr. Bellew:—

Persian.

English.

“*Nawab Governor-General wo Naib us-Sultani Hind dar murásilah ba nám nami-i Hazrat farmúda and ki in mukhlis ra mukhtár sakhta ba Khidmat-i-Hazrat firistáda and tú chand umúrat baráe isticámat i dosti o yak jihati fímábyn i Daulatyn ba Huzur guzarish numayam.*

“*Pas har amar-i-munasib o dastras ki az in jins báshad wa Hazrat izhár farmayand umed dáram ki az s'ai wa tawajjah darán az janib i Nawab Governor-General hech daregh na khwahad shud.*

The Viceroy has stated in his letter to Your Highness that ‘he authorised me to make certain proposals for strengthening the ties of friendship and for promoting neighbourly intercourse.’ Therefore any proposals of a *similar nature* (I emphasised these words) made by Your Highness, which may be proper and feasible, I hope the Viceroy will not refuse to consider carefully.

“No further conversation of importance passed, but, at parting, His Highness stood up and said:—

“Give my salaam to the Queen and to the Viceroy and ask them to consider me as a brother and a servant (*khitmutgar*). He added his prayer for our safe journey.

“We start for Yangi Hissar to-morrow morning, and our further movements will be guided by circumstances.

“Notwithstanding all that has been said about our liberty to visit Sir-i-kol, I have very great doubts but that we shall find obstacles placed in the way. The season is, unfortunately, likely to afford an excuse, for heavy snow has fallen of late.

[*Secret, May 1874, No. 45.*]

249. Return of the Mission to India. Expedition to Wakhan. Death of Dr. Stoliczka.—The Mission left Kashgar on Tuesday, the 17th March 1874, under a salute of 19 guns, and arrived at Yangi Hissar on the 18th. There Mr. Forsyth remained until the 2nd May, by which time news had been received from Ibrahim Khan, which put an end to all hope of proceeding *viâ* Cabul. Meanwhile Ressaïdar Mahomed Afzul Khan was sent

with a letter to Meer Futteh Ali Shah of Wakhan enquiring whether he would receive a visit from a party of officers under Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon. And on Saturday, March 21st, Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, accompanied by Captains Biddulph and Trotter, and Dr. Stoliczka, started for Sir-i-kol with orders to push on, if possible, to Punja Wakhan, and to despatch Assistant Surveyor Subhan on an exploring expedition as far as Karakol. This part of the proceedings was successful. The party reached Punja on the 13th April, and were hospitably entertained by the Ruler of Wakhan. Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon left Punja on the 26th April, dividing his party into two detachments, Captain Biddulph and Ressaïdar Afzul Khan marching eastwards to explore the Baroghil and Durkot Passes leading to Yasseen, while the leader, accompanied by Captain Trotter and Dr. Stoliczka, took the road by Wood's Lake to the Great Pamir. Both parties met at Aktash on the 5th May, and returned to Sir-i-kol Tashkurgan on the 7th. On the 9th May Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon received Ibrahim's letter from Tashkurgan in Balkh, and on the 11th the party left Sir-i-kol Tashkurgan *en route* for Yarkund in the hope of overtaking Mr. Forsyth. This was not accomplished, for Mr. Forsyth left Yarkund on the 18th May three days before Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon arrived there. The homeward march was marked by a melancholy event, the death of Dr. Stoliczka, who succumbed to the rigours of the journey and climate on the 18th June, two days after crossing the Karakorum. He was buried at Leh, and the Government of India directed a monument to be erected over his grave, and a memorial tablet to be set up in the Calcutta Museum to which he had bequeathed all his private collections. By the 17th June Mr. Forsyth reached Leh. Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon was expected to arrive about the 27th, and thus the second mission was virtually at an end. A translation of the letters from the Ameer to the Queen and to the Viceroy is given in Appendix X.

[Vide *Secret*, June 1874, No. 11; July 1874, Nos. 111-113, and August 1874, Nos. 46-53.]

250. Acknowledgment by Government of the services of the Officers of the Yarkund Mission. Notification summing up results attained.—The services of Mr. Forsyth and his officers were warmly acknowledged by orders of the Government of India, No. 1678P, dated 3rd August 1874, and Mr. Forsyth was instructed to submit a connected report of the progress and proceedings of the Mission, the results attained, and the information collected.

"This Report," it was said, "should be written with a view to eventual publication. It is necessary, therefore, that you should exclude from it all matters, whether of a political or an ordinary kind, which it would be inconvenient or undesirable to make public. Such matters should be included in a separate and confidential report. To enable you to prepare these reports you will be retained on special duty on your present pay and allowances for a period of six months from the 15th of July."

On the 3rd August 1874 the following Notification was published in the *Gazette*, mentioning the principal events of the expedition, and drawing attention to the success by which the conduct of affairs by Mr. (now Sir T. D.) Forsyth and his officers had been crowned:—

"His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council has much satisfaction in announcing the return to British territory of the Yarkund Mission after the successful accomplishment of the objects for which the Mission was deputed.

"The Mission was most honorably received by the Ameer of Kashgar and Yarkund, and was hospitably entertained by him for more than three months. A Treaty was concluded with His Highness on 2nd February 1874, which regulates the duties to be levied on trade and commerce with Yarkund, and provides for the protection of traders on the due representation of grievances and complaints. This Treaty has already been published.

"Much valuable information* regarding the present condition, resources, history, geography, and trade of Yarkund and neighbouring countries has been collected by the Mission. The Tienshan Plateau was visited by Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, Captain Trotter, and Dr. Stoliczka, who surveyed the route to the Tash Robut Pass and the Chadur Kul Lake. The road to Maralbashee and Charwagh was traversed by Captain Biddulph. The Artysh District

* See confidential Report by Sir Douglas Forsyth, dated 21st September 1874, and the enclose I papers by Captain Biddulph, Colonel Gordon, and Captain Chapman, also the report of Abdool Subhan's excursion to Shighuan and back to Wakhan.—F. H.

was visited by Mr. Forsyth. On the return of the Mission to India, a party, consisting of Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, Captain Biddulph, Captain Trotter, and Dr. Stoliczka, was deputed to explore the Sir-i-kol District. Captain Biddulph, with Ressaïdar Afzul Khan, of the Guide Corps, examined the country towards the Baroghil and Durkot Passes, while the rest of the party proceeded by Wood's Lake and the Pamir to Wakhan. Ibrahim Khan, of the Punjab Police, also accomplished the journey from Wakhan through Budukshan to Cabul. Mr. Forsyth is now engaged in preparing a connected account of the proceedings of the Mission and the results obtained by it, which His Excellency in Council hopes to be able to publish in a few months.

"His Excellency in Council desires publicly to express his appreciation of the ability and good judgment with which Mr. Forsyth, as head of the Mission, carried out the instructions with which he was furnished. The thanks of the Government of India are due to him and to the members of his Staff, *viz.*, Lieutenant-Colonel T. E. Gordon, B.S.C., 2nd in command of the Mission, Dr. H. W. Bellew, C.S.I., Captain E. F. Chapman, R.A., Captain H. Trotter, R.E., Captain H. Biddulph, 19th Hussars. It is with much pleasure that His Excellency in Council announces that Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to appoint Mr. Forsyth to be an Extra Knight Commander, and Lieutenant-Colonel T. E. Gordon, 2nd in command of the Mission, to be an Extra Companion of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India.

"His Excellency in Council has already expressed his high estimation of the services of the late Dr. F. Stoliczka, and his sense of the loss sustained by the Mission, by the Government of India, and by the scientific world, in the untimely death of that distinguished naturalist.

"The services of the Native Staff and Escort have merited the thanks of the Government of India. In recognition of the services of Ressaïdar Afzul Khan, of the Guide Corps, and Ibrahim Khan, of the Punjab Police, the Viceroy is pleased to confer on them the title of "Khan Bahadoor." His Excellency is also pleased to confer upon Tara Sing the title of "Sirdar." A donation of Rupees 100 will be given to each of the soldiers of the Guide Escort of the Mission, and a donation of Rupees 500 to Jemadar Siffat Khan. The services of the Native Staff employed under Captain Trotter, who have not yet returned to India, will be acknowledged hereafter.

"The services of Lieutenant-Colonel T. E. Gordon are replaced at the disposal of the Military Department. The services of Captain Trotter will revert to the Department of Revenue, Agriculture, and Commerce, and of Captain Chapman to the Military Department, on 1st October next."

[*Secret, August 1874, Nos. 57-58 and 196-197.*]

It should here be added that the Secretary of State in his despatch No. 14, dated 26th June 1874, warmly endorsed the commendation bestowed by the Government of India upon Sir T. D. Forsyth. Objection was however raised to the use of the title "Her Majesty's Envoy and Plenipotentiary" in letters to and from Sir T. D. Forsyth, on the ground that it was not usual in Treaties executed with States in India or on its frontiers to designate the representative of the Government of India by such a title, and that, indeed, no "Plenipotentiary" could be constituted unless munited with the Great Seal. On reference to page 167 it will be seen that Mr. Forsyth was not deputed as Her Majesty's Envoy and Plenipotentiary, but as the Envoy and Plenipotentiary of the Viceroy. The former term was used by inadvertence.

251. Arrangements made by the Maharaja of Cashmere for the return journey of the Yarkund Mission.—It should be observed that the arrangements for the return journey through Cashmere were as cheerfully and efficiently made as those by which the outward march had been facilitated. On the 13th April 1874, when the probability of Mr. Forsyth's return by the Karakorum, Leh, and Srinuggur was recognized, the Government of India instructed the Government of the Punjab to request the aid of the Cashmere Maharaja, adding that if, which seemed very unlikely, the Mission after all adopted a different route, the entire cost to which the State of Jummoo and Cashmere or its subjects might be put would of course be paid by the Government of India just as if the articles were all actually consumed by Mr. Forsyth's party. The Maharaja issued orders to his Wazeer, Mr. Johnson, to work night and day in collecting supplies. Fifty thousand Srinuggur rupees were advanced for the purpose: and the services of the Mission were to be performed without consideration of expense or loss to the country: "My State" said the Maharaja "is a gift from the British Government, whatever will be forthcoming from this State, that too will be from the Government."

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 53; June 1874, Nos. 27-28.*]

252. Mr. Shaw deputed to represent the British Government at Kashgar. Instructions issued for his guidance.—The measures subsequently taken to complete the engagements negotiated by Mr. Forsyth will now be described. On the 4th May 1874 orders were issued that Mr. R. B. Shaw, then officiating as Boundary Settlement Officer in Bundelkund, should proceed with all convenient speed to Leh, and take up his appointment as British Joint Commissioner there. Mr. Shaw, however, before departing for Leh, visited Calcutta, and there he received the following instructions dated 29th May 1874:—

“ His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council has been pleased to depute you on special duty to represent the British Government at Kashgar, in the territory of His Highness the Ameer Yakooob Khan, Ruler of the territory of Kashgar and Yarkund. Your instructions are first to proceed to meet Mr. Forsyth.....now probably on his way back to Leh from Yarkund, from whom it will be your duty to receive and to take back to Kashgar the ratification by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of the Commercial Treaty recently concluded with the Ameer of that country. But in the event of Mr. Forsyth having returned the ratification by other hands, you will still continue your journey to Kashgar, unless Mr. Forsyth informs you that there is some objection or impediment. In this matter you will be entirely guided by his instructions. I forward herewith two khureetas to the address of the Ameer from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General accrediting you to His Highness' Court. The khureeta, copy of which is marked A, will be delivered by you in the event of your being appointed to take back the ratification of the Treaty; and the other khureeta, marked B, will be delivered if the ratification has already been forwarded.

“ 2. Your duties at Kashgar will be to maintain friendly relations with the Ameer's Government, to attend to British commercial interests in His Highness' territory, and generally to supervise execution of the Treaty and to promote its objects. You will refrain from offering suggestions to the Ameer in matters of Government or foreign policy; but if he desires to consult you, you need not refuse to assist him with information and appropriate advice. In the event of questions arising between the Ameer and the Russian Government, you will take care, if the opportunity arises, to impress on the Ameer the risk of complications with that Government, and the importance of avoiding any step that might unnecessarily prejudice amicable relations with its representatives. Your correspondence will be addressed direct to the Government of India, but forwarded under flying seal through the officer on special duty at Cashmere and the Punjab Government.

“ 3. During your deputation to Kashgar, and with effect from this date, you will be graded as an additional Political Agent of the 1st class on Rupees 1,500 per mensem, and will receive, under paragraph 6 of Foreign Department Resolution No. 1899, dated 22nd August 1873, a 'special allowance' of Rupees 200 per mensem. Should it be determined eventually not to maintain a British representative at Kashgar, you will revert to your appointment as British Joint Commissioner at Leh and your present position on the graded list of the Political Department.

“ 4. A medical officer will be deputed to accompany you to Kashgar. He will also with effect from this date receive the same salary as a Civil Surgeon of the 1st class according to his length of service, and in addition to this will draw a local allowance of Rupees 150 per mensem.

“ 5. As regards your office establishment, you are authorized to entertain a Meer Moonshee on Rupees 100 per mensem and a second Moonshee on Rupees 80. The medical establishment will consist of a hospital assistant and a compounder who, in addition to the salary attached to their grade, will be allowed a local allowance of 25 per cent. on their pay with effect from the date on which they join your establishment. As your personal orderlies you are permitted to entertain two Goorkhas or Hill Rajpoots on a monthly pay of Rupees 10 each. The actual travelling expenses of yourself, the medical officer, and the native establishment will be defrayed by Government, and you are authorised to draw from the Lahore Treasury such advance on this account as you may require. To meet office contingencies and expenditure incurred in acquiring intelligence at Kashgar, you are authorised to take an advance of Rupees 1,000; and this amount may, subject to re-consideration hereafter, be considered as the annual allotment for these heads of expenditure.

“ 6. A sum of Rupees 3,000 is sanctioned for the purchase of presents for the Ameer, and Rupees 2,000 for presents to minor officials. You are authorised to purchase these presents and to send in a bill for the amount.

“ 7. You are also authorised to purchase the camp equipage necessary for your yourself, the medical officer, and your establishments. It is believed that two officers' tents, four pals, and one necessary tent will be sufficient.

“ 8. The Punjab Government will be requested to place at your disposal a party of eight selected sowars of the Guide Corps, or some other Cavalry Regiment, under a Non-Commis-

sioned Officer, to form an escort for the Agency. Should your stay at Kashgar prove to be permanent, this detachment may eventually be replaced by men specially enlisted. The escort will be provided by the Military authorities with the necessary camp equipage for themselves.

"9. In conclusion, I am to state that you should leave Calcutta when you have completed such preparations as you have to make here for your journey. It is desirable that you should entertain the establishment now sanctioned, and complete your preparations with as little delay as may be practicable and proceed to meet Mr. Forsyth, who is probably now on his way to Leh."

The two khureetas marked A and B from the Viceroy to the Ameer Mahomed Yakooob Khan are subjoined. They were dated 29th May 1874—

A.

"On the 17th ultimo I forwarded to Mr. T. D. Forsyth, c. b., Her Majesty's* Envoy and Plenipotentiary to Your Highness' Court, a copy of the treaty recently concluded between the British Government and Your Highness, together with my ratification of the same.

"It is, however, probable that Mr. Forsyth may have left the dominions of Your Highness before the treaty can reach him, and I have therefore deputed Mr. Shaw, an officer of high rank and dignity, in whom I have full confidence, to convey the treaty and ratification to Your Highness.

"I have the pleasure to forward for Your Highness' acceptance a few articles of European and Indian manufacture."

B.

"In order to cement and confirm the fast friendship which exists between the British Government and that of Your Highness, and in accordance with the treaty that has been ratified between the two Governments, I have deputed as my representative at the Court of Your Highness Mr. Shaw, an officer of high rank and dignity, in whom I have full confidence."

[The rest was the same as A.]

A letter was also written to Mr. Forsyth acquainting him with what had been done, and adding that even if the ratified treaty had been forwarded, Mr. Shaw would nevertheless go on to take up his office at Kashgar, unless Mr. Forsyth should determine that it was not advisable that a British representative should go to Kashgar at present.

[*Secret, June 1874, Nos. 82-85.*]

253. Mr. Shaw's arrival at Srinuggur. Receives ratified copy of Treaty from Mr. Forsyth.—Mr. Shaw arrived at Srinuggur on the 5th July 1874, and there received from Mr. Forsyth the ratified copy of the treaty for delivery to the Ameer. He wrote to Syud Yakooob Khan Torah to arrange for a meeting, but asked for instructions from Government as to what course should be pursued if the answer were delayed. In reply he was told that it was highly desirable he should meet Syud Yakooob Khan, but if arrangements to bring about a meeting should fail, his departure from Leh need not be delayed beyond the first week in September.

By subsequent orders dated 30th July 1874 a small addition, consisting of two khalasees, a bhistee, and a shoeing-smith was sanctioned for Mr. Shaw's establishment.

[*Secret, July 1874, Nos. 159-161.*]

254. Passports for the Central Asian Trading Company sent to Punjab with instructions.—Before Mr. Shaw started on his journey to Leh and Yarkund the Punjab Government submitted a letter from Mr. T. Russell, Manager of the Central Asian Trading Company, soliciting permission for himself and two European Assistants, Mr. Andrew Dalgleish and Mr. Henry Collins, accompanied by twelve chuprassies and other servants, to enter the territories of the Ameer of Kashgar. The Government of India by orders of 3rd June 1871 forwarded three blank forms of passport for the Manager of the Central Asian Company and his Assistants, to be filled up at the discretion of the Punjab Government. But it was added that in the present

* This term has been objected to, see above page 190.

condition of British relations with the Ameer of Kashgar, it was highly desirable that passports should be granted only to trustworthy and qualified persons, and the Punjab Government were requested in forwarding future applications to record an opinion whether they should or should not be granted. The Government of the Punjab with reply dated 7th July 1874 returned one of the blank passports, and reported that the other two had been filled in with the names of Mr. Thomas Russell and his Assistant Mr. Andrew Dalgleish.

[*Political A.*, June 1874, Nos. 139-141; July 1874, Nos. 310-31.]

255. The Secretary of State directs reference to Her Majesty's Government before residence of a permanent British representative at Kashgar is sanctioned.—On the 24th July 1874 the Secretary of State acknowledged receipt of the report showing the instructions which had been issued for the guidance of Mr. Shaw during his residence at Kashgar. Those instructions were generally approved. The Secretary of State concurred in the opinion of the Government of India that it would be premature at present to decide whether a Representative should be permanently maintained at the Court of the Ameer under Article VI of the Treaty, and the Government of India were instructed to await sanction before deciding in favor of such a measure. These orders were conveyed to Mr. Shaw by letter dated 12th September 1874, and he was told to abstain carefully from saying or doing anything calculated to give rise to the impression that his deputation to Yarkund was permanent. The Secretary of State was also informed by despatch dated 15th September 1874 that the Government of India would await Mr. Shaw's report of his arrival at Kashgar and his reception by the Ameer before taking into further consideration and referring for the final decision of Her Majesty's Government the question of his permanent appointment as representative of the British Government at His Highness' Court.

[*Secret*, September 1874, Nos. 37—39.]

256. Mr. Shaw's arrival at Leh. Movements of the Central Asia Trading Company.—Mr. Shaw reached Leh on the 9th August 1874, and immediately sent letters announcing his approach to the Ameer, Syud Yakoob Khan Torah, the Dadkhwah of Yarkund, and Syud Ibrar Khan Torah, formerly an Envoy to the Viceroy. Mr. Shaw found that the caravan of the Central Asian Company, led by Messrs. Russell and Dalgleish, had already made preparations for advance, and on the 14th August the caravan started *viâ* the Chang Chenmo route with orders from Mr. Shaw to halt at Suget, half a march from Shahidulla, until Mr. Shaw himself should have entered the Ameer's territories.

[*Political A.*, September 1874, No. 295.]

257. Mr. Shaw arranges for conveyance of Syud Yakoob Khan's baggage, and proposes to move into the Nubra Valley by 1st September 1874.—In a subsequent letter dated 28th August 1874 Mr. Shaw reported that his special messenger sent up with a letter to Syud Yakoob Khan Torah had not yet returned. The Syud was believed to be waiting at Kashgar for the arrival of some or all of his baggage then on the way from India. Mr. Shaw made arrangements for carrying the most important of the Syud's loads, 21 in number, with his own camp, and he himself proposed to move into the Nubra Valley (a three days' journey) on the 1st September, so as to be ready to cross the mountains by the end of the first week in September. Mr. Shaw's proceedings were approved under the special circumstances of the

case, though the Foreign Secretary pointed out that the assistance afforded to the Syud would probably give Russia a handle for repeating the complaints, which will be noticed hereafter, that the British Government had supplied Yarkund with arms.

[*Political A., September 1874, Nos. 296-97.*]

258. Postal communication between Ladakh and Yarkund.—

Before leaving Ladakh Mr. Shaw had been careful to consider what measures should be adopted for maintaining postal communications with Yarkund. In his letter dated 19th August 1874 he submitted a scheme which had been prepared at his request by Mr. Johnson, the Wazeer of Ladakh. The estimate provided for two men at Rupees 5 per mensem, a man for each stage, 19 in number; as also for the monthly carriage of provisions for 13 stages, the quantities allowed being 32 seers to each man. The total monthly cost, including pay of men and carriage of provisions, was Rupees 278-8 during summer. Mr. Shaw suggested that in winter the post-bags should be carried right through by men on horseback, two at a time, as it would be almost impossible to keep dāk men at the different stations, and men on foot would meet with great difficulties from snow. He said that Captain Molloy could probably arrange for this from the Ladakh side with Mr. Johnson, and that he himself would endeavour to manage for provisions, &c., for a small gang of Ladakh men and ponies to be posted at the nearest point of the Ameer of Kashgar's territories.

The arrangements were approved by orders of Government No. 203P., dated 24th September 1874. The whole management of the dāk was subsequently taken over by Captain Molloy, Officiating British Joint Commissioner, Ladakh. By grouping the postmen together and lessening the number of stages, the expense of the winter post was reduced, and the revised cost of Rupees 211-4 per mensem during the cold weather months was sanctioned in orders No. 934P., dated 15th March 1874.

[*Political A., Sept. 1874, Nos. 390-92, and March 1875, Nos. 580-82.*]

259. Mr. Shaw's advance from Leh. Syud Yakoob Khan's letter proposing that they should return together. Instructions issued by the Government of India.—The intention of advancing from Leh on 1st September 1874 was carried into effect, but on the night of the 2nd September the special messenger despatched on the previous July arrived with the following letter from Syud Yakoob Khan Torah :—

" I received your letter at an auspicious time on the 1st of the month of Rujjub at Kashgar, for which I thank you. You wrote that you expected to meet me on the way. I am now staying at my own house. My master has issued orders permitting you to advance. *Afterwards you and I will return* together. I trust that on receipt of this letter you will push on as fast as possible, so that on our return journey we may not be met with obstacles on the road (cold, &c.)*

* Does not say where.

" I send 'salaams' herewith to the Governor-General, Foreign Secretary, and to the Punjab Government."

This communication took every one by surprise. Mr. Shaw found it impossible to conjecture whether the reference to their immediate return proceeded from ignorance of the purpose of his coming, or from a deliberate wish that it should not be carried out: his letter to the Syud had been confined to a vague statement of his approach with the ratified Treaty without specifying any further purpose. The view taken by the Government of India is illustrated by the subjoined extract from the Foreign Secretary's Note of 18th September 1874 :—

" Till Mr. Shaw reaches the Ameer's Court, it will not be known what the real aspect of affairs is. But it looks at present as if the Durbar did not wish a permanent Resident from us. However anxious we may be to establish a Resident there, I presume Government would not take their stand on the Treaty right, or push the matter against the Ameer's wishes. We must have no representative at all, unless he is there with the Ameer's cordial concurrence."

The orders issued on 19th September 1874 were that *Mr. Shaw should return to India after the completion of his mission in regard to the Treaty, unless the Ameer expressed a decided wish that he should remain.*

[*Secret, September 1874, Nos. 40-42 and K.-W.*]

260. Mr. Shaw's arrival at Shahidulla. Passage of the Karakorum. Journey of the Central Asian trading caravan.—By 20th September 1874 Mr. Shaw had arrived at Shahidulla, where he was met by a Yuzbashi and other officials of Yarkund. A letter of welcome from the Dadkhwah had already been delivered at Suget, one march before Shahidulla, by the Meer Moonshee of the Ladakh Agency, who had been sent on in advance and who had been hospitably received by the Dadkhwah. The camp suffered little loss in the passage of the Karakorum. Mr. Shaw wrote:—

“ Four nights in succession snow fell, and during one whole march there was a snow-storm. This was on the south side of the Karakorum. The greatest cold registered has been zero of Fahrenheit, but for several nights our minimum temperature was within four or five degrees of zero. Out of 104 hired horses only two have died, and these were of the stoutest and best, as are usually those that are attacked by the strange and fatal vertigo that occurs at high elevations. Four other ponies belonging to the peasants of Nubra and Ladakh and engaged in carrying supplies have also died, and for these I am paying compensation (as well as for two of His Highness the Maharaja's horses that died). The terms of hire of the other horses throw any losses that may occur on the owners.

The experiences of the one portion of the Central Asian caravan had been less favorable:—

“ Mr. Russell, Manager of the Central Asian Trading Company, arrived here some days before me. The mule contractors who preceded him with a part of his goods arrived here in perfect safety without the loss of a single mule out of their 200 animals. The same was the case with the owners of 200 more mules which were hired by the month. But another batch of about 150, also hired by the month, has suffered some losses. Mr. Russell reports 28 dead and two missing. He himself being on ahead with another portion of his caravan, the owners of the last batch left their loads on the ground and deserted. Mr. Russell has, however, been able to arrange with some of the first arrived mule-owners, and also with the owners of some of my discharged carriage, to go back and fetch the abandoned loads, which are only six or seven marches back.

“ The loss of mules is doubtless partly due to a snow-storm of unusual severity for this time of year which attacked the caravan on Lingzi-Tang. But the remarkable and entire exemption from loss enjoyed by the owners of three-fifths of the animals which were exposed to similar risks shows that there must have been something wrong in the arrangements of the other owners. The probability of this explanation is borne out by the fact that the chief contractor of the foremost batch of mules was the contractor of the Kulla mule train established by the Kangra district authorities five years ago, and which has been so successfully plying on this Ladakh road ever since, extending its operations last year even up to this place (Shahidulla). His experience of the road must have taught him to avoid the evils under which the others suffered. He and his companions profess to me their perfect readiness to repeat the journey next year with any number of mules, and are now going on to Yarkund in order to see what the remainder of the road is like.”

[*Political A., October 1874, Nos. 195-96.*]

261. March to Sanju. Hospital reception.—The party crossed the Sanju Pass on the 24th September 1874 with the loss of one horse, and on the 27th the village of Sanju was reached. The Beg or Governor was profuse in his attentions and hospitality. On the way the travellers met numerous horses, camels, bullocks, and asses going up to fetch the goods of the Central Asian Trading Company from Shahidulla. Many of these animals had been sent by order of the Dadkhwah of Yarkund under the charge of officials: but many also were being taken up by the owners on speculation, laden with provisions which they hoped to sell to Mr. Russell, making a further profit by conveying his goods down for hire.

[*Political A., November 1874, Nos. 271-72.*]

262. Arrival of Mr. Shaw at Yarkund. He meets with Syud Yakoob Khan and arranges for a flying visit to Kashgar.—Mr. Shaw reached Yarkund in safety on the 6th October 1874. He was received with the utmost cordiality by the Dadkhwah, and immediately paid a visit to Syud Yakoob Khan 'Torah, who had arrived two days before. The Syud said that the Ameer proposed shortly to visit the eastern part of his dominions, and was only waiting in Kashgar to receive the British officers before starting. It was therefore suggested that Mr. Shaw and his party should leave their heavy baggage at Yarkund and pay a visit to Kashgar with only a few of their people to see the Ameer before his departure; and should then return and spend the winter with the Dadkhwah at Yarkund until the Ameer returned from his eastward journey. It was then arranged that Mr. Shaw should leave Yarkund on the 12th October.

263. Conversations with Syud Yakoob Khan. The Ameer's wishes regarding a British Resident. Remarks regarding the position of England towards Russia.—The conversations which Mr. Shaw had with Syud Yakoob Khan 'Torah explained the proposal that the two should return together to India. The letter dated 10th October 1874 in which these conversations were reported to Government deserves attention. Mr. Shaw thus described what had passed:—

“At our first and second meetings here he informed me that when my letter to his address had arrived in which I announced my coming with the ratification of the Treaty he had shown it to the Ameer, who had ordered him to write in reply that he (the Syud) would wait at Kashgar for me, and then return with me to India before the winter. He had accordingly written the letter which I received; but after some time had ventured to represent to His Highness that we were guests coming from a great distance by a long and tiresome journey, and that it would scarcely be hospitable to ask us to start back again after four or five days' halt only. The Ameer has assented to this view (not having considered the matter in this light before), and consequently it had been arranged that the Syud should start at once, meeting me *en route*; that we should be invited to proceed at once lightly equipped to Kashgar, and accomplish our business of delivering the ratification of the Treaty, after which we should return to Yarkund and rest ourselves for some months (perhaps going again to see the Ameer on his return from the East).

“I deferred making any reply to this until I should see the Syud Torah in a private interview at my own quarters. On the occasion of that interview he further informed me that the arrangement he had come to with Sir Douglas Forsyth was this: that no action should be taken by the Government of India on the Article of the Treaty which provides for the residence of a British Representative at Kashgar until next year; that meanwhile, as the Ameer had submitted himself to the suzerainty of the Porte, it was fit that the Treaty lately concluded with the British Government should be reported to the Sultan for his sanction, and that then on his (the Syud's) return through India His Excellency the Viceroy should appoint a Representative under the Treaty, who should accompany him back to Kashgar. My name, he said, had been mentioned to the Ameer, and approved of by His Highness as that of the person to be appointed by the Government of India when the time came for doing so. He moreover stated that apprehensions of Russians ruled in the counsels of the Ameer.

“I expressed my astonishment at hearing all this, saying that certainly this had not been the impression brought away by Sir Douglas Forsyth and communicated by him to Government (see paragraphs 8, 9, 14, 17 of letter No. 138, dated 2nd February 1874, from the Envoy to Yarkund). That moreover it was now known to all Europe that a Treaty had been concluded with the Ameer providing for the residence of a British Representative at Kashgar, and also that a British Political Agent had been sent up to the Court of His Highness. It would naturally be concluded that he was sent up as Resident, and should he return at once, serious doubt would be thrown in the minds of European Statesmen in the sincerity of the friendship which has been established between the British Government and the Ameer. I ventured to add that, in my opinion, the reception of a British Resident was the best remedy for the apprehension he had mentioned. One of the great advantages of the Treaty lately concluded was, that the due performance of its conditions would afford a striking means of rebutting the charge of insincerity and habitual breach of faith brought against the States of Central Asia by their Northern neighbours (so I had been informed by His Highness the Ameer himself in 1869), and which he had told me afforded excuse to the Russian General for so-called reprisals and annexation. That moreover the presence of a British Representative would clench the general argument by means of his unbiassed reports in each particular instance, and enlighten

not merely the public opinion of Europe (for which all Governments had a great regard), but even the Russian Government, which was at present entirely dependent for its knowledge of the facts on its own General, who might be said to be both plaintiff and sole witness in their own case.

"The Syud Torah assented to all this; but said 'The mistake has been in not carrying out what was agreed upon with Sir Douglas Forsyth. Everything must be done slowly and with deliberation. When was it that you first opened the door of this country? Six years ago, was it not? And in these six years we have accomplished a great deal. If you cannot stay this time, I hope at any rate to bring you back next year, and that the wish of your Government may be accomplished in the end. I know how important it is to them that this country should be erected into a bastion of defence for India.'

"Upon this I said: 'To us this country may or may not be a bastion of defence, but to the Ameer and his dynasty it is without doubt the very sanctuary of life. To preserve it independently is worth infinitely more pains on the part of the Ameer than on our part. If a foreign nation were to fix its outpost at Shadulla, it may be, as you say, that we should have a bastion the less, but where would the Ameer be?' Here the Syud interposed: 'We might lose our country, but so also would you. Russia might not attack you across the mountains, but she would make India untenable for you. You know how many troops the Maharaja of Cashmere has, and how many the other Princes of India have. You may have a large army, but these Princes have between them a larger. All this would be thrown into confusion, and India would become a wilderness.' I answered: 'We have held our own in India and are ready, please God, to do so again. But even if we were to reach the height of absurdity, and imagine India gone, then would England be as safe as ever, with but one dependency the less. There is no possible comparison of such a position with that of a small State under a new Ruler, who, if he lose once, loses all. The question of friendship between his Government and that of England possesses a vastly different importance for him and for us. To us the independence of Kashgaria is a mere frontier question: to the Ameer it is life itself. Which party then should show the most anxiety in the matter?'

"The Syud Torah hereupon changed his manner and adopted a tone of candour and sincerity. He expressed cordial agreement with all the views I had been urging (especially those of paragraph 5 above), even illustrating them by fresh figures of speech. He assured me that he had been pouring advice accordant with them into the ears of the Ameer, till he was weary. The Ameer, however, was a man of difficult temper, and moreover he had such an unreasoning and blinding dread of the Russian power that (the Syud declared with much emphasis) 'If it were not against the law of the Mussulman faith, he would to-morrow declare himself tributary of Russia in order to secure himself against her hostility. Thus, although he had a great friendship for the British Government, his chief anxiety was lest he should take any step that would offend Russia.' 'If Russia,' continued the Syud, 'were to send a force to attack Kashgar, could you send one to repel it? You know you could not. Allow us therefore to guard against danger from that quarter in such a manner as we may, seeing that you cannot undertake to save us from it.'

"I replied that our power to use effective action in Central Asia was a point that it was not necessary to discuss, since it was not our custom to make war unless the interests of England were at stake. Moreover, we were at this moment, and hoped to remain, on the best terms of friendship with Russia, a friendship cemented by the recent Royal marriage. 'But,' I said, 'war is not the only way in which events are influenced in civilised States. The public opinion of Europe is very powerful: many deeds are done in the darkness which the light would prevent. If a great man's servant is ill-using a weaker man, it is often sufficient to call the master or his neighbours to witness the fact. He will stop from shame. It would be unfair to say no good has been done, because no one came forward and engaged in a personal struggle. The work was accomplished without this. The Syud replied: 'Quite true. Why should there not be sense of shame among nations as among individuals? But the Ameer will not accept this view, though I repeatedly urged it on him. Personally I may tell you that I would rather (should it please God to destroy the independence of this country) that it should become dependent on England than on Russia. Why did I leave Constantinople, where I was enjoying a comfortable pension? It was because I thought that my knowledge of Western politics might be useful to my relative the Ameer by inducing him to make an alliance with the English. I have worked at this task for five years, forsaking care and rest; and what reputation and advancement I have obtained has been from this work. There is now no one in this country greater than myself, except the Ameer. You also have been a sharer in this work from the beginning. Let us not spoil it by precipitation; and spoiled it will be if the Ameer is pressed at this time on the subject.'"

These revelations were no less unexpected by the Government of India than by Mr. Shaw. The records of the Foreign Office were ransacked to see whether there had been any such hint as that the carrying-out of the treaty was to depend upon the pleasure of the Sultan as the Suzerain of the Ameer. Nothing

could be found save a demi-official letter from Sir T. D. Forsyth to the Foreign Secretary, dated 2nd February 1874, in which were the following remarks :—

“ My official letter announces the conclusion of the Treaty with the Ameer of Kashgar, but there is much to tell which even this demi-official form of communication will scarcely explain fully.

“ I have alluded officially to the prejudices and fears which have been opposed to our negotiations, and I think it necessary to deal with these as quickly as possible. For some time, as you have been made aware, I had doubts about an European representative being agreed to, and when the Syud brought the Ameer's consent he said: *His Highness wished to send his representative first, and on his arrival in India, our representative could be sent to Kashgar.* The idea of our fastening ourselves upon him seems to disturb the Ameer, and this makes me hesitate to carry out liberally the instructions contained in the 17th paragraph of your letter No. 1851, dated 18th August 1873.”

Sir T. D. Forsyth was asked demi-officially whether any conversation had taken place indicating an intention on the part of the Ameer to refer to the Sultan as his Suzerain before carrying out the treaty. He replied, as reported in despatch No. 74, dated 24th December 1874, to the Secretary of State, that there was no foundation whatever for the statement made by Syud Yakoob Khan Torah that the provisions of the treaty were understood to be dependent on the pleasure of the Sultan of Turkey.

Mr. Shaw was then instructed, as follows, by orders No. 2732P., dated 11th December 1874—

“ It is the wish of the Governor-General in Council that you should return to India upon the opening of the passes next year; and I am to request you to make your arrangements accordingly. If His Highness the Ameer should urge you to stay, you will reply that you must report the request for the orders of the Government of India. If the Ameer should then press you to remain pending the receipt of a reply, you are at liberty to do so. But you will give no impression that you are to become a permanent representative of the Government of India in Kashgar; on the contrary, it will be of advantage that you should let it be generally known that your instructions are to return to India as soon as the passes are open after delivery of the ratified copy of the Treaty in exchange for the copy in the possession of His Highness the Ameer.”

[*Secret, December 1874, Nos. 64—68.*]

264. Mr. Shaw's journey from Yarkund to Kashgar. First reception by the Ameer. Description of John Campbell the hero of “*Lost among the Afghans.*”—Mr. Shaw left Yarkund on the 12th October 1874, and arrived at Kashgar on the 17th. The first interview with the Ameer took place on the 19th, and His Highness professed the most friendly sentiments. It may be worth while to notice here that in the course of this journey Mr. Shaw met an European “*Dervesh,*” of whom the Report of 19th October 1874 gives an interesting description :—

“ At Kizil, the second march from Yarkund, a certain Afghan merchant, formerly known to me in Ladakh, came to see me, and stated that he had with him a countryman of ours, who had been living for some years in this country as a “*dervesh.*” Having something the matter with his eyes he wished to see the Doctor. Accordingly Doctor Scully was good enough to return at once with the Afghan merchant to his quarters, where he had a long talk with the supposed “*dervesh.*” This person afterwards called on me in the evening.

“ The account he gives of himself is this :—That he is the son of English parents who were killed during the Cabul massacre, and that he was brought up as an Afghan till the age of 15 or 16. Then learning his parentage, he made his way to Teheran, where some English gentlemen received him and forwarded him to India. He there adopted the name of John Campbell from the supposed name of his parents. After this he was sent to England; but apparently tiring of the bustle of civilized life, he found his way to this country where he has been living for seven or eight years. I asked him whether a book had not been written about him in England, and he replied at once—‘*Yes, Lost among the Afghans.*’ This book I remember reading, and it corresponds with the account of his life given by the ‘*dervesh.*’

“ His face was certainly English looking, with light eyes, dark hair, and a rough brown beard. He has a broad brow and rather a long nose. I mention these particulars in case it should be wished to identify him. His hands were remarkably light-colored (for this country) and of slender shape. But his knowledge of English was very small, and I found it easier to converse with him in Persian. His manner was most strange. Always looking round to

right and left, and everywhere except in the face of his interlocutor; losing the thread of his subject, contradicting his previous statements, or returning a vacant look to a question put to him, he seemed to be counterfeiting or to be really under the influence of madness or rather idiocy. An occasional shrewd remark or glance seemed to contradict this appearance however; while Dr. Scully reports that during his own interview the Anglo-Afghan showed much more possession of his senses.

"I, of course, offered him every assistance if he wished to leave the country. He seemed indifferent about this however, sometimes speaking well of the country and its Ruler, and sometimes complaining of bad treatment. When pressed to take money for his possible wants, he at first refused, but finally consented with an apparent effort, and when asked to name the amount he wished for, said five *tangas* (one rupee). This occurred twice; the same sum being mentioned to Dr. Scully and afterwards to me. He expressed great gratitude at the interest taken in him. He was able to read English, for he deciphered a written paper which I handed to him; and he stated that he had seen Colonel Gordon and the officers that were with him. When asked what made him leave England, he said—'They were all too busy to attend to me. Telegraphs were working and railways running in all directions, and no one had time to give to a poor stranger, or to enquire what he wanted.' We have told him that if he will call on us in Yarkund on our return, we will assist him in getting back to India should he desire it."

[*Secret, December 1874, No. 69.*]

265. Delivery of the ratified Treaty to the Ameer at an interview on the 22nd October 1874.—The Ameer received Mr. Shaw at a formal interview on the 22nd October 1874. The party were preceded by the Meer Moonshee carrying the Viceroy's letter on a gold-worked silver plate, and by another man bearing the ratification of the Treaty with a Persian translation and a memorandum of the correction desired in Article IX (see above page 182); the escort of Guides were in attendance, and remained drawn up in the square before the palace while the officers entered.

The letter and ratification were presented by Mr. Shaw separately to His Highness, Dr. Scully taking them from the hands of their bearers. These latter remained in the Court-yard, a few paces off at the foot of the steps, afterwards retiring.

In presenting the ratification Mr. Shaw expressed the hope that he might again be the bearer of letters of friendship from His Excellency the Viceroy to the Ameer. To which His Highness replied, "May God grant it!" Mr. Shaw also requested the Ameer to furnish him with his own ratification in exchange for that presented: and this the Ameer promised to do. The interview closed with expressions of good-will.

266. Mr. Shaw proposes to remain in Yarkund, but is referred to orders directing his conditional recall.—In a subsequent report dated 29th October 1874 Mr. Shaw stated that he had abstained from committing himself to the suggestion of a permanent residence. As, however, the Ameer had by the mouth of Syud Yakoob Khan Torah expressed a wish that he should remain in the country for the present, and as these words had been corroborated by actions of hospitality, Mr. Shaw considered that the instructions of Government admitted of his remaining, until at any rate he saw reason to anticipate any change or a withdrawal of welcome.

He was, however, merely referred by the Government of India to the previous orders directing him to return unless pressed by the Ameer to remain.

[*Secret, December 1874, Nos. 69—71.*]

267. Syud Yakoob Khan's return to India. Arrangements made for his journey.—Leaving Mr. Shaw at Kashgar, we shall now follow Syud Yakoob Khan Torah back to India, and show what took place there. The Syud arrived at Leh on the 8th November 1874, under a salute of 15 guns. This honor was by orders of Government paid to him at all saluting stations. The Government of the Punjab had been already instructed to receive the

Envoy with the attention shown him on the previous journey. He was to be treated as the guest of the British Government, and to be accompanied by an European Officer well acquainted with the Persian language. The Officer selected was Captain Hunter of the Corps of Guides. The Envoy reached Lahore early in January 1875, and visited Agra on his way to Calcutta. At Lahore he made over to the Punjab Government three horses for the Viceroy, and one for the Foreign Secretary. The horses were afterwards ordered to be sold by auction, or as might be thought best.

[*Political A., November 1874, Nos. 267—270 and 286-87, and letter to Punjab No. 76 C. P., dated 29th March 1875.*]

268. Syud Yakoob Khan's arrival in Calcutta in January 1875. Letters from the Ameer of Kashgar to the Viceroy.—Syud Yakoob Khan arrived in Calcutta in the middle of January 1875, and was entertained as the guest of the British Government. He brought letters from the Ameer of Kashgar to the Queen and the Viceroy of India. In the letter of the Viceroy, after the usual compliments and expressions of friendship, it was said :—

“In order to return thanks for the kindnesses which have been shown to me by a friend of the English Government, *i.e.*, the Khalif of Room (Sultan of Turkey), Syud Yakoob Khan, who is a well-wisher of the two exalted Governments, has again received orders in accordance with the friendship and concord between the two Governments, and it has been settled that during his journey the said Agent should present himself before you and remain in your society for a few days and perform the due obligations of friendship which are incumbent on him. He will also converse on the affairs which are necessary for the well-being of the two high Governments, and will offer his congratulations on the marriage of our Lady the Queen* of the sea and land and Empress who diffuses kindness, and he will deliver a letter of congratulation according to your friendly advice. I trust that your life may be happy.”

269. Interview with the Yarkund Envoy on 21st January 1875.—On the 21st January 1875, the Yarkund Envoy was received officially by the Foreign Secretary.

Reports spread by mischievous persons in Cashmere.—In reply to an enquiry whether there was anything which the Envoy wished to mention, he said that friendship existed between the two Governments, but that people in Cashmere had been sending mischievous letters to Yarkund, to the effect that it was not good to enter into friendly alliance with the British, also that missionaries had already penetrated into Cashmere, and if the Ameer allied himself with the British Government they would soon make their way into Kashgar territory. The Envoy mentioned two persons who had acted thus, *viz.*, Guffoor Shah and Ghoolam Shah. These persons had also falsely represented that a trader named Mahomed Khan had gone into partnership with some Englishman to purchase 10,000 guns for the Ameer of Kashgar. On being asked what he wished the British Government to do in this matter, he merely desired these people to be prevented from sending such exciting and mischievous reports to Kashgar.

Trade between Kashgar and China.—The Envoy said that he had mentioned the subject of trade with China to the Viceroy. What was desired was that the British Government should ascertain through Her Majesty's Minister at Peking whether the Chinese were ready to enter into commercial relations with Kashgar. If they were, he could guarantee that no obstacles would be placed in the way of trade by the Government of Eastern Turkestan.

Relations between the Governments of Kashgar and Afghanistan.—Under this head, the Envoy remarked that the character of a nation could not be changed: the Russians were rapidly approaching towards the Afghan frontier. When he had visited Constantinople, the Sultan had advised him that it would be expedient for Kashgar, acting under the advice of the British Government, to enter into friendly terms with Cabul. The Sultan added

* An allusion to the marriage of His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh.

that, if it should be thought proper, after consulting with the British Government, he would be willing to enter into the same connexion with Afghanistan as already existed between Turkey and Kashgar, with the view of an offensive and defensive alliance being arranged between the two Central Asian powers against Russia. The Envoy continued that if the British Government thought fit, he would send a letter from Calcutta to the Ameer of Cabul by post: and in the event of the reply being favorable, further instructions might be sought from the Atalik Ghazee who would be advised to depute an Envoy to Afghanistan.

Arrival of Mr. Shaw in Kashgar and his stay there.—The Envoy observed that according to the original arrangement an officer from Kashgar was to be sent to India, after which an officer from India was to proceed to Kashgar. Mr. Shaw, however, had represented to the Envoy that it would be ignominious if he were turned back from the Ameer's territories, to which the Envoy had replied that Mr. Shaw had better say nothing on the subject until he (the Syud) had visited Calcutta for the purpose of ascertaining whether it was the desire of the British Government that Mr. Shaw should stay or not. Mr. Shaw then observed (see *supra* page 182) that some particular word ought to have been inserted in the treaty; but the Envoy pointed out that the meaning of the treaty would be the same whether the word were inserted or not. However, it was agreed that the question should be held in suspense until the Envoy should have visited Calcutta and ascertained the wishes of the Viceroy.

Jaghir in Cashmere.—The Envoy said that his father Syud Ali of Hamadan possessed house property in Cashmere and had purchased certain villages. The Cashmere authorities acknowledged the authenticity of the papers which had been shown to them and were prepared to put the Envoy in possession of his property, valued at Rs. 13,000, half in cash and half in land. But the Cashmere people said they were servants of the British Government, and wished, in the first instance, to ascertain its views. All that the Envoy asked for was that the Government should write to the Cashmere authorities and inform them that there was no objection to his being given the property in question. He added that the Cashmere people had promised compliance with his request, chiefly because he was a friend of the British Government.

Observations of the Foreign Secretary.—The Foreign Secretary caused the Envoy to be informed that some of the subjects mentioned, such as the relations between Kashgar and Afghanistan, Mr. Shaw's residence in the Ameer's territories, and the terms of the treaty, were matters of importance, that as he had not received notice of intention to discuss them, he would not then state the views of Government, but that the Viceroy would be consulted, and another day would be appointed for further consideration of the Envoy's suggestions.

270. Explanation of the Envoy's remarks regarding the arms said to have been ordered from England by the Ameer's Agent, and regarding the residence of a British Agent at Kashgar.—There are two points in the above conversation which require special remark—

First.—*The arms ordered by Mahmood Khan for the Ameer of Kashgar.*—From information communicated by the officer on special duty in Cashmere, it seems that Mahmood Khan is the son of a man who gave valuable assistance to the Ameer of Kashgar in the earlier part of his career. On the death of his father, Mahmood Khan came into some property which he squandered on debauchery. Hearing of Mahmood Khan's destitution, the Ameer sent him a handsome present of money for his father's sake, and Mahmood Khan then went to Cashmere, where he continued his dissolute course of life. Reduced once more to poverty, he came across Colonel Gardiner, and finding that the latter wished to export arms to Yarkund, he gave himself out as an

Agent of the Ameer, and got Colonel Gardiner to order 20,000 stand of arms from England.

A nephew of Colonel Gardiner, Mr. Kiernan, actually proceeded to Cashmere in August 1874, with samples of the arms that were to be supplied. He was stopped, however, and informed that the Government of India would await an official application from Yarkund before considering whether a license should be given under the Indian Arms Act for the importation of the 20,000 stand of arms said to have been got ready for exportation from England.

It should be observed that the Cashmere authorities entirely repudiated any connexion with this affair, and Colonel Gardiner, when called upon by Dewan Kriparam to explain his conduct, asserted that he had been introduced to the Yarkundee merchant Mahmood Khan by Guffoor Shah (one of the mischievous persons named by Syud Yakoob Khan), and that at the request of Mahmood Khan he (Colonel Gardiner) had written to his nephew of the firm of Kiernan and Co. to send out samples of the arms. Whether the Cashmere people were aware of Mahmood Khan's proceedings, and whether the latter was in any way authorized from Yarkund, must remain doubtful; but Sir Douglas Forsyth in a demi-official letter to the Foreign Secretary, dated 27th July 1874, expressed a decided opinion that Syud Yakoob Khan would not have countenanced an arrangement so opposed to the spirit of the recent treaty by entering into such negotiations with Cashmere unknown to the British Government.

Second.—The alleged understanding as to the residence of a British representative at Kashgar.—It has already been shown on pages 196—198 what the alleged understanding was, and it has been noted that Sir T. D. Forsyth repudiated the supposed arrangement. In his demi-official letter to the Foreign Secretary, dated 4th December 1874, Sir T. D. Forsyth wrote:

“The Syud at an earlier stage (*i.e.*, of the treaty negotiation) said that Shaw's advent ought to be postponed till the Ameer sent his ambassador, but he waived this point before I mentioned Shaw's coming to the Ameer.”

The two parties to the discussion were, therefore, at issue on the question of fact.

271. Interview with the Yarkund Envoy on 29th January 1875. Report circulated from Cashmere. Trade with China. The Envoy's visit to England and Russia. Mr. Shaw's residence in Cashmere, &c.—The next official interview with the Yarkund Envoy took place on the 29th January 1875.

The first point referred to was the case of the two men Guffoor Shah and Golam Shah in Cashmere who had been sending disquieting messages to Yarkund. The Envoy was informed that the Viceroy hoped to see the Maharaja of Cashmere at Simla in the course of next summer, and would bring the matter to the notice of His Highness with the view of putting a stop to the proceedings of these people. The Government of India were aware of the fact that Mahmood Khan had been put forward as the Agent of Yarkund for the purchase of arms: but the story was not credited, and Government caused the *soi-disant* Agent to be informed that the import of arms would not be permitted until we received official information from Yarkund that the translation was duly authorized. The Envoy replied that such matters were never carried on under his master's orders without written instructions and intimation being duly given.

Trade between Yarkund and China.—The Secretary informed the Envoy that what he wished would be done, *viz.*, that Her Majesty's Minister at Peking would be instructed to ascertain whether the Chinese authorities were willing to promote such trade or not, and to inform the Chinese authorities that the Envoy had stated there would be no obstacles from the Yarkund side.

The Envoy's visit to England and afterwards to Russia.—He was asked whether he was the bearer of a letter from the Ameer to Her Majesty, and replied that he was charged with such a letter, the purport of which was simply to congratulate Her Majesty on the marriage of the Duke of Edinburgh with the Grand Duchess Marie of Russia. He said he

would give the Government of India a copy. The Secretary said that this was quite proper: but that as it was necessary to make preparations for his journey and reception, the Viceroy would telegraph to England and ascertain the wishes of the Queen on the subject. The Envoy then asked whether the Indian Government thought it likely that Russia would object to his going to England. The Secretary replied that of course we could not undertake to say what would please or offend Russia: but that so far as the Indian Government was concerned, it had no objection to his visiting St. Petersburg, and it was difficult to suppose that the Russians could see anything improper in his paying a visit to England. It was made plain to the Envoy that he need not be anxious *on account of the Indian Government* in this matter.

Offensive and defensive alliance with Afghanistan.—The Secretary informed the Envoy—

1st.—That as the object of such an alliance would necessarily be against Russia, and as friendship existed between England and Russia, the Indian Government could not advise his Sovereign to take any such step as to send a letter to Cabul for such a purpose.

2nd.—That in our opinion the measure proposed would tend to precipitate matters and bring about those very complications which the Ameer of Kashgar was anxious to avert.

3rd.—That the Indian Government thought Afghanistan would not, under existing circumstances, prove a source of real strength to Kashgar; but that on the contrary, the alliance would probably have the effect of inducing fresh complications without affording Kashgar any effective strength.

4th.—That the best advice which could be given to the Ameer of Kashgar was that given by the late Governor-General some years ago, and concurred in by Lord Northbrook. The advice, namely, which Sir Douglas Forsyth had personally communicated to His Highness, that it was his best policy to cultivate friendship with Russia and studiously to avoid all causes of offence, to strengthen the Government of his dominions, and to pursue such a course as would entitle him to the sympathy of the civilised nations of Europe in the event of his being the object of unjust aggression. The Secretary explained that nations were like individuals in this respect—that they were influenced by feelings of justice and shame, and that so long as Kashgar acted fairly and amicably, it would be a cause of shame to Russia if Russia assailed her, and in fact Russia would be less likely to do so than if the slightest ground of justification were afforded by the policy of the Ameer. The Envoy was told that the public opinion of Europe had great weight in international affairs, and that Kashgar would be more likely to retain its independence and power when pursuing a fair and upright course than by mixing itself up with the complicated affairs and neighbouring nations such as the Afghans. The Viceroy therefore could not advise him to send any such letter as he had proposed to the Ameer of Cabul.

Mr. Shaw's residence in the territories of the Ameer of Kashgar.—The Envoy was informed that Mr. Shaw had received orders to return to India after delivering the ratified treaty to the Ameer as soon as the passes were open. If the Ameer pressed him to stay, Mr. Shaw was to refer the question for orders. To this the Envoy replied that he had already sent a letter to the Ameer advising that Mr. Shaw should be requested to remain. The Secretary thereupon observed that Mr. Shaw would be guided by his instructions. If the Ameer was very anxious that he should stay, the matter would be submitted for orders. We were of course glad to have an officer resident at His Highness' Court, but we had not the slightest wish to do anything in this respect without the Ameer's full concurrence, or which might cause him any trouble or embarrassment.

The insertion of a particular word in the Treaty.—The Envoy was informed that we attached no importance to this matter, but that Mr. Shaw had by this time brought it to the notice of the Ameer, and if it were thought

necessary to make any alteration in the wording of the particular article, it would doubtless be done by His Highness' order.

The Envoy's jaghir in Cashmere.—The Secretary said that he would write to the Punjab Government to inform the Maharaja that we should be glad if he could accede to the Envoy's wishes. The letter would have to be sent through the Punjab Government, but the reply could be forwarded to the Envoy wherever he might be.

272. Mr. Wade addressed on the subject of trade between Kashgar and China.—In accordance with the promises given to Syud Yakoob Khan, Her Majesty's Minister at Pekin was informed by letter No. 329 P., dated 1st February 1875, that the Envoy had assured the Governor-General in Council that in the event of the Chinese being willing to promote trade between the two countries, no obstacles would be raised by the Government of the Ameer, but that on the contrary every facility would be offered to encourage the development of such traffic. Mr. Wade was requested, if he saw no objection, to ascertain the sentiments of the Chinese. And it was added that the Government of India had no further interest in the question than in so far as it might be practicable to oblige a Prince who had entered into friendly relations with the British Government.

273. Correspondence relating to Syud Yakoob Khan's jaghir in Cashmere.—On the same date, 1st February 1875, by letter No. 330 P., the circumstances of Syud Yakoob Khan's claim to the jaghir in Cashmere were explained to the Government of the Punjab, who were requested to make the necessary communication to the Maharaja of Cashmere, informing His Highness that if he should be disposed to accede to the Syud's request, no objection would be raised by His Excellency in Council. The following statement of the case by the Maharaja of Cashmere was received with letter from the Punjab Government No. 316, dated 22nd February 1875 :—

“When the Syud passed through Jummoo to Calcutta, he represented verbally that before the period of Sikh rule, his ancestors were in possession of three villages yielding a revenue of 21,000 Rupees Srinagar coin, but that the villages in question were resumed at the commencement of Sikh rule. He added that he was desirous of obtaining a recommendation from the British Government, and that in consideration of his good services to the British Government, he hoped that I would have no objection to act on that recommendation. He was informed in reply that this State owed its prosperity to the British Government, and that nothing was ever omitted to secure the satisfaction of the Government; but as by the Syud's own account the jaghir had been resumed long ago, the original villages could not be restored, but that with the sole desire of pleasing the British Government, land and cash would be assigned him in lieu. I beg therefore to intimate that in accordance with the recommendation of His Excellency the Viceroy, and conditionally on the loyalty of the Syud to the British Government, I will not decline to assign a cash allowance of ten thousand rupees and lands yielding eleven thousand rupees (Srinagar coin in both instances) to the Syud; the rules obtaining in regard to other jaghirdars in Srinagar being applicable in his case also, as it is of paramount importance to secure the satisfaction of the Government. I trust that you will do me the favor of informing His Excellency accordingly.”

274. Syud Yakoob Khan's departure from Calcutta for Bombay on 25th February 1875. Letter from the Viceroy to the Ameer of Kashgar and Yarkund.—Syud Yakoob Khan left Calcutta for Bombay on the 25th February 1875, the Secretary of State having telegraphed on the 3rd February that there was no objection to the Envoy's proposed visit to England. The Bombay Government received instructions by telegrams of 22nd and 24th February to receive the Syud as the guest of the British Government and to honor him with the customary salute of 15 guns. Prior

to his departure from Calcutta the Envoy was received in Durbar by the Viceroy, and the following letter was made over to him for despatch to the Ameer of Kashgar and Yarkund :—

“I have received with much pleasure Your Highness’ friendly letter informing me that Syud Yakoob Khan had been instructed by Your Highness to take the opportunity of presenting himself before me in Calcutta on his way to Constantinople, and of representing matters of importance to the welfare of the two high and friendly Governments. My friend! Your Highness’ Envoy arrived in Calcutta in safety after a prosperous journey through India, and was received with the honor and distinction due to the representative of Your Highness’ Government and to the amity subsisting between the two great countries. Syud Yakoob Khan having announced Your Highness’ wish that he should visit England on his way to the Capital of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, I have the pleasure to inform Your Highness that arrangements have been made for the Envoy’s visit to England. Regarding the other matter of business with which Syud Yakoob Khan was charged, I have caused my sentiments and advice to be conveyed to the Envoy.

“I trust that Your Highness may continue to enjoy the blessings of health and prosperity. A few presents are sent for Your Highness’ acceptance.”

275. Departure of Syud Yakoob Khan from Bombay reported to the Secretary of State, and Ambassador at Constantinople asked to telegraph further particulars to England. Pay sanctioned for Captain Hunter.—Syud Yakoob Khan was also furnished with letters of recommendation to the Political Resident at Aden, Her Majesty’s Consul-General in Egypt, and the British Ambassador at Constantinople. He left Bombay for Europe on the 10th March 1875, accompanied by Captain Hunter, of the Guides. The Secretary of State was informed of the Syud’s movements by despatch No. 16, dated 8th April 1875, in which it was reported that the Envoy purposed, after visiting Constantinople, to proceed to London, and thence to St. Petersburg, and that he was the bearer of a letter from the Ameer to the Queen, congratulating Her Majesty on the marriage of His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh. Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Constantinople was requested by telegram of 22nd April 1875 to telegraph to the Secretary of State the probable date on which Syud Yakoob Khan might be expected to arrive in England, the length of his intended stay there, and the number of attendants who would accompany him. It was arranged that Captain Hunter of the Guides should receive a consolidated salary of Rupees 1,000 per mensem, exclusive of actual travelling expenses, during his employment on special duty with the Envoy, and Captain Hunter also received an advance of Rupees 5,586, to be adjusted afterwards on the submission of the usual detailed bills.

[See *Foreign Dept. Resolution No. 846P.*, dated 9th March 1875. and
Financial „ „ „ 1340, „ 25th February „]

276. Mr. Shaw instructed not to press the Ameer on the subject of the omission of a word from Article IX of the Treaty, and to abstain from interposing on behalf of the Turkish Officers conducted by Syud Yakoob Khan to Yarkund.—One more result of Syud Yakoob Khan’s visit to Calcutta need be noticed. Mr. Shaw, writing from Kashgar on the 14th December 1874, sent copy of the memorandum regarding Article IX of the Commercial Treaty which he had submitted to the Ameer. The memorandum ran thus :—

“As, owing to the omission of some words in the last sentence of Article IX of the Treaty, the phrase appears to be incomplete, it is therefore stated for information that the Governor-General of India is of opinion that the said sentence of the above Article may be read in the following interpretation: ‘If any other arrangement in this matter or in any other question be deemed desirable in connection with the aforesaid Chiefs and Princes, it shall be carried out through the medium of the British Government.’ It is hoped that the Ameer Saheb, accepting the above clause, will cause it to be inserted in the second copy of the Treaty and then sign it with his own hands.”

Government, however, instructed Mr. Shaw by orders of 5th March 1875 that if the Commercial Treaty with Yarkund had not yet been ratified by His Highness the Ameer, the memorandum regarding the omission of a particular word in Article IX of the Persian version need not be pressed upon His Highness' attention, as it was a matter to which the Governor-General in Council attached no importance. Mr. Shaw having reported in the same letter that the Turkish Officers referred to previously on p. 187 had appealed to him, he was told that the surveillance exercised over the Turkish Officers conducted by Syud Yakoob Khan to Yarkund was not a matter that concerned the British Government, and that he should therefore abstain from interposing in their behalf. The subsequent proceedings of Mr. Shaw and his action taken on behalf of the Central Asian Trading Company will be more conveniently described on some future occasion when the outcome of his mission to Yarkund shall be known.

[*Secret, March 1875, Nos. 56-59.*]

277. Interpretation of the term 'ad valorem' duty in the Treaty with Yarkund.—It has been said at the beginning of this section that the compiler does not intend to enter into the statistics of trade between Yarkund and British India. The opportunity will be more favorable for doing so when the report by Sir T. D. Forsyth shall have been published, and when sufficient time has elapsed for ascertaining the results of the Commercial Treaty. But there are two points which call for notice here: the one connected with the interpretation of the Treaty itself, and the other bearing on the excise revenues of British India. The memorandum by Sir Louis Mallet, dated 10th February 1874, touches both points. He wrote:—

“The proposed Treaty between the British Government and the Atalik Ghazee is very simple, and in the purely commercial articles even meagre.

“I presume that it is difficult and often undesirable in engagements with countries such as the one now in question to go beyond the most general form of stipulation, but I may observe that in a Treaty with a more civilised State there would be great danger in such a vague and somewhat loose Article as Article V.

“There is nothing to show the understanding of the contracting parties as to the value upon which the $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. *ad valorem* duty is to be levied. Is it to be the value of the goods at the place of origin *plus* the cost of transport and commission, as is the case in most modern Treaties, or is it to be the value of the goods according to their market price in India or in Yarkund?

“Questions of this kind have arisen even between the French and English Custom houses, and in the remote places at which disputes may arise in the execution of the proposed stipulation, I can imagine that such a contention might give rise to serious difficulty.

“Possibly it may be intended, and this would be the wisest course, to amplify and define this general stipulation by regulations annexed to the Treaty in a Protocol, and it is probable that the Article has been considered by those who are conversant with the local ideas and usages.

“As regards Article IV (the subject of much discussion in this correspondence), I would observe that the Government of India have apparently shunted the consideration of the great *churrus* question by drawing an Article which preserves to each Government the independent control and regulation of its municipal duties.

“In the case of *churrus* this may be well, and indeed the whole trade seems a bagatelle, 300 maunds per annum worth about £2,500. But here again I should have thought it a dangerous thing to leave to the Atalik Ghazee the power of imposing any municipal duties or restrictions which his Government may think desirable. It is quite possible that such internal regulations and impositions might altogether neutralise the liberal stipulations with regard to imperial treatment.”

On receipt of this memorandum the Government of India by despatch No. 31, dated 1st May 1874, informed the Secretary of State that no ill result was anticipated from the absence in the treaty of a precise definition of the term *ad valorem*, usage having presumably supplied the place of such a

definition. At the same time the question was referred for opinion to Sir T. D. Forsyth, who submitted the following reply on the 13th June 1874:—

"Though, according to English ideas, the stipulation of an *ad valorem* duty of 2½ per cent. may appear to be somewhat indefinite, yet it is thoroughly understood by all Mahomedans as being the "one in forty" prescribed by the Sharyat, and which has been levied according to established usage throughout all Asiatic (Mahomedan) countries.

"The practice is for the goods to be valued according to the market rate of the place where they are brought for sale, and in cases of dispute, or where it suits the convenience of the local officers, one-fortieth part of the articles is taken in payment of duty.

"The provision in Article V of the Treaty, that in cases of dispute recourse should be had to arbitration, is a degree of protection afforded to our traders which is considerably in advance of the custom.

"I may mention that I referred this matter to one of the chief Indian traders with Yarkund, and asked whether the *ad valorem* duty should be levied on the original invoice, *plus* cost of carriage. He altogether opposed this idea, saying that it would ruin the trade,—the fact being that goods at present are sold in Eastern Turkistan at such advanced rates of profit, that the merchants are unwilling to let the fact be known, and they are afraid, or were so until protected by Treaty, that if the authorities knew the real prices at which merchandise could be carried to Yarkund, these goods would be forcibly taken at those prices, *plus* a small profit.

"If a merchant has goods which cost him, landed at Yarkund, say Rupees 1,000, and the market price for the same is Rupees 1,800 or Rupees 2,000, it is worth his while to pay 2½ per cent. on the Rupees 2,000 rather than to run the risk of having his goods taken by the Government at the lower figure.

"I am aware of a probable dispute arising when an English merchant for instance may appear in the Yarkund market and offer to sell the same goods at much reduced rates. He would probably object to the arbitrary valuation put on them by the authorities; but I presume that when the matter came to be adjusted by arbitration, as provided for in the Treaty, and he declared what the original cost was, and at what price he was prepared to part with his goods, the matter would become adjusted by the market value of the goods being at once reduced.

"I may add that the Russians seem to have accepted the definition as I have put it, and considering the novel character of our dealing with these people, I think it advisable not to attempt too great a particularisation at first.

"As it was, the formal and somewhat complicated wording of parts of the Treaty proved a great stumbling-block to a ruler accustomed to only the simplest terms of expression.

"In course of time, should the difficulty pointed out by Sir Louis Mallet be experienced by Russian or British merchants, some explanation or amplification may be considered necessary and can be negotiated by the representative of the foreign Government concerned, and if such amplification be made by a Russian representative, then by Article I of this Treaty the British representative can claim the same privilege for his country."

This report was sent to the Secretary of State on the 14th July 1874, with the remark that the clause in question was with slight modifications borrowed from the Treaty of 1839 with Muscat, in regard to the working of which no practical difficulties had been experienced.

[*Secret*, June 1874, Nos. 36-42.]

[„ July „ „ 120-121.]

278. Restrictions on the trade in churrus regarded as affecting duties leviable in Kashgar.—In respect to the apprehensions expressed by Sir Louis Mallet on the opening for restrictions or impositions injurious to British commerce given by Article IV of the Treaty, the Secretary of State was referred by despatch, dated 1st May 1874, to the "most favored nation clause" in the first Article, which, viewed in connection with the provisions of the Treaty recently concluded between Russia and the Ruler of Kashgar, seemed to give sufficient security against any imposition or restriction to which the British Government might find it expedient to object. This reply was founded on the following note by Mr. Lefoer Wynne at that time officiating as Foreign Secretary:—

"The clause was deliberately proposed by Government as the only means of securing the continuance of its freedom to levy an excise duty on churrus. And any abuse of the clause on the part of the Ameer is precluded by the most favored nation clause in Article I of the Treaty. Now the Russians by *their* Treaty are exempt from any duty of *any kind* beyond

2½ per cent. *ad valorem*. So that if ever, as an improbable supposition, the Ameer levied such a municipal tax on our goods as (having due regard to our own excise duty on his churrus) it might seem right and prudent to object to, such objection could be based on the most favored nation clause. Churrus again is not included in the known list of exports from Kashgar to Russia, so that the clause could not be turned upon us."

In connection with the subject of the restrictions imposed in British territory on the import of churrus, the Government of India forwarded to the Secretary of State a copy of the rules which had been sanctioned for the Punjab, remarking that they appeared to go as far as was desirable in the direction of lessening the restrictions to which the trade in the drug had previously been subject. The rules will be found in Appendix XI.

[*K. W.*, *Secret*, June 1874, Nos. 36 and 42 and *K. Ws.*]

279. Trouble caused to the Yarkund Mission by the intrigues of Bunyad Ali and Fyz Buksh.—Before closing this section of the chapter on the affairs of Yarkund, it may be well to notice an episode which, though unimportant in itself, illustrates the character of the Yarkundees and the difficulties which a British officer in East Turkestan must be prepared to encounter. On page 177 some allusion has been made to the trouble caused by the intrigues of persons attached to or connected with the Mission. Chief among the mischief-makers was Bunyad Ali, who not only attempted to excite the fanaticism of the people against the Hindoos generally, but also spread lying reports about the alleged misconduct of Tara Sing, a Sikh follower of Sir T. D. Forsyth. In these intrigues Bunyad Ali was seconded by Fyz Buksh, a Moonshee attached to the Mission, who appears to have conceived a violent hatred for Tara Sing. The ill results arising from the proceedings of Bunyad Ali and Fyz Buksh were so grave as for a time to awaken anxiety in the mind of Syud Yakoob Khan for the safety of the Mission.

"This is a most serious matter," the Syud said to Dr. Bellew, "and must not be allowed to go further. This man, Bunyad Ali, must be won over and his mouth closed. He is a man of some influence here and holds a good position with the Dadkhwah, and has the power of inflicting much mischief upon you. He has only to get half a dozen men to waylay Tara Sing as he goes to the bazaar and to run him off before the Kazee with any false accusation, and before he could be rescued or anything done there will be an uproar and disturbance, the end of which no man knows."

Bunyad Ali was therefore conciliated, but warned to be careful for the future, while his associate Fyz Buksh was placed in confinement. As regards Fyz Buksh Mr. Forsyth recorded a memorandum, dated 20th June 1874, to the effect that as his subsequent behaviour had been exemplary, his well-known services to Government should be allowed to weigh against the temporary inconvenience caused by his indulging in petty personal animosities. But the case of Bunyad Ali required more serious treatment. In letter from Sir T. D. Forsyth, dated 19th June 1874, it is said—

"At the time it was necessary to smooth matters over, and I obtained from him a promise that he would abstain from further intrigues against Hindoos, and that he would not correspond with any officials in India except through me.

"This latter stipulation I made in consequence of an intimation given me by Syud Yakoob Khan that Bunyad Ali gave out that he possessed great influence with officials in India, and that he could represent matters as he chose with a certainty of being listened to.

"Bunyad Ali, after this warning, changed his tactics as regards the Hindoos, but was not the less mischievous, for there is good ground for believing that he fomented a quarrel between two Hindoos. To get him out of the way I employed him on a pretext of looking after our missing daks.

"On arrival here I learn from Captain Molloy that Bunyad Ali has been sending periodically news-letters to him, and through him to the Punjab Government, thus setting my orders and his promises aside altogether.

"As my mission is now at an end, it is unnecessary for me to take notice of his conduct so far as I am concerned; but for the future welfare of our relations with Yarkund, I beg to record my opinion that the practise of news-writers sending letters to any official in Ladak

or India independent of the Political Agent at Kashgar is one likely to be fraught with positive danger to the lives of British subjects in Yarkund.

* * * * *

“This individual will soon, probably, return to India, and I think it advisable not only that he should receive no official countenance, but that he should be prevented from entering Yarkund territory again.”

280. Orders issued by Government in the case of Bunyad Ali and with reference to news-writers in Yarkund.—The proceedings of Mr. Forsyth in this matter were fully approved by the Government of India, and it was suggested for the consideration of the Government of the Punjab that all countenance on the part of that Government should be withdrawn from Bunyad Ali.

“He should be prevented,” it was said, “if possible from re-visiting Yarkund, but in the event of his proceeding to that country without permission, he should be informed that the officer on special duty at Kashgar will not extend British protection to him.

“With regard to the general question of the employment of news-writers in Yarkund, His Excellency in Council considers it advisable that persons not specially employed as news-writers should be discouraged from addressing the Punjab Government, and any reports received from such persons should be communicated to the British representative at Kashgar. Further that no news-writers should be employed without the Agent being informed and the news-writers being placed in complete subordination to him.”

[*Secret, July 1874, Nos. 144-147.*]

In reply the Government of the Punjab stated (letter No. 169 C, dated 12th September 1874) that the instructions of the Government of India would be communicated to Bunyad Ali on his return to Ladakh from Yarkund.

The only persons who had been employed by the Government of the Punjab as news-writers in Yarkund were Rahim Bai, a native of Yarkund, and a Moonshee Muhammad Sultan, of Peshawur, both of whom were appointed after demi-official correspondence with the Foreign Secretary at Simla in July 1871. It was added that the employment of these two men had been discontinued since the return of the late Mission from Yarkund.

[*Secret, September 1874, No. 71.*]

SECTION II.

RECENT POLICY OF RUSSIA IN RESPECT TO EASTERN TURKESTAN.

281. Eastern Turkestan important to Russia from a commercial as well as a political point of view.—The state of affairs in Eastern Turkestan is of interest to Russia in two ways. The rise and progress of a warlike and ambitious Mahomedan State on the borders of the Imperial dominions is a matter of weighty moment for the power which has trampled on Islam in Central Asia. Viewed commercially also, the country is important to Russia. It lies in the main path of trade between Tashkend, Kokand, and Western China. Before the Mahomedan insurrection Russian goods are said to have found their way from Kokand into Eastern Turkestan in spite of the Chinese. But since the latter were expelled or destroyed until quite recently, Russian trade has been shut out from the cities of Altishuhur; while, on the other hand, the advance of Ameer Mahomed Yakoob Khan eastward to Ourumtsi, Manass, and even Khami, and the defensive measures taken by him on his northern line in the direction of the Russian posts on the Naryn river, were not calculated to soothe the ill feeling which commercial exclusiveness and fanatical jealousy had excited.

282. Russian unwillingness to recognise the Atalik Ghazee in 1869.—On reference to pages 246-247 of Mr. Wynne's *Précis* it will be found that at the time of Mr. Forsyth's visit to St. Petersburg in 1869, the Russian Statesmen, while disclaiming aggressive designs against the Atalik Ghazee, refused to recognise him as sovereign of the country. Prince Gortschakoff said :—

“ Though the Atalik Ghazee might have established a Government *de facto*, Russia had treaties with China, and could not enter into diplomatic relations with a successful insurgent against the authority of the Chinese Emperor.” And again “ As this Government have no relations with him (the Atalik Ghazee), and the Government of India appear to have dealings with him, you can assure him on my authority that Russia has no hostile intention towards him or any desire to make conquests in his territories.”

Mr. Michell in his memorandum on Eastern Turkestan has pointed out that Prince Gortschakoff's denial of the existence of relations between the Russian Government and the Atalik Ghazee was inconsistent with the fact that in the previous year, 1868, Lieutenant Reinthal had been sent on a mission to Kashgar, while Mirza Shadi had visited St. Petersburg on the part of Yakoob Beg.

283. Mission of Baron Kaulbars to Kashgar in 1872. His reception by the Ameer.—All doubts, however, both as to the readiness of the Russians to enter into relations with the Ameer, and as to the main objects which they had in view, were set at rest by the commercial mission of Baron Kaulbars in 1872. This officer left Tashkend on the 15th (27th) April, accompanied by Lieutenants Scharnhorst and Kolokoltself, by a topographer, and by a delegate from the Society for the promotion of Russian Trade and Industry. From the Naryn the party proceeded along the valley of the Kara Kayun to the Tash-Robot Pass. The road up the valley to the Arpa, and from thence to Chatyrkul, required little to be made practicable for wheeled carriages. From Chatyrkul to Kashgar wheeled conveyances could be driven along the road by which the mission travelled. The road from the Turugart Pass to Kashgar is described as descending through the defile of the Tayun river. At the confluence of the Chakmak with the Tayun there was found an entire system of fortifications. Further on more fortifications commanded the Tayun defile, and below them lay the wide and populous valley of the Artysh.

The mission was favorably received, as will be observed from the Baron's own account republished from the *Turkestan Gazette* in the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* of 23rd August-4th September 1872 :—

“ The negotiations,” he says, “ took place in the fortress of Yangi Shahr, near Kashgar. When our Embassy reached the Durbar Court belonging to the house of Yakoob Beg, we found armed men drawn up on three sides of the Court. The fourth side was occupied by a gallery giving access to the inner rooms.

“ We entered and saw in one of the rooms a man of small stature, but fairly stout, seated on a carpet and completely alone. His countenance was noticeable for regularity of feature, and was lighted up by the intelligent expression of his eyes, though his looks were far from betraying what passed in his mind. He was dressed very simply in a green robe, and wore on his head a white turban. It was the formidable Yakoob Beg—the terror of Eastern Turkestan.

“ When we made our appearance he remained unmoved ; but after our first few sentences he invited us to seat ourselves around him. I pointed out to him the object of my Embassy, and I observed that my allusions to the possibility of a good understanding between Kashgar and Russia produced upon him an impression of lively satisfaction, which he knew not how to conceal. The conversation which followed consisted in the interchange of compliments. On taking leave it was agreed that matters of business should be reserved for the next day.

“ But on the next day no one came from Yakoob Beg to summon us. I thereupon sent to enquire after his health and receive instructions regarding the audience. An answer was brought back to me that Yakoob Beg wished to receive us on the following day, and pursue the negotiations with me alone in the absence of the other members of the Embassy. The next day, the 16th May, in compliance with the wish expressed by me the evening before, we were taken to see a review of the troops, who were drawn up after the Chinese fashion and wore a uniform of glaring colors. Practice in firing ensued. The infantry (*Sarbaz*) and the artillery displayed unquestionable skill. We were next shown a battery of six very fine guns, well equipped and manœuvred with tolerable rapidity according to the English method. The infantry

is armed with rifles and bayonets of English manufacture. The artillery is commanded by an Afghan of gigantic stature and remarkably fine countenance. On the staff there is an instructor of Russian origin.

"In the evening I thanked Yakoob Beg for his kindness, and he replied: 'I regard you as my friends. That is why I have only shown you a small part of my troops. If you were my enemies, I would have shown you my whole army and placed myself at their head.'

"Our interview that evening took place in presence of all the members of the Embassy, but after refreshment my colleagues left and we remained alone. Then Yakoob Beg announced to me that the English had already sent plenipotentiaries to him, but that he preferred the protection of the Sovereign of Russia, his nearest and most powerful neighbour."

284. Articles of the Commercial Treaty concluded between Russia and Kashgar in June 1872.—The Commercial Treaty between Russia and Kashgar was signed by the Ameer at Yangi Shahr on the 8th June 1872. The articles are given below:—

I. All Russian subjects, of whatsoever religion, shall have the right to proceed for purposes of trade to Jety-Shahr, and to all the localities and towns subjected to the Chief of Jety-Shahr which they may desire to visit, in the same way as the inhabitants of Jety-Shahr have hitherto been and shall be in the future entitled to prosecute trade throughout the entire extent of the Russian Empire. The Hon'ble Chief of Jety-Shahr undertakes to keep a vigilant guard over the complete safety of Russian subjects within the limits of his territorial possessions, and also over that of their caravans, and in general over everything that may belong to them.

II. Russian merchants shall be entitled to have caravanserais, in which they *alone* shall be able to store their merchandise, in all the towns of Jety-Shahr in which they may desire to have them.

III. Russian merchants shall, if they desire it, have the right to have commercial agents (caravan bashis) in all the towns of Jety-Shahr, whose business it is to watch over the regular course of trade and over the legal imposition of customs dues. The merchants of Jety-Shahr shall enjoy the same privilege in the towns of Turkestan.

IV. All merchandise transported from Russia to Jety-Shahr, or from that province into Russia, shall be liable to a tax of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. *ad valorem*. In every case this tax shall not exceed the rate of the tax taken from Mussulmans being subject to Jety-Shahr.

V. Russian merchants and their caravans shall be at liberty, with all freedom and security, to traverse the territories of Jety-Shahr in proceeding to countries conterminous with that province. Caravans from Jety-Shahr shall enjoy the same advantages for passing through territories belonging to Russia.

285. Baron Kaulbars' account of the negotiations as read before the Imperial Geographical Society.—The date as above given for the conclusion of the Treaty is accepted by Mr. Michell on the authority of the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* of 1st—13th November 1872; but from the account read by Baron Kaulbars himself before the Imperial Geographical Society, and reported in the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* of the 26th November—8th December 1872, it appears that the negotiations were not so speedily brought to an issue. It is there said:—

"The negotiations with Yakoob Beg lasted two months, during which the chances of success were very uncertain, and the treatment of the officers attached to the Embassy also varied according to the result of the interviews with the Sovereign. At last on the 10th July the Commercial Treaty was concluded, and thenceforth Yakoob Beg displayed a sincerely friendly spirit towards our mission and its leader, and even consented that M. Kolesnikow, the Tashkend trader attached to the mission, should make an excursion to Yarkund. This undertaking, however, was far from pleasing to him, and notwithstanding the consent which he had given,

he tried to put a stop to it by exaggerating the dangers of the journey. M. Kolesnikow was not deterred from undertaking the proposed journey in view of the advantages which it offered for the conclusion of commercial relations, and his bold adventure was crowned by complete success."

The writer then proceeded to describe how the Russian officers spent the two months, visiting Kashgar and its suburbs, reviewing the troops, inspecting the barracks, taking observations of a solar eclipse, surveying, &c. Finally, Baron Kaulbars, attended by Envoys from Yakoob Beg, left Kashgar, *on the 15th July*, passing north of the Naryn Fort by the defile of Jouvan-Arik, in which the traveller finds a good road constructed by the troops of Semiretchensk.

The above account, however circumstantial and apparently authentic, is inconsistent with the statement quoted in Mr. Michell's memorandum on Eastern Turkestan, to the effect that Baron Kaulbars was *followed* to Tashkend by an Envoy from Kashgar named Mirza Mah-ed-din Mahsin, who was admitted to a solemn audience with the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan *on the 16th (28th) June*. In the very same paragraph Mr. Michell states that Baron Kaulbars returned to Tashkend *on the 7th (19th) July*, without seeming to be struck by the fact that this date is irreconcilable with the date which immediately follows.

[*Secret, March 1873, No. 49.*]

286. **Objects sought and gained by the Commercial Treaty between Russia and Kashgar.**—Regarding the conclusion of the Treaty there can be no doubt. The object sought was said to be purely commercial. The *Journal de St. Petersburg* of 1st—13th November 1872 pointed out that up to the year 1863 Jety-Shahr, that is to say, Chinese Turkestan, or the territory of Kashgar, formed part of the Empire of China. In virtue of the Treaty of 1860, the province had been open to Russian trade and the Russians were entitled to have a Consul at Kashgar. Yakoob Beg having made himself master of the country, the Russians could only tolerate him, if he accepted the engagements entered into in their favor by the Government which he had overturned. It was necessary to take much pains and trouble in order to secure, not by force of arms, but by diplomacy, an acknowledgment in behalf of the Russian merchants of the right to trade in all the cities of Jety-Shahr.

The same Journal on the 7th—19th October 1872 commented upon articles which had appeared in the English newspapers stating that Russia had sent troops to the frontier, and that Yakoob Beg had signed the treaty under compulsion. This was not correct. The negotiations had been peaceful and friendly, with no other aim than to promote trade and a good understanding. What better proof of this than the formal assurance given by the Russian Governor-General to the Envoy of Yakoob Beg "that Russia has not entered into Central Asia with the object of making conquests, but to lay the foundations of civilization and liberty?"

As to the assurances which Yakoob Beg was said to have made in presence of Baron Kaulbars that he preferred the friendship of the Great Tsar to that of England, and had consequently declined all the offers of the Indian Government, what were these but illustrations of Asiatic chicanery which every one would know how to estimate at their true value? Yakoob Beg would not fail to use similar language in addressing English negotiators with whom he might be brought into contact.

287. **The Commercial Treaty between Russia and Kashgar as explained by M. Westmann.**—The explanation given by M. Westmann as reported in despatch from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, No. 288, dated 16th October 1872, was much to the same effect:—

"I spoke yesterday to M. de Westmann on the subject of the late mission of Baron Kaulbars to Kashgar, and the present relations of the Imperial Government with the Atalik Ghazee. In doing so I referred to the reply made by Prince Gortschakoff to Mr. Forsyth in 1869 'that although that Ruler might have established a Government *de facto*, Russia had treaties with China and could not enter into diplomatic relations with a successful insurgent against the authority of the Chinese Emperor.'

"I enquired, therefore, of His Excellency whether any change had occurred in the views and opinions of the Imperial Government, and what had really taken place in regard to YakooB Beg.

"M. de Westmann replied that sometime had elapsed since the opinion of Prince Gortschakoff had been expressed, and that since that date YakooB Beg had established his rule over that country and had maintained order. His Excellency said that it was essential to the interests of Russia that their commerce should not be disturbed, as heretofore, by lawless bands of robbers, and that their caravans should be allowed to pass unmolested in safety.

"His Excellency then referred to a statement of an English paper (the *Pall Mall Gazette* he believed), which mentioned that among other demands made by the Imperial Government of YakooB Beg that of a military passage through his dominions had been exacted by Russia. His Excellency begged to assure me most solemnly that these reports were totally unfounded. No demand for free passage for troops had been made of YakooB Beg by the Russian Government, and no menace of any kind had been used towards him.

"M. de Westmann stated that the convention lately entered into with YakooB Beg was solely for the purpose of protecting the trade with that country. YakooB Beg was, at this moment, the dominant Ruler in that country, and as such the Imperial Government had treated with him. If to-morrow the Emperor of China should reconquer that territory and regain his authority over it, the Russian Government would equally enter into relations with him.

"M. de Westmann stated that for some time YakooB Beg had been under the impression that the Russian Government were about to attack Kashgar, and to dispossess him of his authority. He had consequently rejected all friendly advances on their part. It was only after renewed assurances on the part of General Kaufmann, the Governor-General of Turkestan, that no hostile intentions were entertained against him, that YakooB Beg consented to receive a mission, the object of which, on the part of Russia, was to establish friendly relations with him, and to provide for the security of commercial transit."

[*Secret, December 1872, No. 336.*]

288. Recognition of the Sovereign of Kashgar by reception of his Envoy at St. Petersburg in August 1873.—As a further proof that Russia at last recognized the Sovereignty of the Ameer of Kashgar, the Emperor Alexander received on the 5th August 1873 an Envoy who had been sent by the Atalik Ghazee with a complimentary letter to the Czar. The Ameer was anxious that his Envoy should be received at St. Petersburg, which would be tantamount to a recognition of his sovereignty. The circumstances of the mission are thus reported in despatch from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, No. 307, dated 6th August 1873—

"M. de Westmann informed me yesterday that he had presented to the Emperor on the preceding day the Envoy from the Atalik Ghazee.

"His Excellency said that he was charged with a letter from the Atalik Ghazee to the Emperor, which was enveloped in a tin case, but of which he had no copy, as is usual with letters of this nature. The letter from the Atalik Ghazee was merely one of compliment to the Emperor, expressing his devotion and his wish for friendly relations with Russia.

"The Emperor apparently had expected that the object of this mission was to submit some request to him, and enquired of M. de Westmann whether he thought that there was anything beyond the mere compliments which had been addressed to him.

"M. de Westmann replied that he had no reason to suppose that the Envoy was charged with any special request to be submitted to His Majesty.

"The Envoy is attended by three soldiers of the Atalik Ghazee's body-guard.

"The Emperor invited the Envoy to assist at the Grand Parade, which he did on horseback, attended by a Dragoman, who communicated with him by means of the Persian language.

"The three soldiers also accompanied him and took their place on foot immediately behind the Emperor when the troops defiled.

"M. de Westmann said that the Envoy had showed great tact on his arrival here. He declined to appear in public until after he had been received by the Emperor. He is reported to be intelligent and a person of weight and influence in his own country.

"As a specimen of his oriental culture, M. de Westmann related that on seeing from his windows the troops marching to the parade, he expressed his surprise "that the Emperor, who was the slave of the Almighty, should have so many slaves under him."

[*Secret, September 1873, Nos. 47-73.*]

289. Information from native sources regarding the negotiations between Russia and Kashgar. The latter believed to have been coerced.—Reports from native sources of information on such a subject as the diplomatic proceedings of Russia are not likely to be accurate: but they show at least what is the common opinion of people living on the spot or near it. In this sense the following extract from a letter, dated 22nd November 1872, from Moonshee Mahomed Sultan, a Yarkund news-writer to the Government of the Punjab, may deserve attention:—

"On the 4th of August last an Embassy, consisting of 13 members, arrived in Yarkund. The Envoy represented that a Russian force had been equipped to proceed to Kashgar and Sir-i-kol, but had returned owing to the Treaty having been made. The equipment he said entailed an expense of 1,500 yambus, and demanded payment of this amount on the part of the Atalik. The Atalik accordingly sent 1,500 yambus on the 20th of August by the hand of an officer of his own to Russia. The Treaty has been made for three years.

"On the 10th of September last a Russian Embassy arrived at Kashgar composed of three members. *The Envoy brought a letter from the Russian Government by which the Atalik was informed that he must not attempt to extend his territories beyond the limits of those occupied by the Chinese in Eastern Turkestan. If he should attempt to do so he would come to grief. The Embassy returned on the 20th of September.*"

In hazarding the statement contained in the above passage marked by italics, the writer's sagacity was probably not much at fault; for Her Majesty's Minister at Pekin has recorded an opinion pointing to the same conclusion:—

"As far as I can form an opinion *the Russian Government are anxious to prevent Yakoob Beg from extending his possessions to the north of the Thian Shan range, which might render him later a troublesome neighbour along that frontier of Russia.*"

At Cabul also it was said that the Russian dealings with Kashgar had been accompanied by threats of coercion. Thus on the 31st December 1872 a special correspondent wrote:—

"A dependant of the Meer of Kulab lately came to Cabul to the Meer and was produced by the latter before the Ameer. This man stated before His Highness that the Ruler of Kashgar had before declined to enter into any alliance with the Russians, but that the Russians having recently established a military station on the border of Kashgar, and thrown a bridge across the Kashgar River, the Ruler was frightened at the power of Russia, and concluded a treaty with the Russians, whereby he has agreed to permit three mercantile firms being established in Kashgar, and free access to Russian travellers to Kashgar and its neighbourhood."

[*Political A, March 1873, No. 23; April 1873, No. 94; Secret, February 1873, No. 37.*]

The following communication professing to give a detailed account of the negotiations and of the terms agreed upon was submitted to the Government of the Punjab on the 23rd December 1872:—

"One Tokhta Beg, of Kashgar, arrived at Lahore *via* Kokan, Samarcand, and Bokhara, and has gone to Bombay after halting here two days on his way to Mecca.

"He related that, about seven months ago, a Russian Envoy, accompanied by the officers of Isigh Kol and Naryn on the Kashgar border, had an interview with the Atalik, to whom he complained on the part of the Guveruator against the inconvenience suffered by Russian merchants, and obstruction of Russian commerce, and demanded perfect freedom for Russian merchants in Alti Shahr, similar to that enjoyed by them in Bokhara and Kokan, and that enjoyed by the merchants of Alti Shahr in Russian territories. In that case the Russian Envoy said the present peaceable relations would be maintained. The Envoy demanded the restoration of their goods to Russian merchants, which they had not been permitted to sell and had been stored in deposit by the Atalik, otherwise the Envoy added, the White Emperor of Russia would not hesitate to take remedial measures. The Atalik was dismayed by this message, and requested that he might be allowed 15 days' time to give a reply. After consulting his principal officers, the Atalik signified his willingness to permit the same freedom to Russian merchants as was enjoyed by them in Kokan and Bokhara, and agreed to levy duty on Russian merchandize at the rates obtaining in those countries. The Atalik, however,

stipulated that no land or shop would be permitted to be purchased by any Russian merchants in Altı Shahr for purposes of trade, but that they might take houses on rent. Moreover, it was agreed that no Russian merchant or subject would be permitted to trade in Altı Shahr without the information and permission of the Governor. Furthermore, it was stipulated that cases of depredations by the Khirghiz or Kazaks, on the border in the territories of either State, would be decided without the knowledge of both States; that the Governor of Russia would not attempt to encroach on the present possessions of the Atalik, provided that the Atalik would on all occasions show himself to be the friend of the friends, and the enemy of the enemies of the Russian Government. The Russians then returned, with reply to the above effect, to the Governor to Tashkend, accompanied by Doulat Beg, Mingbashi, and Eshari Kazi Kallan, and Mirza Mahomed Hassan, Officers of the Kushbegi."

[*Secret, January 1873, No. 150.*]

290. Russian designs upon Sir-i-kol.—It may not be out of place here to mention that one of the objects aimed at by the Russians in negotiating a treaty with Yarkund was believed to be either the cession of Sir-i-kol, or leave to establish a post there. In a letter written by two natives from Yarkund or Kashgar at the end of July 1872, that is immediately after the Embassy, the three principal points demanded by the Russians were enumerated thus :—

" 1st.—To cede Sir-i-kol.

" 2nd.—To let us (the Russians) have or build a serai specially for our merchants in the city of Kashgar.

" 3rd.—You will place our Government under great obligation by permitting the location of a Russian military post in the neighbourhood of Khotan on the road to Chauk Chunk and Lassa."

This is corroborated by Bunyad Ali's account printed in Appendix V :—

He makes the Russian say "Give us Tashkurghan and Koh-i-Zamarrud or Sugat to enable us to build a serai there. Both these places were given to us by the Emperor of China."

And Mr. Forsyth in his comments upon Bunyad Ali's narrative pointed out that the desire of the Russians to establish themselves in the south-west parts of Yarkund territory was well known, their opinion being that the route to India over the Pamir was much more practicable and desirable than that over the Karakorum. So, too, Syud Yakoob Khan in the course of his conversation with the Foreign Secretary on the 27th February 1873, stated that though no proposals had been made by the Russian for the cession of territory or the location of military posts within Yarkund territory, it was generally understood that Russia coveted possession of Sir-i-kol.

(Vide *Secret, March 1875, No. 20; also Appendix V and supra page 156.*)

291. Reasons for believing that the Ameer of Kashgar was actuated by fear in consenting to the Commercial Treaty with Russia.—That Russia had hostile designs upon Kashgar until the conclusion of the Commercial Treaty, and that the Ameer's reception of the demands made upon him was influenced by the noise of warlike preparation, there can be no reasonable doubt. Thus Mr. Eugene Schuyler in his memorandum on Turkestan writes:—

" The Russians, on their part, did not wish at first to recognize the independence of what they considered a revolted Chinese province, and, although at various times they sent officers for certain negotiations, they were careful not to recognize Yakoob Beg as the legal ruler of the country. In 1872, Yakoob Beg had become so hostile to Russia that an expedition was resolved upon. A military road had been built through the Thian-Shan

* Military stores.
Mountains and Naryn Pass, and stores of goods* were accumulated at Fort Naryn for use in the expedition. Yakoob Beg, however, changed his tactics, and a peace was agreed upon with Baron Kaulbars, which was ratified by General Kaufmann, and the Government at St. Petersburg."

Mr. Schuyler also states that the capture of Kulja by the Russians was probably due as much to the fear that Yakoob Beg intended to conquer the

country as to the disorders arising from the turbulence of the inhabitants. And moreover the supposition that Russia would have coerced the Ameer had he not yielded is borne out by the tone of the Russian newspapers, which declared that the removal of restrictions upon trade was a necessary condition for tolerating the existence of the Ameer's Government (*vide supra* page 212).

292. Rumours of Russian hostility towards Kashgar in 1874. Cause of quarrel the treatment of Passyscheff's Caravan.—Early in 1874 rumours of Russian hostility towards Kashgar revived. In the preceding summer a Russian caravan belonging to M. Passyscheff with goods to the value of 40,000 roubles had gone to Kashgar. The Ameer was charged with having bought or caused to be bought from M. Passyscheff's caravan goods to the amount of 19,000 roubles only, and with having not only prevented the purchase of any greater amount, but also kept the caravan and those accompanying it under the strictest surveillance. The Ameer was to be called upon to pay an indemnity of 25,000 roubles, and if he refused the pretext would be seized for organizing an expedition without delay.

"The constant negotiations with England" writes Mr. Schuyler in his memorandum on Turkestan, "have also given the Russian Government some alarm, for Kashgar is much nearer to Russian possessions than it is to India, and much more easy of access, the passes being not so difficult. It is very probable therefore that an expedition will be fitted out in the spring against Kashgar. A pretext will probably be found in the treatment of Russian merchants, and it is the intention to demand damages to the amount of 15,000 roubles and a fine besides of 10,000 roubles more. Of course if Yakoob Beg refuses to pay this, the expedition will start at once."

Such were the reports prevalent at St. Petersburg in February 1874, though M. Westmann informed the British Ambassador that he had no knowledge of any differences with the Ruler of Kashgar, nor could he suppose that they could be of any serious nature without his having received intimation of them. It was subsequently decided, towards the end of March 1874, that no expedition should be sent against Kashgar at any rate for the time.

[*Secret, April 1874, No. 262.*]

[" *July* " " 107.]

[" *October* " " 21.]

293. Observations by Mr. Forsyth on Russian complaints regarding the treatment of their merchants.—Mr. Forsyth in his letter No. 163, dated 16th May 1874, admitted that there was some truth in the accusation that the Ameer had ill-treated some Russian merchants by summarily ejecting them from Kashgar without making full payment for their goods which he had taken, but the Ameer was reported to have sent over to Tashkend a large sum of money as compensation for alleged losses, and to have made better arrangements for the future, so that this cause of offence had been removed. Mr. Forsyth added :—

"Moreover Syud Yakoob Khan informs me that some correspondence has lately passed between the Ameer and the Russian authorities at Almaty which he hopes may be conducive to more cordial friendship.

"The Syud very readily responds to the advice which I have thought it right to press forcibly upon him to allow no amount of provocation to tempt his master to deviate from a strict adherence to treaty engagements.

"The danger arising from misrepresentation and a distortion of facts in such a case is apparent, and affords a complete argument for reconciling the Ameer's mind to the acceptance of representatives from Russia as well as from England at his Court.

"A request of this nature has been verbally made by a Russian Agent who has very lately visited Kashgar, and Syud Yakoob Khan informs me that it will be acceded to by the Ameer when the application is made in a formal manner."

"He also informs me that the Russians at Almaty have expressed great displeasure at the favorable reception of this Mission."

[*Secret, July 1874, No. 129.*]

294. **Complaints that Morozoff's caravan was badly received in the territories of Kashgar.**—Another cause of dissatisfaction was found in the experiences of M. Morozoff's caravan. The caravan was intended originally for Mongolia, but rumours of danger in that direction diverted it to Kashgar. M. Morozoff's Agent having got formal permission from the Governor of Semirechensk set out with his party from Vernöe on the 11th April 1874: but according to information published in the *Goloss* of the 9th-21st June 1874:—

"On the 26th April (10th May) the caravan reached the fort on the Naryn, from which place the Agent sent back intelligence of the most unsatisfactory nature. The caravan is now within only three days' march of the Kashgar frontier, and yet the spirits of the people accompanying it are most depressed, seeing that their position is becoming more and more dangerous with every step they make towards the Kashgar frontier. It had reached them that the spirit of the inhabitants of Kashgar was very much excited against the Russians, and that our Agent from Tashkend was arrested and imprisoned in the fortress. The Kashgarians anticipate a Russian expedition against them, and, therefore, keep a force of 10,000 well armed men on the frontier. These arms (defence works?) have been made for them by some Englishman who is in Kashgar.

"All these reports have had the effect of disheartening the Russians, who are accompanying the caravan, to that degree that in a letter of the 26th April (O. S.) from the Naryn, they send their last adieux to their relatives, as though they were all going to certain destruction."

M. de Stremoukoff however informed the British Ambassador that these newspaper reports had not been officially confirmed, and that nothing had been heard officially of Morozoff up to the end of June 1874, at which time his caravan arrived at Vernöe.

[*Secret, July 1874, No. 141.*]

[„ *August* „ „ 63.]

The accounts received regarding M. Morozoff's caravan are not very clear or consistent. The following particulars quoted in Mr. Michell's memorandum, dated 9th December 1874, from various Russian newspapers, seem to show that the merchants in the end received most favorable treatment:—

"The Semipolatsk correspondent of the *Goloss*, in a letter which is reproduced in the *Moscow Gazette*, gives the following particulars relative to the success of Morozoff's trade caravan, which, having been prevented a second time from going to Khami and Barkul (Chinese towns), proceeded in the spring of this year to Kashgar.

"The caravan was met and conducted to Kashgar by a military escort, the agents and servants with the caravan being fed on the road at the cost of Yakoob Beg. At first the Russians found a difficulty in disposing of their merchandise, and every purchaser demanded a receipt on payment, explaining that it was a formality necessitated by the conduct of the Russian merchant Somoff, who on a previous occasion had claimed payment afresh through the Russian Government on his return to Tashkend. But when the *Dadkhwah* of Kashgar proclaimed in the bazaar that Morozoff's caravan had no connexion with Somoff, and that there was no reason to anticipate, in dealings with Morozoff, a repetition of the disagreeables occasioned to the Kashgarians by Somoff, trade became brisk, and the Russians sold off all their cloth and cotton stuffs. They found no purchasers for their nankins and coloured *daba*, but Yakoob Beg, although he twice declined doing so, finally took all the rest of their merchandise off their hands, settling with the Russians 'in a very conscientious manner.'

"The caravan stayed 70 days in Kashgar, and the Russians enjoyed complete liberty in the town. Morozoff's agents were presented to Yakoob Beg at Yangi-hissar (in the vicinity of Kashgar), and he sent them back to the frontier with an escort, provisioning them himself all the way.

"The correspondent adds that the amiability of the Kashgarians went even so far that, when Morozoff's agents wrote to the *Dadkhwah* from the frontier that they had sold the remainder of their merchandise to Yakoob Beg at too low a rate, the latter at once sent them *five yambus*, or in other words, presented them with 500 roubles.

" A correspondent of the *Invalide*, writing from Tashkend, under date of the 20th October (O. S.), states that Yakoob Beg was at that time said to have been organizing a mission to Tashkend, which was to bring the 12,000 roubles owing for more than a year on account of losses sustained by the Russian merchant Somoff."

On the other hand, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported in his letter No. 260, dated 21st July 1874, that he had been informed on good authority that the Ameer of Kashgar had offered to make good the losses sustained by Morozoff's caravan, and that an Envoy would be sent to Tashkend with the indemnity, and to congratulate the Emperor on the marriage of his daughter with an English Prince.

[*Secret*, September 1874, No. 32.]

[„ January 1875, „ 62.]

295. The case of the Russian trader Somoff and his treatment in Kashgar.—It appears probable on the whole that the information which Lord A. Loftus mentions had reference not to Morozoff's caravan but to the case of the merchant Somoff. This Russian trader, it is said, relying on the privileges secured by the Commercial Treaty of 1872, set out for Kashgar with the caravan of the merchant Papyshoff (or Passyscheff?). He found the convention a dead-letter at Kashgar. He was not permitted to leave the caravanserai or visit Yarkund and Khoten. The Ameer himself bought the greater part of his goods, and left only a third for sale in the market. For two months Somoff received no payment for the goods sold to the Ameer. At last on 27th September 1873 he got about Rupees 33,000 for goods valued at Rupees 48,000.

On returning to Tashkend Somoff lodged a complaint. The Ameer (on being called upon to explain) denied the merchant's assertions. Somoff, he said, had voluntarily remained in the caravanserai, and had been allowed entire liberty; the responsibility for the Ameer's purchase of the goods rested on one of his officers who had used His Highness' name to cheapen the goods. A Commission was appointed to enquire into Somoff's claim, and valued his losses at 12,000 roubles. A letter to that effect was sent with a deputation to the Ameer. Nothing could be more satisfactory than the Ameer's answer: he regretted the mistake, and would pay ten times the amount if necessary. The money would be sent by an Embassy which he intended shortly to despatch to Tashkend. Such is the account given by a correspondent of the *Goloss* of the 30th July 1874.

[*Secret*, December 1874, No. 34.]

The above particulars give a clue to the explanation of the fact noticed by Mr. Shaw in his letter No. 29, dated 30th November 1874. He reported that shortly after the interview at which he had presented the ratified Treaty to the Ameer, an official named Mahomed Yar, who had been in attendance at the interview, started with some secrecy for the Russian frontier, accompanied by waggons said to contain much gold and silver. Mahomed Yar was said to be going to meet some high Russian official who was about to pay a visit to the district adjoining the frontier. Another rumour suggested that the Ameer had sent to protest against a supposed threat of attack from Russia.

Now if this be compared with the statement in the *Novre Vremia* of the 5th—17th December 1874, that an Envoy from Kashgar had been despatched to Russia, and that he was supposed to be the bearer of the indemnity for the losses suffered in the preceding year at Kashgar by a Russian trading caravan, there can be no reasonable doubt that the mysterious waggons which attracted the attention of Mr. Shaw contained the money demanded on behalf of Somoff. The despatch of the Envoy immediately after receipt of the ratified Treaty may have been a chance coincidence; but there may also have been a deeper meaning which will perhaps come out after Syud Yakoob Khan's return from St. Petersburg.

It must, however, be observed here that, according to paragraph 9 of Mr. Forsyth's letter from Kashgar, dated 9th January 1874, the Ameer had already sent to Almaty over 12,000 tillas to meet complaints that the full value of the goods purchased by the Ameer from Russian caravans in October or November 1873 had not been given. If this were true, it is not easy to see what need there was for further payment in the autumn of 1874. Probably Mr. Forsyth's information was inaccurate.

[*Secret, February 1875, No. 13; March 1875, Nos. 5-11 and 165-166.*]

296. Cordial reception given to Russian caravans in Kashgar since the settlement of the Somoff or Papyshoff claims.—The experience gained by the Ameer in the case of the Papyshoff or Somoff merchants has taught him a lesson which he is not likely to forget. The *Journal de St. Petersbourg* of the 9th—21st April 1875 writes in a strain approaching to enthusiasm of the cordial and hearty reception with which recent caravans have been welcomed in Kashgar:—

“The failure of the enterprise of the merchant Papyshoff has not disheartened the Russian traders, and a caravan was equipped by the Moscow Firm of Morozoff. It was destined for the city of Kashgar itself, and placed under the care of Gali Faizudin, that experienced guide whose name we have often mentioned. Sad to say it was not fated that this gallant leader of caravans should accomplish the enterprise entrusted to him. Leaving Vernöe on the 17th April 1874, he fell sick shortly after his departure, and died on the 5th May in the Naryn Fort. The caravan continued its journey under the guidance of Gali Sadyk, son of the deceased. It penetrated into the territory of Yakoob Beg by the Pass of Tash-Robat in the beginning of May, and was received by messengers of Yakoob Beg, who offered presents. A Kashgarian escort accompanied the caravan to Kashgar itself which was reached on 20th May. A good dwelling-house was assigned, and permission given to proceed with the sale of goods without hindrance.

“In a word, the caravan met with the most kindly reception and with every facility for successfully accomplishing the purpose of its mission. Yakoob Beg pushed his politeness so far as to take on his own account a remnant of the goods, such as nankeens and coloured cotton stuffs, for which there was no market at Kashgar, and squared the accounts to the entire satisfaction of the Russian merchants. Before their departure the latter were received by Yakoob Beg in a suburban Palace situated eight versts from Kashgar. The audience took place in a garden: the Atalik Ghazee was very pleasant, and dismissed the Russians with gifts of more or less value. The caravan left Kashgar on the 30th July. The merchants had sold with profit all their loads as well as a part of their camels and horses which were unfit for service, and they brought back a lading of local products, such as raw silk in skeins, indigo, *maschroub*, woven cotton and silk, leather of inferior quality, and ingots of silver. During the return journey the caravan was attended by an escort.

“Encouraged by the success of the Morozoff venture, the Russian merchants are organizing two caravans destined for Kashgar. One, that of M. Kouznetsow, will start from Vernöe and travel to its destination by Tokmak and the Naryn Fort. The merchandise consists of tea and manufactured articles costing from 8 to 10,000 roubles. This caravan will be led by the Sart, Abdool-Rusool-Abdoo Gafar. The second caravan is equipped by Bykovski, merchant of the first Guild, and will go to Kashgar from Tashkend *via* Kokand. It will be placed under the guidance of an agent of M. Bykovski, and the goods will be composed of sandal wood, coral, skins of otters, &c., valued at 10,000 roubles.”

297. A Russian view of the character of the Ameer of Kashgar.—At the present time, therefore, it seems that there is no quarrel left open between Russia and Kashgar. But so long as the Russians hold the views regarding the character of the Ameer which are attributed to M. de Struve by Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, the chances of lasting harmony are not favorable. Mr. Wade writes:—

“M. de Struve, newly-appointed Minister of Russia in Japan, has just been here on a visit to M. de Butzow, who was but a few months since transferred from Japan hither.

“M. de Struve has been for the last twelve years or so employed in Central Asia, especially in Kokand, where he made acquaintance with Yakoob Beg, or the Atalik Ghazee, now

ruling in Kashgaria. * * * * *

M. de Struve was particular in his enquiries as to the likelihood of a serious attempt on the part of China to re-establish her authority in Ili and Kashgaria. He admits the suppression of brigandage and other evidences of a comparative restoration of order of which we have heard in the latter country, but he contends that the condition of the people is one of absolute slavery. The Atalik Ghazee, he says, is a ruthless despot, fanatical only for political purposes, and utterly incapable of founding anything in the way of a government that will last.

“He more than hinted that Russia could look for nothing but trouble at the hands of a Mahomedan neighbour, and declared with a good deal of emphasis his preference for the Toungan and Taranji people whom the Mahomedans had massacred in Ili or expelled from it.”

Mr. Wade also reported in his letter No. 145, dated 4th June 1873, that M. Vlangaly, Russian Minister at Peking, when alluding to the capture of Urumtsi by the Atalik's forces, had affected to denounce the advance of the Ameer northwards as full of future trouble to Russia.

[*Secret, July 1874, Nos. 127-128; also January 1874, No. 191.*]

298. **British policy towards Kashgar in its relations to Russia. The boundaries of the Ameer's dominions.**—As between England and Russia discussions on the subject of Kashgar have been few and unimportant. After the conclusion of the agreement regarding the frontier of Afghanistan, the Government of India in despatch No. 62, dated 30th June 1873, suggested that something of the same kind might be done for Yarkund. The attention of Her Majesty's Government was drawn to the hope expressed by Syud Yakoob Khan Torah (see Section I of this Chapter, page 160) that in the event of any further discussion between the British Government and Russia in regard to the boundaries of Central Asian States, the opportunity would not be lost of obtaining a definition of the boundaries of Yarkund. The despatch continued :—

“We were unwilling, during the continuance of the recent negotiations regarding the boundaries of Afghanistan, to give expression to any views which would have the effect of introducing a fresh element into that discussion. Now, however, that those negotiations have been carried to a satisfactory conclusion, we feel ourselves at liberty to represent to Her Majesty's Government the expediency of taking advantage of the good understanding that exists at present between the two Governments to arrive at a definition of the northern and western boundaries of Yarkund. Such a definition we consider would be advantageous to the peace and tranquillity of Central Asia, and would complete the good work which has been so far carried out with the assistance of the Russian Government.”

This suggestion was not accepted by Her Majesty's Government. Lord Granville considered it inexpedient to run the risk of raising, without absolute and pressing necessity at that time, any question with Russia respecting the frontiers of Yarkund.

It may be added that when Sir C. Dilke on the 15th May 1874 called the attention of the House of Commons to the necessity of a recognition of the Ameer of Kashgar, and of a *delimitation of his territory*, the Under-Secretary of State for India is reported to have objected that the Atalik Ghazee had not intimated to the Government of India a wish that his territory should be defined. A reference to the Indian despatch of 30th June 1873 would have shown that this statement was not correct. As between Kashgar and Russia the Ameer had distinctly suggested a delimitation of his frontier through Syud Yakoob Khan, his Envoy.

[*Secret, June 1873, No. 369.*]

[„ *Dec. „ „ 233.*]

299. **Facts regarding the presentation of arms by the British Government to the Ameer of Kashgar.**—Another point, to which more attention was given than it deserved, was the question whether the

British Government were supplying the Ameer of Kashgar with arms. The facts are simply these. When Mr. Forsyth proceeded on his mission to Kashgar he took with him a small number of ornamental guns, knives, and swords such as are usually given to Eastern Chiefs and Princes. He also took three model cannons valued at £50, £10, and £16-10, respectively. To the above it should be added that when Syud Yakoob Khan returned from Constantinople to India he carried with him as far as Egypt a few small mountain guns, 200 breech-loading rifles, and 400 muzzle-loaders, besides a small quantity of ammunition. He was obliged to leave the guns and ammunition at Alexandria, because the Peninsular and Oriental Company refused to export the goods. But through the exertions of the Consul-General in Bombay all the Syud's packages, excepting some casks of gunpowder which no ship could be found to carry, were conveyed to Bombay. Thence the Government of India caused the packages to be forwarded *vid Lahore en route* to Yarkund: and as noticed previously on page 193, Mr. Shaw, when on the march to the Ameer's dominions, caused some of the more important of the articles belonging to Syud Yakoob Khan to be conveyed with his camp.

[*Vide Secret, January 1874, Nos. 86, 139, 150, 155.*]

[„ *September* „ *No. 29.*]

[„ *October* „ „ *19.*]

300. Russian enquiries on the subject of arms and ammunition alleged to have been supplied to the Ameer of Kashgar. Explanation given by the British Government.—Such being the facts regarding the presentation of arms to the Ameer of Kashgar, we shall now see what superstructure of distrust and suspicion the Russians proceeded to build upon them.

In June 1874, vague and incorrect rumours on the subject having appeared from time to time, it was thought necessary by telegram No. 1184P., dated 2nd of that month, to inform the Secretary of State that the reports that India was sending arms and ammunition to Yarkund were without foundation. A small quantity of ammunition given by the Sultan at Constantinople in the previous year was being sent: and hence the inaccurate statements which had been made.

On the 23rd June 1874 the Secretary of State telegraphed—

“Foreign Office report surprise at St. Petersburg at rumours of Forsyth taking 1,000 muskets to Ameer of Kashgar. Send particulars on this point.”

The reply despatched on the 25th June pointed out that in the telegram of 2nd June the report as to the presentation of arms by the Ameer of Kashgar had been contradicted by anticipation.

“No arms” it was added “were bought in India by Government for presents to the Ameer. Forsyth took up only those few arms bought in England of which full list should be in India Office.”

[*Secret, June 1874, Nos. 88-90.*]

The purport of the explanation given by the Government of India was sent to the Chargé d’Affaires at St. Petersburg by Foreign Office despatch No. 146, dated 3rd June 1874, for communication to the Russian Government, and opportunity was at the same time seized to announce the gist of the instructions which had been issued for the guidance of Mr. Shaw as British representative at Kashgar:—

“Mr. Shaw has,” the Viceroy adds, “left for Yarkund. His orders are to maintain friendly relations with the Ameer’s Government, and to attend to British commercial interests. He will refrain from offering suggestions to the Ameer in matters of Government or foreign policy; but, if consulted, is willing to assist with information and appropriate advice. In the event of questions arising between the Ameer and the Russian Government, he will, if opportunity arises, impress on the Ameer the risk of complications with that Government, and the importance of avoiding any step that might unnecessarily prejudice amicable relations with its representative.”

The contents of the above quoted despatch were made known by the *Chargé d'Affaires* to M. Westmann on the 10th June 1874. M. Westmann professed to be ignorant of the reports circulated regarding the supply of arms and ammunition to Yarkund, and to be unaware of Mr. Shaw's mission. He however took the opportunity to speak to the *Chargé d'Affaires* with reference to a rumour which had reached him that Mr. Forsyth had been the bearer of a gift of 1,000 muskets to the Ameer of Kashgar. In mentioning the subject His Excellency said he did not wish to make a complaint or speak officially, but if the report was true, it appeared to him a matter for surprise that so large a number of fire-arms should have been selected for a present to the Ameer which might be used against Russia. The India Office put this right on the 10th July 1874 by stating what Mr. Forsyth really had taken, and by suggesting that the Ambassador at St. Petersburg should state the facts unofficially to M. Westmann at some future convenient opportunity. Accordingly Her Majesty's Ambassador explained the facts early in August 1874, and to an enquiry by M. Westmann whether the ornamental guns specified among the presents sent with Mr. Forsyth were cannons, Lord A. Loftus replied in the negative. This denial being not strictly accurate, the Government of India in despatch No. 65, dated 2nd October 1874, pointed out that the presents included the three model cannons mentioned *supra* on page 221.

[*Secret, August 1874, No. 25 ; September 1874, Nos. 28-30 ; October 1874, Nos. 16-19.]*

SECTION III.

ATTITUDE OF THE CHINESE TOWARDS THE AMEER OF KASHGAR.

301. Advances from Kashgar eastwards as described by Mr. Michell.—Mr. Michell in his memorandum on Eastern Turkestan gives the following account of the bold and adventurous progress of the *Ba-doulet* or "prosperous" Ameer of Kashgar towards the very confines of the country still under the sway of China :—

" Having obtained possession of Khami in November 1870, and the Tungans of Ourumtsi and Manass, of Koumoudi, Sandji, and Koutoubi, having submitted to him in the beginning of the year 1871,—the Sy-yan-chai (or Sy-yan-fe) of Turfan, which fell to him in November 1870, standing guarantee for their fidelity,—the Sovereign of Kashgar needed only Kuldja to be master of all the country which had constituted the extreme western provinces of China.

" By a series of fortunate and bold strokes in 1870 he extended the frontier of his dominions by 600 versts (400 miles) towards the east, and in Khami he gained a point of vast importance on the principal line of route from China proper to Dzungaria and Eastern Turkestan.

" From that time, as it was reported from Tashkend, a vast field opened out to his ambition. He began to look forward to a perfect understanding and coalition with the Tungans, who had declined the amnesty offered to them by the Chinese Government, to the reduction by their means of the country of the Ili and to the seizure of Barkul. It was believed that he contemplated extending his conquests even to China, and of these coalescing with the Mahomedan population which was in actual rebellion."

[*Secret, August 1874, No. 206.]*

302. Reasons for questioning whether the powers of the Ameer of Kashgar ever extended so far as Khami.—On reference to pages 233 and 234 of Mr. Wynne's Central Asian Précis, it will be seen that the statement regarding the extension of the Ameer's power as far as Khami or Khamil, 600 versts east of Turfan, rests on the authority of a correspondent of the *Journal de St. Petersbourg*, who wrote from Tashkend in January 1871.

The sequel will show that Khami still obeys the rule of the Chinese, and is in fact one of the points at which the armies of the Empire are said to be collecting for the invasion of East Turkestan. There is moreover sufficient evidence to prove that if Khami really fell into the hands of the Kashgarians, it was never incorporated in the dominions of the Ameer. Mr. Forsyth in his memorandum, dated 8th January 1871, describing the proceedings of the Yarkund Mission of 1870, wrote that the Ameer was reported to be entrenching himself in a strong position in or near Turfan, from which point he could neither advance nor retreat. We know that he did eventually advance to Ourumtsi and Manass, but his position there has been so disturbed and dangerous, that, voluntarily or involuntarily, he has drawn back his foot.

When Syud Yakoob Khan visited Calcutta in February 1873, he was shown a map and asked to point out the limits of the territory of Kashgar. Those limits, he said, ended towards the north-east at Ourumtsi, which had been recently conquered by the Atalik. He said nothing about the conquest of Khami. Nor did he mention that fact when narrating to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab the success of the Atalik in hostilities against the Tunganis who were said to be fighting on behalf of the Chinese Government.

Bunyad Ali also, whose memorandum is printed in Appendix V, wrote that the Ameer had already taken possession of the country *as far as Ourumtsi*, and had occupied two cities beyond Turfan, Lekchan (Lukshun) Shahr and Pechan Shahr, but not a hint was given that the dominions of Kashgar embraced Khami.

Sir Douglas Forsyth in his confidential report dated 21st September 1874 on the results of the Yarkund Mission of 1873-74, writes thus of the limits of the Kashgar territory towards the north-east:—

“From Turfan he (the Ameer) extended his conquests to *Ourumtsi and Manass*, and no attempt at a boundary can be given there, for the fact of his possession is a doubtful question.”

Captain Biddulph also informed the compiler of this note demi-officially that—

“the Ameer of Kashgar has never been further east than Turfan, and this is the first time I have ever heard of his being supposed to have authority at Khami. While we were in Kashgar in February 1874, a report arrived that the Chinese were advancing and had occupied the Barkul district in force, but no act of hostility against the Ameer was stated to have occurred.”

303. Particulars received from Tashkend as to the fighting between the people of Kashgar and the Tunganis in the spring of 1872.—Even at Ourumtsi and Manass the Ameer barely held his position by dint of hard fighting until dread of more formidable foes than the Tunganis compelled him to withdraw.

A well-informed correspondent of the *Journal de St. Petersbourg*, writing from Tashkend on the 15th-27th August 1872, gave the following particulars of the recent struggles between the Kashgarians and Tunganis. The cause of the war is said to have been a quarrel between an old Tungani Chief and one of the “Ionchai” of Ourumtsi, the latter party having summoned the people of Kashgar to their aid:—

“The Tunganis of all the towns subject to Yakoob Beg, excepting Turfan, banded together with their brethren of Manass to march against the Kashgarians. They began by attacking the detachment which had been sent forth from Ourumtsi against Manass and had occupied Koutoubi. They dislodged the detachment from this place and compelled them to fall back on Ourumtsi. There they laid siege to one of the citadels of Ourumtsi, where were stationed 2,000 Kashgarians under the command of Omar-Dadkhwah. From the latest intelligence it seems that the besiegers, though suffering much hardship themselves, have surrounded the citadel in such a way as to cut off all communication. They number 6,000 and receive daily re-inforcements. In the middle of May the son of Yakoob Beg set out from Aksu at the head of a considerable body of troops to carry aid to Ourumtsi. In order to cut him off, the Tunganis detached 700 men to take up a position in the Pass of

Davan Chin, which is the sole line of communication between Turfan and Ourumtsi. As regards Aksu, it is said that the fortress there, which has been built by the present Ruler of Kashgar, is greater than that of Kulja, and that the walls are constructed of burnt bricks. The town itself is similarly surrounded by a wall."

[*Secret, January 1873, No. 23.*]

304. Russian Caravan unable to visit Ourumtsi from Manass in 1872. Description of Manass and the road from Kulja.—While this fighting was going on, an event occurred which should have awakened the Ameer to the danger inseparable from holding a position on the trade road between Ili and China. In June 1872, a caravan belonging to the Russian merchant Kouznetsow returned to Kulja from Manass, where the traders had spent four months. They were the first Russians who had visited Manass. They wished to push on to Ourumtsi, but the hostilities which had broken out between the inhabitants of that town and the people of the Khanate of Kashgar prevented them, and they were able to sell only half their goods. The journey of the caravan was very happily accomplished, thanks to the good-will of the Chinese, who appeared to expect that Russia would restore to them the provinces which had seceded from China. The inhabitants of Manass, on the other hand, regarded the Russians as their liberators, the Chinese yoke having become intolerable to them. They heartily welcomed the Russian caravan, and if the accounts of the merchants were correct, half the Tungani population would rise up in arms and join the Russians if a detachment marched upon Manass. This town was found to consist of three small forts. The central gate led into the enclosure of the principal fortress; the latter communicated with the two other forts, which had no way of egress on the outside. The walls appeared to be very thick, but the whole of the defences could not resist an assault by European soldiers. The road from Kulja to Manass presented no obstacles to the march. It was, however, found wholly abandoned and lined with ruins of plundered and deserted towns and villages—mournful witnesses to the sanguinary drama of which these countries had been the scene for the space of ten years. The leaders of the Kouznetsow caravan was M. Somoff, whose complaints of ill-treatment have cost the Atalik Ghazee so dear (see above page 218).

[*Secret, October 1872, No. 8, January 1873, No. 23.*]

305. Operations by the forces of the Ameer of Kashgar against the Tunganis of Ourumtsi and Manass in 1872-73.—Some account of the campaign against the Tunganis and their defeat and dispersion by Beg Kuli Beg Torab, the son of the Ameer of Kashgar, is given in the paper by Bunyad Ali printed in Appendix V. The result is briefly summed up in a news-letter, dated 22nd November 1872, written from Yarkund to the Government of the Punjab:—

"It was reported before that the son of the Atalik has proceeded towards Urumchi and Turfan. Urumchi had not been conquered. A severe battle was fought with great loss of life on both sides. The Atalik's son then conquered Urumchi. He also took a city named Manass, about five marches from Urumchi, but restored it to its Ruler Khalifa Daud Tungani, merely placing a *zakatshi* of his own there. The son of the Atalik has returned to Bagur."

Particulars of further operations in the Tungani country are contained in a letter from Tashkend, published by the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* of 14th (26th) October 1873. The following is a translation:—

"The insurrection of the Tunganis against the Kashgarians which broke out last year was unsuccessful. After the defeat which they suffered near Manass in May 1872 at the hands of the troops of Beg Kuli, nothing remained to them but the town of Manass. Even there their strength was not great, since they were obliged to give entrance to the *ziakatshi* (tax-collectors) of Kashgar. Towards the end of 1872, however, the Tunganis succeeded in dismissing these Kashgarian officers and re-assembled the band of Shushagun. The Kashgarians were unable to undertake any decisive operations against Manass in consequence of the cold. They sent, however, a small detachment, 700 men strong,

which failed to occupy the town and went into winter quarters about 30 versts from Manass on the Ourumtsi road in a village named Kutoubi. In the month of April a fresh detachment of Kashgarians, 500 strong, commanded by Omarkul Dadkhwah and Abdur Rahman Dadkhwah marched against Manass and endeavoured even to take it by assault, but the detachment was repulsed and fell back again upon Kutoubi. The success of the Kashgarian operations was impeded by the bands of Shushagun which plundered and destroyed the convoys and cut off the communications of the attacking army with Turfan and Ourumtsi.

"At the end of April Beg Kuli collected together more considerable forces at Ourumtsi. At the head of a body of 2,000 men he marched against Manass for the purpose of inflicting a decisive blow on this last point which the Tunganis disputed with the Kashgarians. The Tunganis sought aid from Shushagun, who sent an elder of the village of Shiko to negotiate with them. It appears that the Military authorities of Shiko got wind of these discussions with the Tungani rebels, and caused this individual to be arrested on his return from Manass. This fact of a Chinese entering into negotiations with Tungani rebels under the nose of the Military authorities who were charged with the operations against the Tunganis of Manass and Ourumtsi, and accepting such a mission from a brigand chief hostile at once to the Chinese Government, to the Tunganis, and to the Kashgarians, is sufficient in itself to bear witness to the extraordinary disorder which now reigns in the political and social condition of Western China.

"By the 17th May Beg Kuli was at the gates of Manass, and two months afterwards the authority of Yakoob Beg was firmly established in that town. Then the conquerors thought only of pushing their advance towards Sazanza, the terrible haunt of the Chinese of Shushagun, but we have not as yet received any reliable information as to the issue of the expedition."

[*Pol. A., April 1873, Nos. 93-94, and "Journal de St. Petersbourg" of 14th-26th Oct. 1873.*]

306. Opinion of the British Minister at Peking on the danger of the Ameer's advance to Ourumtsi and Manass.—Such were the exploits on which the Atalik Ghazee congratulated himself when he sent Syud Yakoob Khan to India towards the end of 1872 (see above page 153). Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, however, failed not to perceive the danger to which the Sovereign of Kashgar was exposed by these ambitious advances. On the 27th June 1873 Mr. Wade telegraphed to England—

"Yakoob Beg has just taken Urumchi, Chinese Empire frontier post, latitude 40°, longitude 93°. Hostilities in Ili Kulja will very probably follow. May be well to telegraph Viceroy."

The Secretary of State, who repeated this telegram to India on the 12th July 1873, was informed that the capture of Ourumtsi had been known to the Government of India for a considerable time, and that according to a statement made by the Yarkund Envoy to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab (see above page 152) the town had been conquered by the Atalik Ghazee in the spring of 1872. It was added that nothing had been heard recently in regard to Ourumtsi, but that Mr. Forsyth would be instructed when at Yarkund to obtain all available information on the subject.

Mr. Wade's views were more fully expressed in his letter to the Government of India dated 27th June 1873. He wrote:—

"As the Russian Minister has informed me within the last few days, Ourumtsi or Ourumtsi (latitude 43, longitude 94) has fallen into the hands of the Atalik Ghazee. This place, otherwise known as Tih-huachou, by which name it figures in the statistical geography of the empire, may be considered the capital of the large tract included by the Emperor Kienlung in the new provincial jurisdiction of Kan Su, and is in normal times the head-quarters of the *Ti-tu*, or general commanding a provincial army of Chinese, as distinguished from Manchu or Mongol troops.

"The Chinese have been so long without any real authority in the country west of the Kia-yu-Kuan, the furthestmost gate of the Great Wall, that the fall of Ourumtsi will affect them little, whether in respect of the loss itself, or of the discredit one might assume such a loss to entail. But its consequences otherwise may be serious, for it will bring the Atalik Ghazee into direct contact, too possibly, into direct collision with the Russians who have hardly disguised their objection to the growth of a new Mahomedan power even in Kashgaria."

The Government of India, when forwarding the despatch from which the foregoing extract is taken, furnished the Secretary of State with three telegrams received from the Punjab in August 1873, showing that up to July all was quiet in Eastern Turkestan.

[*Secret, July 1873, Nos. 118-119; January 1874, No. 183.*]

307. Information sent by Mr. Forsyth from Yarkund regarding the war at Ourumtsi and Manass—Mr. Forsyth in letter No. 101, dated 25th November 1873, sent the following news from Yarkund:—

“Since my arrival here, a detachment of troops has come in from Manass, and I learn that the Atalik's son, Beg Kuli Beg, after taking Manass, had a fight with the Chinese somewhere in the direction of Koomul and was defeated; after which the Beg Kuli Beg appointed a relative of Daood-Kulfa (who died about five months ago) Governor of Manass, and leaving a garrison of troops there returned to Ourumtsi. It is said that the distance between Manass and Kulja is 16 posting stages, of which above one-half are in the hands of the Atalik and the other half belong to the Russians, a mountainous pass dividing the two powers. It is said that the Russians assisted the Chinese in their late fight with Beg Kuli Beg by sending them double-barrelled guns; this would accord with the information given by Mr. Wade to the Viceroy in his letter of June last.

* * * * *

“That the Atalik has brought himself into dangerous proximity to the Russians on his north-west frontier is very evident, and this increases his dread of that power. Syud Yakoob Khan deprecates this advance beyond the mountains which were easily defensible, into the northern valleys, as rendering the Atalik exposed to attacks on both sides.”

Mr. Wade's letter of June 1873 has been quoted above; but Mr. Forsyth probably referred to a letter from Mr. Wade to the Viceroy, dated 15th September 1873, in which the British Minister wrote alluding to a report of the retaking of Ourumtsi by the Chinese, that if the expulsion of Yakoob Beg from Ourumtsi were a fact, *he would be slow to believe that it had been effected without foreign aid.*

[*Secret, February 1874, No. 102; January 1874, No. 188.*]

308. Danger of advance to Ourumtsi and Manass. The Ameer reported to have given over these cities to the Tunganis as his tributaries.—It had long become plain to every one outside the limits of Kashgar that by pushing on to Ourumtsi and Manass, the Ameer was encountering very serious risk. The British Ambassador at St. Petersburg in his despatch dated 16th March 1874, wrote—

“It is not impossible that, considering the proximity of Manass to the Province of Ili, and the projects attributed to Yakoob Beg of forming one Mussulman State under his rule, a collision may take place between the forces of Yakoob Beg and Russia, if the former should attempt to push his conquests towards the Province of Ili.”

Nor was Mr. Forsyth slow to advise the Ameer through Syud Yakoob Khan that such advances were imprudent.

“Our conversation,” he wrote on 4th March 1874, “had been specially directed to the progress of the Ameer's arms in the direction of Manass, and I fully explained the position in which the Ameer had put himself by thus pressing so far beyond the limits which nature seemed to assign to his kingdom, the injury he was causing to trade, and the offence he was probably giving Russia by seizing towns in the direct line of trade between Kulja and China.

“The Syud at the time earnestly sought my advice, which I declined to give in any official way, but, as a friend, I put before him all the information I could give regarding Russian and Chinese forces whose attack he might provoke, and I pointed out on the map the excellent defences which the mountains afforded, and the difficulty and danger to which he was exposed by descending into the northern valleys and holding Ourumtsi and Manass.

“The Syud took the subject much to heart, and examined it minutely with me, showing great anxiety to get out of the difficulty.

“I now hear that a short time ago negotiations were entered into with the Tunganis of these parts, and that the Ameer has given over to them Manass and Ourumtsi.* If this be so, and I have it on the best authority, I think it may be accepted as a sign of the Ameer's desire to avoid all cause of offence, and of his readiness to accept friendly suggestions.”

[*Secret, June 1874, No. 49.*]

309. Latest intelligence from Yarkund shows Ourumtsi and Manass to be still incorporated in the dominions of Kashgar.—The degree of independence enjoyed by the Tunganis of Ourumtsi and Manass and the nature of their relations with the Ameer Mahomed Yakoob Khan are matters which remain in doubt to the present day. Mr. R. B. Shaw, writing from Yarkund on 30th April 1875, states that—

“some time ago a Chinese (converted) official, called the Mah-Dalai, who enjoys the confidence of the Ameer, was sent to Urumchi (Ourumtsi) to try and settle the disturbances that had broken out there. A letter has been received from him lately by a compatriot in this city, in which he says that the troubles are caused by the intestine dissensions of the large bodies of Tunganis who a year or two ago fled out of Kansu after the re-capture of Suchow by the Chinese, and were allowed to settle about Urumchi and Manass and loaded with gifts by the Ameer. It appears that Hakim Khan Torah, the Governor of the Turfan Province, in which are included Urumchi and Manass, is unable to make his authority felt by these powerful new-comers, who are ready enough to receive the Ameer's gifts, but resent any attempt to interfere in their affairs or quarrels.”

If this account, especially the passage marked with italics is correct, then it is clear that the Ameer of Kashgar has not withdrawn from Ourumtsi and Manass, that those places are incorporated in one of his principal Governorships, and that his authority runs there, if not contested by the turbulent settlers.

310. Unwillingness of the Chinese to recognise the independence of Kashgar. Rumours of threatened invasion.—It is a principle of Chinese policy to recognise no changes which have resulted in the diminution of the Empire. The fact that the Mahomedan insurgents have been allowed to retain possession of Eastern Turkestan is due to the weakness of the Chinese. The latter have the will, but not the power, to re-assert the authority of the Emperor over the rebellious provinces in the extreme north-west. In September 1872, when General Jungchuan was made Governor of Ili, he received also the titular dignity of Governor over the Mahomedan cities of Altishahr, in all of which Chinese rule had been extinguished for eight years.

Since then there have been frequent rumours that the Manchoo claim was to be backed up by force, and that troops were being collected for the overthrow of the Kashgarian kingdom. The case was thus stated in the *Russian Exchange Gazette* of the 14th to 26th April 1874:—

“Eastern Turkestan, which now owns allegiance to Yakoob Beg, from Hami to Kashgar, over an extent of 2,000 versts, was conquered during the present Chinese dynasty in 1756, and during the course of more than a century, in spite of all the endeavours of its inhabitants to free themselves from their conquerors, could not succeed in shaking off the Chinese supremacy. It was only in 1863 that, by a general rising of the whole of the Mussulman population, the country regained an independence which the Chinese Government has never recognised. When Suchow, situated near the Great Wall, was recovered last autumn from the rebels, the besieging force was at once ordered to hasten to the conquest of rebellious Turkestan. It were strange to imagine that the Court of Peking could have abandoned all idea of recovering a country that had thrown off the Chinese yoke. Chinese vanity recognises no obstacle; neither time, money, nor distance will arrest its course. Although Turkestan was never a source of profit, yet the very idea of its daring to assert its independence, and to renounce the beneficent rule of the Bogdokhan, was preposterous. To this feeling of vanity must be added that of revenge, by which the Chinese are always actuated when they feel their own power; and so detachment will follow detachment into Eastern Turkestan. Let us assume that they will at first be routed, but that will matter little. The Chinese will never be at a loss for troops; the only fear of a Chinaman is refusal of admittance into the ranks of the army. Will China gain her end? She holds Barkul, which lies only 165 versts to the north of Hami, the citadel of which place has hitherto remained in the hands of the Manchus. Westwards from Barkul to Guchen, an extent of 400 versts, the country is now likewise in the possession of the Chinese. Consequently, the Chinese are able to invade the territory of Yakoob Beg from the north and east. Although the Mussulmans have shown that they are capable of offering resistance, yet it is on the Chinese Mussulmans and not on the Turks that Yakoob Beg would have to depend for resistance to the Bogdokhan; and he has even now several regiments of Tungans, to whom the success of the rebellion against China is owing. Let us assume that

Yakoob Beg has obtained, through the English, a supply of European arms; but of these the Chinese can also obtain as large a supply as they can wish for. They have already learned to appreciate those arms. They do not object, in case of necessity, even to the services of European officers. Treachery they can also employ. The Chinese know well how to utilise to their own advantage the character of their neighbours. They are not over scrupulous as to the means they employ, so long as they attain their object. As far as we know, the subjects of Yakoob Beg do not all willingly recognise the authority of the Kokandian refugee who rose to power at the expense of a descendant of the ancient sovereigns of Turkistan. The slightest success of the Chinese, supported by bribery and promises, would have the effect of throwing open to them the gates of the cities. One thing is certain, that Turkistan, if left to itself, must sooner or later succumb once more."

311. **Apprehensions of a Chinese invasion of Kashgar territory in 1873 and 1874.**—In the previous year as reported in his despatch No. 290, dated 23rd July 1873, the British Ambassador asked M. Westmann whether he had received lately any information concerning reports of a projected invasion of Kashgar by the Chinese Government with a view to regaining possession of that territory. And M. Westmann replied that no such information had reached him, nor did he think that the Chinese Government were in a position to make any such attempt. But in the spring of 1874 rumours of an approaching invasion gathered force. The *Journal de St. Petersbourg* of the 1—13th March 1874 announced that the Chinese had considerably added to the strength of their detachment at Shiko. They intended to march against Manass. The Zanzun Jungchuan was about to leave Chuguchak and take up his abode at Shiko. The friends of the Chinese at Liansian and Szansou were expected to join him, and the common belief was that they would undertake an attack upon Manass and afterwards upon Ourumtsi. A detachment of one thousand men had already left Shiko, but their destination was as yet uncertain.

312. **View taken in England on the state of affairs between China and Kashgar.**—These reports of an impending invasion attracted the notice of the public in England. On the 15th May 1874 Lord George Hamilton, in reply to the motion of Sir C. Dilke regarding the delimitation of the territories of Kashgar, informed the House of Commons that the Chinese Government had recently sent an army with the view of recovering the territories which the Ameer of Kashgaria had acquired, and thus at that moment the Ameer was at war with China.

313. **Her Majesty's Government draw attention to an article published by the "Exchange Gazette" on the impending Chinese invasion.**—In July 1874 Her Majesty's Government sent a copy of Mr. Michell's Abstract No. CVI and drew the particular attention of the Viceroy to the article therein extracted from the *Russian Exchange Gazette*. The following is the most important part of the article:—

"According to the official *Pekin Gazette*, the Chinese are making active preparations for a war with the Atalik Ghazee. On the east from Suchau, which town the Chinese captured last year, they are sending 17,000 picked men, detachments from the forces which were assembled for the seizure of that town; they have strong garrisons at Barkul and Khami on the very frontiers of the Ameer of Kashgar. On the north from Tarbogotai, Kobdo, and Uliasutai, they can also send reinforcements to the marching forces, as to the garrisons. The chief impediment in the way of the Chinese is the difficulty in marching their troops; the country through which the Chinese army has to pass was at one time in a flourishing condition. From the north-western side of the Chinese wall and over the famous Tse-yu-Tchian Pass up to Khami itself, and even beyond, was a once famous trade route lined with settlements and station-houses, along which there were adequate supplies, not alone for travellers, but also for troops marching every year from Central China to Kashgar and Khoten for the relief of the garrisons. But the rebellion has left in the hands of the Chinese a now perfectly ruined and desolated country, which, according to the official report of the Governor-General of the

Western Provinces, is not alone incapable of affording any supplies to a marching army, but is itself in need of Government aid. Of the difficulties which the Chinese have to encounter in the movement of the troops, we may judge from another official report written by the Commander-in-Chief in Tarbagatai in which it is stated that the money for the payment of his troops is a whole year reaching him from Peking."

* * * * *

"At the same time it is to be observed that the route lies through Mongolia, whose population may be said to have taken almost no part in the organised rebellion, but which was subjected to the attacks of the rebels who were driven out of China and from Turkestan. However that may be, it is open to no doubt that, one way or the other, the Chinese will, sooner or later, bring all their available forces to the frontiers of the Atalik Ghazee's territories. Having now ridden themselves of internal commotions, in the quelling of which they have displayed so much pertinacity, and that without raising a foreign loan,—notwithstanding the extreme exhaustion of their finances,—they can easily and without haste follow out their traditional idea, urged by *amour propre*, of re-establishing the former boundaries of the Empire. They received no revenues from Turkestan, but no considerations of expense will stay them. Being well acquainted with the mode of Asiatic warfare, we can easily foretell that the Chinese will regain a perfectly ruined and desolated country; but what do they care for that? They aim neither at an extra amount of population nor at the riches of the country: they wish only to restore the old frontier. The Atalik Ghazee may threaten as much as he pleases to repel their attacks, to rout the Chinese troops, yet will he not curb the Court of Peking. Reinforcements will continue to pour into the country until the object is gained. If the Atalik Ghazee relies on his European arms, be they from the Sultan of Turkey or from the English, if his troops are trained in the European fashion, it is not to be forgotten that now the Chinese also have European arms and European instructors. At the same time the resources of the contending sides are not equal. The Atalik's cannot be so abundant as those of the Bogdo Khan, his opponent. The latter will find a strong ally in treason, which better perhaps than all other people in the world the Chinese know how to evoke. We must not forget that Yakoob Beg is a stranger in the land, a new-comer in his own Kashgar dominion. Surely his new subjects are not all devoted to him in their souls; they surely do not all sincerely abhor the unforgotten rule of the Chinese.

"To what end then, we may ask, are all the endeavours of the English to create for themselves a fresh ally in the Atalik Ghazee, with whom they, as well as ourselves, have so hastily concluded a treaty of friendship and trade. Let us both not flatter ourselves with fond hopes, thinking that we have opened a new market for trade. The Chinese will even endeavour in their revenge to prolong the ruination of the country when they recover it. It had been better had the English not sent arms and instructors into Eastern Turkistan, because the more desperate the defence, the more fierce will be, in the end, the revenge of the Chinese."

On receipt of the above cited information the Government of India by letter No. 2068A.P., dated 21st September 1874, drew the attention of the Officer on special duty at Kashgar to the rumoured preparation by the Chinese Government for a war with the Ruler of Eastern Turkestan, and Mr. Shaw was requested to use such opportunities as might present themselves for ascertaining what information on the subject was to be got at Yarkund, and to report the result with his opinion of the probable power of the Ameer to resist an attack from the Chinese.

[*Secret, October 1874, Nos. 48-50.*]

314. The Government of India suggest joint diplomatic action with Russia to avert Chinese invasion of Kashgar.—In the meantime, however, the India Office had forwarded a memorandum by Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, in which it was said, on the authority of M. de Struve, the newly-appointed Minister of Russia in Japan, that the re-occupation of Kashgaria, although certainly not abandoned, was for the present even further from the thoughts of the Chinese Government than the recovery of Ili. The Government of India noticed this statement in despatch No. 61, dated 2nd October 1874, and expressed satisfaction that the Chinese Government appeared to have no immediate intention of undertaking active operations against Kashgar. It was added:—

"If, however, there should hereafter prove to be reasonable ground for apprehending an invasion of that country by Chinese troops, we would suggest, for the consideration of Her

Majesty's Government, whether, now that the Russian and British Governments have both recognised the independence of Ameer Yakoob Khan by receiving embassies from and contracting treaties with him, it would not be advisable for both Governments to use joint diplomatic action at Peking to prevent, if possible, the Chinese Government from attacking the Ameer. Should such joint action be impracticable, it might perhaps still be desirable that a representation on the subject should be made to the Chinese Government by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Peking. It is of importance to British interests in the East that the independence of Kashgar should, if possible, be preserved."

[*Secret, September 1874, Nos. 35-36; October 1874, No. 51.*]

315. Doubts as to the intention or power of the Chinese to invade Kashgar.—News received about the same time from native sources showed that the belief in a Chinese invasion had not gained ground in the quarters which were to be the object of attack. Thus in the Ladakh diary from 24th to 30th August 1874 it was stated that two traders from Yarkund had reached Nubra. These traders brought down reports with them that every thing was quiet in Eastern Turkistan, and that there was no news of any movement of troops on the Chinese frontier. The British Joint Commissioner observed on his own part :—

"The rumours that have recently been promulgated about the proximity of a hostile Chinese force on the north-eastern frontier of the Ameer's dominions would not seem to be very well founded from the fact that traders are allowed to move freely with their goods between the towns of Urumchi and Turfan, which would hardly be the case especially in a country where everything affecting the political condition of the kingdom is kept so secret, as it is in Yarkund, were hostilities imminent with a foreign power."

Mr. Wade also threw additional light on this matter in his letters to Lord Derby, Nos. 158 and 159, dated 31st July 1874. In the former he said that he had been informed by M. de Bützow that the Ameer Yakoob Khan, who on this occasion was well spoken of, had recalled one of his sons from Manass and had replaced him by another son who was waging war in that neighbourhood. The condition of the various peoples inhabiting the region in question had been described to M. de Bützow as one of hopeless disorder. In the latter Mr. Wade discussed the question of a Chinese attack upon Kashgar :—

"The mail of the 12th June brought papers which refer to an article in the *Pall Mall Gazette* on the statement of a Russian named Vassilief, to the effect that the Chinese Government is preparing a force for the reconquest of the country now governed by the Ameer Yakoob. M. Vassilief is represented to recommend that Russia should support the Ameer. What this may signify on the side of Russia I have no means of divining. On the side of China there is not a vestige of ground for the assumption that her Government has an army equal to any enterprise of the kind or contemplates the formation of one.

"I reported a few months ago the jubilation of the Chinese Government over the suppression of all rebellion in the north-west provinces.

"Tso-Tsung-tang, Governor-General of Ken Si and Kan Suh, had announced the recovery of Suchou Fu and the restoration of order up to the Kia-Yu-Kuan, a famous barrier in the Great Wall, which, notwithstanding the enlargement of the Province of Kan-Suh effected last century, really marks the bounds of China proper. It is now believed that the Governor-General, Tso, applied the money sent him for the pay of his army to the purchase of peace from the insurgents; and as under these circumstances the rebellion must be regarded not only as unsuppressed, but aggravated by the discontent of troops without pay, he is threatened with very serious consequences."

[*Secret, October 1874, Nos. 52-53; January 1875, Nos. 55-56.*]

316. Russian views on the probability of a Chinese invasion of Kashgar, June 1874.—The opinion held at St. Petersburg about the same time was that the Chinese were preparing for the struggle. M. de Stremoukoff informed the British Ambassador in June 1874 that the Chinese had lately taken the town of Suchow on the Great Wall, and had massacred every man, woman, and child in it. It was supposed that they would

advance against the Atalik Ghazee with a view to reconquer their lost provinces, but probably some time would elapse before they could find themselves in sufficient force to attempt it.

[*Secret, August 1874, Nos. 62-63.*]

317. Opinion formed by Mr. Shaw at Kashgar as to the power of the Ameer to repel a Chinese invasion.—The views of Mr. R. B. Shaw as to the chance of the Ameer's successfully resisting the Chinese were stated at length in his letter No. 27, dated 29th November 1874. He noted that in Kashgar itself there was an absolute blank with regard to any knowledge of hostile movements on the part of the Chinese. He pointed out, however, that the authorities of East Turkistan might remain ignorant of such a movement until it became more developed. The Chinese Provinces were masked from Kashgar by the intermediate Tungani States, which seemed to be always carrying on a kind of guerrilla warfare against the Chinese settled districts. Correct information would be difficult to obtain through such a medium. The rest of the letter contained an interesting and apparently reasonable review of the whole situation, as follows:—

“ There can, however, be no doubt that the physical features of the country are all in his (the Ameer's) favor. An attacking force from China on debouching from the gateway in the Great Wall would first have to cross a narrow part (many days' journey however) of the desert of Gobi. Here, as the Russian account translated by Mr. Michell states, the settlements and stations which were but scanty at the best have been entirely destroyed by the rebellion. The town of Kamul or Hami beyond (west of) the desert has, it seems, remained in the hands of its Chinese garrison, but all communications between it and the mother country by the direct route is, I believe, cut off, and to this district apply the words of the Russian account:— ‘ It is not alone incapable of affording any supplies to a marching army, but is itself in need of Government aid.’

“ There is thus no second base to be found in the Kamul district. Almost from the very day of its leaving the shelter of the Great Wall a Chinese expeditionary force would be exposing its right flank (if not its left also) to the attacks of the hordes of Tungani horsemen (reinforced probably by their fellow tribesmen who have lately been driven out of the possession of Suchaw and north-western Kansuh). These Tungani hordes do not hesitate to attack even the walled towns held by the Chinese in Zungaria, and would certainly not fail to harass their old foes in the open field, cutting off the long trains of convoys which must follow the Chinese army to keep it alive.

“ Beyond this district, coming still westward, the route lies along a comparatively narrow strip of fertile country extending some 50 or 60 days' journey, skirted on the one side by the range of the Celestial Mountains swarming with hordes of Kalmaks and Kirghiz who might probably be reckoned upon as allies by the Ameer and as foes by the invaders, and closed in on the other side by the sands of the great desert, where the Turki horsemen could muster unseen for flank attacks. All along at intervals on this route are fortified and garrisoned towns which could not safely be left in hostile hands in the rear of an invading force.

“ Whether much could be effected even against a very inferior enemy in Kashgar and Yarkund by the head of this long line of attack, drawn out over a distance of some 2,000 miles from its base (Kanchow), and exposing everywhere its flank to the assaults of a series of enemies for the most part nomads, whom to follow up and chastise would be almost like striking at a swarm of hornets, this will probably be considered a problematic question.

“ The points on which a doubt may be raised, however, are the probable conduct and power for mischief of the Kirghiz of the Kalmaks, and of the Tungani tribesmen in the event of an invasion from China; for regarding the physical features of the route there is no room for doubt. The Tunganis, who have for several years been and still are engaged in hostilities, with their former masters, the Chinese, would (it may be said with the highest degree of probability) oppose to their utmost an invasion, the first step to which would be their own subjection to their incensed foes. The Kalmaks have for some years been allies of the Ameer and have assisted him in his wars. His policy has from the first been to make friends with them; but it is difficult without further data to decide whether his influence together with the prospect of looting the scattered convoys of the Chinese would be sufficient to induce them to take a part in the war, by well supported sallies from the gorges of mountain range which shelters them and their flocks. As for the Kirghiz further west, whose position in the mountains is similar to that of the Kalmaks, they took a part ten years ago in the destruction of the

Chinese in Kashgar, and they now form a kind of frontier militia along the Ameer's northern and western boundary. Their burthens are but light, and it is believed that they are loyal to the present Ruler, and at any rate have much to fear from the vengeance of the Chinese should they obtain predominance. It is difficult to ascertain the numbers of the Kirghiz.

"Of course, with both these races, a promise to be allowed the sacking of Kashgar might have much weight in detaching them from the side of the present Ruler, and here Chinese intrigue might possibly come into play. But the knowledge of the massacres which have signalled the late Chinese re-conquests of territory from their Mussulman rebels would tell against the easy acceptance of Chinese promises.

"On the whole, I conclude that no really serious attempt on Kashgar can be made by China until she has re-conquered her former position in the region still held or overrun by the Tunganis. That, even after that, it will cost her many sacrifices in men and money before she can prevail further west, but that her known pertinacity and her immense resources may enable her in the end to wear out the defence of Kashgaria, or even by her intrigues to neutralise the defending forces. But this would be in either case at the cost of destroying all that would make Kashgaria valuable as a possession, besides the losses necessarily incurred by China herself in the process.

"It will be observed that I have taken it for granted all along for the sake of argument that the forces of the Ameer himself would be very inferior, and have not dwelt upon the strength of the resistance offered by Kashgaria itself as any formidable obstacle. But it is not at all certain that the Ameer's troops would be inferior either in numbers or in military qualities to any force which could for some time to come be set in the field against them by China in the plains of Kashgar and Yarkund, after running the gauntlet of hostile tribes for 2,000 miles nearly.

"The lowest estimate that I have heard given in this country (by witnesses by no means prepossessed in the Ameer's favor) for the troops actually employed at this moment amounts to 30,000. The number said to have been eating his bread during the last war is set down as high as 100,000. But this probably is meant to include all the Kirghiz and Kalmak auxiliaries. I have no means of checking these apparently exaggerated statements; but a rough calculation leads me to think that there must be more than 20,000 men at the present moment on foot in the country. These are as a rule fairly well trained for Asiatics, much attention being paid to their drill and shooting, and all being good riders. For the work of hovering on the skirts of a hostile army on the march, plundering convoys, and cutting off stragglers, a manifold larger number could no doubt be enlisted, every Turki being a born horseman.

"As for the trained nucleus, the Ameer could probably command the services of an immensely greater number of the restless spirits from Western Turkistan (whose occupation is rapidly dying out in that region), if he could only pay them. I had a suggestive conversation the other day with a native of India, * who is pretty high in the Ameer's service, and who has served for nearly half a century in the Khanates of Turkistan. He tells me that the military training which the Ameer insists upon giving his army is unexampled among the people of Central Asia. The Uzbeks are accustomed to assemble at the call of a chieftain and make a dash against their enemy. If they succeed, they are repaid by the spoils of their conquest; if repulsed, they scatter to their homes. Beyond their personal guards and the half civilian gangs of men who are employed in enforcing the payment of tribute, &c., the Rulers and Chiefs of Turkistan maintain no regular army in peace time; and their men never fire a gun for practice from year's end to year's end. Nor does the pay of the troops come to much. The guards have privileges and perquisites, and the rest of the army (so called) only assembles in time of war.

"But when, as in the case of the present Ameer, a Ruler is not content with this but attempts to maintain a trained army on the same terms, it becomes a different matter. Food, lodging, and occasional presents of money and clothes are provided for the men, but no regular pay. What suffices for a limited number of idle guards (allowed moreover to be unscrupulous regarding other ways of supporting themselves) is not enough for a much larger body of men kept under pretty strict discipline and expected to apply themselves to their drill and firing practice. The Andijani following of the Ameer are kept in good humour, and moreover were accustomed in their own country to the system of presents, but no pay. The Kashgarians are near their own homes, and moreover receive grants of land from the Ameer which they irrigate and cultivate in common, living in small colonies under their Yuzbashis, &c. But the foreign soldiers of fortune who serve in the hope of gain are decidedly dissatisfied (with the exception of a few Chiefs), and their experience offers nothing inviting to others.

"The prospect of regular pay, without extras, would attract many more men to the standard of a Chief who has not always plunder to offer. But one of the peculiarities of this country is that while wealth in the shape of goods and eatables is fairly common, money in any form is scarce. The Ameer finds it easier to feed and clothe his men than to pay them, even though the value given in both cases might be equal. Thus his army, though formed of good material, is less numerous than it might easily be had he more money.

"It must be remembered that the previous conquests of this country by the Chinese were effected under different circumstances from those which now prevail. On their first coming, in the middle of last century, they were called in by what may be called the national party of the Turk nation in Kashgaria, who were groaning under the oppression of the half-brother of their late King, who was aided by his Kalmak kinsmen (his mother having been of that tribe).*

* See Davies' Trade Report, Appendix, page 336. The resistance was therefore confined to what may be called a foreign party in the State. On the other hand, the Tunganis probably even then formed a considerable portion of their army, and until the Mussulman revival a few years ago were probably as loyal as any other section of the population of China. At any rate, they certainly offered no opposition to the Chinese advance; neither did the mass of the Turki population, who had themselves invited the Chinese.

"On the occasion of the subsequent re-conquests (as they may be called) of Kashgaria by China, it was only the open country that was in the possession of the enemy; the chief strategical positions being generally retained by large Chinese garrisons against which the invading Khojas from Andijan exerted their strength in vain. And the Tunganis then formed the best part of the Chinese forces in these regions. Never yet have the Chinese conquered Kashgaria from the hands of a firmly established Government, which, undistracted by intestine commotions, has had leisure to concentrate all the resources of the country on the measures of defence dictated by an able Chief. Never before have they had to protect themselves from daring and inveterate enemies on their flank and rear while advancing to the attack. * * *

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"If China recovers Kashgaria, it will be at no such easy cost as before: it will, I believe, be after such a long course of mutual destruction as will leave China with her vast population and resources alone capable of continuing the contest."

[Secret, February 1875, No. 11.]

In a subsequent letter from Mr. Shaw, dated 14th December 1874, a current report was mentioned that the Tungani Chiefs had sent emissaries to the Ameer announcing that they were being attacked in force by the Chinese, and that unless he would assist them to defend themselves, as they would rather die than submit again to the Chinese. Another rumour was that a large army of the Chinese had reached *Manass*, having been three years on the road. From this it appeared that the troops marched through *Mongolia* and *Uliasutai* by which route reinforcements take a year from *Pekin* in reaching the advanced posts.

[Secret, March 1875, No. 56.]

318. Recent news all showing that the Chinese are strengthening their forces on the North-West Frontier with the reputed intention of invading East Turkistan.—Of late reports coming from various quarters all tend towards the same direction, namely, that the Chinese for some purpose or other are strengthening their forces on the borders of East Turkistan. The *Russian Turkistan Gazette* of the 1st January 1875 stated that the garrison of Shiko was being steadily increased by draughts of Kalmak troops. But a short time previously the Chinese force at that place had not exceeded 2,000 infantry and cavalry. The number was now 3,000 and always increasing.

In a demi-official letter of 11th February 1875 to Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, the British Joint Commissioner at Ladakh wrote:—

"The only other news is that the Chinese are reported to be moving on with large masses of troops to Yarkund, and that the Emperor of China has issued a mandate that not a Tungani is to be left alive in his dominions. In a town called "Zilling" [which I don't recognise] a massacre of Tunganis is reported to have taken place, and 12 mosques to have been burnt to the ground."

The *Russian Turkistan Gazette* of the 18th March 1875 gave the following account of the hostile preparations which the Chinese were said to be making:—

"The Chinese are concentrating considerable forces on the frontier, and are very active in military preparations, for instance buying horses and storing provisions, for which they pay

comparatively high prices. Rumours of an early Chinese invasion are gaining strength. Their forces on the frontier are now said to amount to 20,000 men, and the last news advice further re-inforcements from the interior."

319. Latest intelligence received from Russian sources regarding the movements of the Tunganis and the preparations made by Chinese and Kashgarians for the impending conflict.— Intelligence to the same effect was reported in a letter from Tashkend published by the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* of the 9th (21st) April 1875. The letter contains interesting particulars of the recent movements among the Tunganis and of the preparations made on one side and on the other for the coming struggle. A translation is given below—

"Later information than that conveyed in my letter of 30th June 1874 entirely confirms the supposition that the state of uneasiness which prevails at this time over the whole extent of Eastern Turkistan to the north as well as to the south of the Celestial Mountains (Thian Shan), as well as the aggressive attitude of the Tunganis, are the direct consequences of the progress of Chinese arms in Kansu and more directly of the taking of Suchow.

"When the neighbouring inhabitants of this latter town, exhausted by ten consecutive years of disorder and civil war, were no longer able to supply the Tunganis who had defended Suchow against the troops of the Bourdo Khan, with means of existence, they resolved to seek aid elsewhere and to leave the country before the Chinese had actually made themselves masters of it. Men, women and children, with all their possessions, took the road to the north-east, and while the greater part directed their steps towards Turfan, the less important bodies dispersed in Mongolia. It was one of the latter who plundered Boulountokhoë on the 8th November 1873, and then went to swell with its numbers the Tunganis population of Manass and the neighbourhood of that town.

"On arriving at Khami (formerly called Kumal) the principal troops of the Tunganis undertook the siege of the town, the population of which was composed of Taranchis, who had formerly enjoyed a certain independence under the rule of hereditary Princes, and who are now governed by Chinese. After some days they shewed a disposition to surrender and exterminated the Chinese: a party of the latter escaped from the carnage and fled to Barkul. However the Tunganis entered the city and entirely burnt and demolished it; then they retired to Turfan taking the Taranchis whom they would not leave to the revenge of the Chinese. At Pishan and at Turfan the Kashgarians gave the new-comers a kind reception, provided them with provisions, and after having counted them let them pursue their journey in the direction of Ourumtsi. The Taranchis of Khami for the most part stayed in Turfan and the surrounding villages. They were a miserable population, ruined by the disorders they had undergone. The Tunganis, on the contrary, carried away with them quantities of cattle, precious metals, and teas and other costly goods. Among the Taranchis was the Princess (wife of the last *van* or prince) of Khami who had governed the town since the death of her husband in the name of her son.

"Shortly afterwards the latter disappeared from Turfan, and there is every reason to believe that he was carried off by devoted friends of his deceased father and consigned to some safe place, perhaps Khami or Barkul. His mother, by Yakooob Beg's order, was imprisoned at charchik, a small town belonging to the Kashgar State, situated between Kucha and Aksu.

"Such a large gathering of Tunganis in Ourumtsi and its neighbourhood naturally caused a speedy failure in the food supplies of the country; misery and famine supervened, and under their evil influence the Tunganis sought safety in rapine and brigandage. They flung themselves first on the nearest prey—the Torgoot tribes (Kalmaks), whose encampments were established in the Yulduz mountains and the neighbourhood of the town of Karashahr.

"In the meantime the Tunganis who had invaded Mongolia, and from thence had turned their steps to Manass, did not remain inactive. While avoiding a collision *en masse* with the Chinese troops who were concentrated at Kurkarasu in considerable numbers in the middle of May, there were said to be 3,000 men there, they directed their movements in detail against Shiko and Kura-usuh (near Keitun). Towards the middle of May they plundered a caravan of Chinese merchants with an escort of 30 soldiers who were going from Sazanza to Shiko. In spite of these provocations, the Zan-Zoun Juan maintains a defensive and expectant attitude. He continues to assemble his troops, and during the course of the summer the detachment placed under his orders and occupying Shiko has increased to about 1,000 men, cavalry and foot-soldiers. Unfortunately the former have lost a great part of their horses by cattle disease, which is still prevalent.

"The Chinese continue to fortify Chuguchak; the ramparts are already completed, but the inner works are advancing slowly, and up to the present time most of the garrison live in

yourts (felt tents). The civil and military authorities occupy the ruins of the ancient Russian factory. The number of the garrison amounts to 1,500 men, but they are not a homogeneous army, and, further, they are badly armed and lack the munitions of war. Among these troops are a certain number of Solons who have come from the district of Kulja, and whom the Chinese military authorities affect to treat with great respect so as to encourage the emigration of their fellow-countrymen who have stayed at Kulja; it appears that they even wear an uniform.

"Sazanza, likewise, contains a Chinese garrison of 1,500 men; at Savan there is a small detachment of 200 men re-inforced and renewed every month by the garrison of Shiko. The Chinese villages of Purtazi and Sigafur, situated between Shiko and Jbinkho, being abandoned by their inhabitants, are occupied by a detachment of 1,000 men who have set up agricultural establishments. This military colony was attacked at the beginning of 1874 by a band of Tunganis who came from Ourumtsi. At Sigafur a small fortress has been established.

"Communication between Chuguchak and Boulun-tokhoi was carried on, till latterly, by a route part of which crossed the south-west extremity of Zaizan, forming a part of Russian territory. The military movements which, during these last years, occurred in the very heart of this once peaceful locality, induced the Russian authorities on the frontiers to forbid all movement of Chinese troops and of military transports by way of the Russian territories. Consequently the Zan-Zoun Jung was obliged to seek a new road communicating with Boulun-tokhoi. The new road leaves the old one near the temple of Matene, goes to the south-west, and after some versts ascends a steep and stony mountain, on the slope of Mount Kojur, descends rapidly into the defile of the River Bai-Murza, rises again on a spur of Kojur, to rejoin by a gentle slope the locality called Katonaschi in the valley of Bai-Murza, where it unites with the old road at five versts from the Russian frontier. The road is scarcely two *sagènes** in width, it is very winding, full of stones, and generally badly kept. In its present condition beasts of burden can pass with difficulty, and probably it will never be fit for carts. The Chinese recognise this, and are engaged in finding out a more favorable line; it is thought they will stop at a path frequented by beasts of burden which winds along by the Semistaon at about 60 versts from the defile of Jair in the valley of Emil.

"As regards the proceedings of the Chinese troops who come from the central provinces and are charged with re-conquering the towns of Eastern Turkistan, we confine ourselves to recording here, with all reserve, the following information from Chinese sources:—*тo infans*, each at least 250 men strong, had already arrived at Guchen. Out of this number, 32 detachments of 500 men each had established themselves in the neighbourhood of the above-mentioned town. Part of this army were destined to undertake decisive operations against Ourumtsi and Manass in the spring of 1875; another party was to follow the road by Tarbagatai (Chuguchak) and appear at Shiko. The Zan-Zoun Jung was to be charged with the carrying out of this scheme under pain of deposition and death in case of ill-success or delay. The arrival from China of a still more formidable army composed of 10 *tomans* (each *tomian* consists of 10,000 men) would be awaited. Half of this army was to march against the Kashgar States, and the other half towards the valley of Ili.

"It is clear that all these rumours are exaggerated, and the figures are made up from imagination, but this much remains certain, *viz.*, that important events are in preparation in this part of Asia. In their movement from the south-east to the north-west the Chinese will have to deal no longer with the Tunganis only; they will find themselves in conflict with a more formidable enemy, the Ruler of Kashgar. On both sides great preparations are being made. Yakob Beg has long expected this struggle. As to the Chinese they are organising vast magazines in several of the frontier localities, they are everywhere buying, and at whatever cost, wheat, flour, cattle, horses: the Kalmaks of Zaganghyhen (encamped near Boulun-tokhoi) will not remain mere spectators of the contest, and their Chief will once more serve the cause of the Chinese Government for which he has already so often exposed himself."

320. Latest advices received from Yarkund as to the impending Chinese invasion.—The latest information received from the dominions of Kashgar will be found in Mr. Shaw's letter No. 58, dated 15th April 1875:—

"It is reported" he wrote "that a force of 5,000 Chinese have advanced five marches from Kumul (Hami) towards Turfan, and have entrenched themselves. Troops, it is said, are being gradually pushed forward from Kashgar in small bodies at a time. Further rumour says that the Ameer after meeting the Dadkhwah at Yangi-Hissar in a week or two for consultation will go on to Aksu to be nearer the scene of the disturbances. These are sometimes ascribed to the Chinese, sometimes to the Tunganis, and sometimes to a combination between the two nations."

* 'Sagène' (Sachine) is the Russian for a fathom = 7 English feet. 500 sagènes make one Russian verst = 3,500 feet, and 3 versts equal nearly 2 English miles. (See *The Modern Cambist*, page 86.)

321. Mr. Wade advises the Chinese to recognize the Ameer of Kashgar. The Imperial Ministers dare not submit such a proposition to the throne.—In illustration of the tenacity of the Chinese, it only remains to notice the advice given to the Ministers of the Emperor by Mr. Wade in November 1874, and the reply to his friendly suggestions. This subject, so far as it concerned Ili or Zungazia, has been mentioned on page 146: but besides recommending that Kulja should be yielded up to Russia, Mr. Wade advised that Kashgaria—

“the southern territory, equally recent and equally troublesome acquisition, should be retroceded to the Mahomedans, in other words, that Yakoob Ameer's dynasty should be recognised by the Emperor of China.”

And Mr. Mayers was instructed to say that Mr. Wade would be glad to see China quit of the necessity of maintaining her claim to a country which, could she resume it, would be a mere incumbrance to her. On the other hand, by spontaneous recognition of Yakoob as the Mahomedan Sovereign of Mahomedans, China might gain an ally where she had now a possibly hostile neighbour. The conversation which took place between Mr. Mayers and Governor-General Li Hung Chang on the 24th and 26th November 1874, was exceedingly interesting and characteristic. The following is Mr. Mayers' memorandum:—

“I next proceeded to speak of the western frontier, on which subject the Governor-General manifested great interest and spoke without reserve. He studied the region of Kashgaria and Ili as shown in Williams, map, which I had brought with me, and not only admitted that Mr. Wade is right in his opinion that China would do well to relinquish her efforts for the recovery of these territories, but also stated that he himself and the late Grand Secretary, Tseng Kwo-fau, before him, had already advocated the same view. Drawing his hand down perpendicularly the western border of Kansuh he observed:—‘This is where we ought to stop; beyond this, is not China, and although we might by a great effort recover possession of the Mahomedan territories, it would only be to lose them again in course of time. Our Military Governors would relapse into carelessness, and there would be a fresh insurrection sooner or later.’ At the same time the Governor-General said no one would be so bold as to recommend in writing to His Majesty the abandonment of territory. Alluding to the outbreak of spleen directed against the Prince of Kung in September last, His Excellency said:—‘You can judge from this how self-willed and proud the young Emperor is; he would ask what one meant by suggesting that the conquest of his ancestors should be relinquished at the very moment when the empire has just been pacificated within its provincial limits.’ After musing for a moment or two the Governor-General said—‘I might propose the step myself, by word of mouth,’ and he implied that he thought of visiting Peking shortly. He added—‘of course what you are driving at is to prevent Russia gaining possession of Kashgaria, and so becoming next-door neighbour to India.’ I replied that this was not the motive of Mr. Wade's communication, and pointed to the map for proof of my explanation that on no part of its frontier is India more securely guarded by mountain ranges than in the direction in question; whilst at the same time I dwelt upon the security to China which would be ensured by having a strong and well-disposed independent State on her western flank, instead of a dependency which would be a constant source of danger, even if subdued. I further hinted that the continuance of hostilities might in all probability have no other result than in necessitating a Russian advance southward, as had been the case in Ili. The Governor-General listened attentively to what I had to say, and enquired about the relations between Russia and the Ameer Yakoob, whose position and antecedents I explained. He asked me whether we had any official confirmation of the *newspaper* report he had seen of a Chinese defeat by the Ameer's forces, of which he said he knew nothing beyond what had appeared in print; and he seemed much struck on learning that commercial conventions had been concluded with the Russian and Indian Governments by the Ameer. It seemed also to interest him greatly to hear that an Envoy from Kashgar had visited Constantinople and had brought back investiture for his master from the Sultan. I said nothing of Mr. Forsyth's mission. After some further conversation the Governor-General said—‘Do you think that if China agreed to suspend hostilities, the Ameer would consent to tender his submission?’ To this I replied by asking what His Excellency meant by the phrase. The Governor-General replied that what he understood by it was the acceptance of some such feudatory position as that enjoyed by the Mongolian Princes, who are independent in their own territory, but recognise the sovereignty of the Emperor by an act of homage (such as rendering tribute and receiving investiture). I replied that this might be doubtful, as the Ameer may feel confident of being able to hold what he has conquered, but that of course I could not give a decided opinion on such a subject. As regards any hostile movements in advance, the Governor-General expressed most openly his disbelief in the power of the army supposed to be operating in Turkistan to do more than hold the positions which are still in

Chinese hands. He spoke contemptuously of Kung-luen, the Commander-in-Chief lately appointed; and he promised to think over what I had been saying. He had heard something of Russian schemes for a railway to China which he thought was intended to pass by Kashgar; but I explained that the proposal that had been lately mooted was for a line from Ili to Hami, and I observed that this gave all the more reason to believe that the recovery of Ili by China is most unlikely.

* * * *

“Touching upon the subjects dealt with in the previous conversation, the difficulty of persuading the young Emperor to place his relations with foreign powers on a different footing from the present, was alleged as a reason for the difficulty of leading the official world to a better recognition of the rights of converts to Christianity; and on the subject of Kashgaria the Governor-General now remarked that no one could venture to propose a relinquishment of the struggles in that direction. He had however written to the Governor-General, Tso-Tsurg-t'ang, on the subject; but Tso (for whom he is known to have no love), he said, is in favor of prosecuting the war.”

The advice given by Mr. Wade received the approval of Her Majesty's Government as being, in a general sense, suited to the state of affairs in that portion of Central Asia. But as he himself was fain to admit, he drew nothing from the Ministers except an affirmation that allowing his views to be practically just, no one would venture to submit propositions of the kind to the throne.

[*Secret, May 1875, Nos. 12-17.*]

F. H.—30-6-75.

CHAPTER IX.

SCHEMES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF RAILWAYS IN PERSIA

322. **The Reuter concession. Protection of the British Government solicited by M. Reuter.**—The preliminary negotiations between Mr. Cotte, Agent for Baron Reuter, and the Persian Government were reported in the letter from Mr. R. F. Thomson to Lord Granville, No. 2, dated 9th July 1872. On the 12th of the following September M. Julius de Reuter himself wrote to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stating that the Shah had granted him an exclusive concession for a term of 70 years for the construction of railways, irrigation, and others works throughout Persia. M. Reuter then adverted to the progress which the Russians had made in opening lines of railway towards the Caspian, and added—

“I desire to serve this, my adopted country, by introducing my enterprize under English auspices alone, and I shall have pleasure in so doing without soliciting a subsidy or other material support from Her Majesty’s Government. I nevertheless desire to feel assured that in the event of differences arising between the Persian Government and myself, Her Majesty’s Government will recognise the validity of my scheme and protect my rights as a British subject as far as may be in their power.”

The Duke of Argyll was consulted upon this letter by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and replied that, while His Grace would view with satisfaction the efforts of the Shah’s Government to increase the prosperity of Persia by means of railways, roads, &c., *the claim of M. Reuter for British protection was a matter entirely for the consideration of the Imperial Government.* At the same time Her Majesty’s Minister at Teheran sent to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a copy of the concession which the Shah was said to have signed, but which had not as yet been delivered to Baron Reuter. This will be found in Appendix XII. The Government of India, to whom the correspondence was forwarded, took no steps in the matter beyond asking for a copy of the concession when concluded.

[*General A., November 1872, Nos. 3-4; Secret, January 1873, Nos. 201-207.*]

323. **Malcolm Khan explains the Reuter concession to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.**—The visit of the Shah to Europe was approaching; and in the beginning of 1873 Mirza Malcolm Khan was appointed Persian Minister in London, and charged to announce and make arrangements for the journey. On his way the new Minister visited St. Petersburg, and there informed the British Ambassador, that the principal object of his deputation to London was with reference to the Reuter Railway concession. The projected line was to go from Teheran to Bushire, and a further line was in contemplation in a westward direction towards the Black Sea. The Minister was charged with full powers by the Shah to treat all matters relating to the concession in London without reference to the Central Government. Five separate proposals for a railway concession had been made to the Persian Government, *viz.*, a Russian, a German, a Turkish, a French, and an English proposal, to which last the preference had been given.

[*Secret, April 1873, Nos. 76-78.*]

324. **Mr. Taylour Thomson’s views as to effect of a railway from the Caspian to Teheran. Policy of the British Government.**—Her Majesty’s Minister at Teheran from the outset regarded with dislike so much of the scheme as provided for the construction of a railway between the Caspian and Teheran. He informed the Secretary of State by telegram dated 7th April 1873 that *the completion of such a railroad involved*

the question of Persia ceasing to be an independent power. Her Majesty's Government, however, were not disposed to interfere, and by telegram of 24th April 1873 Mr. Tylour Thomson was informed—

“ Her Majesty's Government would wish, for the advantage of Persia, that the internal communications of the country should be developed and improved: they would be glad that railway communication with Europe should be established through Turkey, but they do not think it desirable that you should expose yourself to suspicion of interference, probably of an ineffectual character, against any line which is necessary for Persian interests.”

The survey of the railway from Resht to Teheran had already begun,— Mr. Collins, Agent of Baron Reuter, accompanied by Civil Engineers, having arrived at Teheran on 21st April 1873 for that purpose.

[*General A.*, July 1873, No. 4; *Secret*, July 1873, Nos. 47-52.]

Mr. Thomson's views on this subject were fully explained in his letter to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, No. 10, dated 17th April 1873:—

“ The Russian line of railway between Rostoff and Vlady Kafkaz, the great military centre of the Caucasus, has already been commenced, and will no doubt be continued along the coast until it reaches Bakoo. If therefore the proposed line connecting Resht with Teheran were completed, the Reuter Company having by concession of the Shah the right to construct such other railways in Persia as it may deem fit, the Resht line would as a matter of course be connected with Astara, the present Russo-Persian frontier town on the Caspian, by that Company, and the same town by Bakoo by the Russian. This would be done at little expense from the abundance of forest timber and the natural facilities which the country affords for the construction of such a work, and thus Teheran would be brought into direct railway communication with St. Petersburg itself.

“ But on several occasions the Grand Vizier, when speaking with me confidentially on the position of Persia towards Russia with reference to the presence of the Russians on the Attrek, did not hesitate to declare that his Government, standing alone, had no choice but eventually to yield even if Russia, instead of claiming the Attrek as her frontier, should announce that Asterabad itself was Russian territory, and this being the view taken by the Persian Minister in the present position of affairs, it is only too obvious not only how seriously the independence of the country would be affected if, in addition to the occupation of the Attrek and domination of the Goorgaun valleys, her capital were by direct railway communication brought under the influence of Russia's military resources, but also how powerfully that state of dependence would affect British policy and interests in Central Asia, as well as the relations of Turkey with Persia.”

[*Secret*, December 1873, No. 2.]

325. Russian opposition to the Reuter Concession.—The Shah arrived at St. Petersburg on the 22nd May 1873, and found the Russians strongly opposed to the Reuter concession. Malcolm Khan informed the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that all of them from the Emperor downwards had expressed in the strongest language their opposition, going even the length of saying that “ *La Russie ne pouvait pas la tolérer.*” Malcolm Khan added that without the support of England, Persia could not risk the displeasure of Russia.

[*Secret*, December 1873, No. 11.]

326. Reuter's scheme of a railway from Constantinople to the frontier of Persia. Opinions expressed by Sir Henry Rawlinson, Major Bateman-Champain, and the Indian Foreign Secretary.— Baron Reuter meanwhile was indulging in visions of connecting the capital of Turkey with the Persian frontier by a line of railway through Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. And his schemes, though they came to nothing, Her Majesty's Government having refused to guarantee interest on the cost of a work undertaken in a foreign country, elicited opinions which it may be worth while here to record.

Sir Henry Rawlinson wrote as follows in a memorandum forwarded with India Office letter dated 12th June 1873:—

“There can be no doubt that it would be very important to connect Constantinople with the Persian frontier by railway, both in the interests of Turkey and England.

“To consider, firstly, the interests of Turkey, such a railway would bring the eastern provinces of the Turkish Empire, such as Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia, Kurdistan and Turkish Arabia, which are now more or less independent of direct control, into immediate relations with the capital. It would develop the natural resources of those provinces, stimulate trade, and contribute a powerful element of strength to the empire, both financially and politically.

“With regard to the second point of enquiry,—the effect of such a railway on British interests, a somewhat more detailed explanation is necessary. In a general point of view the railway might be said to be advantageous to us in affording the first section of the through line between Europe and India, to which the march of events will, sooner or later, inevitably lead, and which, indeed, if we may judge from the activity with which the question is being now simultaneously discussed in Russia, France, Germany and England, is likely to be undertaken, in some fashion or other, sooner rather than later. But it is in reference to the special condition of affairs in Persia at the present time that the project acquires real importance. The principal item in the extraordinary concession which has been recently made to Baron Reuter by the Persian Government and which gives the Baron a virtual monopoly of the natural and industrial resources of Persia for 70 years, refers to the construction of railways and necessitates, as the first step in the gigantic enterprise to which the attention of British capitalists is now being invited, the immediate formation of a line from Resht on the Caspian to Teheran. This is at present the only available means of access into the country; the only means at any rate by which, within a reasonable limit of time, the material necessary for the prosecution of all the other projected routes can be introduced into Persia. There must, therefore, be a certain interval of time during which all the trade, and, indeed, intercourse of Persia with Europe will pass through Russia, to the manifest risk of her continued independence; but there is no reason whatever for concluding that such a state of things should be permanent. It is only natural to suppose that a railway system will in due course be created in Persia, fed in the first instance from Russia, but radiating afterwards from Teheran towards other points of communication with Europe, or the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, or the Persian Gulf, in which event the Caspian Railway will become a mere competing line, and the Russian hold upon Persia will be relaxed in proportion.”

Attention was then drawn to the necessity of active assistance on the part of England, if it were wished that the Persian line to the frontier should be carried on by a Turkish line to the Mediterranean, and the embarrassment which would follow if Reuter and his concession were thrown into the arms of Russia was pointed out.

In India, Major Champain, R.E., Director-in-Chief of the Indo-European Telegraph, recorded a favorable opinion on the proposed line from Constantinople through Diarbekir to the Persian frontier; but as regards the general prospects of Baron Reuter in the matter of his concession, he predicted that many obstacles, among others the character of the Persians and the system of the local Governments, would impede success, and that sooner or later it would be necessary for him to seek support “to enable him to work his apparently magnificent concession.”

Upon this memorandum by Major Champain and upon the question of the concession, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. C. U. Aitchison, wrote the following remarks:—

“It seems pretty clear that unless Reuter receives the countenance and support of some Government, the projects will entirely fail; and that if he cannot succeed in getting our support, he will probably try Russia, a move which would be very injurious to us.

“It is also probable that Reuter's schemes will be carried out largely by the aid of English capital, and that sooner or later therefore, if the schemes are exposed to risk of failure, pressure will be brought by the capitalists to force the Government into some official recognition of the schemes.

“Further, it is not in itself a desirable thing that very large sums of English capital should be invested in Persia without the advantage of the representation which the British Minister would give.

“I think we might, therefore, without undertaking to take up every petty matter of dispute between Reuter and the Persians, afford the scheme such general countenance and support

through the British Minister as to ensure that the interests of the Company would, at all times, in matters of importance, be freely represented to, and laid before, the Persian Government, and reasonable protection given.

"If this were done, our influence might gradually be re-established in Persia without the necessity of entangling ourselves in railway projects. At the same time, provided Reuter distinctly undertook to connect Teheran with the Persian Gulf and a branch line to the Turkish frontier, it might well be worth while for England and India jointly to give a guarantee for the Turkish line for a given number of years, say 15 or 20, in one or other of the ways suggested by Reuter. I look upon it as a certainty that the Russians will sooner or later have a railway from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf, unless they are forestalled. It is essential to the trade of South-Eastern Russia."

Major Champain's memorandum was sent privately by the Viceroy to the Duke of Argyll and Lord Granville, but no steps were taken by the Indian Government either to support or discourage Baron Reuter, as the matter had already been disposed of by Her Majesty's Government.

[*Secret, December 1873, Nos. 2-55, and K.-Ws.*]

327. The Reuter concession annulled. Cause assigned by the Persian Government. Views of the Secretary of State for India on the subject.—The commencement of the Resht and Teheran Railway took place on the 11th September 1873, and Hussun Ali Khan, Minister of Public Works, visited the works and having inspected the cutting complimented the Engineers upon the progress they had made. But the Reuter concession was doomed; though Baron Reuter himself on the 31st October 1873 assured Lord Granville that he had determined to persevere in his enterprise in *an international sense*. Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran had already in September 1873 foreseen the course which the Persian Government eventually adopted. Referring to the opening of the works of the Resht and Teheran Railway he wrote:—

"By Article VIII, however, of the concession to Baron Reuter, there would appear to be room to dispute whether the works of the railway may be said to have been opened or otherwise, there being reference in that article to rails being brought to Enzellee, and if on this ground it were found that they had not been commenced, no rails whatever having been yet brought there, or likely to be brought there by the 25th of October, the confiscation of the £40,000 cautionary money deposited in the Bank of England by Baron Reuter would have effect. Objection could also be taken in virtue to Article XXIII to the terms of the concession not having been observed by Baron Reuter, he having failed in his engagement to commence the works of the mines, waters, forests, &c., simultaneously with those of the railway, no such works having yet been commenced."

His subsequent letter No. 158, dated 8th November 1873, shewed that the alleged infraction of these two articles was the pretext which the Shah's Government intended to seize for the purpose of putting an end to an agreement which had come to be recognised as politically dangerous. Three days previously, *viz.*, on 5th November 1873, the Persian Minister Housein had written to the Agent of the Company:—

"I regret to give you notice that the Company which you represent having failed to fulfil the engagements stipulated for in Article VIII, according to our view the Persian Government in consequence of this very fact regards itself as freed from its engagements towards Baron Reuter. ... Therefore until the two parties can agree together again, not only every order already given will be countermanded, but also the convention remains in our view null and of no effect."

And on the 6th November 1873 the Musheer-ud-Dowlah telegraphed to Baron Reuter:—

"I announce to you with regret that the term fixed for the beginning of the railway having elapsed, and no rails having yet been laid down, the article of the concession providing against the failure to execute this important point gives us the right to free ourselves from the contract."

The view which Her Majesty's Government were disposed to take of the whole transaction is stated in the India Office letter to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated 13th November 1873:—

"His Grace has learnt with regret that the Persian Government has determined to declare the concession to Baron Reuter to be null and void on the ground that the Baron has failed to comply with some of the preliminary conditions of the agreement. His Grace is not prepared

to express approval of the Reuter concession as a whole, nor of the Persian Railway scheme in its details, but he cannot doubt that a system of interior railways and irrigation works would be generally of great benefit to Persia, and would subserve the only interest which England can have, namely, that of making the country stronger and more prosperous.

“The Duke of Argyll considers it impossible that this object can be attained without the extensive application of European capital, and he regards it of importance that this application should be directed in such a manner as to secure the confidence of the European Powers that it is made with a view to common and not to exclusive or special interests.

“It is on these grounds that His Grace would learn with pleasure that the objections taken by the Persian Government to Baron Reuter’s further operations have been removed, and that Persian Railways and other reproductive public works were likely to be continued under the diplomatic protection, as proposed by the Baron, of all the great European Powers connected with the country.”

[*Secret, March 1874, Nos. 176-201.*]

328. Disputes between the two parties to the Reuter Concession.—It is unnecessary to enter at length into the wrangling which ensued between the parties, Baron Reuter declaring on the one side that the opening of the works on the 11th September 1873 was a sufficient fulfilment of the stipulations, and that the Persians themselves were to blame for the delays which had occurred by omitting to prepare certain schedules of charges (*cahiers de charge*), the Persian Government on the other side explaining to the representatives of the Shah abroad that Baron Reuter had in the latter part of September or beginning of October “merely to confuse matters” levelled the road for about a quarter of a *fursakh*, and that he had not begun operations “even with the object of confusing matters” upon the mines, forests and waters which he had undertaken to work simultaneously with the railway. So far as the Persians were concerned, it was evident that, unless pressure should be exerted from without, the concession was annulled for good and all.

[*Secret, March 1874, Nos. 176—201.*]

[*Pol. A., April „ „ 225—226.*]

329. Baron Reuter appeals to Her Majesty’s Government in March 1874. Official protection refused. Instructions issued to Her Majesty’s Minister at Teheran.—On the 16th March 1874 Baron Reuter made a formal appeal to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for assistance in removing the misunderstanding which had arisen. With a full statement of his view of the case he submitted an opinion recorded by Sir W. Vernon Harcourt, that if the transaction were between individuals the facts and correspondence would afford no just ground for terminating the concession. Her Majesty’s Government, however, still declined to interfere officially. In letter dated 27th March 1874 the Foreign Office informed Baron Reuter that Lord Derby saw no reason to differ from the opinion expressed by Lord Granville in Viscount Enfield’s letter* dated 15th October 1872, that Her Majesty’s Government could not bind themselves officially to protect Baron Reuter’s interests whilst carrying out his engagements with the Persian Government.

“Lord Derby” it was added “looks upon the undertaking entirely as a private one, in which Her Majesty’s Government cannot interfere, and although he is prepared to instruct Her Majesty’s Minister at Teheran to obtain for your representations to the Persian Government the same hearing to which the representations of any other British subject who had entered into a contract with that Government would be entitled, he cannot authorize or instruct him to use any diplomatic influence or good offices on your behalf except in this respect.”

Her Majesty’s Minister at Teheran was instructed to strictly confine his proceedings in the matter within the limits indicated, though it appeared to Her Majesty’s Government that Baron Reuter might fairly claim, that should he succeed in proving his contract to have been terminated through the default of

* This letter does not appear to have been received by the Indian Government.

the Persian Government, that Government ought to grant him such concessions as would compensate him for any loss to which he might actually have been subjected through the failure of the contract.

In a separate letter of the same date (27th March 1874) to Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran, it was observed :—

“It appears to Her Majesty's Government to be exceedingly doubtful whether the Persian Government could ever have carried out the contract, as its effect would have been to place the administrative resources of the State at the disposal of a single individual who might have in turn alienated them to others, or even to a Foreign Government; and although Baron Reuter may have suffered disappointment, and possibly even injustice, from the failure to execute the contract, Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to say that the Persian Government were otherwise than well advised in cancelling it when they came to appreciate its true bearing at the earliest opportunity which presented itself.”

[*Secret, June 1874, Nos. 12—13.*]

330. Share taken by the Russians in the annulment of the Reuter Concession.—The share taken by the Russians in the annulment of the Reuter concession is as yet matter for conjecture. The cause assigned by the Musheer-ud-Dowlah for the action of the Persian Government was that the Shah was alarmed by the popular cry that he had delivered his country and religion into the hands of the Europeans and by the opposition of the clergy in particular. Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran in his letter No. 158, dated 8th November 1873, explained that—

“the intention of the Persian Government was simply not to get rid of what they considered to be a bad commercial and financial contract, but to extricate themselves from a most disastrous political crisis *fomented and supported by foreign influence* amongst a bigoted and fanatical priesthood and the personal enemies of the Prime Minister to such an extent as to threaten almost the stability of the throne.”

Mr. Thomson also ascertained that M. Beger had paid a private visit to the Shah on the 25th November 1873. The Russian Minister, after enquiring whether an editorial letter published in the *Teheran Gazette* of 10th November 1873 was really an expression of the determination of the Government to annul the concession, was said to have remarked, “In this matter, however, we are indifferent as regards ourselves; it is in your interest that *we are so urgent in our representations against it.*” On the whole there can be no reasonable doubt that if the statement that “*la Russie ne pouvait pas la tolérer*” was not sufficient, no effort was wanting on the part of Russian Statesmen to procure the withdrawal of the concession.

[*Secret, March 1874, Nos. 94-97.*]

331. Negotiations for a concession to a Russian Company to construct a railway from Julfa to Tabreez.—Within eight months from the date on which the Reuter concession was annulled by the Shah's Government, efforts were being made to obtain for a Russian Company a concession to construct a railway from Julfa in Georgia to the town of Tabreez. The negotiations which ensued afford an instructive comment upon the Russian system of dealing with Asiatic Governments. The person selected for carrying out the scheme was General Falkenhagen, a retired Engineer Officer of the Caucasus, who had been employed in the construction of several lines of railway in Georgia. He arrived in Teheran towards the end of June 1874, and brought with him a letter of recommendation from the Russian Department for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Minister in Persia, in which he was described a person of serious views. He proposed to construct a line of railway from Julfa in Georgia to Tabreez in connection with the line from Tiflis to Julfa. But the terms he asked for were hard. He demanded a guarantee by the Persian Government of 6½ per cent. annually for 44 years on a capital of 3,440,000 Russian ducats, 5 per cent. being interest on the capital and 1½ per cent. annually as sinking fund. These demands were too much even for the submissive Government of Persia, and on 28th July

1874 Mr. Thomson informed Lord Derby that the contract had been rejected by the Shah on the 25th idem. Russian Statesmen, however, are not to be daunted by Asiatic opposition. They immediately exerted pressure, the nature of which may be understood from the following telegram despatched by the Shah himself to the Persian Minister at St. Petersburg in August 1874 :—

“Say to Gortschakoff that the Russian Minister and General Falkenhagen insist upon having immediate answer regarding railroad concession, that any affairs of this nature cannot be terminated in a few days and is not a subject for official negotiation; that full time should be afforded to study the question; that the Russian Legation interfere as if this matter were an official one; that in matter of the Reuter concession from the commencement until now neither British Government nor its Legation have ever interfered either verbally or in writing.”

The Russian and British systems were thus candidly compared. The sequel will show which of the two was most effectual.

332. The Falkenhagen concession re-opened after rejection owing to pressure exerted by the Russians. Action of the British Government.—On the 30th July 1874 M. Beger requested the honor of a private conversation with the Shah. All Persians, excepting the Minister for Foreign Affairs, were requested to withdraw, and the Russian Minister then stated that the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs was in everything hostile to Russian interests, and urged with great warmth reconsideration of General Falkenhagen's proposal. The Shah in vain pleaded that the moment was inopportune. M. Beger's importunity was not to be denied. On the 4th August 1874 Mr. Thomson telegraphed that the question of the concession to the Russian General for the construction of a railroad from Julfa to Kasbin (or Tabreez) had been re-opened after rejection by the Shah. A Persian Commission of five had been appointed to discuss the matter, and it was feared they would recommend acceptance of the proposal. Her Majesty's Minister therefore asked whether he might recommend the Persian Government not to give a decision until they thoroughly understood their position with reference to the Reuter concession. This suggestion was approved by telegram from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs dated 5th August 1874.

Although Her Majesty's Government still considered that the Persian Government had done wisely in cancelling the contract conceded to Baron Reuter, and steadily refused to support the contract as it stood, they could not but view these proceedings of the Russian authorities with dissatisfaction. Accordingly on the 6th August 1874 the Secretary of State for India invited the consideration of Lord Derby to the importance of upholding the independent action of the Shah at this particular juncture.

“It would be advisable to instruct Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran by telegraph to use all the influence in his power to resist any improper pressure that may be applied to him (the Shah) with respect to this concession. If the Shah is of his own motion disinclined to favor the proposed railway, the influence of England may be legitimately used to prevent his judgment from being overcome by the importunity of the Russian Minister.”

On the 10th August the Foreign Office informed the Secretary of State for India that telegraphic instructions in the above sense had been issued.

[*Vide Secret, September 1874, Nos. 3-4 and 55-56.*]

333. Renewed negotiations regarding the Falkenhagen concession. Articles deemed objectionable by the Persian Government.—Meanwhile the negotiations were being carried on with much vigour at Teheran. With his letter No. 169, dated 13th August 1874, Mr. Thomson forwarded a translated draft of the articles proposed by General Falkenhagen. It will be only necessary here to set out the following articles which contained the terms considered most objectionable by the Shah's Government :—

ARTICLE VII.

The nominal capital of the Company is fixed at 3,440,000 Russian ducats, and is to be formed by the issue of shares (actions). The Company will be at liberty to exchange a portion of the shares for bonds (obligations).

ARTICLE VIII.

The Government of His Majesty the Shah guarantees to the Company, from the day of the completion and of the commencement of the working of the Railway until the expiration of the term of the concession, a yearly nett profit of $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. upon the nominal capital of the Company, that is 223,600 Russian ducats a year representing the profit upon the nominal capital of the Company and a sinking fund during the period of 44 years.

If the working of the Tabreez Railway should not produce a nett income of 223,600 Russian ducats, in that case the Government of His Majesty the Shah engages to make good the deficit, whatever it may be, by paying in cash to the Company every year half the amount due for the first six months on the first of January, and the next half on the 1st of July, according to the European calendar: and to pay this money to the Company punctually during the whole term of the concession from the day of the commencement of the working of the line.

ARTICLE IX.

As a compensation for the disbursements which the Persian Government has to make for the payment of its guarantee, the Company is later to give to the Persian Government half of the profits which may accrue from the working of the line after the deduction of $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The payment thereof to the Persian Government is to be continued until such time as the Persian Government shall have realized the entire sum representing it (the capital) and 5 per cent. interest, when it will cease.

ARTICLE X.

In order to ensure that the annual profit of $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. upon the whole nominal capital of the Company—which is the minimum profit guaranteed by Persia—may be received by the Company at the periods stipulated in Article VIII, the Persian Government makes over to the Company for the entire period of this concession the customs of Tabreez, which shall be transferred to an International Board of Customs at the village of Julfa, or at some other part of the frontier, which will be fixed in a separate Convention between the Government of His Majesty the Shah and that of Russia. The Government of His Majesty the Shah promises to make at once an arrangement with that of Russia for the conclusion of a convention for the purpose of establishing on the River Aras a united Russian and Persian Custom House under an international administration, similar to those which exist on the great Railways between some of the European States.

This International Custom Board can be entrusted with the accounts between the Persian Government and the Company respecting the above-mentioned guarantee.

The Government of His Majesty the Shah promises that in the discussions respecting the aforementioned International Board of Customs, it will make it a condition that Agents on the part of the Persian Government must form a part of this Board, and also that it will induce the Government of Russia to support and assist the Company in the sale in Russia of its scrip described in Article VII.

The above provisions, namely, the articles stipulating a guarantee by Persia, the internationality of the Tabreez Customs House, and its removal thence to Julfa in Russian territory, were the obstacles to the conclusion of the proposed contract. On the other hand, Mr. Thomson had doubts whether further negotiations would be desired by Russia if the rejection of those articles were made an absolute condition.

334. Note addressed by Mr. Thomson to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs on 17th October 1874, reserving the right of Her Majesty's Government to take such steps as they might deem fit regarding the Falkenhagen concession.—On 17th September 1874 M. Beger had another private conversation with the Shah, during which the railway concession demanded by General Falkenhagen was brought forward. On this occasion he did not complain, as on the previous one, of the hostility displayed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian interests, but dwelt strongly on the advantages which would accrue to Persia from the construction of this railway, and stated that it was at the earnest instance of His Majesty himself that General Falkenhagen had been sent to this country. The Shah replied that no one could be more sensible than he was of the advantages to be derived from the adoption of railway communication in Persia, but that the terms proposed by General Falkenhagen for this concession were too onerous.

By the 8th October 1874 the negotiations had proceeded so far that Mr. Thomson expected the agreement, with the omission of the guarantee and Customs House articles, to be terminated in a few days. He therefore proposed by telegraph to address the following official note to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

“Being aware that a concession for the construction of a line of railway between Julfa and Tabreez is, with the official intervention of the Russian Legation, under negotiation between Persian Government and General Falkenhagen, I think it right to observe to Your Highness that any such concession being prejudicial to the interests of Baron Reuter, whose concession, notwithstanding declaration by Persia of its being null and void, still remains an open question, I think it my duty, pending receipt of instructions from Her Majesty's Government, hereby to reserve to them the right to take such steps in the matter as under the abovementioned circumstances they may deem fit.”

This note was communicated *unofficially* to the Musheer-ud-Dowlah on the 17th October 1874.

[*Secret, November 1874, Nos. 46-51 December 1874, Nos. 22-26 and 31.*]

335. Nature of the pressure exerted by Russia in respect to the Falkenhagen concession.—The reply of the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Tylour Thomson's unofficial note of the 17th October 1874 was to the effect that the Falkenhagen concession was still merely a project, but that if it should succeed it would have no connection with the Reuter concession, which the Persian Government considered as no longer in existence. Thanks, however, to the continuous pressure exerted by the Russians, the negotiations for the Julfa and Tabreez Railway were fast coming to an end, and before the close of October 1874, the Persian Minister of Public Works had been authorized by the Shah to discuss the articles of the convention with General Falkenhagen, to conclude and exchange them in any manner considered advisable, and to lay them before His Majesty for ratification. Of the nature of the pressure put upon the Shah's Government, some opinion may be formed from the subjoined extract from Mr. Thomson's letter No. 215, dated 12th October 1874:—

“On the 21st of last month, M. Beger, having requested an interview, called upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said that he had just received a telegram from M. Westmann to the effect that he had been informed by the Russian Ambassador in London that a foreign influence had been exerted over the Shah to spoil the affair Falkenhagen, and that this foreign influence had been instigated (*provoquée*) by him (the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs). That all this had been made known to the Emperor, and that the Emperor was indignant at his conduct (*et que l'Empereur était indigné de votre conduite*).

“To this the Minister of Foreign Affairs protested that the English Minister had never said a word either for or against that concession, but that he had often asked him for information as to how it stood, and added: “I have frequently told you that it was not I but the Shah who was opposed to it, and who could not accept the guarantee and Custom House articles. Now, however, that you insist it was my doing, very good, let it be so. I am not answerable to you for what I do. I am a Persian, not a Russian, subject.”

So frequent and urgent did the representations of the Russian Minister become that Mr. Thomson apprehended the downfall of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the re-instatement of the Ex-Minister, who had been for 20 years the devoted partizan of Russia. Mr. Thomson, therefore, thought it necessary at an audience which took place on the 8th November 1874 to address to the Shah observations which were summarized as follows:—

“That His Majesty is well aware that the policy of Her Majesty’s Government is that Persia should be independent; that in order to be so it was necessary that Persia should scrupulously observe her engagements with Foreign States, and concede the just claims of foreign subjects. On the other side, it was also necessary that all internal affairs should be kept separate from foreign ones; otherwise by degrees the independence of this country would be subverted. That I ventured to make these observations as I latterly had perceived that improper foreign intervention and pressure had been permitted in a matter which was indisputably one of internal administration—the Russian concession—and that although the Reuter concession was of vaster magnitude, Her Majesty’s Government had abstained from all interference. If interference of this nature were allowed, it could not fail to lead to further demands destructive of the independence of his country.”

Mr. Thomson added that His Majesty expressed in a very gracious manner his satisfaction with the observations that had been made to him. Nevertheless, the general belief at Teheran was that it depended on Russia alone to accept the Falkenhagen concession as negotiated. And the Shah was reported to have observed that, when the guarantee and Custom House stipulations were claimed by General Falkenhagen, he had rejected definitively all negotiation on such a basis, but that when those articles were withdrawn he considered it advantageous for the country that the railway should be constructed, that others also should be undertaken, and that, the terms being favorable (for Persia), he would be glad to see such works constructed by English, French, or any other foreign agency.

[*Secret, December 1874, No. 26, and February 1875, Nos. 39 and 40.*]

336. Modified terms obtained by General Falkenhagen from the Persian Government in January 1875.—In January 1875 further concessions were wrung from the Persian Government. On the 4th January Mr. Tylour Thomson telegraphed to Lord Derby that General Falkenhagen had announced by letter to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Company declined the Railway concession as signed by the Persian negotiators, but that if the Persian Government would insert the guarantee and Custom House articles, the Company would accept it. The matter, however, was not suffered to rest thus. The interpreter of the Russian Legation communicated to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs the great vexation with which the Emperor of Russia had learned the unacceptable terms proposed by the Persian negotiators, and the result of these remonstrances was soon perceived in the modifications reported by Her Majesty’s Minister at Teheran on the 28th January 1875. Mr. Thomson described the modifications as follows:—

“Three new articles are introduced in this agreement, and some changes of minor importance are made in some of the stipulations of the former concession.

“By Article 6 the term of the concession is fixed at 44 instead of 70 years; in the first of the new articles the Persian Government guarantee the payment of 1,02,000 tomans annually, being interest at the rate of 3 per cent. upon the nominal capital of the Company stated at 3,440,000 Russian ducats. But it would appear to admit of doubt whether so large a sum would ever be required for the construction of the line, and if this be the case, the Persian Government may in reality be guaranteeing a much larger rate of interest than it appears to do by this article.

“In the 2nd the Persian Government reserves to itself the control of the expenditure and revenues of the railway, and under the 3rd the Company engage to pay to the Persian Government 40 per cent. of the net revenue received by the Company over and above 6 per cent. on the nominal capital. General Falkenhagen has left Teheran for St. Petersburg to consult with the so said Company as to their acceptance or otherwise of the new concession—a period of four months being accorded to him for that purpose.”

A translation of the articles finally agreed to by Persia will be found in Appendix XIII. This has been compiled from the draft sent to Her Majesty's Government in despatch No. 225, dated 30th October 1874, with the alterations and additions reported in despatch No. 16, dated 28th January 1875.

[*Secret, February 1875, No. 33, and April 1875, No. 4.*]

337. Further action taken by Her Majesty's Government in support of Reuter's claim to compensation.—To return now to Baron Reuter, the Baron having stated his willingness to relinquish the concession granted to him by the Persian Government, he was informed by Foreign Office despatch of 23rd July 1874 that instructions would be sent to Teheran directing Her Majesty's Minister to use his good offices to assist in bringing about an arrangement between the Persian Government and Reuter's Agent for the relinquishment of all claims in regard to the concession on the basis of compensation for Baron Reuter's actual expenses and labor, it being understood that no claim could be pressed diplomatically. In accordance with previous instructions Mr. Thomson telegraphed on the 27th July 1874 that he had explained to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs the matter of the Reuter concession, that while Her Majesty's Government could not support the contract as it stood, they would see with pleasure that Baron Reuter were allowed to benefit by any part of it which the Persian Government might think free from objection.

On the 23rd October 1874, M. Reuter stated the points which he desired should be laid before the Persian Government on his behalf: they were—

- (1.) That the Persian Government should acknowledge the validity of his concession on condition of his subsequently surrendering it.
- (2.) The surrender should be effected at the option of the Persian Government, either for an indemnity to be agreed upon; or
- (3.) If the Persian Government should not accept proposal No. 1, that it should declare its willingness to negotiate with him at once for such modifications as might be desirable to the Persian Government and not injurious to his interests.

In reply he was informed that Mr. Thomson would be furnished with a copy of his letter, but that any proposals he desired to make must be submitted through his Agent, as Her Majesty's Government could not authorize Mr. Thomson to do more than use his good offices. And by telegram of 13th November 1874 Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran was authorized to give unofficial support to the demands as formulated in M. Reuter's letter of 23rd October.

It appears, however, that Baron Reuter, on reconsideration, was not altogether satisfied with the conditions which he himself had proposed. His Agent at Teheran was not placed in possession of the "three points" until the morning of the 18th November 1874, and then under instructions not to act until further orders. At length on the 19th January 1875, the Agent, Mr. Collins, submitted to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs *two* points as the basis of an amicable arrangement. They were—

- (1.) That the Persian Government should declare its readiness to negotiate and establish a modified concession.

Or, if the Government declined this first proposition—

- (2.) That a pecuniary indemnity, to be agreed upon thereafter, should be paid by the said Government to Baron Reuter in return for the entire renunciation on his part of all the rights conferred upon him by the concession of 25th July 1872.

It will be seen from the following extracts from Mr. Thomson's despatch of 28th January 1875, that the prospect of an agreement between the parties was not brilliant :—

"Up to the present date no reply has been given by the Persian Government to this note, and as Baron Reuter has instructed his Agent not to discuss in any way the terms of modified concession referred to in the first point, he has in consequence abstained from visiting the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the above period.

"In conversation with me the Minister of Foreign Affairs has frequently professed his desire, and apparently with some sincerity, to come to an amicable arrangement with Baron Reuter, but I have been unable to form a clear opinion as to the object of those professions, whether it is with the view of possibly obtaining some insight as to the probable pretensions of Baron Reuter, or of ascertaining what in my private opinion I might consider an arrangement advantageous to both parties. The question of pecuniary indemnity being granted by the Persian Government is rejected absolutely by the Persian Minister as altogether inadmissible."

[*Vide Political A., September 1874, No. 372.*]

[*Secret, November 1874, No. 47.*]

[*Secret, December " " 28.*]

[*Secret, February 1875, " 51, and April 1875, Nos. 7-8.*]

338. Action taken by Her Majesty's Government to support Baron Reuter against General Falkenhagen.—As regards the rival claims of Baron Reuter and General Falkenhagen, Her Majesty's Government decided to go beyond unofficial intervention. On the 13th November, that is on the same day that instructions were issued to give unofficial support to the Reuter's demands in reference to his own concession, the following telegram was despatched by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran :—

"Baron Reuter has informed me that he has instructed his Agent to protest against the proposed concession to a Russian Company for the construction of a railroad from Julfa to Tabreez.

"I have to instruct you to support this protest by a formal and official representation to the Persian Government.

"You will state that Her Majesty's Government have hitherto purposely abstained from instructing you to do more than use your good offices unofficially to obtain for the Baron Reuter a fair hearing of his claims as Her Majesty's Government desired to avoid anything which might appear like interference in the internal affairs of Persia.

"I instructed you on the 23th of May to explain to the Persian Government that although Her Majesty's Government could not support the Baron's contract as it stood, they would be glad that he were allowed to benefit by any part of it which the Persian Government might think free from objections.

"Her Majesty's Government feel that Baron Reuter has good cause to complain that, if the Persian Government desire or consent to have a railroad constructed to Tabreez, the concession should be granted to any one else, and I have accordingly to instruct you to urge upon the Persian Government the propriety of suspending any action in regard to the concession to the Russian Company until the Baron's claims have been duly considered and a settlement arrived at with him."

These instructions were duly carried out by Mr. Tylour Thomson on the 14th November 1874.

339. Protest submitted on behalf of Baron Reuter against the Falkenhagen Concession.—The protest on behalf of Baron Reuter was submitted by the Agent Mr. Collins on the 10th November 1874. The declaration is subjoined—

"1. Whereas Baron Julius de Reuter of London, a British subject, is the grantee of a concession from the Persian Government conferring on him the sole and exclusive right to construct railways and carry out other public works of utility in Persia, which said concession bears date July the twenty-fifth, 1872, is signed and sealed by the Grand Vizier, Mirza Hossein Khan, and all the Persian Ministers, and has further been formally ratified by His Imperial Majesty the Shah.

"2. And whereas the stipulations imposed by the concession on the said Baron Julius de Reuter have been by him faithfully and duly fulfilled, notably that which is laid down in

Article VIII of the same, wherein it is decreed that the works of the railway from Resht to Teheran shall be commenced within a delay of fifteen months from the date of signature of the concession, *i.e.*, prior to the twenty-fifth day of October 1873, which said commencement did actually take place on the eleventh day of September 1873, and was officially acknowledged so to have taken place in a letter addressed on the same day to the Chief Engineer of the Railway by the Minister for Public Works, Hassan Ali Khan, and written as therein stated by order of the Grand Vizier, Mirza Hossein Khan.

"3. And whereas by certain supplementary conditions which have been likewise signed and sealed by each of the Persian Minister, and further ratified by His Imperial Majesty the Shah, it is mutually agreed and determined that the carrying out of the various other branches of the enterprise, such as mines, water-works, forests, as stipulated in Article XXIII of the said concession, shall only take effect in accordance with "Cahiers des Charges" to be agreed upon between the contracting parties, and inasmuch as the said Persian Government has both failed and refused to discuss these "Cahiers des Charges" or any part of the same notwithstanding frequent applications to do so on the part of the concessionnaire and oft-repeated protests against the delay thereby occasioned.

"4. Now these presents witness that it having come to the knowledge of the said Baron Julius de Reuter that the Persian Ministers have granted, or are about to grant, to a Russian individual, party, company or association, a concession for the construction of a line of railway from the Russo-Persian frontier at Julfa to Tabreez, I, the undersigned, duly appointed Agent to Baron Julius de Reuter at Teheran, declare such concession to be an infringement and violation of the rights absolutely and exclusively conferred on the said Baron Julius de Reuter by virtue of the concession dated the twenty-fifth July 1872, and in his name and on his behalf I hereby formally and solemnly protest against such a proceeding, holding as I hereby do the said Persian Government solely responsible for all losses and damages which Baron Julius de Reuter may thereby directly or indirectly sustain."

[*Secret, February 1875, Nos. 44 and 51.*]

340. Counter-protest on behalf of the Persian Government regarding the Falkenhagen agreement as affecting Reuter's claim.— Baron Reuter's protest was met by a counter-protest on the part of the Persian Government. The following is a translation of the note written in French by Mirza Hossein Khan, Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Collins, on the 15th November 1874:—

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs in reply to the communication dated 10th current from Mr. Collins, Agent of Baron Reuter, transmitting therewith a so-called protest in the name of the said Baron against the concession for the Julfa-Tabreez Railway granted to a Russian Company, declares once more and for the last time to Mr. Collins, or to whomsoever it may concern, that the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shah, viewing the concession granted to Baron Reuter as null and void for the same reasons which have already been repeated on many occasions (see the declarations and written replies which have been exchanged on the subject) considers itself thus entirely liberated from all its engagements with M. de Reuter and free in all its actions relating to such affairs. Consequently the Government throws upon the said Baron, as it has already formally announced, all the losses arising from the annulment of the convention, and it at the same time energetically protests against this recent protest also, which cannot but be regarded as an illegal document."

[*Secret, February 1875, No. 45.*]

Nor was the Minister's reply to Mr. Thomson's letter of the 14th November 1874 more satisfactory.

"I regret" he wrote "that Her Majesty's Government should have instructed Your Excellency to support a question which the Persian Ministers consider as having ceased to exist, for in my own opinion the Persian Government, as far as it could, rendered all possible and necessary assistance and co-operation to Baron Reuter in the hope that he would carry out the conditions of the concession which had been granted to him. After Baron Reuter openly and plainly failed in carrying out his engagements and the Persian Ministers also, through the private enquiries which they instituted with the greatest care regarding Baron Reuter, lost all hope of his having the means and capability of fulfilling his engagements, and felt certain that his object was not to begin and finish any undertaking conducive to the public benefit, such as is stated in the concession, but rather that he intended making this concession the instrument of some important undertaking for himself in Europe; they then with the arguments set forth in the correspondence between Mr. Collins and myself, copies of which have all been duly transmitted at the time to Her Britannic Majesty's Legation, annulled and cancelled the

said concession on account of Baron Reuter's failings, and Her Britannic Majesty's Government having deemed this act of the Persian Minister to be a wise one praised and confirmed the same. If the Persian Government considered Baron Reuter to have the slightest right, it would never have given a concession to another Company, and I take this opportunity of reminding Your Excellency of the statements made by Her Britannic Majesty's Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance in the House of Commons regarding Baron Reuter's concession.

"I beg most respectfully to be excused if I state that, in my opinion, there appear no grounds for the Legation which is entrusted to Your Excellency to interfere officially between the Persian Government and Baron Reuter."

As has been shown previously on page 247, neither the protest nor the intervention of Her Majesty's Government had the smallest effect upon the issue of the negotiation with General Falkenhagen. In fact the terms which the General succeeded in obtaining at the beginning of January 1875 were more favorable than those contemplated by the Persian Government at the time when Baron Reuter protested and the British Minister interfered.

[*Secret, February 1875, No. 47.*]

341. Gratitude of the Russians for the action taken by Persia in regard to the Falkenhagen Contract.—In further illustration of the tactics adopted by the Russians in the matter of the Falkenhagen contract, it may be observed that Mr. Tylour Thomson in his despatch No. 19, dated 13th February 1875, mentioned a despatch, dated 18th January 1875, addressed by the Persian Minister at St. Petersburg to his Government, in which he reported that being in the Jardin d'Hiver the Emperor had in the most gracious manner enquired after the health of the Shah, and added that it had afforded him great satisfaction to know that His Majesty had always manifested an earnest desire to meet his (the Emperor's) wishes, and more particularly in the matter of the railway concession to General Falkenhagen, in which although obstacles had unfortunately latterly been encountered in its negotiation, he was aware how well disposed the Shah was that it should be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Nor were there wanting inducements of a practical and substantial character, for General Falkenhagen was said to have delivered to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, as a *douceur*, a promissory note for 50,000 Russian Imperials, to be cashed when the commission was made effective. This document was immediately transferred by the Minister to the Shah, who deposited it in the private coffer which His Majesty reserves for the safe keeping of documents having reference to matters personal to himself. A distribution of promissory notes to persons of influence at Teheran and St. Petersburg completed this branch of the operations.

[*Secret, May 1875, No. 73.*]

342. Discussion in England on the subject of the Reuter and Falkenhagen concessions. The latter declined by the Russian Company.—From this point the two streams of correspondence relating to the Reuter and Falkenhagen concessions become blended together. The Secretary of State for India was consulted by the Foreign Office upon the correspondence relating to Baron Reuter's protest, and asked whether under the circumstances he considered it of any use to pursue the matter further. The reply dated 20th February 1875 stated that in Lord Salisbury's opinion there was no room or opportunity for any other mode of influencing the Persian Government except that of diplomatic representation; it might be wise before deciding against renewed interposition to await the further communication which Mr. Thomson had promised to send; but the correspondence so far as it had gone appeared to establish either that British influence was not preponderant at the Court of Teheran, or that influence, other than diplomatic, had been brought to bear on the other side: if this were the case, further effort in Baron Reuter's behalf would be unavailing. Mr. Tylour Thomson's advice will be found in

his despatch to Lord Derby No. 48, dated 31st March 1875. He considered it better on the whole to await the expiration of the period of four months granted for the acceptance or rejection of the Falkenhagen's concession before proceeding further in the matter. There was reason to believe that the concession would not be accepted by the Company of which General Falkenhagen declared himself to be the representative. This belief has since proved to be well founded, for the despatch from Secretary of State No. 81, dated 28th May 1875, contained the intelligence that General Falkenhagen had telegraphed to Persia requesting that his concession might be considered null and void. On the other hand, it may be observed as a possible indication of the willingness of Persia to adopt a more favorable view of the Reuter case, that when Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran took exception to the reply which the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs intended to address to the Agent, Mr. Collins, on the subject of M. de Reuter's claims to a modified concession or pecuniary indemnity, the objectionable note was not sent, and the Persian Minister begged Mr. Thomson to give him a draft of a reply which in his opinion would be suitable. This Mr. Thomson declined to do for the present, partly because his action might be represented as an official intervention, and partly because the fate of the Falkenhagen contract was uncertain.

[*Secret, April 1875, Nos. 13-22, and Despatch from Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran, No. 48, dated 31st March 1875.*]

It thus appears that both these celebrated contracts have come to nothing in the end. But there is a marked and instructive difference between the two cases. In the one, the negotiations have proved abortive, simply because the Shah's Government, in spite of extraordinary pressure, could not be brought to grant terms which were considered sufficiently liberal. In the other, the contract was granted, but subsequently broken on a pretext: and all the efforts of the British Government, official or unofficial, have not advanced the cause of the concessionary one iota, whether as regards obtaining satisfaction for the past or as regards the protection of his interests against a rival enterprise.

343. Reuter's scheme for working a railway from Constantinople to Persia. British Government object on the ground of the proposed guarantee.—Besides the Reuter and Falkenhagen concessions, other schemes have been suggested from time to time, either for the purpose of improving the internal communications of Persia, or for connecting that country with the west. It has already been noticed on page 239 of this Chapter that Baron Reuter laid before Lord Granville in May 1873 the outlines of a scheme for constructing and working a line of Railway from Constantinople to the Persian frontier and in conjunction with the lines in Persia itself, for which he had obtained his extraordinary concession. The subject was discussed in Sir H. Rawlinson's memorandum which has been quoted on page 240. The writer, after noticing the main points in the Reuter concession, suggested that such a guarantee on the part of England as the originator of the scheme required would probably not be granted. This objection proved fatal to the adoption of any practical steps to carry the proposal into effect, for Baron Reuter was informed by Foreign Office letter, dated 13th June 1873, that the Lords of the Treasury considered that it would be contrary to established rule for Her Majesty's Government to guarantee interest on the cost of a work undertaken in a foreign country, and that their Lordships were not prepared to deviate from this rule in the present instance.

[*Secret, December 1873, Nos. 7 and 33.*]

344. The alleged opinions of the Austrian Minister at Teheran regarding Turco-Persian line.—It is evident however, that the

idea of a Turco-Persian line has not been abandoned by Reuter, and his friends. Mr. Collins, the Agent at Teheran, wrote to Baron Reuter on the 20th January 1875, alluding to the strong opinions expressed by the Austrian Minister at the Court of the Shah on the apathy displayed by the English Government in the matter of the concession. Count Dubsy, it was said, maintained that, if it were not already too late, the only possible way of counteracting Russian designs was to construct the Railway *viâ* Mesopotamia, Kermanshah, and Ispahan to the Persian Gulf, and that this should be done under a joint guarantee of the powers interested therein. Count Dubsy seemed to think that his own Government would readily participate in such a guarantee, and he urged that M. de Reuter should place himself in communication with the different powers, with the object of ascertaining their views.

345. The Karoon River project. Navigability of the River.—Another project, which may at any time become of practical importance, is that of opening up the route from Mohammerah to Shuster by the Karoon River, and thence into the heart of Persia. All available information regarding the river and its capabilities for navigation will be found set forth in Colonel Macgregor's work on Central Asia, Part IV., pages 224-226, and in the collection of papers forwarded with despatch from the Bombay Government, No. 2096, dated 9th April 1872 [Political A., June 1872, Nos 496-498]. Briefly put, it may be said that there is water-way for steamers of moderate draught through the Bahmashir and Hafar Canal into the Karoon and thence to within a few miles of Shuster. The only obstacle of any importance is the celebrated "Band" at Ahwaz, 48 miles south of Shuster, consisting of four ridges of rock which cross the Karoon at this place. There are, however, openings in these ridges through which it is possible for light steamers to pass as shown by the experience of the *Assyria* under the command of Lieutenant Selby in 1842. It has also been considered feasible (see Macgregor, Part IV., page 14,) to remove the principal obstruction to such an extent as to admit of the passage of steamers and to diminish the velocity of the current. Or, if this could not be done, it has been suggested by Colonel Pelly that the Ahwaz Bund or rapids, as he called them, might be turned by a short cutting. At Bandikir, 30 miles below Shuster, three streams unite, namely, the original river Karoon, the Ab-i-Gargar Canal, which is taken from the Karoon above Shuster, and rejoins it at Band-i-kir, and the Dizful. Both the former are accessible to vessels of light draught. The latter presents great facilities for navigation to within a few miles of the town of Dizful, which is the principal market of Khozistan. The description of the country along the Karoon and Dizful Rivers is favorable, especially in regard to the supplies of fuel to be found on the banks, and the friendly disposition of the Arabs towards the English.

[*Political A*, October 1871, No. 564.]

On the whole there can be no question but that the Karoon River might be utilised for steam navigation, if it were thought advisable to encourage the development of that route. Hitherto, however, the project has not advanced beyond the stage of discussion.

346. Attempts of Messrs. Gray, Paul and Company to obtain a concession for running a line of steamers on the Karoon.—In July 1871, Messrs. Gray, Paul and Company, of Bushire, pressed Colonel Pelly to obtain for them a concession from the Persian Government to run steamers between Mohammera and Shuster; one of the principal advantages anticipated was speed, the journey from the coast to Ispahan being estimated at only ten days; and another, the substitution of a more certain mode of conveyance than the ordinary and precarious carriage by means of animals. In the same month, Mr. Dawes, a partner in the firm of Messrs. Gray, Paul

and Company, addressed the Persian Minister in London urging very strongly the development of the Karoon route by means of steamers and a light line of railway. His scheme was thus described :—

“ Situated at the head of the Persian Gulf, and immediately opposite to the Port of Bussorah, Mohammera possesses communication with the interior by the River Karoon, navigable as far as Shuster for light-draughted river steamers. Selecting Mohammera, therefore, as a starting point, the first railway might be carried by the valley of the Karoon as far as Shuster, thence strike off to Ispahan, and subsequently to Teheran, taking the most important towns in route, and embracing, at the same time, the short bit of railway from Shah Abdul Azim, which there appears so much anxiety to possess. To adopt this route will be to revert to the ancient and natural highways of Persian commerce, abandoned only in late years in consequence of the disturbed state of the districts now, if I am rightly informed, again subjugated and rendered safe by the energetic action of His Imperial Majesty’s Government.

“ The advantages of this line are that operations would be commenced at the coast where the material would be landed, and the railway, as it progressed towards the interior, would carry forward its own material, thus saving the enormous cost of transport which would inevitably embarrass any undertaking commencing in the interior. It would pass through a rich grain-producing district tolerably well populated, would accommodate the large import and export trade before mentioned, and would draw towards itself (from the Turkish routes and duties) the valuable trade of the Kermanshaw and Hamadan Districts, provide an easy route for travellers to the sacred tombs of Kerbella, and, of course, secure the Ispahan and Yezd trade.

“ I would not suggest an expensive railway, such as we have here or in India, but rather a light line of railway, say of three feet gauge, such as the Great American Pacific Railway, which Mr. Ronald F. Thomson, Her Majesty’s Secretary of Legation at Teheran, having recently travelled over will be able to describe.”

The time, however, was singularly unpropitious for bringing such plans under the consideration of the Persian Government. The famine was then desolating the country, and, as stated in letter from Mr. Alison, Her Majesty’s Minister at Teheran, to the Government of India, dated 16th December 1871, the whole of the available resources of the State were applied to keeping the people from starvation. It was not likely that the Minister of the Shah would enter into a contract for subsidizing a line of steamers for the purpose contemplated. Accordingly, nothing further was said or done beyond collecting information about the Karoon River, and sending it to the Secretary of State, who was told that the practicability of river navigation as far as Shuster had been fully established.

[*Pollt. A.*, October 1871, No. 565, January 1872, No. 111, June 1872, No. 502.]

347. Views of Major St. John, R. E., on the advantage of opening up the route by the Karoon River to Shuster, and thence to Ispahan.—The opinion of a scientific officer well acquainted with the country and its requirements was decidedly favorable to the idea of opening out the Karoon route and connecting Shuster with Ispahan. Major O. St. John, R.E., who had served several years in Persia on the Telegraphic Staff, wrote the following remarks in July 1872 :—

“ The route from Shuster to Ispahan is of the greatest importance to English trade. Facilities of communication between Teheran and the Caspian have much increased of late years. Russian diplomatists lose no opportunity of furthering the commercial interests of their country, and, in spite of regular steam communication between Bushire and Europe, Russian commerce is steadily gaining ground on English all over Persia. If water-carriage to Shuster, and a ten days’ caravan journey to Ispahan, were substituted for the present method of import *via* Bushire, the day’s land journey to each of the principal commercial towns of Persia would be as follows :—

	<i>Via</i> Shuster.	<i>Via</i> Bushire.	<i>Via</i> Bunder Abbass.	<i>Via</i> Trebizond.
Teheran	... 27	35	...	42
Ispahan	.. 10	24
Yezd	... 22	24	28	...

The transfer of the point of import of English merchandize from the ports on the Gulf to Shuster is no new idea. British merchants, interested in the Persian trade, have for some years wished to carry out such a scheme; and if the consent of the Teheran Government could

be obtained, capital for the navigation of the Karoon, and even for a light mountain railway, would, I know, be forthcoming. The substitution of a river port for the open road-steads of the Gulf would enable the Persian Government to simplify their cumbrous system of customs, which now offers great obstacles to trade, and is, under present circumstances, most difficult to change. Indeed, I know nothing more calculated to improve the condition of Persia herself, and her connection, political and commercial, with England and India, than opening up the navigation of the Karoon River, and its corollary, a road thence to Ispahan."

Certain of the views put forth by Major St. John regarding the activity of the Russians in the north, compared with the apathy of the English in the south of Persia, were disputed by Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran, but the above-quoted opinion as to the practicability and value of the Karoon route has not been questioned.

348. Renewed suggestions by Mr. Dawes on the part of Gray, Paul and Company, urging the development of the Karoon River route.—The question of stimulating trade by the Karoon River was re-opened by Mr. Dawes in February 1873, and again later on in the same year. The arguments used were similar to those which have been already noticed, namely (1) that the Rivers Karoon and Dizful had been proved to be navigable; (2) that the route compared favorably in point of distance with other lines, especially those from Bushire to Shiraz, Ispahan, and Tehran and from Bunder Abbas to Ispahan, Kerman and Yezd, (3) that Russian enterprise in the north should be met by competition in the south.

Mr. Dawes stated that the firm which he represented, (Messrs. Gray, Paul and Company,) would be prepared, if the country were settled and the land routes from Shuster reopened, to establish regular steam communication for a fair and reasonable subsidy, while the Karoon steamers would exchange traffic with the Indian mail steamers and the river boats plying between Bussorah and Bagdad.

"The province of Khuzistan," he said, "in which are situated Mohammera, Shuster, and Dizful, is the most fertile and well watered in Persia: misgovernment has reduced it to its present ebb; well managed, it might become what it once was one of the granaries of the world."

He acknowledged that the Bashtani mountains presented physical difficulties on the Shuster-Ispahan route, but affirmed that those difficulties had been overrated. He pressed for a survey of the Southern Districts, and stated his belief that if such a survey tended to remove the impression of the inaccessibility of Southern Persia, the railway works from the coast of the Persian Gulf would be undertaken without further interference from Government. These suggestions merely elicited the reply that the subject was under the consideration of the Secretary of State.

[*Secret, December 1873, No. 28, also Demi-official correspondence of February 1873.*]

349. Journey of Mr. Mackenzie, of Gray, Paul and Company, to explore the route between Ispahan and Shuster.—The enterprising merchants, Messrs. Gray, Paul, and Company, still turn their thoughts to the improvement of communications in the south of Persia. Captain Napier in his Diary for February 1875, mentions that an English merchant, Mr. G. Mackenzie, of the above-mentioned firm, who had lately opened an agency at Ispahan, proposed to make the journey from Ispahan to Shuster on the Karoon, with the view of, if possible, opening up that route for the conveyance of his goods. Sheikh Jabar of Mohammera had already a steamer on the Karoon, and was in communication with the firm. The only difficulties that remained to be overcome were such as the Chief of the Bakhtiyaris, the tribe holding the mountain range dividing the plain of Persia from the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates, might oppose to any attempt to open out his country to commerce, and to Persian influence from which he would have to fear the loss of his independence. The route itself was said to be exceedingly

easy passing over a low portion of the range directly from the valley of the Zinderood, the stream flowing through the plain of Ispahan into that of the Karoon. Mr. Mackenzie had been furnished by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs with a letter of introduction to the Bakhtiyari Chief. It appears from Captain Napier's Diary for March 1875, that Mr. Mackenzie started on his journey on the 24th February.

350. Suspicion excited at Teheran by an article in the "Neue Freie Presse" regarding the interested designs of England upon Mohammera.—Unfortunately for the advancement of the trading interest in this part of Persia, suspicion and excitement were lately aroused in Teheran by a mischievous article which appeared in the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse* from the pen of Dr. Polak, an Austro-Hungarian subject, and for some years physician to the Shah. This article, as will be seen from the subjoined translation, attributed to England ambitious designs upon the port of Mohammera, and under cover of pretended satisfaction at the future prosperity of the port warned the Shah's Government against the encroachments of the British. The following is a translation of the article:—

"In a letter from a correspondent of the *Allgemeine Zeitung* of 19th December it is said that the Arab Sheikh Hajee Jafir with the aid of the English has occupied Mohammera, and is prepared to declare himself independent. This place to the present day a medium-seized village, composed of a certain number of fishermen's huts covered with reeds, belongs to Persia. Situated at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab and of the Karoon at the point of the delta, the place may be regarded as the key of the whole Persian Gulf, since ships to any number, and of no matter what draught, can find there a safe anchorage: steamers can ascend the Euphrates and the Tigris, and the Karoon is the sole river in Persia which is navigable by steamers nearly as far as Shuster. Although it is actually held by an Arab Sheikh, it may be predicted that this Bedouin Sheikh following previous examples will, in return for a good pension, cede this position to the English, who by such an arrangement will find themselves in the agreeable situation of commanding Arabia, Persia, and Turkey.

"Just as we saw some years ago at Singapor, we shall now see the establishment of a strong commercial depôt, where there will be a considerable import and export of European and Asiatic trade, in short, an intermediate stage between London and Bombay. I have already discussed this question in my official report on the Persian Exhibition as follows: 'A brilliant future is in store for Mohammera by means of profitable lines of communication. This hamlet situated at the mouth of the Euphrates and the Karoon has an excellent harbour and anchorage, and is consequently the sole natural route for a line of railway in the opulent and fertile province of Khuzistan; inasmuch as the other routes towards the Persian Gulf by Bushire or Bunder Abass border on the impossible by reason of great difficulties. In the hands of a commercial nation, this hamlet, now so miserable, may assume the rôle or the importance of Marseilles and Genoa for the interchange of trade in the Persian Gulf between India, Arabia, Egypt, and Europe.

"Notwithstanding that a more favorable opportunity offered for an English occupation of this position at the time of the Anglo-Persian war, when the English landed at the port, and also at the time when they could have annexed it on the conclusion of peace, yet at that time the importance of the port was not known either in Persia or in Europe. They chose rather to put as speedy an end to the war as possible without indemnity, and the English Parliament not understanding at that time the importance of the position pressed for the conclusion of peace. This generosity was a great political blunder as I have already explained in my work on Persia, because Asiatics never deem themselves conquered unless they are forced to pay money or cede land. Accordingly it happened almost immediately after the withdrawal of the English that the Persians assumed the air of conquerors, and used every kind of chicanery with Colonel Taylor the English Envoy at Herat.

"The Russians who have a better understanding of Asiatic affairs have never displayed so much generosity. By the occupation which has taken place, and to which I too have in spite of myself more or less contributed, it would seem that the English wish to correct their mistake. It is true that in consequence of the advances which the Russians have made in Central Asia (and by which Persia is still further paralysed) the English are compelled to take up a firm position which enables them readily to despatch their troops into the heart of the country at Shuster, from which there are roads and lines to Kermanshah, Hamadan, Teheran, and Ispahan. The same state of things is to be found in the north in respect to the trade which Russia has pushed into those countries: the effect will simply be to counterbalance Russian influence.

“For our part we now see clearly how the English intend to lay out their first railway line to India; from Thessalonica there are steamers to Alexandretta, from which would begin a line of rail running west of Aleppo down the Euphrates to Baghdad, and terminating at Mohammera from which point vessels are within a few days’ steam of Bombay. If necessary they will then construct lines towards the middle of Persia or along the Gulf by Kelat and Beluchistan as far as the Indus. Besides the Suez Canal, it is indispensable for the English to possess a second road to India. These events will happen sooner than is commonly supposed. In proportion to the embarrassment which the English experience from the northern line begun by Baron Reuter, of so much the more vital importance for them and for their Indian Empire becomes the construction of lines in the south. Further we trust that our predictions regarding Mohammera and Meshed as the emporia of Central Asia will be verified in our day.”

351. Effect of the article in the “*Neue Freie Presse*” on the Shah’s mind. Action taken by the Persian Government against Sheik Jabbar of Mohammera.—Her Majesty’s Minister at Teheran, in bringing this article to the notice of Lord Derby, remarked that though the political intrigue of England and the report of her troops being in possession of the place were probably not credited by the Persian Government, yet the value of the position was so evident that it was not surprising the perusal of the article should have produced a strong impression on the Shah’s mind.

Captain Napier added some further details, namely, that a force of 1,600 men sent by the Governor of Shuster to enforce payment of arrears of revenue, had been repulsed by Sheik Jabbar of Mohammera, and that the Shah was preparing to lead a force to the south under his own command, but had subsequently changed his mind, and appointed General Buhler to the chief command.

When these papers were laid before the Government of India, the Foreign Secretary observed—

“the advantages of the Karoon as a route for trade are well known, and three years ago we drew the late Mr. Alison’s attention to it. The transition from a trade to a military route is very easy, and it is probably the interest we have manifested in the route combined with the rebellious proceedings of Sheik Jabbar that has given rise to the mischievous article referred to.”

[See *Despatch from Her Majesty’s Minister, Teheran, to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs No. 32, dated 28th February 1875.*]

(Sd.) F. H.—26-6-75.

CHAPTER X.

THE RUSSIAN ADMINISTRATION IN TURKESTAN. EXPLORATION OF THE LOWER OXUS SCHEMES FOR RAILWAYS THROUGH CENTRAL ASIA.

I.—THE RUSSIAN ADMINISTRATION IN TURKESTAN.

352. Public opinion in Russia drawn to the unproductiveness of Turkestan. Figures given by Mr. Schuyler and the "Golos."—Of late the attention of the public in Russia has been directed to the great and increasing drain upon the wealth of the Empire which the Government of the Central Asian Provinces entails. The subject was brought prominently forward in Mr. Eugene Schuyler's memorandum on the Russian Province of Turkestan. The figures which he gave were generally borne out by the *Golos* newspaper, until that journal found itself forced to give a different account in accordance with official commands. A comparison between the two sets of figures for five years may be drawn from the following table:—

YEAR.	INCOME.		EXPENDITURE.		DEFICIT.	
	Mr. Schuyler.	The <i>Golos</i> .	Mr. Schuyler.	The <i>Golos</i> .	Mr. Schuyler.	The <i>Golos</i> .
	Roubles.	Roubles.	Roubles.	Roubles.	Roubles.	Roubles.
1868	665,922	1,204,906	4,522,429	4,392,940	3,856,507	3,188,034
1869	2,356,241	2,356,241	4,223,428	4,592,460	1,867,187	2,236,219
1870	2,957,229	2,915,983	5,966,321	6,114,883	3,009,092	3,198,900
1871	2,113,750	2,102,955	6,726,441	6,820,945	4,612,691	4,717,990
1872	2,022,286	2,008,374	7,528,627	7,576,186	5,506,341	5,567,812
TOTAL	10,115,428	10,588,459	28,967,246	29,497,414	18,851,818	18,908,955

The *Golos*, when giving the figures, pointed out that while the revenue derived from the country varied, rising at the commencement of the period and decreasing towards the end of it, the expenditure systematically increased. And the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg in his despatch No. 43, dated 3rd February 1873, which referred to the statements of the *Golos* observed that *the question of finance was likely to exercise a very great influence in regard to the future organisation of Turkestan as well as on the Imperial policy with respect to that distant acquisition of the Russian Empire.* The Russian Press, it was said, was beginning to take note of the large expenditure required from the Imperial revenue for Turkestan, with no apparent hopes of its diminution, nor of its proving productive of future wealth to the Empire at arge.

353. Details of revenue and receipts in Russian Turkestan.—Mr. Schuyler in his memorandum goes at some length into the details on both the receipts and expenditure side of the Budget of 1872. Regarding the receipts he writes—

"The income of the country is of two kinds: first, that coming specially from the country itself and its population, and, secondly, that which is, as it were, moved in from Russia, produced from the Russians who live there.

"The local revenues amount to only 1,328,200 roubles. Of these the personal taxes and taxes of *kibitkas* (tent tax) amount to 566,000 roubles. The road tax is 154,000 roubles, and the tax on lands and its products is 276,000. The duty from internal trade is 15,000 roubles.

The entire indirect taxes on articles of consumption, including the duty on articles of foreign trade, amount to 224,000 roubles, to which should be added the duty on tea imported from India, amounting to 10,000 roubles. The receipts for articles paid to Government, 13,000 roubles. From Government property, as, for instance, rents of shops in the bazar, 32,400 roubles, and for freights on steamers of the Aral Flotilla, 800 roubles. The coal taken from the Government mines amounted to 4,600 roubles, but the quantity actually sold in 1873 brought in only 100 roubles. Wood and timber brought in 8,500 roubles. This shows the unproductiveness of the country, and the undeveloped state of its mineral wealth. There were collected 21,400 roubles of previous taxes, and, among smaller items, foreign passports for natives brought in 700 roubles.

The revenues received chiefly from Russians were as follows:—

Direct taxes of various kinds 6,200 roubles, indirect taxes from articles of consumption 255,000 roubles, most of which was from the excise on spirits. The taxes for rising in official rank brought in 19,000 roubles in the year. The postal revenues amounted to 44,000 roubles, and the telegraph, which was not at that time open to Taskhend, 3,000 roubles, while the sale of powder and cartridges brought in 1,200 roubles. The sale of Treasury notes produced 16,000 roubles. The sale of various Government property, such as medicines, useless things, and so forth, brought in 14,000 roubles, and private work at the Government typography was done to the amount of 2,500 roubles. The return of money illegally obtained from the Treasury, fines, and the pension capital, brought in 20,000 roubles.

“The chief increase in the articles of revenue is in the excise on liquors, the stamp tax on documents, and the postal revenues. The excise on liquors and rights for the sale of liquors in 1868 was 114,000 roubles, in 1869, 129,000 roubles, in 1870, 213,000 roubles, in 1871, 240,000 roubles, and in 1872, 255,000 roubles. The stamp tax produced, in 1868, 3,000 roubles, and in 1872, 26,000 roubles, but this was not placed on a proper basis until the year 1870. The postal revenue was only 9,800 roubles in 1868, and in 1872 was 65,300 roubles. As the natives do not use liquors to any extent, it being against the principles of the Koran, the excise is paid, of course, by the Russian population only, and as, in the course of five years, the produce of the tax has more than doubled, it would seem as if the Russian population had also doubled in that time. It is, however, not probable that the Russian population of Turkestan is more than 100,000, from which must be deducted the Tartars, who do not drink, consequently every Russian in the province during 1872 paid a tax of 2 roubles per head for the right of drinking, a large sum as compared with the usual statistics for the use of liquors in other populations.

354. Details of charges in Russian Turkestan.—According to the same authority the main items of expenditure in 1872, were as follows:—

	<i>Roubles.</i>
1. Salaries and expenses of officials	802,400
2. Pay and maintenance of the army	3,015,200
3. Horses for the Cavalry and Artillery	1,249,100
4. Medical Department of the Army	138,800
5. Building expenses	205,000
6. Lighting and heating	252,900
7. Munitions of war	36,900
8. The Aral Flotilla	57,800
9. Travelling expenses	129,200
10. Transportation (carriage of stores, &c.)	222,700
11. Postal expenses	696,800
12. Topography and Surveying	29,700
14. Extra expenses	486,200
15. School	12,600
16. Geological and economical investigations	29,300
17. Provincial expenses, roads, bridges, &c.	146,100
18. Assistance to Cossack troops, &c.	33,700
19. Various expenses	51,400

to which must be added 500,000 roubles for the expenses for articles on account of the army made in other parts of Russia but destined for Turkestan.

355. Analysis of charges. Preponderance of military expenditure. Mr. Schuyler's comments on extravagance in certain branches.—Re-arranging the figures given by Mr. Schuyler it will be found that the principal items of expenditure fall under the following heads:—

Head.	Total amount.	Percentage of the whole.
	<i>Roubles.</i>	
Army	4,478,700	59
Administration (including) transport and carriage of stores	2,455,100	32
Education and Science	71,600	1
Miscellaneous (including Aral Flotilla)	595,400	8
TOTAL ROUBLES ...	7,600,800	100

From this it appears that the great drain on the resources of the country is for purely military purpose. But the expenses of administration alone are considerably in excess of the income in any year except 1870, when nearly three million roubles were collected. Mr. Schuyler admits that it is no easy matter to say where economy should begin, but he appeals to the opinion expressed by those persons who have served in the country that only one-half of the number of troops maintained need be kept up. At the time the memorandum was written the force in Russian Turkestan consisted of about 36,000 soldiers. Mr. Schuyler adds:—

“There are also other things which, though perhaps not great in themselves, mount up to a large sum; for instance, the expenses of the Tashkend fair during 1872 amounted to 152,000 roubles, an expense utterly useless and uncalled for. The sum of 30,000 roubles is expended in repairing and keeping up the house and garden of the Governor General; 30,000 roubles a year is also given to the horse-breeding establishment, which, though, if properly cared for, might be of some service to the country, is not an absolute necessity and serves merely as a comfortable berth for certain members of the Governor General's chancery.

“When the province of Turkestan was formed into a separate Governor Generalship, it was thought that it might probably reduce the expenses of Orenburg and Western Siberia, but experience has shown that the expenses of these provinces are not at all diminished, and we have the addition of very large sums to keep the officials and staff of officials who are now in Tashkend. As Turkestan is a separate Governor Generalship and Military District, it must have all the central administration, in order that it may be entirely independent of others. Thus, there is a central administration of artillery, a central administration of the army, a central administration of the finances, &c., which could be quite as well arranged at Orenburg or Omsk. General Tcherniaef, who certainly knows the country as well as any one else, in a long and able report which he made last year to the Minister of Finance, expressed his strong opinion that it would be advisable, on financial as well as on political grounds, to return to the old order of things, to abolish the office of Governor General, and to restore the Province of Turkestan to the Governor General of Orenburg.”

356. Recantation of the “Golos” and attempt to shew that the receipt of Turkestan exceeded the charges 3 $\frac{3}{4}$ million roubles.—The *Golos*, on reconsideration of the matter, appears to have repented of the evil which it had done by drawing a gloomy picture of the finances in Russian Turkestan. The *Journal de St. Petersbourg* of the 26th January (7th February) 1875 contained the following article on the recantation of its contemporary:—

“The *Voix* discusses the financial situation of Turkestan and strives to shew that it is far from being so unfavorable as recent accounts would seem to indicate. According to particulars which had gone the round of the newspapers, the receipts of Turkestan were estimated for the

period from 1868 to 1872 at over 10½ millions of roubles, while the total charges for the same period reached the sum of 29½ millions of roubles, from which calculations it resulted that our acquisitions in Asia had laid on the treasury a burden of 19 millions of roubles.

"The *Voix* endeavours to make out that the mistake lies in this, that in examining the financial condition of our Central Asian dominions, the expenditure side of the account has included the cost of maintaining the military forces which are indispensable there: that cost, however, it argues, is a charge of a general rather than a local character, since the troops cantoned in Turkestan are kept up there not only to secure the obedience of our new Russian subjects, but also to protect one of the frontiers of the Empire. Moreover, our contemporary goes on to say, the account given is inaccurate in this sense, that on the one hand it leaves out of consideration the receipts of the Province of Kulja and of the District of Zarafshan; while, on the other hand, the war contribution exacted from the Ameer of Bokhara, an accidental item of income, is included in it.

"Reviewing the Turkestan budget in the light of the above considerations, the *Voix* shows for the years 1868 to 1872 total receipts amounting to 9,887,000 roubles against total charges amounting to 6,100,000 roubles, and a resultant balance (*une économie*) in favor of the treasury of 3,795,000 roubles."

357. Public opinion in Russia on the subject of the expense and unproductiveness of the Government of Turkestan.—This rose-coloured review of the Turkestan finances was not allowed to go unchallenged. It was made the subject of an attack in the *Bourse*. That paper maintained that it was not possible to separate, as the *Golos* had done, the military from other expenses, since, the administration of Turkestan being subordinate to the Ministry of War, all its receipts and charges (exclusive of the charges on account of the establishments of the finance, control, and postal departments) were shown in the War Office estimates, without there being any means of deciding what part of the expenditure was occasioned by military exigencies, and what part provided for the needs of the civil service. The Governors of the Province of Turkestan, for example, are also at the head of the troops cantoned in their province, what part of their salary should be reckoned a military charge, and what part as a remuneration for their services as civil administrators? Another example; the chapter in the War Office budget relating to Turkestan contained charges for various public works, of which a considerable number were in no way connected with the military service: in distributing such charges between the two categories in question there was risk of falling into very serious mistakes.

The *Bourse* then proceeded to consider the argument that it was wrong to include among the charges of Turkestan those which related to the districts of Kulja and Zarafshan, while no account had been taken of the receipts of those districts. The receipts of Kulja and Zarafshan (Roubles 2,466,399, in four years) were applied to meet the charges of the same districts: and that sum had been treated as a special item of income not shown in the estimates. It might have been more correct to shew the Roubles 2,466,399 on both sides of the account, but this would not in any way have affected the balance sheet of the Turkestan finances. In regard to the expenses not covered by the receipts of the two districts (the maintenance of the troops quartered there), it was quite right to take them into consideration, seeing that the detachments in question were included in the army of Turkestan, and that their pay must have been shown in the Turkestan estimates, if they had not been placed elsewhere.

The *Bourse* doubted the probability of an increase on receipts. Up to 1874 there were two distinct classes of taxation on commerce, the Russian duties, and the *ziakat* or native tax. An increase in the proceeds of the former very often involved a decrease in the latter, inasmuch as the natives preferred the Russian duties to the more onerous *ziakat*. There was certainly a prospect that trade would progress in Turkestan, but it was a subject for regret that commerce was passing more and more into the hands of traders of Kokand and Bokhara, while the great and old established Russian merchants were yielding place to petty men of business, a fact which might lead to the

increase of the tax on patents, but could hardly have a beneficial effect on the country.

Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg also recorded an opinion in his despatch No. 74, dated 2nd March 1875, that the previous statements of the *Golos* as to the large deficit in the budget during the five years ending 1872 were perfectly correct, and that the counter statements had been published by official orders with a view to satisfy public opinion. How far that object was attained may be understood from the remarks published by the *Russki Mir* in an article strongly denouncing the principles on which the Government of Turkestan was conducted. The wrath of the Russian authorities descended on the *Russki Mir*, and it was suspended for three months, but the effect of the article probably remained unimpaired, and its appearance seemed to Lord A. Loftus to prove that public opinion in Russia was becoming daily more attentive to the large expenditure which the Government of Turkestan imposed on the Imperial Exchequer, and which was unattended with any practical benefit to Russia. The following are the remarks referred to :—

“ It is desirable to despatch unprejudiced persons to Turkestan for the purpose of elucidating many other questions, as for instance.

1. “ How far the yearly expenditure of Russian wealth is necessary for the dissemination of European civilization among the Kirghizes and Sarts through the medium of officials, when millions of native Russians remain in abject poverty and subsist all the year round on nothing but bread mixed with husks and bark of trees?

2. “ Whether there is any possibility to reduce the number of troops and officials, and by simplifying the administration to curtail the expenditure?

3. “ Whether the productiveness of the border Cossack settlements is not impoverished by the inordinate drafting of Cossacks for service in the Turkestan region?

4. “ Is there any necessity for the existing costly surroundings of the Governor General, and whether, since the establishment of a line of telegraph, it is at all necessary that he should enjoy the unlimited power he now possesses? These questions are apt to strike every one, especially seeing that out of the seven years that have elapsed since the establishment of the Governor Generalship, General Kaufmann with his numerous suite and assistants has passed two years and a half at St. Petersburg.

5. “ Is it necessary to retain the system of ‘ extraordinary outlays ’ and the exchange of presents with the neighbouring Khanates, particularly as such presents, according to report, have reached such a magnitude that they no longer resemble an interchange of civilities?

6. “ It would be advisable to investigate locally why the expenditure in the region is constantly increasing, while the local revenue is yearly diminishing. Whether the latter circumstance is attributable to the exhaustion of the tax-paying capabilities of the population, or to the growing appetite of the Turkestan officials.

7. “ In order to determine the extent of the productiveness of the outlay made by the Russian Government in the Turkestan region, it would be useful to ascertain in what manner the sum of 2,400,000 roubles belonging to the Zaratshshan revenues, and placed at the complete disposal of the Governor General has been dealt with?”

[Secret May 1875, Nos. 51-55, and enclosures of Secret Despatch from the Secretary of State, No. 57, dated 9th April 1875.]

358. Endeavours to increase the cotton and silk trade of Russian Turkestan. The revenue not expected to cover the charges for some time to come.—In connexion with this subject of the unproductiveness of Russian Turkestan, it may be worth while to notice the subjoined extract from an article published in the *Russische Revue* (Vol. I, pages 24-59 and 113-135) by P. Lerch :—

“ The principal raw staple exported from Russian Turkestan is cotton which is cultivated chiefly by Tajiks and Sarts. In 1867 the cotton imported into Russia in Europe from Tashkend was 30,000 poods. The greater portion of the cotton produce of the country is consumed in domestic industry. No great increase in the export can be expected, so long as a large portion of the soil suited for cotton cultivation is abandoned to the cattle of the nomads. The cotton exported from Central Asia in 1867 amounted to nearly a sixth part of the entire quantity of cotton imported into Russia The quality of Central Asian Cotton is inferior, not only to the American, but to the Indian and Egyptian. Mr. N. M. Rajewski has lately been endeavouring to extend the cultivation

of American cotton in the country and to introduce a rational method of cleaning and packing it. These efforts to enhance the value of the cotton of Russian Turkestan deserve attention. Since 1866 also, endeavours have been made to improve the produce of silk by a proper treatment of the Cocoons and for some time the export of caterpillars has been forbidden. Although an annual increase of most kinds of the produce of the soil of Russian Turkestan may be looked for, I do not believe that the time is near at hand when the country will yield a Revenue to the State sufficient to cover the cost of the administration and the maintenance of the Army."

359. The population of Russian Turkestan viewed in reference to the fiscal condition of the province.—Indeed, if the character of the population in Russian Turkestan be considered, it is clear enough that a sufficient revenue for the purposes of a costly administration cannot be expected. If the population were to a great extent agricultural, or settled and addicted to trade, it might be possible to devise some productive method of taxation. But the bulk of the population is neither agricultural nor settled, as will be seen from the following figures,* given by the writer M.P. Lerch, whose opinion has been quoted in the preceding paragraph.

" I.—The nomadic population.

" 1. Kazaks ...	93,400 families at 5 persons to a family	467,000 persons of both sexes.
	80,000 " " "	400,000 " "
" 2. Kirghiz ...	35,200 families at 5 persons to a family	176,000 persons of both sexes.
	exclusive of those in the circle of Vernöe.	
" 3. Kalmuks	13,000 " "
" 4. Uzbegs ..	1,000 families at 5 persons to a family	5,000 " "
" 5. Toorkmans	3,500 " "
		<u>1,064,500 persons of both sexes.</u>

" II.—The settled population.

" 1. In the Kurama circle	27,000 families at 7 persons to the family [Uzbegs (Kuramas), Sarts and Tajiks]	189,000 persons of both sexes.
" 2. In the Khojund circle	13,100 families at 5 to a family [Tajiks and Uzbegs]	66,500 " "
" 3. In the Yizakh circle	7,100 families [Uzbegs, Tajiks and a few Russians]	48,000 " "
" 4. In the Chemkund circle	5,000 families at 5 persons [Sarts]	25,000 " "
" 5. In the Perowsk circle	[Russians and Kazaks]	3,400 " "
" 6. In the Kazalinisk circle	[Russians, Kazaks, &c.]	1,400 " "
" 7. In the Tashkund circle	[Sarts, Russians, &c.]	78,100 " "
" 8. In the District of Semiretschje—		
(a.) In the towns	[Russians, Kazaks, Sarts]	14,000 " "
(b.) In the Kosakenstanizen	...	14,000 " "
(c.) In the new settlements	[Russians] 574 families, about ...	1,700 " "
		<u>441,100 persons of both sexes.</u>

III.—Settled and Migratory population.

In the Zerajshan district 163,000 persons of both sexes."

It thus appears that two-thirds of the population in Russian Turkestan are nomads, while the industrious and money-getting Sarts and Tajiks form only a part of the remaining one-third. The Russian colonists, though highly useful from a military or political point of view, are not likely to contribute much towards the general revenues, except perhaps in the department of excise.

* The article appeared in 1872, but the acquisitions of 1873 are not likely to have given many profitable subjects to Russia.—F. H.

360. Failure of the proposed Fair at Tashkend.—It will be observed that Mr. Schuyler denounced the expenditure on the Tashkend fair as extravagant and useless. The scheme seems to have been grand, but, as experience in India has shown, it is impossible to drive an oriental people in the matter of trade.

“Colonel Glukhoffsky had an idea to establish a great fair at Tashkend, which he persuaded the Government would be a great emporium for all Central Asia, and consequently buildings were erected on a large scale, similar to those at Nijni Novgorod, at a distance of about two miles from the city. When the fair, however, was opened, no one appeared to trade, and an order was then made, closing the bazaar in the city of Tashkend during the whole period of the fair, with the idea of thus compelling [the natives to come and] trade there. This proving ineffectual, heavy fines were imposed on natives and others who did not appear there, and they were even sent there under a guard of Cossacks, but even this had slight effect. The Russian merchants themselves were obliged to petition for a repeal of these orders, on the ground that if the natives were forbidden to trade in the usual way, they would be unable to pay them the money which they owed. The Russian merchants, too, found it disagreeable to be compelled to keep warehouses for their goods at the fair as well as in their private establishments, and the fair has therefore been a failure, entailing an expense upon Government during the three or four years of its existence of nearly 400,000 roubles.”

361. Small proportion of expenditure on education.—On reference to the figures given in sections 354 and 355, it will be seen that the expenditure upon scientific objects has been small and the charge for education 12,600 roubles is scarcely worth mentioning. One is not surprised therefore to find Mr. Schuyler commenting with some severity upon the failure of the Russians to provide for this important part of a civilized administration.

“As far as education is concerned, the Russians have done almost nothing. In Samar-cand, owing to the vigorous efforts of the commander of the city, himself a Mussulman, a small school has been opened for the instruction of Mussulman children in Russian; but neither in Tashkend nor in any other town of the province does such a school exist, nor, indeed, a school of any kind. It has been proposed once or twice to introduce the teaching of Russian and of modern knowledge into some of the Mussulman Medresses, or high schools, and upon the whole this project was viewed with favor by the authorities, but owing to their lack of intuitive, the matter has been neglected. This is to be the more regretted as few of the officials who come to the country have a knowledge of it, and the administration is consequently obliged to use an interpreter, either natives who barely understand Russian, Cossacks, who have a very rough knowledge of the native language, and Tartars, who are in general the most honest or best of interpreters. The badness of the interpreters is not only a source of great trouble and confusion in dealing with the natives, but has led to some most ridiculous and even critical mistakes.”

362. Recent measures introduced into Russian Turkestan for the furtherance of education. National schools.—Of late, however, the authorities have bestirred themselves to introduce a system of national education. Their efforts have not met with unmixed approval, as will be seen from the subjoined translation of an article published by the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* of 16th August 1874 on information supplied by the *Russian Gazette de l'Academie*—

“It would be a mistake to suppose, our contemporary writes, that the Mussulman population of our newly acquired provinces is altogether destitute of the blessings of education. The education, it is true, differs widely from our own, but it rests upon a solid basis and strikes its roots deep down into the past history, the religious aspirations, and the practical requirements of the people. The *Médresses* or high schools and the *Maktabas* or primary schools are to be found in great numbers all over Central Asia; the city of Tashkend, for instance, possesses sixteen *Médresses*, and at Bokhara there are sixty-six, besides about two hundred *Maktabas*. The *Médresses* usually occupy spacious stone buildings. They are surrounded with gardens, and often richly endowed by the bounty of the Ameers, Khans, and Begs. Not only is the instruction imparted in the *Médresses* gratuitous, but the scholars are boarded and lodged at the charges of the establishment. It will be readily understood that the migratory population is comparatively backward in educational progress; at the best they boast of a few religious ideas instilled into them by the Mollahs who manage to make a very handsome profit out of the nomads and yet to retain a high degree of influence among them.

"The *Gazette* assures us that the scheme of reform is very radical. It is proposed to open two Gymnasias at Tashkend and Vernöe, to organize a normal school, and to establish a system of national schools. Over these establishments there will be a department charged with the duty of inspection. The Gymnasia will be framed on the model of our own, while the national schools will be so arranged as to be adapted both to the Russian and Native child population. The schools designed for the Nomads will be moveable, so that they may follow the tribes in their wandering course.

"Our contemporary cannot conceal his astonishment at the abruptness of the proposed changes. Up to the present time, he writes, the Government of our distant provinces has adopted the policy of abstaining from such sudden reforms as were calculated to offend the prejudices and habits of the conquered nations, leaving the future to the influence which might be expected from time, and from the gradual but inevitable growth of a closer connexion between the hitherto distinct elements of the population. The scheme of reform here described is at variance with these cautious principles of action: and our contemporary apprehends that if carried into execution it may lead to untoward results."

Mr. Schuyler informs us that the authorities of Samarcand had arranged for the purchase of a lithographic press with the object of making native books cheaper, and thus gradually spreading enlightenment, but this was viewed by General Kaufmann with disfavour and absolutely forbidden. The Governor General, however, is ready enough to expend a liberal sum on the dissemination of knowledge according to the approved regulation pattern. The *Turkestan Gazette*, which is the official organ of the Government, costs 100,000 Roubles per annum: that is, this sum is an annual deficit not covered by the sale of the paper. The facts are given in the *Turkestan Gazette* itself of the 8th April 1875.

363. General character of the Russian Administration in Turkestan; system of Government, taxation, &c.—Regarding the general character of the Russian Administration in Turkestan, a great deal of interesting information is afforded in Mr. Schuyler's memorandum. Into his criticisms upon the character of General Kaufmann, and his personal charges against other authorities, it is not necessary to enter, but the following description of a project submitted to the Emperor in the winter of 1873 deserves notice:—

"The bases of this project were the union of the civil and military powers in the same hands, and the internal administration of the native population over all matters not having a political character by representatives elected by them in accordance with their customs. The main features of the project were the following:—

"The Governor General, who is at the same time the Commander-in-Chief of the forces, has about the same position as Governors General in other parts of the Empire, and besides that, the power, in case of need, to suspend the regulations or to make exceptions to them. He has also full power for carrying on diplomatic negotiations with the neighbouring countries. Under him are two Governors of the provinces of Syr-Daria and Semiritch respectively, and the Commanders of the Zarafshan district not included in the Regulations. The provinces are further divided into districts,—five in Semiritch and eight in Syr-Daria, as well as the city of Tashkend, which is constituted a separate administrative district. At the head of these districts, or *Uzeds*, are Prefects or Commandants, who have the police and general supervision of all the inhabitants of the district, Russian as well as native. Originally resembling the district police officials in Russia, these prefects have come to occupy a much more powerful and independent position. The nomad population,—Kirghiz,—were divided into "*valosts*" (communes) and "*auls*" (camps), the *auls* comprising from 100 to 200 families, and the *valosts* some ten times as many. These sub-divisions were governed by administrators and elders, who were chosen by the people themselves, and were under the immediate supervision of the district prefects, who had the power to change or remove them in case of failure of duty. Among the settled population an *aksakal* (lit. "grey beard") or elder was chosen from each considerable village by the people themselves, and in case of cities, each ward had its own *aksakal*, the duties of whom, in police and administrative relations, were the same as those of the elders among the Kirghizes. Russian courts were established, with jurisdiction in nearly all criminal matters, and for hearing disputes between Russians, or between Russians and natives. For all civil matters, and for some of the lesser crimes, the natives were allowed courts of their own. Among the Kirghiz or nomad population these were called *Bis*, elected by the population, and judged according to the received tribal and national traditions. In the towns the *Kazis*, or native judges, deciding according to the *Shariat* or Mussulman law, were allowed to remain, but they were made elective by delegates from the population, and their importance in the eyes of natives was much diminished.

"The taxes usual in these provinces under the Mussulman rule were, to some extent, retained,—the *beradj* and *tanagr*, or taxes of land and its products,—the *beradj* being fixed at one-tenth of the harvest. The *zakel*, or customs duty, was fixed at 2½ per cent. on the value of all commodities imported into the country, and at the same rate on the trading capital as it had been previously established. From the nomad population there was demanded a tax of 2 roubles 70 kopecks on each *kibitka*, or family. The province of Turkestan includes something like 15,000 square geographical miles, about equal to that of France and Italy together, and has a population of somewhat under 2,000,000, the most thickly settled parts of which are immediately about Kerney, Tashkend, Khodjend, and Samarcand, the remainder of the country being chiefly inhabited by nomads."

The compiler of this note is indebted for the following particulars to M. P. Mosa, the Translator of Foreign Languages in the Indian Foreign Office.

"The Administration of Turkestan and all other possessions of Russia in Asia is very centralised as that of Russia herself. The Administration of Russia in Asia is an exact copy of that in Europe, *viz.* :

- | | | |
|---------------------|-----|--|
| 1. <i>Gubernias</i> | ... | Governorships. |
| 2. <i>Uyedsz</i> | ... | Districts or Shires. |
| 3. <i>Folosts</i> | ... | Villageships, that is small circles comprising several <i>Derevnias</i> (villages) under one <i>Folosnoi Starosta</i> or <i>Starshina</i> (elder). |

"Every *uyedsz* has at least one justice of the peace. Sometimes an extra justice of the peace is appointed for two or three large *volosts*. Within certain limits a *volosnoi starosta* is also a kind of rural justice of the peace; in matters not exceeding the value of fifty roubles his decisions are without appeal. A *starosta* may be ignorant of reading and writing, as all his transactions are conducted verbally: if the keeping of records is indispensable, it is done by a so-called *pisar* (writer) who ranks under the *starosta*, but in nine cases out of ten rules supreme in the whole *volost*.

"Both in the military and civil services Russia employs a very great number of Germans in Asia. From General Kaufmann downwards most of the best posts of trust are in the hands of Germans. At the University of Dorpat (in the Livonian Province) the Russian Government educate every young man who binds himself to serve for a term of ten years in Asia free of all cost, even his board and lodging, for five years. Thus the medical, forest, and mining officers are nearly all Germans. Nevertheless the tendency to Russianise everything and everybody is very strong. In Asia and Livonia this is specially done with the schools—in Poland even with the churches—simply by an Ukase of the Emperor. The taxation in Asia is comparatively very low at present."

364. Public Works in Russian Turkestan.—Irrigation of the steppe between Chinaz on the Syr-Darya and Djizak.—As regards public works in Turkestan Mr. Schuyler accords to the Russians a measure of praise. He writes:—

"The roads are being greatly improved (which seems a little strange when good roads are so almost unknown in Russia itself); bridges are being constructed over the chief streams, and canals are being projected for the purpose of irrigation. Russian engineers, however, have yet to learn from the natives with regard to irrigation, nearly all the last attempts in this direction having proved failures, and the great canal from the Syr-Daria, which is expected to fertilise the Yaunshed (?) Steppe between the Syr-Daria and Djizak, will probably absorb a vast amount of money and be a failure. In former days when this steppe was cultivated to some extent the water was brought, not from the Syr-Daria, but from the Zarafshan through a mountain pass."

The official opinion as to the prospects of the irrigation works is more sanguine. The *Turkestan Gazette* of the 18th February 1875 published an article on the subject. A translation of the most interesting part follows:—

"In the month of November 1874 our Turkestan administration began to execute a colossal undertaking, namely, the excavation of an irrigation canal through the Hungry Steppe between Djizak and Chinahz. The general character of the soil in this steppe is a slightly saline loam which during the greatest part of the year presents the aspect of an exceedingly dry, barren desert. Only in the spring seasons is this Hungry Steppe rapidly overgrown with a rich mass of grass, which is profusely sprinkled with a variety of many-colored flowers and gives the whole the appearance of a sumptuous carpet. On these occasions the steppe for a short time swarms with enormous droves of horses and herds of sheep. But as suddenly as this splendour arises, it also vanishes. Already during the month of May the scorching heat of the sun destroys all this vegetation, after which a few turtles, lizards, and a few miserable, poisonous ferns are the only remaining representatives of life for the rest of the year, till it receives a new impetus in the following spring. Through this melancholy region leads at present the mail-route from Tashkend to Samarkand.

"The Chinahz Djizak steppe was not at all times the waterless, barren desert that it now is. Numerous ruins of *sardabs* (cisterns) now dry and of some caravan serais as well as several other tokens denote beyond a doubt that this district was not only well cultivated once, but also that the route through the same was well frequented by caravans. Only the most atrociously lazy and disorderly habits—old qualities of the Central Asians—have forced its former inhabitants to abandon their rich fields; and then, added to that, want of water and the heat of the sun has gradually turned them into the one continuous desert of our days.

"It became the first care of the administration of our new Turkestan province to recover for the use of man this waste land from Nature. The want of ground in the neighbouring district of Khodjend, which adjoins it from the east and south, was a stimulant which kept the idea alive after it had once been formed, and for the sake of the inhabitants of Khodjend, Ura-Tinbe and Djizak, the irrigation of an area of 120,000 desiatinas (540,000 acres) was early resolved upon.

"A preliminary survey of the steppe was commenced in 1869. In 1874 the preparations were concluded; all the necessary investigations had been made, and the plans and estimates for the proposed undertaking were ready. The future canal is to begin at the village of Parman-Kurghau and to end at Mirza Rabbata, its entire length being about 100 versts (57 English Miles), and at first sight it is certainly not the extraordinary task to be accomplished which, owing to the nature of region, it will undoubtedly prove.

"Among the villagers of Central Asia exists an ancient custom, which is worthy of imitation, to help each other in works for the good of the general weal—for instance, irrigation, road-building, &c. When one or more villages ask their neighbours for aid in such undertakings, it is never refused, because the latter know that they can claim the same in return whenever they are in need of it. According to this usage, the administration requested the inhabitants of the district of Khodjend to start the works, and without a murmur the call was at once responded to by 6,000 men who with their tools appeared on the appointed spot. The Government allowed them five copeks (about 2*d.*) per diem for their maintenance, which is as much as these simple people spend at home for their daily wants and which therefore perfectly satisfied them. The work was continued for 14 days, and at the recommencement of it next year the number of laborers is to be increased by inhabitants from the Tashkend and Kurama districts."

The plan of digging a canal through the Steppe has been preferred to a rival scheme of irrigation by means of pumping engines, chiefly on the ground of economy. The canal works are expected to cost 700,000 roubles, and the expenses of maintenance, it is hoped, will be almost nominal. The conclusion of the article is addressed to the reading public in Russia, and bears an amusing resemblance to the efforts which are so often made in Indian journals to arouse the interest of England in the affairs of its great dependency.

"Our Russian newspapers in Europe catch at one side facts and reprint them without any thought or selection. The editors are very fond of small gossip, and especially of correspondence of a piquant nature: but not one has till now bethought himself of a serious discussion of our Turkestan life, the activity of its population, and the relations of the Russian administration towards our new Central Asian subjects. Yet these matters deserve that some respectable organs of our Western Press should honestly draw the attention of Russian society to them.

"Let us be fully aware of the importance of our position and the magnitude of our tasks here. Ignorance at Moscow on Central Asian affairs may any day prove our most dangerous foe."

II.—EXPLORATION OF THE LOWER OXUS.

365. Scientific Mission to explore the Lower Oxus.—Among the immediate consequences of the successful campaign against Khiva may be included the mission of a party of scientific officers to explore the lower course and mouths of the Oxus. It was remarked in the report of the Russian Geographical Society for the month of April 1874, that the events which had happened of late years had laid open to scientific exploration countries hitherto difficult of access. Of those countries three attracted the special attention of the Society. They were the Thianshan Range, the Pamir Plateau, and the Lower Amu. But since it was not practicable to send three missions simultaneously, and there were political questions to be taken into account, it was resolved that General Kaufmann should be asked to indicate the direction which should preferably be followed. He, influenced doubtless by strategical as well as by scientific considerations, decided in favor of the Lower Amu:

and on the 9th February 1874 the Emperor gave his consent to the proposed expedition, directing, however, that the explorations should be confined to the limits of the Russian dominions on the right bank of the river.

366. The Mission professed purely scientific, not political aims.—The plan had, of course, no professed political or military aim. In the words of Prince Gortschakoff to Count Brunnow (*Secret, July 1874, No. 20*):—

“The scientific expedition which is already restricted in extent, will remain strictly confined to the regions of science alone in conformity with the Supreme will, which has been expressed with equal plainness and decision,”

(that is, as in the case of the prohibition against an advance to Merv). Even when thus restricted the programme left enough for the expedition to accomplish. Its labors were divided into four sections—(1) of geodesy and topography; (2) of meteorology and hydrology; (3) of ethnography and statistics; (4) of natural history.

The first two sections of the work are those of which the results might be expected to prove especially important, since they embraced such branches of the enquiry as the depth of water in the various mouths of the Oxus and the navigability of the river through any of those mouths upward.

A detailed and interesting account of the organization of the mission, its proceedings and success will be found in Appendix XIV, which has been translated from the *Russische Revue*, No. 3 of 1875.

367. Navigability of the Oxus from the Sea. Description of the three principal branches.—From a political point of view undoubtedly the most important of the results achieved by the expedition was the discovery of a navigable channel. In order to appreciate clearly the nature of this discovery, it should be remembered that the Amoo has three principal outlets into the Sea of Aral, the first beginning from the west, the Taldyk, then the Ulkun Darya, and lastly the Yangy-su, which is connected by a series of lakes and marshes with the Kuvan-Jarma. Lerch, in his “*Khiva or Kharizm, its historical and geographical relations*,” writes thus of the three branches:—

The Kuvan Jarma, or Yangi-su arm of the Oxus.—“At Khoja Ili, the second branch (the Laudan on the left bank is the first) of the Amoo, the Kuvan-Jarma diverges from the right bank in a northerly direction. In Ljussilon’s map it is called Kasarma and flows north-east to the lake Tampin-Ayatch, while according to A. Butakow’s memoir on the delta of the Amu it takes a northerly direction inclining to the east in the second half of its course (called Yangy-su, or in the Kirghiz pronunciation Zangy-su.).....In that year (1859), Butakow ascended the Yangy-su and its upper half the Kuvan Jarma or K  k (the Blue) as far as lake Tampin Ayatch. This lake is separated from another, the Daukara, by a narrow tongue of land which is submerged when the water is high; but it has also continuous connection with the Daukara through a breach in the strip of land twenty fathoms broad. Butakow puts the breadth of the Yangy-su at from 40 to 70 fathoms, and its depth at 5, 7 and 8 feet..... Four and thirty versts above the mouth an elevation of sandstone runs right across the channel, on which the depth of water is 1½, 2 and 2½ feet. This rocky bottom of the bed crops up again 12 versts up the river.

“The depth of water varies from 7, 8 and 9 feet to only 3, 2½ and 2 feet.

The Ulkun Darya Arm of the Oxus.—“After sending out the Laudan and the K  k or Kuvan Jarma, the Amu continues its course to the north-west, its volume of water growing even smaller, as several unimportant branches and at last the great Kara-baili diverge to the right, 65 versts below Khoja Ili. These arms discharge themselves into depressions where they form reed-covered lakes, out of which the water again flows into one great channel, the Ulkun Darya. This is the most important of all the mouths of the Amu East of the Taldik, the Ulkun Darya already mentioned falls into the Sea of Aral. Ten versts above its mouth at Tenke-kum, it divides into two branches, the western of which is called Kitchkein Darya (“little river”). It issues from a lake, the Ertengkol, and flows at first in a bed four fathoms deep, and fifteen fathoms broad, which divides right and left at right angles. The left arm runs in a narrow channel, the Kolden, to the Taldik into which it debouches below Kungrad; the right flows under the name of Ulkun Darya to the Aral Sea. In 1858

Butakow was able to descend the Kolden opposite Kungrad, in the Steamer *Perowskij* (40 horse-power and 140 tons; but in 1859 the depth at high water was only 2½ feet."

The Taldik Arm of the Oxus.—"The Taldik, which begins below the town of Kungrad is the only branch of the river which discharges itself into the Sea of Aral without being broken into lakes. In 1848 and 1849 the current in it was very strong. At the bar the depth measured three feet, but in 1858 only 1½, and in some places 1¼ feet. In these ten years also the alluvial deposits have been pushed forward about two versts."

368. Passage of the Steamer "Perowskij" through the Yangi-su branch into the main stream of the Oxus.—Now it will be seen from Appendix XIV. that the steamers *Samarkund* and *Perowskij*, the latter of which draws 3½ feet of water, unsuccessfully attempted to ascend the Ulkun Darya branch. They managed to penetrate to a distance of about 57 miles beyond the bar of the Kichkine Darya, and there were stopped by the dense reeds, through which it was only possible for the *Kayuks* or flat-bottomed craft of the country to pass. The Yangi-su, however, proved more accessible. Some difficulty was experienced in finding an entrance among the shoals of the Tusche-baz Bay, but once in the stream there were no more serious impediments than occasional shallows, a narrow bed, and a powerful current. In seven days the *Perowskij*, reached the Fort of Nukus and the navigation of the Oxus was accomplished, for higher up the stream there appear to be no difficulties to contend against except the velocity of the current, which was sometimes so strong as almost to overcome the 40-horse power engine of the *Perowskij*. The return trip of the steamer took place later in the year, when the water in the Amu is not so high as it is in the month of July, and the result proves that the river is open to navigation even in the season of low water. Whether the Taldyk arm of the river is accessible at any point or entirely closed by the bar at the mouth, the explorations of the mission do not enable us to say. The people in that part of the delta, especially the Kara Kalpaks, viewed the operations of the Russian officers with suspicion and hostility, and the prevailing insecurity of the frontier is said to have put a stop to the work. But certainly what was accomplished is momentous, as the reviewer observes, whether from a commercial, military, social, or political point of view. The discovery that the Oxus is navigable for vessels of moderate draught from the Aral Sea to the frontier of Bokhara, and that consequently there is a safe and easy way of communication between the line of the Syr Daria and the Military Settlements in the most recently acquired dominions of Russia is an event of very considerable importance, not only to the Russian Empire but also to neighbouring nations.

III.—SCHEMES FOR RAILWAYS THROUGH CENTRAL ASIA.

369. Project for effecting a junction between the Russian and Indian lines of Railway.—Attention was drawn to this stupendous scheme by the celebrated M. Ferdinand de Lesseps, who, on the 1st May 1873, wrote to General Ignatieff, Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, proposing the formation of a company under the title of "Société Universelle du Grand Central Asiatique" for the purpose of making preliminary enquiries into the possibility of constructing a line of railway from Orenburg *via* Samarkund to Peshawur. M. de Lesseps estimated that only 3,605 versts of road would have to be constructed, and that the cost of the preliminary explorations, &c., might be put at three million francs. From the execution of the project he foresaw not only commercial advantage but the cessation of jealousy and mistrust between England and Russia.

The reply of General Ignatieff dated 5th May 1873, was published by the *Débats* of the 20th June. It was favorable, but the opinion of the Russian Government was expressly reserved, and the writer confined himself chiefly to generalities.

On the 11th June 1873, M. de Lesseps laid his proposals before Prince Orloff, Russian Ambassador at Paris:—

“Men,” he wrote “marked by intelligence, devotion and self-sacrifice will combine without asking aught from Government or banker. At their own cost, risk, and peril they will make a preliminary exploration under the protection of the States through which their road will lie; on their return to Europe they will publish a preliminary scheme pointing out, along with the results of the topographic observations, the local resources, whether in respect to the proposed works or the profit which would accrue from concessions of land, mines, &c.”

Prince Orloff replied on 20th June 1873, that the letter from M. de Lesseps having been submitted to the Emperor, His Majesty had given permission to the son of M. de Lesseps and to M. Cotard, an Engineer, to undertake the proposed journey in the Russian Provinces lying between Orenburg and Samarcand.

In the meantime the subject was being discussed by the Geographical Society of Vienna. The general opinion appears to have been that the project was possible, and that the possibility of its execution should strengthen all arguments in favor of the speedy establishment of railway communication through Turkey in Europe and Asia to the Persian Gulf, and thence by the coast or across Persia to India: and the construction of such a line was regarded as a political and commercial necessity for England. Colonel Stubendorff, however, who is described as representing the Topographical Department in the Russian Military Section of the International Exhibition, argued, in conversation with the Military Attaché at Vienna, against the utility to Russia of any railway from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, alleging that the sea-borne trade was already satisfied by the communication from the Eastern Seas *viâ* Odessa, from which port the communication by rail with the interior of Russia is constant and throughout the year, and this could not be said of the inland water communications of that country, which debouched on the Caspian at Astrakhan. Colonel Stubendorff also indicated as a Persian Railway that would probably come on the tapis a line from the south-east corner of the Caspian through Herat to Peshawur.

370. The Lesseps' scheme still in embryo. Want of knowledge regarding the countries through which the line would be carried.—The grand enterprize was as yet in embryo from which condition it scarcely emerged. The first element necessary for success, namely a knowledge of the country, was wanting. M. Westmann informed Her Majesty's Ambassador at Saint Petersburg on the 8th July 1873, that the Emperor had given his assent to the preliminary explorations, and had caused instructions to be issued to the several Russian authorities to protect M. de Lesseps: there was no question of surveys or engineering works being undertaken: it was simply a journey of exploration to see the country through which the railway would pass, in order to judge how far such a project could be carried out.

But M. de Lesseps had no geographical knowledge of the country, and in M. Westmann's opinion the scheme was perfectly impracticable. The Ambassador at Constantinople held much the same view (see his letter No. 110, dated 10th June 1873). Those who had spoken to M. Lesseps on the subject stated that he displayed an unusual degree of ignorance of everything connected with the nature and even of the names of the countries through which he proposed to carry his line. General Ignatieff conveyed to the Ambassador the impression that he regarded the enterprize “as one of the wildest of dreams.” In truth, the speech which M. de Lesseps delivered before the Geographical Society of Paris on the 4th July 1873, shows plainly the scantiness of his knowledge of the countries which his magnificent scheme embraced. For facts relating to Transoxiana, the orator had to go back to the exploits of Alexander, and the romantic descriptions of Quintus Curtius. Between Samarkund and Peshawur he confessed that he approached the unknown, but he was aware of an ancient centre of population named Balkh “the Mother of Cities.”

371. Various Russian schemes for railway communication through Central Asia.—The conquest of Khiva had given an impulse to the plan of effecting a communication between Europe and India *viâ* Russia, and various schemes had been laid before the Special Commission appointed to examine the commercial routes between Russia and Asia. C. J. Baranowski succeeded in forming a Russian Company for exploring the line of route for a railway from Orenburg to Peshawur, *viâ* Tashkend and Samarkund; another Russian by name G. J. Bykouski attempted to secure English capital for the same object. The following details of the Russian proposals were given by the *Russki Mir* :—

(1). "The proposal of M. Schawrow, Reporter of the Commission, suggests a line of rail from Krasnovodsk to Khiva. In furtherance of his argument he quotes the following numerals—

	<i>To Khiva. Bokhara. Samarkund. Tashkend. Kokan.</i>					
From Orenburg	... versts	1,395	1,755	2,225	1,945	2,235
From Krasnovodsk	... „	700	1,060	1,310	1,590	1,655

"Still the matter becomes a trifle altered, if whilst retaining the numbers of the 'report,' all these distances are carried further on to a specified point, for instance Moscow.

"In which case it would be as follows :—

From Moscow *viâ* Orenburg—

To Khiva	3,004	versts.
„ Bokhara	3,364	„
„ Samarkund	3,834	„
„ Tashkend	3,554	„
„ Kokan	3,844	„

From Moscow *viâ* Krasnovodsk—

To Khiva	3,364	versts.
„ Bokhara	3,725	„
„ Samarkund	3,975	„
„ Tashkend	4,255	„
„ Kokan	4,320	„

which shows that the route *viâ* Orenburg is much shorter than that *viâ* Krasnovodsk, in addition to which the first route is in a straight line, whereas the second leads through the stormy Caspian Sea, thereby necessitating two unloadings; consequently the line *viâ* Orenburg is undoubtedly the most preferable, and is able to be more rapidly constructed. Let us not again be deprived of the transit trade in Central Asia on account of want of strength of action, as we were in the Caucasus.

(2). "The direction from Orenburg to Tashkend *viâ* Kasalinsk, as also the enormous round-about way projected from Tashkend *viâ* Akwoly, Petropowlowski, Jetakerinburg to Moscow (No. 138), and lastly

(3). "The project of Baranowski, and

(4). "That of Bykowski; both agree in accepting the Bokharian town of Karshi as the south-western point. With regard to whether the route will be prolonged from thence *viâ* Bamian or *viâ* Badakshan, it is at present too early to decide. In the same way it is impossible to reckon exactly what the expenses of laying down a line of rail in those regions may amount to, still it is thought that they will not be much higher than the construction of a railroad in Russia itself."

[*Secret, December 1855, No. 55.*]

372. Details of the Central Asian Railway scheme proposed by Professor Baronowski.—Regarding Professor Baronowski's scheme for Central Asian Railway, interesting particulars were afforded by the Russian newspaper, the *Neva*. The line was to be carried from Saratov on the Volga by Tugoikamis, Aibugir, Urgenj, and Bokhara to Peshawur, with a branch line from Bokhara to Tashkend. This line, it was maintained, offered greater advantages than the other two which had been proposed, and which would start from Orenburg and Ekatarinenburg respectively. To overcome the difficulties of the arid Ust-Urt, it would be necessary to construct an aqueduct of considerable dimensions, and to set up the proper machinery for raising the water to the required level at Aibugir on the south-east coast of the Sea of Aral. To this point the Laudan, a copious branch of

the Amu Darya must be brought along its old bed. Other works such as bridging the Volga and the passage across the mountains into India were considered to present no unusual engineering difficulties.

M. Baranowsk maintained further—

“That the construction of the Saratow line will in reality be less expensive than either of the two other lines, as the difficulty of contending with ‘moving sand’ will only occur on a small portion of the line, and could be altogether avoided by a slight circuit.

“It is proposed that the portion of the proposed line—Saratow, Bokhara, Kalesch Aba—should be undertaken by Russia, and the continuation of it from Kalesch Aba, Dscherem (Term) Nuksaun Pass, and Chittral, to Peshawur by England.

“The entire length of the first portion is about 2,500 versts, that of the latter about 460 versts, so that the length of the whole line would be under 3,000 versts.

“The following table shows the distances from Orel and Moscow along the different lines proposed:—

		FROM OREL.		
		<i>Via</i> Saratow.	<i>Via</i> Orenburg.	<i>Via</i> Ekaterinenburg.
		<i>Versts.</i>	<i>Versts.</i>	<i>Versts.</i>
To Tashkend	...	3,224	3,390	3,858
„ Samarkund	...	2,944	3,673	4,138
„ Bokhara	...	2,744	3,870	4,338
„ Peshawur	...	3,704	4,830	5,298

		FROM MOSCOW.		
		<i>Via</i> Saratow.	<i>Via</i> Orenburg.	<i>Via</i> Ekaterinenburg.
		<i>Versts.</i>	<i>Versts.</i>	<i>Versts.</i>
To Tashkend	...	3,278	3,324	3,500
„ Samarkund	...	2,998	3,604	3,780
„ Bokhara	...	2,798	3,804	3,980
„ Peshawur	...	3,753	4,764	4,940

“Professor Baronowski contends that he has thus demonstrated that the Saratow line would be the more direct one; the question of the feasibility of the English portion across the Nuksan Pass, he says, is one of secondary importance, and the Russian portion presents no engineering difficulty. He further answers for its productiveness as a local line to Bokhara and Tashkend.

“The *Neva* remarks that it is not possible at present to say whether a railroad will ever be laid from the Volga to the Indus, but that it is confident that the connection of Bokhara and Tashkend with the Russian lines of railway is only a question of time.

“The surveys, it adds, have been already in part commenced, and will have to show which of the three lines proposed would be the safest, quickest and cheapest.”

[*Secret, January 1875, Nos. 47-48.*]

373. M. Lesseps writes to Lord Granville on 30th October 1873, informing him of Victor Lesseps' proposed journey to India, and recommending the Central Asian railway project, commercially and politically.—To return now to M. de Lesseps, on 30th October 1873, he sent through the British Ambassador at Paris a letter to Lord Granville in which he stated that in a few weeks his son M. Victor de Lesseps, accompanied by Mr. Stuart, an English Engineer, would proceed to India in order to examine the feasibility of a junction of the Anglo-Indian Railways with the Russian lines; if necessary, they would prosecute their researches beyond the British territory according to directions received from the Viceroy; as regards the line, it was proposed to start from Orenburg, and proceed thence to Samarkund *via* Tashkend; striking the course of the Oxus in the neighbourhood of Balkh, the line would follow first the valley of that stream, then that of one of its numerous tributaries, and cross the mountains through the Khawak Pass or by some other of the routes actually followed by caravans; the establishment of railway communication with Central Asia would promote international traffic, and confer commercial benefits both on England and on India, but from a political point of view also

the success of the undertaking would be advantageous to the Indian Empire for the reasons thus set forth—

“ Since the Khivan campaign, Russia has been necessarily obliged to extend her domination or her influence over the inhabitants of Central Asia, not only for the advantage of those populations themselves, but for her own security. Her power will inevitably spread in the valley of the Oxus, until it reach the limit naturally marked out for it by the highest mountains in the world.

“ If, under these circumstances, England remain inactive to the south of the Hindoo Koosh, the fanatical Moslem tribes inhabiting the valley of the Oxus will be partly or wholly driven over the mountains, thus adding fresh elements of ferment to the troublesome Mahomedan population of India and the adjoining provinces. I believe, therefore, it would be strongly in British interests to construct a railway which would facilitate the transport of European troops into a district which might prove a dangerous focus of insurrection. In any case the line would tend considerably to increase British influence throughout the whole frontier district.

“ If, on the other hand, as will probably happen in course of time, the valley of the Cabul River be annexed to British territory, it would be evidently necessary to have a line as far as the frontier on the Hindoo Koosh, where it would join that on the Russian side.

“ So long as England remains mistress of the seas (and the application of steam to navigation has only rendered her superiority more evident), she has nothing to fear from the conquests or legitimate influence of Russia in Central Asia. A Russian army seeking to invade India by the Hindoo Koosh would be thousands of miles away from its basis in European Russia. A British army posted in the north-west would be at but a comparatively short distance from its basis at Bombay or Calcutta, whilst prompt and secure communication between England and the Indian ports would always exist through the Suez Canal.

“ We believe then that British India could confidently await the attack of a force whose only line of communication would be a railway thousands of miles in length; and which the destruction of a tunnel or a bridge in the mountainous frontier district could starve into surrender or dispersion.”

M. de Lesseps referred to the well-known intention of the Russian Government to undertake the construction of a railroad as far as Samarkund in case it should not be made by a private company. But this statement appears to have been erroneous for the Russian Minister of Finance, to whom the scheme for a junction of the Anglo-Indian Russian Railways had been referred by Prince Gortschakoff, informed M. de Lesseps that no such project existed. After communications had passed with the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy, M. de Lesseps was informed that upon enquiry it appeared that the difficulties, both political and local, and even the dangers of such a journey as M. Victor de Lesseps and Mr. Stuart were understood to contemplate were so great that Her Majesty's Government could not under the circumstances of the moment incur the responsibility of encouraging them to undertake it.

374. Arrival of M. Victor de Lesseps in Calcutta. Facilities afforded to him by the Indian Government.—Nevertheless M. Victor de Lesseps and his companion proceeded to India, and on the 2nd February 1874 the former laid the following memorandum before the Foreign Secretary at Calcutta :—

“ During their stay in India M. de Lesseps and Mr. Stuart will direct their attention to the following points, with the assent of the Indian Government :—

“ I.—General opinion of the Indian authorities concerning the projected Central-Asian Railway between India and Europe.

“ II.—Commercial statistics : probable traffic of the line.

“ III.—Topography.

I.

“ The general impression conveyed by their conversations with the Indian authorities will enable the projectors of the line to form an opinion on point I.

II.

" Point II comprises—

" (a) An enquiry concerning the existing commercial intercourse between India and Europe.

" (b) A statement of the present amount of traffic on the Indian Railways.

" With regard to section (a) the Indian Government will doubtless be enabled to communicate documents containing for each port—

" (a) Annual passenger traffic: annual movement of export and import according to nature of goods.

" (b) Points of production of these goods: their destination.

" (c) Cost of conveyance: length of time employed in transit.

" With regard to section (b) the official Railway statistics would furnish all requisite information.

" From these data a statement might be established concerning the comparative advantages of land and sea carriage for passengers and goods, and thus estimates of the probable traffic of the proposed line might be prepared.

" An inquiry concerning the trade already existing between India and Central Asia would complete the investigation of point II.

III.

" All information concerning the passes of the Hindoo Koosh and the neighbouring countries comes under point III, as also all maps, surveys, &c., of these territories."

M. Victor de Lesseps was informed in reply by letter of 4th February 1874 that every facility would be given him for the collection of the information required on the subjects noted in his memorandum. This was done, the aid of the Surveyor General and of other Departments of the Government of India being invoked for the purpose of supplying maps, books, and trade returns, which would be useful to the explorers.

[*Secret, February 1874, Nos. 119-140.*]

375. M. de Lesseps informs Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Indian portion of the Central Asian Railway scheme is abandoned.—While this was being done in Calcutta, M. de Lesseps was already writing to inform the Secretary of State that the Indian portion of the Central Asian Railway scheme must be abandoned for the present. Subjoined is a translation of his letter written from Ismailia, dated 1st February 1874:—

" I no longer expected a reply to my communication of 30th October last when I received in Egypt the letter of 15th January which you did me the honor to address to me. My son and Mr. Stuart have just left for India, where they will make a simple tour of enquiry without asking anything from the Government of the Queen or its Agents. As they will not go beyond the English dominions, they will have no reason to apprehend any of the perils of which you are good enough to warn them.

" As regards the project for uniting the Anglo-Indian and Russian Railways, it is plain that it must be postponed until the statesmen of Great Britain shall have abandoned what I believe to be an error, as they have ever had the wisdom to do in all the great questions of civilization which have been agitated in England since the beginning of the century.

" The projectors of the Central Asian Railway will henceforth direct their attention to the prolongation of their principal line to China, the walls of which have been consolidated by the influence of France and England, and in a future, more or less remote, they will follow up the branch to India, for which country the existing policy of Britain still dreads the freedom of communications."

376. Explanation given by the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg regarding M. de Lesseps' letter on the abandonment of the Indian portion of the Central Asian Railway scheme.—This somewhat mysterious letter was forwarded to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg who appears to have been considerably puzzled by it, especially by the intimation that attention was to be thenceforth devoted to

railway communication with China. After much pondering, the Ambassador at last conceived that he had discovered the key to the mystery, which he thus proceeded to expound in his letter No. 135, dated 18th March 1874:—

“ I am informed that a Russian Commission under the direction of M. Sosnowski has lately left St. Petersburg for the ostensible purpose of becoming practically acquainted with the condition of the tea trade between Russia and China and ascertaining the cause of its decline.

“ The Commission will first proceed to Kiachta and continue its journey thence to Peking. From Peking the Commissioners will ascend the Hoang Ho or Blue River to its upper waters, and then visit Urumchi, Guchen, Turfan, and other important commercial towns.

“ A small armed force will be despatched from Semipaletinsk to the Black Irtysh, which flows out of Lake Norzaisan in the summer of 1875 to meet and serve as an escort to the Commissioners who, it is supposed, will ultimately proceed to Kashgar.

The real object of this Commission is, it may be surmised, to discover and eventually open a new channel for Russian trade with China through Chinese Turkestan. The researches and explorations of the Commission will extend over a period of a year and a half. It appears to me therefore that the object of the Russian Government abandoning, as I may hope, any further extension towards Southern Turkestan is beginning to direct its attention to the development of the trade with China through Turkestan. The allusion made in M. de Lesseps' letter may therefore refer to a projected Railway from Orenburg to the Chinese frontier, and I have reason to believe that such ideas are entertained here. By these means the whole trade from China will pass through the Russian territory and by the encircling of Kashgar by Russia that State would entirely fall within its commercial compass.

[*Secret, May 1874, No. 121.*]

377. Committee at St. Petersburg assembled for the purpose of discussing the Anglo-Russian Railway scheme.—The latest intelligence regarding Railway projects in Central Asia is derived from the Russian *Turkestan Gazette* of 29th April 1875. It is there said on the authority of the Petersburgskaya Vedomosti (*St. Petersburg Gazette*) that the question of a line connecting Russian Central Asia with British India was being discussed by a Special Committee at St. Petersburg, of which the members were—Prince Gortschakoff, President; the Secretaries of State for War, Finance, and Public Works, Generals Von Kaufmann, Chefkin, and Heins, while the experts were General Bieznosikoff, Colonel Veniukoff and others.

The subjects for discussion were the project of Messrs. Lesseps (father and son) and particularly the practicability of carrying a line from Tashkend *via* Kokand and Kashgar into Cashmere and the plains of Lahore.

(Sd.) F. H.—14-7-75.

APPENDIX I.

STATISTICS OF THE YOMUDS.

THE Yomud tribe, which resides in the neighbourhood of Astrabad, consisted formerly of 40,000 families, but has now increased to 60,000. Of these families 20,000 reside to the north of Astrabad, from Hussun Kooli, which is at the mouth of the Attrek up to the Goombed-i-Kaboos, which is the boundary line between the Yomud and Goklen tribes, and the remainder from Balkan, Aladagh, and Senoo Daghee, to near the Kliivan territory, extending over a space of 20 stages. They consist of two tribes, named respectively Joonee and Sharaff.

These two tribes are sub-divided into other tribes. The Joonee tribe is known as Attabae, and Sharaff tribe as Jafferbai.

The Attabae tribe consist of the following tribes, most of which are again sub-divided into other tribes :—

Shana, Mahomed Anlook, Sookee, Yanpai, Sarrejapai, Tamak, Kazeebai, and Kankerem.

The Khanumpai tribe consists of the following :—

Tanna, Don Kaskhee, Kasakha, Kassa, Anshoorkook, and Kara Dashlee.

The Ak tribe consists of two tribes, Oozeen Ak and Keeska Ak.

The Oozeen Ak—Sookkee, Kook, and Habeebpai.

The Keeska Ak—Sheer Mahomed Pai, Noor Mahomed Pai, Kizzilcha, Yoolma, and Herra.

The Daz tribe—Poonka, Hanka, Dooed Ata Aghlee, and Cheen Soblee.

The Koochek tribe—Aslan Hek, Oosta Hek, Khartoon, and Gooec Kara.

The Kan Yookmaz tribe—Halakoo, Kizzilcha, Sareejeh Koor, and Makhdom.

The Ikvar tribe—Ak Arkalee, Kara Arkalee, Budrak, and Imar.

The Sharaff tribe, known as the Jaferbai, consisting of—

The Noor Ali tribe—Arukh, Kal, Kooselnai, Kizzil, Sakkapai, Boorkhass, Ameeree Toomaj, Onuk Toomaj, and Choukan.

The Yar Ali tribe—Kooyoon Ali Koor, Panak, Karanjak, Karajeh, Oogoorchelec, Kaleeta, Behelka, and Koolak.

The Eelke tribe—Sekker, Gheer, Meerzaee, Vakeelee, Oolek, Cherch Shek, and Apacee.

The Davajee tribe—Oudak, Mirjavet, Ich Meek Abdal, Khivae, Garaee, Chop Nabesh, Bookka, and Gurganee.

The Kara Daghlee tribe—Pehlivan, Auzeen, Pooran, Yatlee, Trakee, Kulmuck, and Oroos.

The Kochook tribe—Gahgah, Khiva Chee, Marta Guroom, Akchalee, Kereck, and Dan Kereck.

The Tatar tribe—Sekkeree, Ak Koomeshlee, and Aghel Mooshee.

These tribes reside on the banks of the Gurgau between Karaval Tuppa and Moolla Koola, which is eight fursakhs distant from Astrabad, and Karaval Tuppa 18 fursakhs distant from Astrabad.

The tribes of Ikder, Kan Yookmag, Ata, and Makhdom reside at Karavool Tuppa and their *oubahs* lie south-west.

The tribes of Kochook and Tatar reside between Ak Noor and Bibi Sheerdan. The distance from Astrabad to Ak Noor is eleven fursakhs, and to Bibi Sheerdan ten fursakhs.

The tribes of Imbar and Koochek reside below Fenderesk, nine fursakhs distant from Astrabad.

The Budrak tribe are at Kotool, seven fursakhs from Astrabad.

APPENDIX I—(Concluded).

The Davajee tribe is near Kotool, six fursakhs from Astrabad.

The Daz tribe is in the neighbourhood of Hoossein-abad, four fursakhs from Astrabad.

The Yelkee tribe is near Shere Khan Kalata, three fursakhs from Astrabad.

The Ak Atabai tribe is within two fursakhs of the town.

The Jaferbai tribe extends from Shadaranee Kelan to Koord Mahala five fursakhs distant from Astrabad.

The Yomud tribe reside in the jungle in winter and on the banks of the Gurgan in summer.

There are three other tribes, who are the descendants of the Caliphs Abubekr, Osman, and Ali :—

Ata and Makhdoom from Abubekr, Fakee Sheikh from Osman, and Khajeh Oulad from Ali.

These are considered Syuds by the other Turkoman tribes and are in receipt of all the religious alms and tithes. Although there is constant enmity and blood feuds between the Yomud and Goklen tribes; yet these three tribes have free intercourse with both.

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APPENDIX II.

MEMORANDUM ON MERVE BY CAPTAIN THE HON'BLE G. NAPIER, DATED 22ND
FEBRUARY 1875.

The oasis of Merve, though distant over 160 miles from Meshed, 90 miles from the nearest point of Persian territory, and more than 200 miles from Herat, has been brought by the course of recent events into direct political connection with Khorassan and Afghanistan. It is to the countries in their rear that the tribes occupying the oasis now look for assistance against an enemy, and it is there only that in the event of defeat they could now hope to find a safe and permanent asylum for their women, children, and cattle. To the mounted men of the tribe the whole expanse of the desert is open, and its scanty pasturage and brackish springs would suffice them; but their immense herds of camels and flocks of sheep and their fine studs could not exist, save on the banks of the Murghab or on the pastures of the Heri-rood.

In times gone by, the Turkoman was in the advance guard of Sunnite and Usbeg invasion, continually pressing upon the frontier of the Persian Shialis, playing, in fact, the old rôle of Turan, with the additional incentive of a fierce religious hatred for the Iranian. His back was to the north, where he found rewards, honours, a market for his human goods, and often substantial aid in the shape of Usbeg armies; his face to the south, where was a fair field, from which to reap his harvest of plunder. All this is now changed, and the change is one fully appreciated by the tribes, who have turned their faces to the north and look southwards for aid. The conquest of Khiva and the subjection of Bokhara by Russia have cut them off from their feudal allegiance to the Usbeg dynasties, and severed the religious ties that bound them to those States. To the east and west they are isolated and separated by immense waterless deserts from their kinsmen of the Ersari, Yemoot and Chaudar tribes.

The tract permanently occupied by the Tekkah Turkomans lies more than two days' march from the point where the waters of the Murghab are lost in the desert, and includes the site of the ancient city of Merve.

The cultivated land lies along the course of the river for 3 or 4 fursukhs (12 to 16 miles), and has a width of 1 to 1½ fursukhs, or 4 to 6 miles. Beyond extends a circle of pasture land, having a radius of 7 to 8 fursukhs, and enclosed, save along the banks of the stream, by a desert of shifting sand, extending to the Oxus and the Tejen stream to the south-west.

The central point of the Settlement appears to be the new fort lately built by the Tekkah as a place of refuge for their families and property.

As described to me, the fort is defended on one side by the Murghab, flowing between steep banks, deep and unfordable; on the other a moat, with a depth of 10 to 12 yards, and a width of 30 yards, filled from the river. The *déploi* of the moat has been thrown up into a high thick rampart with, it is said, an irregular outline. The total length of the rampart is 2 fursukhs, (about 8 miles), and it has a height of 12 feet (about.) The space enclosed is sufficient for the whole non-combatant population with their tents, and the females of the tribe.

After due allowance for oriental exaggeration, there can be no doubt that a far more formidable work than is usually to be found in these countries,

has been constructed. The depth and width of the moat seem fabulous, but, since the water of the Murghab flows through it in an unfordable stream, it must be at least a serious obstacle. The irregular outline given to the rampart, contrary to all Asiatic precedent, gives colour to a surmise that the nomads have had advice in their engineering efforts; and such may possibly be the case, though it was denied. More than two years have now elapsed since the work was commenced, and though great efforts have been made it is still incomplete. The whole of the able-bodied slaves of the tribe have been employed, and many of the Turkomans themselves have aided in the work, a circumstance commented on, as showing their determination to defend themselves. The extent of the enclosure, even if exaggerated by one-half, is, of course, too great for vigorous or united defence; but its capture will still be a formidable undertaking, for the tribe is numerous and warlike and will, before confined to its limits, have been driven to make a desperate resistance.

The guns left by the Persian Commander, the Hashmat-u-Dowla, are still at Merve, with some others, but I could not learn for certain that they had been mounted, or that there were any supplies of shot and powder. Powder is manufactured and possibly some quantity might be raised in the "obahs" and the shot left by the Persians is still available, supplemented, as I was informed, by supplies brought over from Bokhara by horsemen.

The mode of defence determined on was detailed to me as follows:—

Mode of defence to be adopted.

On the first alarm, the whole of the women, children, tents and mares, with an unlimited store of provisions, will be sent into the fortress, with all the unmounted men. The plain will be cleared of crops and laid under water.

The mounted men of the tribe, a large proportion, will advance into the desert and meet the enemy, working on his flanks and communications. Any better plan it would be difficult to devise, and against an undisciplined Persian force it would probably enough succeed, as it has done before. Their communications would certainly go, and they would lack the vigour to deal a crushing blow by the capture of the entrenchment with sufficient speed.

Near the Fort is the principal Settlement, which appears to be of a permanent nature. In addition to the usual tent or "alochik," there are huts built of wood, cut higher up on the Murghab and floated down, and of reeds. In these live the merchants, the Jews, and a few handicraftsmen; saddles, guns and swords and some woollen fabrics are made in the Settlement.

Settlement.

The Jews are chiefly of Meshed; there they are Mahomedans; in the desert they usually return to their old form of worship. Their number fluctuates with the state of security and of trade. There is now, I am informed, only one family,—that of the agent of the Meshed Jews,—in connection with the Bokhara trade.

Outside the Settlement there are no fixed habitations, the "obahs" being scattered over the cultivated plain or pasture lands in groups of 200 to 500. With an increase of cultivation they are acquiring, in some degree, the permanence of fixed settlements or villages of tents.

Obahs.

The cultivated land, lying on both banks of the stream, is equally divided between the two divisions of the tribe, the Otamish and Toktamish; the one holding the one side of the stream, the other the opposite bank. Large cuts from the stream irrigate the land on both banks, and enable the Turkomans to lay the whole country for many miles under water. The soil is exceedingly fertile, two or three crops (2 of green fodder and 1 of grain) being reaped from one sowing; the yield of wheat is commonly a hundredfold. The Turkomans admit that they are poor cultivators, and do not take the trouble to make the most of their rich

Cultivation.

soil. The ground is scratched with light ploughs drawn by camels, and the seed sown broadcast. Large quantities of wheat is raised, more than sufficient for home consumption. A considerable quantity is also taken to Khiva and to Serruks to feed the Persian garrison. During the famine in Khorassan large quantities of grain also found its way from Serruks to Meshed.

Barley, jowari (millet), and lucerne are grown for forage, the latter being cut and dried for winter use. Cotton is also grown and used with silk in weaving a coarse cloth used for under-clothing by all classes. Melons are grown in large quantities, and within the last two or three years

gardens have been planted on the banks of the Murghab. This circumstance was specially mentioned by the Turkomans, as indicative of the change that was taking place in their mode of life, consequent on their long undisturbed possession of the fertile oasis.

Since the destruction of Merve by the Usbegs, nearly a hundred years ago, no attempt has till lately been made to restore the old gardens and vineyards; the nomads affecting to despise all such occupations. Young trees had therefore to be brought from Charjoe, a distance of 150 miles by horsemen, during winter, when water is to be found everywhere on the steppe.

Vines and other fruit trees now bear well, and there are many plantations of mulberry for sericulture. The tribes to the west, the Akhal, Tekkah, and the Goklan, have long raised their own supply of raw silk; but the people of Merve have hitherto purchased from Khiva, Deregez, or Bokhara.

A few words on the trade of Merve, as throwing some light on the condition of the people and bearing indirectly on their political relations with their neighbours, may not be out of place:—

Trade of Merve by Deregez.

Exports.	Estimated value per annum.	Remarks.
	Tomans.	
Alija Bafi	10,000	Mixed silk and cotton goods for Turkomans.
Shal Bafi	20,000	Silk piece-goods for Turkomans and Bokhara.
European goods	9,000	Chiefly sheetings, chintzes, calico, &c.
Kerman goods	5,000	Shawls for puggeris and kamarbands.
Indigo	2,500	Pretty steady demand.
Sekatbar	Lead and spices, value and quantity fluctuating.
Opium	Value and quantity very fluctuating.
Imports	46,500	
Raw silk	From Bokhara.
Cochineal	" "
Imperials	Russian gold coins, Bokhara.
Aghari	Fine camel-hair, cloth from Turkomans.
Saddles	From Khiva and Turkomans.
Felts	Horse clothings and felts.
Kulaji	Rough cloth for bags of goat's hair.
Lamb-skin.		
Fox-skin.		

NOTE.—The quantity of raw silk imported depends upon the state of the crop in the countries Trans-Oxus. It sometimes, though very rarely, appears among the exports.

The number of caravans passing yearly is reckoned at 10 or 12, and they consist usually of 20 or 25 camels, half of which may be laden with merchandise. Carriage is often changed at Merve. At Deregez the camel loads are broken into loads for mules or asses.

Deregez is five stages; two and a half tomans = Rupees 10 per 700lbs., is charged for the journey. Merve is six stages for camels. The Turkoman carriers charge one kran per maund = 10 tomans, Rupees 40 per Kharwar of 700lbs.

Bokhara is ten stages for camels. Rate of hire charged is in proportion.

At Doregez $\frac{1}{10}$ th = $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. is the fixed rate of duty on all that passes.

At Bokhara "Margund Pooli" or payment to guards of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. is taken on the frontier, $\frac{1}{20}$ th from Jews, $\frac{1}{30}$ th on mixed ventures. At the city gate also the same is taken.

At Meshed a gate due and octroi are taken amounting to $\frac{1}{15}$ ths.

The nomad has few wants and produces little that is in demand among his neighbours; but his wide pastures enable him to rear an unlimited supply of beasts of burden, camels, pack-horses, and a few mules; and it is, therefore, as a carrier chiefly that he passes across the steppes. During the rule of the Asoph-u-Dowla in Khorassan, the Sarik Turkomans were in possession of Merve and, being to a great extent under his influence, were induced to give some protection to caravans in transit through their country. The Tekkah, now the most powerful tribe on the eastern steppe, are, on the contrary, thoroughly independent, and thoroughly hostile to the Persians. Trade has, in consequence, languished, the Persians being afraid to trust themselves and their goods beyond the border, and the Turkoman carriers unable to bring their camels within reach of the rapacious Persian troops guarding the border. Such has been the state of affairs for the last ten years. The fault lies on both sides, the Turkomans annoying the Persians by constant raids, and the Persian authorities rendering a better understanding impossible by treacherous and unfair reprisals on people engaged only in trade.

During the several terms that the Government of Khorassan was held by the Hissam-u-Sultana (uncle of the Shah), there was a dawning of better things. Tekkah Chiefs were received by the prince, and arrangements made for opening the routes to caravans; but his successors pursued a different policy, and the Tekkah are now thoroughly disgusted and hopeless. The first advances were always made by them, and seem to have been met either by impossible conditions or by treachery, the Persians punishing themselves by depriving the nomads of the small profits they might derive from transporting Persian goods across the desert. A few caravans now find their way to and from Merve by way of Deregez, a border state 5 marches N. W. of Meshed. They are taxed heavily by the Khan, but protected from other plunderers. The route is in other respects unsuited for trade, for the difficult pass of Allaho Akbar cannot be crossed by camels, and a change of carriage is necessary.

From Meshed to Merve and thence to Bokhara goods are sent chiefly by the Jews of Meshed, their consignments being safe in the hands of the Turkomans, while those of Persians might not be so. The chief articles of export to and from Merve and of the transit trade are given in the annexed "statement."

The value of exported goods is calculated roughly from the averages of several years.

The value of imports could not be ascertained, as only a portion reach Meshed, but it does not equal the exports. At Merve the Turkomans charge no transit duties, and in ordinary times the merchants are free from exactions. The carriers, however, are always Turkomans of Merve, and the agents of the trade are in close connection with them.

The fact that this trade is carried on across the steppes, and that the caravans are safer among the Turkomans than on the border of Khorassan and Bokhara, is encouraging, as proving the complete control that public opinion has upon the members of a tribe of professional plunderers living under no constituted authority. Between Merve and Herat also caravans pass pretty freely, following the course of the Murghab.

The exports and imports are much the same as those between Merve and Khorassan.

The Turkoman male is, as a rule, an entirely unproductive member of the community, occupying his time either with his
Manufactures. horses and herds, or in distant forays.

The women and slaves manufacture almost everything that is required for domestic use. The tent or "Alochick," the lattice framework of wood cut on the river bank, and the covering of felts made of the wool of the flocks, the carpets, saddles, saddle bags, horse-trappings, vessels for churning, skin bags for milk, clothing and bedding, and in addition some articles to be

bartered for such goods of foreign make as may be required. These articles are chiefly felts, much sought after in Khorassan, felt and woollen horse-clothing. *Akar*, a very fine cloth of the wool of young camels, *koork* and *koork-i-barra*, cloth of sheep and lambs' wool, trapping and saddle bags of handsome carpet work, lamb-skins and fox-skins. Every tent has its loom, and the women have the reputation of being as industrious as their lords are the reverse.

The mass of the population of Merve are Turkomans of the Tekkah tribe, but there is also a considerable population of slaves, dependents of other tribes, and waifs from all parts. Elements of population. The slaves are, of course, chiefly Persians, or the descendants of Persians, and at a moderate computation there is one to every tent. The dependent Turkomans are Syuds of Toork origin and fractions of the Sarik and Salor tribes, formerly in possession of the oasis lands. There are some Afghan residents, and, as before mentioned, a small fluctuating population of Jews.

The Tekkah Turkomans, according to their own tradition, come originally from the shores of the Aral and Caspian, and settled on the Labab tract on the south bank of the Oxus. The Tekkah.

Thence they were tempted by Nadir Shah, who enrolled large numbers of them in his armies, and settled the tribe in the "Atak" at the base of the Khorassan highlands. Settled in the "Atak." Their settlements stretched from the banks of the Heri-Rood, along the mountain and the course of the Tejen, to the edge of the Caspian desert westwards.

There were at that time Persian villages in the "Atak" at Mehna, Chochba, Chordeh, and Abivert, and Koord and Yemoot settlement further west.

So long as the master hand was felt, the new comers and their fellow subjects in the villages lived amicably enough side by side, the Tekkah at Tejen, and on the outer "Atak;" but on Nadir's death disturbances arose, and the Tekkah seized the whole country up to the base of the mountains, destroying the Atak villages, and driving the Koords, Persian Toorks, and Yemoots out of the pastures of Nissa, Ishkabad, Annau, and Karez. Drive out original inhabitants.

For more than one hundred years the Tekkah remained in possession, often attacked and driven out into the desert, but always returning to their pastures with indomitable pertinacity; plundered by, and plundering, the Koord mountaineers, and sweeping round their flanks to harass the defenceless villages in the plains of Khorassan.

Their final expulsion from the Eastern "Atak" and Tejen took place thirty years ago, and was the result of a quarrel with the Chief of Kelat, Mahomed Ali Khan, with whom they had long been in league and by whose aid they had successfully resisted many of the attempts of the rulers of Khorassan to dislodge them. A daughter of the tribe had, contrary to custom, been taken in marriage by the Chief, who refused the demand of a deputation of the tribe for her restoration. Raids in retaliation for this injury followed, and the Khan at length cordially co-operating with the Shah's troops, enabled them to occupy the Eastern "Atak." Expulsion of the Tekkah from Eastern Atak.

The Tekkah retired to Serruks, which had remained unoccupied since the defeat and dispersal of the Salor tribe by Abbas Mirza in 1837, and shortly after leagued with the "Salor" son of Asof-u-Dowla and the inhabitants of Meshed in their unfortunate rebellion, earning the vengeance of the victorious Prince Governor, Sultan Moorad Mirza. Retire to Serruks.

Their star was, however, in the ascendant. In 1852 the Prince Governor aided by the Sarik and Salor tribe, whose lands on the Heri-Rood the Tekkah had occupied, marched against them, but was forced to retreat from the desert with heavy loss. They were then attacked and defeated by the Khan of Khiva, who had already occupied Merve. On the day following their defeat, an accident enabled them to obtain a partial success, which was by a bold and sudden onslaught improved into a decisive

Repulse of the Persians.

Defeat of the Khivans.

victory. The Khan was slain and his army entirely destroyed. The gratitude of the Persians, over whom the horrors of an Usbeg invasion had been impending, was unbounded, and the munificence and wise policy of the Firman Firma Prince Feridoon Mirza brought about a union of the eastern tribes, the Tekkah, Sarik, and Salor, who entered into a dependant alliance, and admitted Persian Governors into Serruks and Merve. Feridoon Mirza died on his return from Serruks, and was succeeded by Sultan Moorad Mirza. The ambitious designs of this Prince on Herat speedily dissolved the ill-assorted alliance. The Sarik marched with the Persians to Herat, while the Tekkah aided the Eimaks of Herat in their forays on the Persian camps and caravans. On his return after the surrender of Herat, the Prince, aided by the Sariks, attacked the Tekkah, drove them out of Serruks and down the Murghab to Merve, which he occupied with an entrenched camp. The vanquished tribe retired into the desert, and while suffering the greatest hardship kept their enemy fully occupied.

Driven out of Serruks.

Seize upon Merve.

The withdrawal of the Persian troops, which followed on a change of Government, left the Sarik at the mercy of their rivals, to whom they were forced to relinquish the fertile land of the oasis. They retreated to Serruks and again sought the assistance of the Persians.

The Prince Hamza Mirza Hushmat-u-Dowla had succeeded his brother Sultan Murad Mirza in the Government. He bears the reputation of a brave and popular, though most unfortunate leader. In an evil hour he determined to make a final effort to right the allies of Persia, whose misfortunes were not unfairly laid at his door. Collecting an army of 30,000 men, with 30 guns and a large body of Turkoman auxiliaries he advanced in the spring of 1860 against Merve. The Tekkah retreated before him, allowing him to occupy the oasis, and detaining him there with desultory attacks and futile negotiations. The whole fighting force of the tribe, including the contingents of the most distant "obahs" of the Akhal having been collected, the opportunity of a distant foray of the Persian force was seized upon to make a general attack. The entrenched camp of the Persians and the force out on the plain were simultaneously surrounded by clouds of horsemen. A few embankments cut laid the intervening country under water, effectually disabling the Persian artillery. The attack, aided by nightfall was pressed close, a panic ensued, and the ill-disciplined infantry, breaking their ranks, fled for the distant camp. The whole of the guns, arms, and 20,000 prisoners, fell into the hands of the Tekkah. The Prince, with the broken remnants of his army, negotiated a retreat; and his Turkoman allies, turning their backs in despair on their fertile lands, scattered along the banks of the Murghab northwards to the border of Herat, their numbers greatly diminished and their tribal unity destroyed. Serruks was occupied by the Persians, who have held it ever since, avoiding hostilities and keeping clear of alliances with their neighbours of the desert.

Defeat of Hamza Mirza.

Having got rid of their Persian invaders and completely dispossessed the former occupants, the Tekkah sections of the Eastern "Atak" settled down on the oasis lands, the Akhal contingents returning to the Western Atak laden with booty and prisoners.

Western sections return to Akhal.

From that time the distinctive appellations of Merve Tekkah and Akhal Tekkah—the latter from a wide pasture of that name in the Western “Atak”—appear to have been applied to the two divisions by the people of Khorassan, and they have come to be regarded as to some extent distinct tribes.

A very close connection has, however, been maintained, any movement of a portion of the tribe being speedily telegraphed along the whole line.

The Tekkah of Akhal look up to those of Merve as the superior tribe, Nature of connection between the two branches of the tribe. superior in wealth and power, as in fact the main body, of which they are only a branch. They admit their liability to aid in the defence of Merve with their whole forces, but do not appear to demand entire reciprocity, or to anticipate more than a limited amount of aid, in the event of attack from the west. They form an outpost, which will retire on the main body when pressed, or join it when summoned. To take a recent instance, on the three occasions that they have met the Russians, they do not appear to have expected, and certainly did not receive, help from their brethren of Merve.

In the relations of the Mervees also with Afghanistan, Persia, and also with Bokhara, they have little more than an indirect interest; their front is to the west, towards Astrabad and the Caspian.

Hence, though an integral portion of the Tekkah tribe, and united by the Separate political connections. closest bonds, the Akhal branch is to such an extent, geographically and politically, separated from the main body, that its present condition and future prospects will be better viewed, in connection with the tribes of the western steppes.

In viewing separately the politics of the Akhal, it will be necessary simply to bear in mind that their connection with Merve may afford them an asylum in the event of defeat and a slight accession of strength; and in viewing separately the politics of Merve, that the Akhal branch is a party to all its negotiations in peace and a certain support to the full extent of its number in time of war.

The two in fact, while allied by kindred interest, have distinct political connections, which cannot well be viewed from the same stand-point.

Tekkah of Merve. Unlike the other branches of his race the Tekkah of Merve remains winter and summer on the same ground.

The possession of the fertile oasis land has already effected a change in his habits. The winter and summer moves, habitual to the Turkish nomad, and often persisted in when apparently there is no advantage either of climate or pasturage offered by the change, have been abandoned. His camp is moved simply with reference to necessities of agriculture. The “Obah” is pitched in the centre of the cultivated land, and is moved only within a circuit of a few miles. The herds and flocks being sent out in charge of slaves to graze in the belt of pasture land separating the cultivated plain from the desert. Much more use is also made of artificial grasses than formerly. Green barley, jowari and lucerne (lately introduced) are largely cultivated for fodder, being presumably necessary to supplement the insufficient pasturage. The labor of cultivation appears to be left to a great extent to slaves, but as much more grain is produced than suffices for the consumption of the population, and the number of male slaves is limited to about one to each family, or less, it may be presumed in spite of denials that the nomad has at last put his hand to the plough, and has riveted another link in the chain that is to bind him to a more settled mode of life.

Occupations. The only occupations for his time that the Turkoman will readily own to are the rearing and training of horses, a general supervision over his herds of camels and his flocks, trade, and plunder; and these may certainly be assumed to take up the greater portion of the time of a large proportion of the tribe.

From a distance and with very limited opportunities of intercourse with the people, it was impossible to make anything like an exact calculation of the actual numbers of the tribe, and of the proportions in which they are divided among different occupations, a matter of very great importance in relation to their political future and the prospect of their ever attaining to a separate national existence or to a social condition fitting them for incorporation with an organised and civilised community. Failing better information, a fair general idea may be gained from the following computations which are based on the best obtainable native information.

The total strength of the tribe, not including the Akhal branch, was very variously given by different individuals at from 15,000 to 30,000, and even 60,000 tents or families. Making a fair allowance for exaggeration on one hand, and detraction on the other, 25,000 may be accepted as a fair mean. The nomad having usually a large family and one or two slaves, seven, instead of five, souls per family may be accepted as a true average. This would give a population of 175,000, and a total of effective males, not slaves, of about 30,000 or something more than one to each family.

A Turkoman invariably divides his people into two great classes, *viz.*, those who live by plunder and those who do not. Following somewhat the same plan, but eliminating more carefully the former, among the 30,000 adult males may be reckoned 1,000 strangers, merchants, Ishans, and Mollahs, 3,000 or 4,000 engaged in agriculture, 1,000 permanently engaged in the carrying trade, 15,000 in rearing and tending cattle, &c., leaving a balance of 9,000 or 10,000, having no property and no sufficient employment at home, and forming an element of the population, out of which comes little increase to the general wealth, and all the dangers that have hitherto and will, in the future, beset the community.

This balance was, on good authority, reduced to 7,000 or 8,000, said also from various causes to be on the decrease, leaving the division of the population about as follows:—

Merchants, Priests, &c.	1,000
Carriers	1,000
Agriculturists	4,000
Nomads	16,000
Plunderers	8,000
			TOTAL	...	<u>30,000</u>

The fighting strength of the tribe comprises, as is the rule with nomadic races, nearly every adult male.

Allowing 25,000 as the available number of the Tekkah and 10,000 as the number of the dependent clans, and slaves that could be depended upon to fight, a total of 35,000 is obtained. This was declared to be far below the mark, 50,000 being claimed as the lowest computation and may therefore be accepted as near the truth.

The whole of these are, of course, armed with guns and swords, and have supplies of powder and lead sufficient for a brief campaign. The proportion of European, *i. e.*, of percussion arms is admitted to be small.

The difficulties of computing the number of mounted men that could be turned out by the tribe are increased by the tendency of the Turkomans to exaggerate on this point. There is nothing of which they are more proud than of the number of horses owned by their tribe or clan. After reducing very nearly one-half the average of numbers given me, at various times, there are left to the tribe 5,000 mares and 12,000 horses sufficient to mount perhaps 15,000 men, and this is, I believe, about the number that might be relied on.

Ponies and pack horses are not included in the above. The fighting force available on an emergency may be reckoned therefore at

Horse	15,000
Foot	20,000
			Total	35,000

The Tekkah Turkoman footmen or "tofangechi" is much respected by the Persians, and is admitted by them to be a staunch fighter and a good shot. He is, of course, poorly armed, but might be relied on to make a good defence behind his entrenchments, even against modern arms.

The prowess of their horsemen is greatly exaggerated, except by the tribes who know them best, the Koords of Koochan and Bujnoord.

So much has been written about them, that it would be superfluous to dilate on their qualities and method of combat. There are, however, two points worthy of note which I have not yet seen noticed. The Turkoman horseman avoids meeting an enemy face to face after the manner of cavalry of European nations, and never uses his sword from choice, save on a dismounted and defenceless enemy. He is in fact but a very serviceable mounted skirmisher, his weapon the rifle,* which has only lately replaced the bow and arrow of his Scythic progenitor.

The same remarks apply to all the Turkoman tribes of the Persian border. The Turkoman horse of whatever breed is admirably adapted to all purposes of cavalry.

The 8,000 men put down above as "Plunderers," forming the dangerous class of the Merve community, are not actually a distinct band of professional robbers, but represent rather the available population, from which the "Allamans" or plundering bands may be recruited, and for whom further occupation must be found, if the community is to settle down and live at peace with its neighbours. The "Allamans" also are not permanently organised bands. There are certain recognised leaders, known to the Persians as "Duzdbashis," who head every raid but have no regular following. The leader forms his plans for a foray in secret, and calls for volunteers by planting his spear before his tent-door. His followers are informed of nothing but the time fixed for departure; for every camp has its spies, paid by the Persian border chiefs. The following list of the "Duzdbashis" or robber leaders of Merve may be of interest as showing the systematic manner in which plundering is still carried on, and pointing out the men whose removal would almost suffice to secure the peace of the community.

Robber Leaders of Merve.

- (1) Taj Ganj, of the Seechma Tira or section also known as Taj Sardar, whose beat is towards Serruks and Herat.
- (2) Doongatir, of the Bakhshi section, who recruits chiefly among the Mujawir and Syuds, dependent sections of Turkomans not Tekkah, and bearing the worst character in the whole community. His beat is towards the Russian settlements on the right bank of the Oxus.

* Of native manufacture known as "Klarli" in Khorassan.

- (3) Kulli Ishan, of Seechma Tira. Raids in the country about Shorakhan and Khiva.
- (4) Adina Nafas, Mujawir. In the Ghaeenat and Khiva.
- (5) Ashoor, Marghun, or the hunter. Sultan Aziz, Ghaeenat and Goonabad.
- (6) Begunj, Seechma. In Meshed.
- (7) Kara (black) Begunj, Boorkas.
- (8) Shickhli Sardar, Aman Shah, a very noted man, lately heard of on the Herat road in pay of Sardar Yakoob Khan.
- (9) Khajakkar Sardar, Aman Shah, also a very influential man. Raids Kelat, Deregez, and Khiva.
- (10) Adina Kurban, Bakhshi, Kelat and Khiva.
- (11) Aziz Sardar Iwaz. Two brothers of Kara Yurma section. Said to be the most noted robbers in Merve. They are successful and popular leaders and able at all times to raise 4,000 to 5,000 men for raids in any direction.

The business of plunder, however, is said of late to have fallen into much discredit. It is reprobated by the mollahs, except when the raids are made on Russian territory, who refuse to hold intercourse with the "Allamans," as the robbers are styled, and is discouraged by the principal "Aksakals" or greybeards.

In former days the "Allaman" went forth headed by the chiefs of the tribe, and with the blessing of the "Ishans" or priests, but times would appear to have changed, and the causes of this change are to be sought for not in any great improvement in the moral tone of the community, but rather in radical alterations in the conditions under which the business must now be carried on. Robbery is evidently no longer respectable, because it is both unsafe and unprofitable. Unsafe, because it may likely enough entail invasion and subjugation, which was never before even a possible contingency; unprofitable because the closing of the slave-marts has rendered the capture of Persian villagers in large numbers a useless exertion. Though it has received a severe check, so long as there are men and horses unemployed, plundering will continue.

Honest occupations will absorb more of the young men of the tribe, but there will remain a number of reckless spirits, under no authority or control, sufficient to bring down upon the whole tribe the misfortunes already looming in the distance.

The Tekkah of Merve are, it is scarcely necessary to say, like all tribes of Tartar origin, divided and sub-divided into clans, and sections of clans, and these again into smaller divisions. The whole tribe, including the "Akhal" branch, are divided into two clans or "Taifa" and 40 minor divisions, the names of which are given in the annexed statement. The "Akhal" branch consists of fractions from nearly all the "Tira" or sections of the tribe.

The two clans are so far distinct that they hold opposite banks of the rivers, but the sections or sub-divisions are completely amalgamated, an "obah" or group of tents having often representations of several "Tira."

Divisions of Tekkah Tribe of Turkomans.

Clan (Taifa.)	Section (Tira).	Sub-divisions.	Aksakal.	REMARKS.	
Otamish ...	1. Bakhehi ...	1. Jaltak ...	Kutogh Bai.		
		2. Mirash.			
	3. Basman.	{ Said Beg.			
	4. Salaf.				
	5. Ak Tash Ayak	{ 1. Taj Khan ...			
	6. Kara Tash Ayak				
	2. Sijmas ...	1. Ak Sofi	{ 2. Mohamad Ra-beem.		
		2. Haj Sofi Arab			
		3. Kyzil Kuz			
		4. Malik Aman.			
5. Baghcha.					
6. Arko.					
7. Saree.					
8. Ferrang.					
3. Kara Ahmed	Verdi Nyaz Khan ...	In pay of Amir of Bokhara. An influential man.		
4. Bulghoz	Khwaja Nefes.			
5. Sultan Aziz	Asoor Lung.			
6. M u j a w i r Sheikh.	...	Davees Bai.			
7. Salor	Verdi Murad Khan.			
8. Topal	Hakim.			
9. Khwaja	Moosa.			
10. Atta	Agha Ali Murad.			
Toktomash...	1. Beg ...	1. Aman Shah ...	Mulla Sadiq.		
		2. Kongor ...	Odagh Qumsik.		
		3. Gokcha ...	Koushid Khan ...		
	2. Wakeel ...	1. Yusuf {	1. Talak ...		Nur Verdi Khan ...
			2. Kara Burma.		
		2. Bokri		Alla Nazzar.
			3. Kashil.		
	4. Kuujak.				
	3. Khar	Kara Sheetan ...		In pay of Amir of Bokhara.
4. Kara	Daood Mirab.			
5. Yazil	Verdi Pehlwan.			
6. Arak	Aman Nuzzar.			
7. Kardja	Oraz Murad Khan ...	Influential Chief of Akhal. Head of obah of 1,000 tents.		
8. Harin	Aman Verdi.			
9. Khatil	Omar.			

NOTE.—The names of the principal Akhals only are given. Some as Nur Verdi Khan and Oraz Mohamad Khan have tents and property in both Akhal and Merve. The following are some men of note in Merve, the names of whose clans I was unable to ascertain:—

Mohamad Durdy Khan.

Malik Bai.

Adna Geldy Khan, Now at Khiva.

Each section has an Aksakal or grey beard, a chief attaining his position neither by election, nor by hereditary right, but by the tacit admission of his claim in virtue of age,

Aksakals.

experience, and personal influence. The position brings no gain, and appears to be respected only in the person of the incumbent. It is never contested and confers no authority.

The conciliation of these chiefs would, of course, be the first step taken in dealing with the tribes, but it would then be necessary to win over almost every individual member, for each has his opinion and a voice in the discussion of public matters.

A far greater power than the Aksakal is the Ishan* or Mollah; his authority is also, though to a less extent, dependent on personal influence. At present there are none of note among the Tekkah Merve, but the meanest has great power.

* Ishans.

Not the least important of the recent changes in the condition of the community, induced probably by the course of recent events in the neighbouring countries, has been the local election of a leader or chief Aksakal, one Kousheed Khan of the Gokcha section, a man of great influence, but not otherwise seemingly of much note. His position is entirely without precedent, and the instructive acknowledgment of the necessity of some form of authority, by a mass of lawless nomads, swayed almost solely by their own impulses, is remarkable, and of itself proves the existence of a power capable of exercising a wide influence over the fortunes of the community, a counterpart, in fact, of "public opinion" as known in more civilised countries.

Kousheed Khan.

It is this public or general opinion, expressing the necessity for united action in the face of grave danger, that has, no doubt, led to the tacit acknowledgment of the authority of a single chief, and to unusual and energetic action under his direction, in the work of public defence.

The power vested in Kousheed Khan are, as might be expected, undefined, and he has no title among his own people, being simply spoken of by name.

Without authority to impose a tax or to punish, he has been able, nevertheless, for two years to keep the tribe at work on their fortifications, a labor utterly distasteful to them, and contrary to the customs of a people who have no faith in walls, being taught by tradition and habit to trust in battle only to the speed of their horses; he has also negotiated with Bokhara and Khiva, with Afghanistan, and probably also with Russia and in the name of the tribe; his power to do so being admitted by even the most distant sections of the "Akhal."

The election of a chief with even the limited power over the internal affairs of the tribe vested in Kousheed Khan, would prove of immense advantage, in any negotiations that might be opened with the tribe, for he would serve as a reliable medium of communication; and there can be little doubt that any engagements he might make in the name of the community would be fully ratified.

After the defeat of the Shah's army under the Hashmat-u-Dowla, related above, and the final occupation of Merve by the Tekkah, there was for a long period no attempt at intercourse between Khorassan and Merve. The Persians remained in possession of Serruks where they fortified themselves, and, though unable to occupy the pastures of the Tejen, prevented their being made a base for their plundering expeditions by the Tekkah, and by the Sarik and Salor, who, finding themselves again deserted by the Persians, had come to terms with and were in league with their kinsmen.

Direct trade with Bokhara was at a stand-still. The Turkomans could not venture their property on Persian soil, but they indemnified themselves for the slight loss thus sustained by constant raids across the Heri-Rood, plundering the country up to the walls of Meshed, and south as far as the

borders of Seistan, and sweeping off the population of entire districts into slavery. This was of course no new phase in the history of the unfortunate peasantry of Khorassan, but the evils they had formerly suffered were intensified by the concentration of the efforts of their enemies on the work of pillage.

In 1869 the Government of Khorassan again fell into the hands of the Hissam-u-Sultana, Sultan Murad Mirza. This Prince is popular with the Turkomans, being both respected and feared by them.

He alone of all Persian statesmen appears to have accurately appreciated the full importance to Persia of Russia's movements on the Aral and Caspian, and to have gauged truly the value of the opportunities of extending her influence and consolidating her northern border, opposed to her thereby, and the dangers of apathy and neglect in the face of the insidious advances of her northern neighbour.

It was clearly the policy of Persia at the time that the Russian preparations for the occupation of Khiva were disturbing the tranquillity of the whole of the Khivan steppes and of Khorassan, to take advantage of the position she commanded as a neutral, to secure, if possible by gentle measures, the allegiance of the independent tribes on her border.

The Hissam-u-Sultana's efforts in this direction were honest and well devised, but failed, through the force of adverse circumstances. His tenure of office was too short, and he lacked the cordial support of the Shah's Ministers. The febleness of his predecessors had so emboldened the plundering tribes that it needed not only vigorous measures but a long continuance of them to restore tranquillity. At the time of his arrival the Tekkah and Salor were ravaging the villages within sight of the walls of Meshed, and the whole country south was parcelled out between the various bands of raiders, which remained in almost permanent possession. During his two years' tenure of

office he was successful in opening friendly communications with the Tekkah Chiefs, and in securing the free passage of caravans for a short time. The old villages of Mehna, Mapak, Chardeh, Doshakh, Afardeh, Tormachi, and Gulingan in the Kelat Atak were re-occupied for the most part by Tekkah emigrants, who paid one-tenth of the produce to the Persian Government, and became liable to military service, thus effectually strengthening the border and forming a screen to the Kelat villages in their rear. The re-occupation of the Tejen pastures by the Tekkah was also in progress. Turkoman raids in other parts however continued, and appear to

have furnished the Prince's enemies with a pretext for his recall. His efforts while in power were also paralysed by the same influences, for his policy which was to put a stop to Tekkah raids by a show of force on the border, to win their Chiefs by liberal gifts, and to induce a peaceful re-settlement of the Kelat "Atak"—the former seat of the Merve Tekkah—thus creating a bond of friendship, based on solid benefits conferred and cemented by a community of interests, that might lead to the pacification of the whole tribe, under the influence of Persia, depended entirely on a free command of money and troops, both of which were withheld.

With the recall of the Prince vanished Persia's best, if not her last, chance of securing the tribes on her border, and again obtaining possession of Merve. Two years have been wasted, and the good work of two previous years has been more than undone, for if the Turkomans are not as they were in actual possession of the border, the reason is only to be looked for in the threatening aspect of their own affairs, which occupy their attention and their energies.

His successor had scarcely assumed the reins of Government when the new Turkoman communities of the "Atak" were plundered and driven out by the Khan of Deregez,

one of those border Chiefs who are opposed by tradition, and by the strongest motives of self interest, to any policy of pacification. He, of course, saw his opportunity in the change of policy that was sure to ensue on a change of Government under such circumstances.

In the following spring* a large caravan from Merve with Persian goods

* March 1873.

Turkoman caravan plundered. carried by Tekkah camels was plundered by the orders of the new Governor at a village, a few miles only from Meshed. This, of course, effectually extinguished the reviving trade with Bokhara, and increased the feelings of hostility of the Tekkah, giving them fresh proofs of Persian treachery and an increased contempt for the weakness of their Government.

The late Governor of Khorassan would point perhaps to the re-occupation of the Kelat "Atak" as an administrative success, and he has no doubt succeeded in introducing and maintaining, by great efforts, a mixed population of Khorassan, at some few points, but his measures have nevertheless altogether missed the real aim of his predecessor's wise policy, which was to bring about a return of the Tekkah to their old seats in the "Atak" and Tejen, and thus to pave the way to the annexation of the Merve lands.

Of the probable success of such measures, in spite of traditional hatred and differences of religion, the present state of Persian relations with the Yemoot is tolerably good evidence, and in any event the attempt should have been made and persevered in, for it is the only chance left to Persia of maintaining the integrity of her northern border.

The proposal to use force in bringing the Akhal, and subsequently the Merve Tekkah, into subjection, reported to have been made by the late Governor of Khorassan, has apparently met with no response from the Shah's Ministers; and it is fortunate that it is so, for any such project would very probably terminate in military disaster, and would, in the opinion of the most competent judges, certainly fail in bringing the tribes into subjection.

Relations with Afghanistan. To the course of recent events alone is to be attributed the present close and friendly relations subsisting between the Tekkah Chiefs of Merve and the Afghans.

When the former had their base and their markets beyond the Oxus, the Afghan borderers suffered almost equally with the Persians from their ravages, and Afghan forces joined with Persian in retaliation. The Turkoman then saw nothing to be gained from Afghan friendship, and as a liegeman of the Amir of Bokhara was often impelled to unite his duty with his interests in espousing his cause in his quarrels with the Ruler of Afghanistan. Now, it is the Ruler of Bokhara who is regarded by him as an enemy, in league with, or at the feet of the "unbeliever," while to the Afghan he looks for aid and offers his allegiance.

Before the year 1867 the Tekkah had been in communication only with Sirdar Yakoob Khan, the Governor of Herat. In that year Taj Sirdar of the Sijmas section of Merve Tekkah accompanied the Sirdar with a body of 300 or 400 horse to Girishk, Candahar, and Cabul, where he was entertained and handsomely rewarded by the Amir Shere Ali Khan. He returned with Yakoob Khan to Herat, and remained in close communication with him, if not, as was rumoured, in his pay. The Amir's liberality, however, was not thrown away; for Taj Khan is said to be still secretly devoted to him. With Taj Khan was one Twair Khan, an Aksakal and robber-leader of the Sarik tribe, who is in the pay of the Sirdar, and was credited with sufficient influence to bring a large body of his tribe into the field.

The influence of these two men is, however, comparatively limited, and would scarcely have merited mention, but that Raids on Herat stopped. they were instrumental, to some extent, in bringing about the present relations. By their aid Yakoob Khan was able to save his subjects to a great extent from the incursions of the Turkomans. The village populations enjoyed an almost complete immunity, and the Eimak nomads had to complain only of occasional losses of cattle.

About this time also the Sirdar entered into communication with Kousheed Khan, and received promises of aid, in the event of a breach with his father, which, it was even then believed, would not be rendered.

In March 1873 Kousheed Khan send a deputation to the Sirdar asking for aid to resist a threatened attack of the Russians, proposing to immigrate in case of defeat to Herat, and suggesting the Badgees tract on the upper Murghab, formerly held by the Hazara Eimaks. Deputation to Herat asking asylum.

An asylum was promised, and the request for aid referred to Cabul, but the storm had, meantime, passed over.

Previous to this as early I am informed, as 1869, Baba Khan, son of Kousheed Khan, had been sent to the Amir to offer the allegiance of the Tekkah, on condition of aid in the event of invasion, and a guarantee of the tenure of the oasis lands. Deputation to Amir in 1869. Said to have accompanied him to India. Baba Khan and some others, it is said, accompanied the Amir to India, and afterwards returned to Merve, with full assurances that the Amir would, on condition of their aiding him, when called upon, and respecting his territories, give them material aid in the event of their being attacked. If this tale be true, it accounts for very much, that is, otherwise, unaccountable, their firm belief in the sincerity of the Afghan alliance, in the complete dependence of Afghanistan on England, and her consequent ability to give them effectual aid. These are impressions that might easily have been taken back to Merve in 1869, but are not otherwise easy to trace to their origin.

In the autumn of 1873 Baba Khan was again sent to Yakoob Khan, and thence to Cabul, with, it is stated, letters to the Amir, again offering their allegiance, and asking for assistance in arms, &c. The reply to this was, that arms would be given as soon as the need for them became apparent. This was regarded by the Tekkah as an evasion, and other messages were sent, the result of which did not become known. In September last Deputation in September 1874. Kousheed Khan again sent his son to Cabul with letters, informing the Amir that the Russians were preparing to attack Merve from the Oxus and the Caspian, and asking for aid. Baba Khan was at Herat at the time of my departure from Meshed awaiting a reply. The threatened attack on Merve from the Oxus, about which there was some talk among the Turkomans, having passed off, it is probable that no direct answer will be given. The result of these negotiations, whatever

may have been the real nature of the assurances given by the Amir to the applications made to him, has been to inspire the Tekkah of all classes from Merve to Kizil Arvat with a confidence that they will find the Afghans ready to aid them if they should be attacked by Russia, and if this should be impossible, at least to give them a secure asylum, in which they will be safe under the shadow of a great protecting power from further molestations. Of the existence of this feeling I received such repeated proofs that I believe it to be a very general one, and as such likely to influence the tribe in their dealings with their neighbours both in Persia and on the Oxus; for so long as they rely upon finding an asylum in their rear, they will be more apt to provoke, and more ready to resist, than might otherwise be the case. Result of these negotiations.

The reasons underlying the evident desire of the Tekkah for an Afghan alliance have been touched upon above. There is, in fact, no other quarter to which they can look at all hopefully. Khiva and Bokhara are in the hands of the Russians, whom they have every reason to fear, and for Persia they have only feelings of dislike and contempt. The Afghans, too, are their co-religionists, and this is, under the circumstances, of some value, as smoothing the way to friendly intercourse. There is also a very general impression abroad that an alliance with Afghanistan means an alliance with England. The Turkomans especially believe that England intends, and is able under all circumstances, to maintain the integrity of Afghanistan, and hope, by an alliance with the latter power, to come under the protecting arms.

Reasons for desiring Afghan alliance.
Feelings towards England.

It may appear strange that a tribe, with whom we have never had direct connection, and have had no intercourse for more than 30 years, should entertain so firm a belief in our power, when it is, certainly, to some extent, doubted in the neighbouring country, but such is the case. We are credited also with many of the qualities they most admire. English generosity is everywhere among them extolled, and the nation bears also a high character for justice and good faith. These sentiments may, I think, be traced to the good work done by the Officers of the Herat Mission, and to their lavish but judicious expenditure. It is to them, therefore, that we owe, at the present day, the suffrages of a large majority of the Eastern Turkomans.

Effects of Herat Mission.

It may or may not be true, as noted above, that a deputation was sent to India, but of the desire of the Tekkah for a direct connection with us, or an indirect one through Afghanistan, I received abundant proof, and I believe that they might be transformed into a peaceable, honest, and prosperous community, and would prove a source of real strength to the border and to the empire.

Possibility of an advantageous settlement of the Merve question.

In face of the commonly accepted notions of Turkoman character, this view may appear wholly chimerical. A few words further of explanation are therefore necessary, and will, I trust, be deemed warranted by the importance of the subject.

The strategical value of the position of Merve requires no demonstration, and its political importance becomes as evident, when the question is viewed from the spot.

Merve.
Political value of position.

The Murghab River rising in the mountains of Afghanistan, flows north into the desert of Khiva, and reaching not more than half-way across it buries its water in the sandy waste.

Connection with Afghanistan.

Along its banks live a succession of nomadic tribes, commencing with the Eimaks of Herat and followed by the Sarik and Salor Turkomans, forming an unbroken chain, connecting the oasis of Merve with the heart of Afghanistan. East, west, and north of the line fertilised by the river, extends a waterless desert, forming a natural boundary between Khorassan, of which Merve and the Murghab may be considered merely a salient angle, and the tracts comprising the Usbeg Khanates. The occupation of Merve by a power, starting from these Khanates as a base, would be an infringement of this natural boundary.

Natural boundary.

A glance at a map, of course, makes this fact evident, but it acquires real political import when it is found that the boundary is recognized and felt by the people of Khorassan and the neighbouring tracts, to be not only a geographical fact, but also a traditional and actual dividing lines, across which the sinister influences of a power, however restless and aggressive, could not be effectively exercised.

Political importance of boundary.

It is scarcely too much to say that the attention of all classes is rivetted on Merve, and no opinion is more freely expressed than that its occupation

by the Russians will be their first step into Khorassan, for their movements on the Caspian are regarded as merely subsidiary to this main end.

That a Russian invasion of Merve is, if not imminent, certainly a matter of a short time, more or less, is, I think, shown by the state of their relations with the tribe; and after allowing full weight to all arguments based on the apparent and to some extent real isolation of the position, its small value as a possession, as being likely to be a source of weakness rather than of strength to a power having designs on Afghanistan, and the impracticable nature of its people, there remains the broad fact that its occupation by an aggressive power will shake the confidence of all classes and open the way to further extensions of influence, or what has always been the weak side of Afghanistan, the side of Herat.

Moreover, if the character of the population of Northern Khorassan and of Herat be taken into account, the importance of the question becomes greatly enhanced.

The Turkomans and the Eimaks of Herat and Persia are born mercenaries. Their views on politics are coloured by no tinge of patriotism; they hold themselves merely for the highest bidder, and they regard the approaching contact of the two great rival powers, which they believe to be inevitable, with a feeling akin to curiosity. (The Tekkah of Merve have exceptional cause of anxiety and of apprehension from one of the powers.) Whatever happens, they feel sure that they themselves will come well out of it, for they have nothing to lose, and their aid will be valued by either party.

At present, it may, I think, be accepted, their prepossession is in favor of the nation whose gold they have already seen, and whose prestige still stands high amongst them, but this advantage cannot be expected to stand the test of actual contact with a powerful rival. It is, in fact, still a case of "first come first served;" the power that is first on the field will gather to herself all the free swords of the border.

The dangers of an occupation by an aggressive power of the Merve may, therefore, be summarised thus:—

Summary.

1st.—Public confidence and the tranquillity of Khorassan and Herat will be disturbed by the infringement of what is regarded as the natural and only safe boundary between those tracts and the "Khanates."

2nd.—A way will be opened for intrigue and the extension of foreign influence into the heart of Afghanistan.

3rd.—All the mercenary tribes of the frontier will come within an influence that cannot fail to attract and corrupt them.

These are the main political considerations; there are also others touching the strategical and material value of the position, and the danger to our prestige generally of its hostile occupation, of almost equal weight.

The main question, from which I have somewhat diverged, regarding the practicability of any permanent or satisfactory settlement of, or connection with, a community so constituted as that of Merve, is one that will, I fear, almost instinctively be answered by a negative. It is no doubt beset with difficulties, and its solution depends primarily on the state of our relations with Afghanistan, and the nature of our engagements with Russia, but there are certain lights thrown upon the subject on the spot that are worthy of attention, and may make it appear in a somewhat different aspect.

In the first place the character of the Turkoman named appears to me to be incorrectly appreciated. He is not by any means the mere plundering savage that his Persian neighbour points him. From what I have seen and heard, I would describe the

Character of Turkoman.

average Turkoman as exceedingly intelligent, shrewd and alive to his own interests. Moved by impulse no doubt, but not to the extent that would make him oblivious of his interests, he is also fairly well-informed and a great

N.B.—By which I mean that he takes an extraordinarily intelligent interest in the politics of the countries around his desert, and may be accepted to be a good judge of the character and intentions of the leading powers.

(Sd.) G. E. NAPIER.

politician; * accustomed from childhood to a free roving life, anything like restraint would be at first irksome to him, but he does not appear to be incapable of discipline. The Turkoman of Merve is also fully alive to the advantages he now enjoys in the possession of one of the most fertile tracts in the world, and a guarantee of its undisturbed possession would be the strongest inducement that could be held out to him. He is already in some degree, as shown, changing his habits, and there is every indication, I think, of the possibility of his settling down in course of time, of his own impulse, to peaceful occupations. Two large sections of the race, the Arsari and the Goklan, have already done so, and the character of the Tekkah cannot be radically different.

The main practical difficulties that present themselves in the way of dealing with such a community are, that a large fraction of it is without sufficient occupation and wedded to a life of plunder, and that there is apparently no constituted authority capable of representing the whole body.

The first is, however, a difficulty that diminishes daily with the extension of agriculture, and the increase of difficulties in the way of successful brigandage. If suitable employment were found for the more restless spirits, the authority of the heads of the tribe, which is all in favor of order, would probably at once accomplish the rest.

The second is, I think, met by the investiture of Kousheed Khan with power to negotiate, and to enter into engagements in the name of the tribe.

Any further discussion of the means by which a permanent connection with a tribe so distant, depending as the question does so much on our relations with other powers, would, I fear, be deemed superfluous, and it will suffice to express my opinion that, as viewed from the spot, there is nothing at all impracticable in the idea of a Tekkah alliance with Afghanistan, their country being annexed as an integral portion of that kingdom and sharing its immunities. It is desired by the Tekkah, who declare their willingness to receive Afghan or English officers among them, and a few years of undisturbed peace might prepare them for the burdens of connection with an organised form of Government, and the Afghans can have no objection. In the country itself where such a settlement of the great pending question of the day is considered not only a possible, but a probable event, the practical difficulties are not regarded as even difficult to overcome.

The Tekkah appear to have come first into contact with Russia on the frontiers of Bokhara. A large body of the tribe, numbering 6,000 or 7,000, headed by Kousheed Khan, Kara Shaitan, and other Chiefs, joined the army of the Ameer of Bokhara, just too late, it is said, to take part in the campaign that concluded with the battle of Jizzak in 1867. Their connection with this affair is believed by the tribe to have marked them out for the special vengeance of Russia, who is still awaiting her opportunity to retaliate. Since their return from Bokhara, they have carefully abstained, as a tribe, from further hostilities, the petty attacks and plunderings of which the Russians have since had to complain having been carried on against the advice of the more respectable and prudent members of the community, who are, however, powerless, when the summons of the robber leaders is backed by priestly sanction.

Last year a caravan proceeding (according to the Russian papers) from Khala-Ata to Petrovsk Alexandrovsk was attacked and plundered by a large body of Tekkah, and a Russian soldier carried off captive to Merve, where

Relations with Russia.

Aid given to Bokhara.

Capture of Russian caravan.

Russian prisoner at Merve.

he is still detained for ransom. Some attempts were made by the Persians to procure his release, but for reasons which it is not difficult to surmise, the matter was allowed to drop. That the Governor of Khorassan had made an offer to ransom the prisoner, I ascertained beyond a doubt from Turkomans, but the sum named was not accepted, and the attempt was not renewed. Had the Persian Government been in earnest in the matter, there can be no doubt that the Turkomans might have been brought to terms, for there were at that time no less than 40 Turkoman prisoners at Meshed, and others at Kelat Nadiri, and Koochan. For some time, also, the Chief of Merve was in communication with Ivanoff, the Russian Commander in the Amoo Darya district, but refused to surrender the prisoner as demanded without the payment of a ransom, a threat of hostilities was met by

Failure of negotiations for release.

defiance. Such a termination of the negotiation was probably foreseen and perhaps intended. It seems more than probable that the sudden relinquishment of the Persian attempts to obtain the prisoner's release, for which no sufficient explanation was ever given to me, was not unconnected with the result of the simultaneous

Opinion in Khorassan.

negotiation on the Russian side. The fact of a Russian subject being held captive at Merve within a few days' march of a large Russian force on the Amoo, is of course well known throughout Khorassan, and is the subject of much discussion; aggressive motives are, of course, freely attributed to the Russian Commander, and there is certainly much to justify suspicion—for, as was said with much force, if the principle of ransom only was objected to, there had been many opportunities of reprisals on Turkoman caravans, and on Turkomans passing between Khiva, Bokhara and Merve. Possibly there were no such opportunities, or there were objections to interfering with trade, and the suspicions aroused are groundless and unjust; but the fact remains that such opinions are held, and that the people of Khorassan believe that the final blow is already impending, and that the days of Tekkah liberty are numbered. This is in itself calculated to exercise a disturbing influence in and beyond the limits of Khorassan, and the captive's existence remains a temptation and almost a justification to the world at large of aggression. The Turkomans themselves do not apprehend any immediate danger, the occupation of Charjoeë will be their signal, and they hope, before that can be effected, to have secured an asylum, if not an alliance with

Renewed negotiations.

Afghanistan. According to the last news I received before leaving the border, Colonel Ivanoff had renewed negotiations regarding the prisoner and two of the Tekkah Aksakals, Adna Geldy Khan and Walad Khan, are at his head-quarters. The result of this will probably be the release of the prisoner. If so, there will be good

Apparent change of policy.

reason to believe that a change has been effected in the views of the Russian frontier administration, and that the policy of forbearance and conciliation, which is now being pursued by Russia in her dealings with the Yemoots and other tribes in the west, is to be applied to the case of Merve also. A similar policy was seen by the Hissam-u-Sultana, as above noted, to be the most advantageous one for Persia to pursue, and there can be no doubt that if left free from outward disturbing influences, it will in course of time lead to the subjugation of the Merve Tekkah, and their incorporation in the irregular legions of Russia. The presence of a Russian prisoner at Merve will in any case prove useful, as a justification in case of war or a pretext, if other measures should be determined on. The Tekkah whom I met were, I found, fully aware that their fate was under consideration in Russia, and the words they spoke to me had probably been frequently repeated to the Russian officers on their frontier. "If the Russians attack us at once" they said, "they will find even the women of the tribe in arms, and all prepared to make a desperate resistance. If they wait a year or two, and take Akhal and Charjoeë, and spend money amongst us, God only knows what may be the result," which was equivalent to an admission that (in the latter case) their conquest was certain.

The true causes of the evident dislike and dread of Russia, exhibited by the Tekkha, are not easy to discover. It might almost be expected that a tribe of professional soldiers would not regard the approach of a military power likely to appreciate properly their value, and to give them the kind of employment they most approve, with any special disfavor. When questioned, they say that the Russians are "Kafirs" unbelievers, but almost in the same breath they express a desire to become subjects of a power open to precisely the same objection. The causes of their preference for England are given elsewhere. Their hostility to Russia would appear to be to a certain extent traditional, and due to their connection with Khiva and Bokhara, and to some extent also the result of guilty apprehensions of punishment for late injuries inflicted. Neither of these feelings should offer any insuperable obstacles to pacification.

Whatever course may be pursued, some time must elapse before the final and complete occupation of the oasis can be accomplished. The undertaking appears one of far greater magnitude than the recent capture of Khiva. The physical difficulties to be overcome are not perhaps of equal magnitude, but the resistance, if the attack should be made before the strength of the hostile feelings that now exist has been sapped, will be of a very different nature.

Since the subjection of Bokhara to Russian domination, the Tekkah appear to have lost all respect for their suzerain, the Amir, and declare that they would no longer obey his summons to war. Two "Aksakals, Kara Shai and Verdi Niaz Khan, are still in his pay, but their influence with the tribe is small; they are probably retained to enable the paramount power to obtain accurate information of the movements and sentiments of the tribe. The connection of Khiva is chiefly with the Akhal branch. The people of Merve gave no assistance to the Khan during the late invasions, and it is only by their plunderings in the Khivan territories, subject to Russia, that they can become connected with the politics of that State. The case of the Akhal is different. They have had direct dealings with Khiva, assisted her in her troubles, and are liegemen of the Khan, and on the same ground or pretext have been brought directly within the sphere of Russian diplomacy.

XXIII

APPENDIX III.

COLLECTION OF ROUTES IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF THE ATTREK TAKEN FROM CAPTAIN NAPIER'S MEMORANDUM ON THE TOPOGRAPHY OF THE EASTERN ALBURZ TRACT.

List of Routes in the Eastern Alburz tract, including one from Herat to Merv.

No.	ROUTE.	Miles.	Fursakhs.
1	Herat to Merv	50
2	Meshed to Sarraks	31
3	„ „ Khelat-i-Nadiri and Sarraks	24
4	„ „ „ „ Atak	106	...
5	„ „ Deregez by Radkan	111½	...
6	Deregez to Sarraks	27½
7	„ „ Merv	30 to 40
8	„ „ Balkan	94 to 97
9	„ „ Koochan by Dawand Pass	70	...
10	Koochan to Deregez by Allaho Akbar Pass	45	...
11	„ from Ishkabad and Annan	39	...
12	Ishkabad and Annan to Duringar (Route 9)	4½
13	„ „ „ Koochan by Augbaz	11½
14	Boojnoord to Kareekala and Kizzil-Arvat	38½
15	„ „ Atak	22
16	„ „ Gurgan and Astrabad	26½
17	Jah Jerm to Astrabad by Nowdeh	131½
18	Nardin to Kizzil-Arvat	27½
19	„ „ Gurgan	12
20	Gurgan to Attrek (River)	11½
21	Astrabad to Attrek	10
22	Hussun Kooli to Kareekala	39

NOTE.—Routes of which distance is given in fursakhs have been derived from native information, usually with the aid of a rough sketch map.

FURSAKHS.—Khorassan fursakh calculated at 4½ in plain and 4 in hills.

Distance in fursakhs in hilly country reduced one-third or one-fourth, according to ground, for direct distance. The Koords usually measure stages by the hour, calculating one fursakh an hour. This gives 4 to 4½ miles (for a horseman) on level ground and 2½ to 3 miles in the hills.

MILES.—Calculated at 4½ miles per hour on level smooth ground, the ordinary marching pace of a horse.

In rough or broken ground at 4 miles.

In mountains 2½ to 3 miles.

Ascent of gradients measured by aneroid barometer mean of readings of 2 instruments.

ELEVATION.—Calculated from mean of several observations of boiling point.

Temperatures from standard thermometer.

APPENDIX III.—Routes near the *Attrek*—Continued.

Route No. 1.

HERAT TO MERV.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Khush Rabat .	6 fur.	Across plain north from Herat.
Kara Tuppa ...	12 "	18	Plain for the most part. One pass across low hills.
Archa Hauz-i-Khan.	6 "	24	Plain.
Pul-i-Khishto .	5 "	29	Plain. At this stage there is a good spring, and usually camps of Sarrak and Salor Turkomans from Panjdeh. It is on the banks of the Murghab, half way between Panjdeh and Merv.
Ghulkhandi ...	6 "	35	Murghab River, not fordable.	Plain on banks of Murghab.
Yolatan ...	12 "	47	Along banks of Murghab. There being grass and water on the whole line, caravans can encamp half way. Yolatan is occupied by Sarrak and Salor Turkomans.
Merv ...	3 "	50	Plain, cultivated for the most part, and covered with camps of Tekke.

NOTE.—The fursakh of Khorassan, especially in plain ground, may be reckoned at 4½ miles. All the stages on the route have grass and water.

Route No. 2.

MESHEH TO SARRAK.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Kannagosha ...	3½ fur.	Plain, E.-N.-E. from Meshed.
Moozderan ...	9½ "	13	Kashaf road at five fursakhs fordable; water said to be brackish lower.	Plain as far as Kashaf road. Thence over undulating ground on hill skirts along north bank. Plain to south high, undulating, fertile in parts, without any population, known as Dasht-i-Pusht-i-Koh-i-Jam, being bounded on the south by ridges lining the Jam stream. Moozderan has several watch towers, held by (nominally) 50 foot and 50 horse.
Ak Derband ...	9 "	22	Defile ...	Following stream through low hills. At one fursakh pass post of Gar Moozderan on south bank; at 2½ fursakhs post Tavar, north bank; 3½ fursakhs post Darz Verdi, north bank; 5½ fursakhs post Bast-i-Sang-i-Dak; at 7 fursakhs Bast-i-Ibrahim Khan; thence two fursakhs to Ak Derband. The defile is defended by several towers held by 50 horse and a few infantry.
Sarrak ...	9 "	31	Descend pass to Shorchai, said to be passable for guns.	At one fursakh, descending for some distance, Shorchai, Persian post of 140 men, four or five miles below and to right of road is the junction of the Heri road and Kashaf road or Ab-i-Meshed, thence known as the Tejen. From Shorchai level barren plain to Sarrak.

NOTE.—This route is put down as given, but it is probable that the distance from Moozderan to Ak Derband has been exaggerated, as also the distance between the outposts on the road. In rough hilly ground the fursakh is usually estimated by the time it takes the traveller to cover his stage.

Sarrak has no population save a Persian garrison of 400 infantry and 300 or 400 people, the scum of the bazaars of Meshed, sent there lately to colonise. The fort is large enough to contain all and built, it is said, on a European plan, but it is old and dilapidated and defended only by eight light guns. The soil is fertile and water ample; wood is cut on the river banks. The garrison, however, are prisoners, being unable to move out except "in force." Supplies of grain are purchased from the Merv Turkomans.

APPENDIX III.—Routes near the Attek—Continued.

Route No. 3.

MESHED TO KELAT AND SARRAK BY KHOUR.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Kannagosha ... Foronad or Gujki. Khour ...	3½ fur. 2½ „ 6 „	... 6 fur. 12 „	Large villages in the Tabatkhan Belook. Road through low hills. Across high ridge of the Tekke Khana mountain, by a road over which it is said guns have been taken. Accounts as to the road differ, but it is probably very rough and bad, and the light guns certainly taken to Tejen must have been transported by hand. NOTE.—From the summit of the Karendagh mountain a good view is obtained of the whole Khour route, and a more impassable looking country for wheels it would be difficult to find. Khour is a large village lying on the north side of the ridge, at the head of the Chachha Valley. From Khour to Khehat is 9 fursakhs N. and W., over a very rough country, passing the villages Zoo and Karatagan, lately re-peopled. Down a deep valley, shut in by high spurs of the Tekke Khana. The descent in the 16 miles is probably not less than 6,000 feet. Chachha lies within the outer range of hills, and is a large village of now 100 houses, with fine crops of rice and wheat. It was re-occupied on y last year. A fine stream waters it. Tejen lies 10 fursakhs N.-N.-W., across a barren plain. It was till two or three years ago occupied by Turkomans from Merv.
Kelat ...	9 „	21 „	Following the stream, two fursakhs to Karachahha, a village in the plain, also lately occupied; and six fursakhs east to Sarrak, across a barren plain.
Khour to Chachha.	4 „	16 „	NOTE.—Between Khour and Ak Derband there are a few paths practicable for mounted men, but very difficult. These are or ought to be held by small posts No laden animals pass.
Sarrak ...	8 „	24 „	

Route No. 4.

MESHED TO KELAT AND THE ATAK.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Kardeh ...	24 miles 6¼ fur. Kashaf road at 5 miles. Razan, 17½ miles. Anderookh, 19½ miles. Defile of Kardeh. Ascent from Meshed, about 900 feet.	Leave Bala Kheyaban gate and turn E.-N.-E. through gardens. At 1½ miles pass gardens and fort of Samazrand, and bear north past dome of Khaja Ratu left. At 5 miles cross Kashaf road by stone bridge; stream small, easy banks, sound bed, and no depth water. Thence over plain rising gently to village Razan, 17½ miles, on hill skirts. Thence, between long undulating gravel slopes, to Anderookh, 50 houses, 19½ miles. At 20 miles enter Derband-i-Kardeh, narrow defile, shut in by precipices, 800 to 1,000 feet in height. Mountains on either side of limestone and trap, tabular and accessible. Stream from Kardeh finds its way through the defile, which in places has a width of less than 50 yards. At 22 miles leave stream and pass over low hills of conglomerate, skirting the stream again at 23½ miles. Thence west half mile to Kardeh, a small village of 20 or 30 houses. the property of the Khan of Choolai. Supplies procurable in abundance with notice. Road, a fair bridle path, which might be made easily practicable for guns.

APPENDIX III.—Routes near the Attek—Continued.

Route No. 4—(Concluded).

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Vardeh ...	28 miles 8½ fur.	52 miles 14¾ fur.	From Kardeh follow stream up a narrow tortuous defile, winding from N.-W. to N. and E.-N.-E., and shut in by high inaccessible cliffs, leaving a passage frequently less than 50 yards. At seven miles pass small village Aoul, 20 houses. At 9½ miles rock inscription of 926 Hijra, right bank of stream. At 19 miles small tributary from glen to left, at head of which lies large village Bolghor, one mile distant bend north following stream, and at quarter mile pass road to village Seech, falling in right rear. Defile shut in by cliffs of sandstone. At 24 miles emerge on open valley draining from E. and W. Two roads to Kelat branch off E. and W. The latter said to be the worst. At 26 miles cross water-shed line into valley draining into the Atak, and bear left. At 27 miles cross rocky spur by steep and bad ascent, and descend by rough path into glen of Vardeh, also draining into Atak. Road for 20 miles impracticable for any wheeled carriage, and commanded by inaccessible cliffs. Laden camels pass without difficulty. Last ridge above Vardeh passable by laden mules with difficulty. Camels make a long detour. Vardeh 20 houses. Supplies very scanty.
Kelat-i-Nadiree	22 miles 6½ fur.	74 miles 21 fur. Ascent from Kardeh about 1,800 feet.	Leave Vardeh east down glen at two miles pass village Baghchand, six houses, with fort on rocky hill, and turn E.-N.-E. over low hills of sandstone and coloured marls and shales. At 5 miles bend north and descend deep glen with steep slopes of mottled clays and marls, and jutting spurs of slate and limestone, the strata violently contorted. At 12½ miles strike small stream flowing from west, and follow its course through a very narrow defile, shut in by cliffs, leaving a passage only sufficient for one horseman. At 16 miles enter open valley, the north side of which is bounded by the south wall of the natural fortress of Kelat. Thence following stream, bending west, down the valley. At 20 miles turn north with the stream and pass through a narrow gap in the enclosing ridge known as the Derband-i-Argphoon Shah, closed by gates. At 22 miles following stream reach village Geo Gunbuz and Nadir's tower.
Chardeh ...	28 miles	106 miles Descent from Kardeh 3,000 feet.	Road from 5 to 16 miles impassable for wheels or laden camels (camels using the road as far as Vardeh go no further, taking fire-wood cut in the cypress— <i>Juniperus excelsa</i> —forests to Meshed). From Kelat to Chardeh in the Atak is about 28 miles. To the Derband-i-Napht, in the north wall of Kelat, a narrow gap similar to that of Arghphoon Shah, is seven miles following the stream. Road, fair bridle path, but impassable for guns. Thence, winding through a narrow valley, enclosed by low hills of clays, marls, and sandstone, 16 miles to the hill skirt. Thence to Chardeh, on the banks of the stream, at 28 miles. Chardeh has 50 to 60 houses, settled by Turko-mans, under the protection of the Khan of Kelat.

Route No. 5.

MESHED TO DEREGEZ BY RADKAN.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Kazimabad ...	12 miles 2½ fur.	Leave Meshed by the Bala Kheyaban gate, and follow the main road up the valley N.-W. at five miles, passed ruined Rabat and fort of Bahrabad. At 12 miles walled village of Kazimabad; 15 houses. Supplies plentiful. Road level and good.

APPENDIX III.—Routes near the Attrek—Continued.

Route No. 5—(Continued).

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Goonabad ...	14 miles 3½ fur.	26 miles 6 fur. Killa Askanya, 7 miles. Killa Eshankulla, 9 miles. Killa Sadad Khan. Killa Vakeel Khan, 11 miles.	N.-W. following main road. At seven miles Killa Askanya, right; at nine miles Killa Eshankulla, left; Killa Khan Sadad, right. At 11 miles Killa Vakeel Khan, right. At 12½ miles country cut up by ravines, draining into the Kasbah road; roadway remains good and passable for wheels. Road heavy in parts from recent rain, but good all along. Goonabad, large village of 100 houses; supplies ample.
Chenaran ...	12 miles 3 fur.	38 miles 3 fur. Killa Ibrahimabad, 2 miles. Killa Sulogird, 3½ miles. Killa Now Buhor, 4½ miles. Shaffeabad, 7 miles. Hajiabad, 8 miles.	N.-W. through gardens for one mile. At 2 miles Killa-Ibrahimbad, right. At 3½ miles Killa Sulogird, half mile left; 4½ miles Killa Now Buhor, right, seven miles, village and gardens, Shaffeabad; 8 miles Hajiabad. At 9½ miles cross small stream flowing north to Dastgird. At 10½ miles cross dry bed of stream from the hills south. High steep banks with ramp passable for wheels. Road sound and firm the whole way, and for the most part gravel and kunkur. Country level and unbroken. Chenaran, large walled village, 400 houses. Zaffaranloo Koords.
Radkan ...	14 miles 3½ fur.	52 miles 12½ fur. Joukar, 2¼ miles. Kelat Anjan, 2½ miles. Kelat-i-Arab, 8½ miles. Deh Sununder, ruined village, 5½ miles. Deh Mazanly. Deh Sar-i-zah. Gul Khatoon, 7 miles. Deh Mati, 8 miles.	N.-N.-W. across cultivated plain for 1 mile. Direct road to Koochan branches off left. Plain uncultivated and undulating to Joukar. At 8 miles clearing the last villages of Chenaran, the road passes over wide level pasture land. A marshy stream from the head of the valley is past by a good ford. At 11½ miles the Meeli-Radkan, a fine masonry tower, 95 feet high, with cubic inscription is passed. Radkan is a large village of 1,000 houses of Kywanloo Koords, defended by double mud walls, towers, and ditch.
Killa Yusuf Khan.	25 miles	77 miles Deh Zadees, Abshor, Daootly.	North, over level pasture land for some miles. Thence passing the villages Deh Zadees, Abshor, two miles further, Daootly four miles further, whence two miles to Killa Yusuf Khan, a large village of 150 houses of Kywanloo Koords. Supplies, &c., ample.
Taveel ...	13½ miles	90½ miles Badkhor, 15 miles. Fanow, 8½ miles. Tabori, 10½ miles.	Follow stream, tributary of the Attrek (here 10 or 12 feet by 2, but said to be not perennial) E.-N.-E. to the village of Badkhor, situated at the head of the valley, and at the entrance of a defile, 5 miles. At 16 miles enter defile, narrow and completely commanded by low rocky hill, and follow windings of stream, keeping a north-easterly direction. At 8½ miles pass hamlet of Fanow, 12 houses. At 10½ miles defile opens out to half mile, with a long stretch of cultivation, in centre of which stands village of Tabori. Two small streams flow in on left, and main valley divides E. & N. From the west flows a small stream, draining the Dowlutkhana plateau. Road passing over low spur behind Tabori, flows east branch of valley due east to Taveel (23½ miles), a small Koord hamlet of 10 families. Supplies procurable. From Badkhor to Fanow and Tabori, 4 miles, the defile is narrow, and traversed by a winding stream, with two or three feet of water, and a muddy bottom for the most part, guns might pass with a little labour. Thence to Taveel the road is open and good.
Chapooshloo ...	21 miles 8½ fur.	111½ miles Maidan Khana Pass, 900 feet. Defile Derband-i-Kibkan.	Leave valley N.-E. up lateral glen; road steep and rugged, and impassable for guns. Camels are said to go, and guns have been taken round a long <i>détour</i> up the valley to a point where the hill is less rocky, though steeper (three or four light guns were dragged by hand). Ascending glen for two miles reach plateau of Maidan Khana. Thence across easy undulations E.-N.-E., and at three miles descend N.-E. into narrow defile, following small stream. At 6 miles pass through gap in main chain known as Derband-i-Kibkan and enter open valley of Kopal.

APPENDIX III.—Routes near the *Attrek*—Continued.

Route No. 5—(Concluded).

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Mohamadabad and the Atak	8 miles.	...	Derband, 7 miles.	<p>Thence on an easterly bearing, pass at 7 miles village of Derband, the first in Deregez. At 8 miles pass fort of Kopul, with hamlet, cross stream, and follow it to 9½ miles; a total descent from Maidan Khana of 1,400 feet. Leave valley winding E.-S.-E. to E. towards Abiverd, and the Atak, and turn north up a narrow glen, in a high spur of the main range, running out to the S.-E. At 12 miles reach summit of pass Allah-ho Akbar, a slight depression in the spur. Ascent 1,000 feet. Thence descent 2,000 feet, to the village of Agdash, 15 miles over plain sloping easily to the N.-E. reach Chapooshloo. Total descent from summit of pass (about) 3,000 feet. The descent of the Maidan Khana Pass is steep and impracticable for guns, but the hill slopes are soft and a road might easily be cut. The ascent of 1,000 feet to the crest of Allah-ho Akbar is impracticable, the hill side being formed of bare limestone rock, and seamed with deep precipitous gullies. The descent of 3,000 feet is good, the road having apparently been made, and guns might with care be driven down. The valley following the Kibkan stream to Abiverd also appears quite impracticable for guns, and is shut in by precipitous spurs on both sides.</p> <p>From the village of Derband an alternative road goes back over the shoulder of Koh Omarat, a mountain to the east, passing to the east of Taveel, reaches Radkan, in the valley. It is shorter, but avoided by caravans on account of the steep and bad ascent of the Dumji Pass.</p> <p>To Mohamadabad, the chief town, or village of the Deregez State, is a distance of eight miles, over a level plain, and through a narrow pass in a low spur running out into the plain from the mountains on the east. Thence to Khairabad and the villages in the Atak is eight miles. A low range of hills formed of soft clays and marls being crossed by a good road. By a short <i>détour</i> to the west the Atak may be gained without crossing the enclosing hills through a defile, by which the Deregez stream finds its way to the Atak. The defile is narrow, and might be easily defended, and the low, enclosing range, though everywhere passable for horsemen, has a steep slope to the south, and a broad crest affording good positions. From Deregez there is a road across the hills to the east, to Kelat-i-Nadiri, travelled by Colonel Baker and Lieutenant Gill, R.E., in 1873.</p>
	8 "	...	Allah-ho Akbar Pass.	
	16	127½ miles.	Agdash, 15 miles.	

Route No. 6.

DEREGEZ TO SARRAK.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Atak or Turan	12 miles. 3 fur.	N.-E. from Mohamadabad by the Derband-i-Ger Bheg, or across the low hills to the south passing at 8 miles Khairabad.
Abiverd	6 "	9 fur.	East, along hill skirt, over level ground. Abiverd is inhabited; has ample pasture; watered by a fine stream. Nearest village, Kivabat, of Kelat, lately re-peopled, some miles higher up.
Chardeh	5 "	14 "	East along hill skirt, passing at about 10th mile Archingan, a village lately re-occupied and watered by a stream flowing from the Koh-i-Iwarat, or Hazar Masjid, and passing through Kelat.
Mehna	3½ "	17½ "	About S.-E. along the Atak to Mehna, a village lately occupied from Kelat, watered by a stream from the east of Kelat.
Kara Chachha	4 "	21½ "	} S.-E. See Route No. 3.
Sarrak	6 "	27½ "	

APPENDIX III.—Routes near the Atrek—Continued.

Route No. 7.

DEREGEZ TO MERV.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Tejen ...	10 fur.	From Deregez to Merv is a journey of six days for laden camels, about 150 to 160 miles. At 35 to 40 miles the Tejen is crossed, a shallow stream, flowing through a sandy waste, and fringed by thin scrub of tamarisk and willow. Thence four long stages across a desert, with wells of brackish water at each halting-place. Laden mules also accomplish the journey.
Merv ...	28 to 30	38 to 40		

Route No. 8.

DEREGEZ TO AMAN, KIZZIL-ARVAT, BALKAN.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Nowkhandan...	8 miles 2 fur.	N.W. across the cultivate plain of Deregez, following the course of the stream draining the valley. Nowkhandan is a large village of 700 houses, surrounding a high mound, on which stands the fort. Gardens and vineyards extend for some miles up and down the stream.
Annaw and Ishkabad.	8 "	10 fur. Gawars Annaw	Leave the valley of Deregez by the Dihana or pass of Ishkabad (N. W.), which is easy and practicable for light guns, and cross over low hills to the Atak; passing at the edge of the plain Gawars the first Tekke <i>obahs</i> . At 8 fursakhs reach Annaw, 300 tents, and two miles further, Ishkabad, 1,000 tents.
Kurjow ...	10 to 11	18 to 19	Along the Atak skirting the hills.
Akhal ...	10 to 11	28 to 29	Ditto.
Karez ...	8 to 7	36 to 37	Ditto.
Doran ...	10 fur.	46 to 47	Ditto.
Bami Burma...	9 "	55 to 56	Two large <i>obahs</i> , about one mile apart, destroyed by the Russians under Markozoff in 1873.
Kizzil-Arvat ...	7 "	64 to 65	The country passed over, as far as Kizzil-Arvat, is level, barren for the most part, but not a sandy waste, as is the desert, or <i>koom</i> beyond. No less than 40 Tekke <i>obahs</i> , each with its small stream from the mountains or perennial spring, are passed; and there is extensive cultivation, the population of from 20,000 to 30,000 families subsisting without the necessity of purchasing.
Balkhan, 3 days	32 to 32	94 to 97	From Kizzil-Arvat to Balkan is a ride of three days, making stages of 10 fursakhs,* 40 to 48 miles a day. The country is broken by sand hills and low rocky ridges, the last spurs of the Elburz, which extends in that direction across the desert as far nearly as Balkan. The tract is said to be elevated above the desert N. and S. of it, and to have a few springs and pools of fresh water, and in spring abundant pasturage in some places, frequented by the Yomuds "Chorwars," or nomads. Caravans have never passed that way, but the Tekke have twice lately ridden across to attack the Russians on the "Darja," or "Daryacha," the lake of Kaifa-Su, described as a small lake of fresh water collected from the rainfall on the surrounding tracts, on the edge of which gardens and houses have been commenced. Thence to Kizzil-Su, the permanent settlement or fort of Krasnovodsk, and to Kaifa-Su and Shah Kadom, the landing place at the head of the bay, is a distance of two to three fursakhs.

* NOTE.—Distance is given as stated to me, but each day's journey was probably much longer. For, assuming that Astrabad and the mouth of the Balkan inlet have been laid down from correct Russian sources, and the position of Kizzil-Arvat from Boj-noord correctly given to me, as I believe it to have been, the distance from Kizzil-Su to Kizzil-Arvat should be about 170 miles.

APPENDIX III.—Routes near the Atrek—Continued.

Route No. 9.

DEREGEZ TO KOOCHAN BY DAWAND PASS.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Nowkhandan...	8 miles 2½ fur.	Route No. 8.
Duringar ...	24 miles 6¾ fur.	32 miles 9¼ fur. Burjkillā, 2½ miles, 20 houses. Zulfan, 3¼ miles, 30 houses; Khal-kanloo Tozanloo, 20 houses, ½ mile left. 5½ Faiz Ali Beg, 20 houses. Shekanloo, 20 houses, 10 miles. Zainadilloo, 15 houses, 12½ miles. Sang Sarrak, 16½ miles.	N.-W. from Nowkhandan through gardens and vineyards. At 1½ miles pass Khallaloo, and gain wide open cultivated plain; 5½ miles Koh Kohchar, a spur of the main range runs out into the plains, rising to a height of about 1,200 feet. Thence bear west skirting right flank of mountain, and follow stream up the valley, which contracts to 1 mile in width, ½ mile from Zamodilloo Valley bends W.N.W. Sang Surkh lies on the slope of a spur on right bank, and closes a pass leading from the Akhal settlements in the Atak; the road lying N. W. up a glen, and over Koh Asalma to Annan and Ishkabad, distant 16 miles (4 fursakhs).
Imamgulli ...	20 miles 6 fur.	52 miles 15¼ fur. Duringar Toor-ki, 18½ miles, 15 houses. Dawand Pass, 900 ft.	At Sang Sarrak, pass through narrow gap in mountains W.S.W. and turn N.W. At 23 miles valley bends sharp S.S.W. At 24 miles gardens and hamlet of Duringar-i-Koordi, four hamlets of 20 to 25 houses in each, of Kaikanloo Koords. Supplies ample. A road to Kalta Chenar and Annan leads off N.W. from village up narrow glen. Follow glen S.S.W. At 4 miles cross stream, and leave it, issuing from narrow gorge on right, through which lies road to Shorak Durhadam, villages of Koochan, distant five fursakhs. Thence on south bearing up narrow, rocky glen. At 9½ miles reach foot of Dawand Pass. Road passable for wheels, but narrow, and commanded by rocky heights. Ascent of Dawand Pass, 2 miles, 900 feet; road fairly good, and ascent for most part easy. From crest of pass, south, over bare open downs, leading over low gap in Chooeenlee ridge. At 13½ miles, pass Chooeenlee, 20 families, Marjanloo Koords, and cross low, easy ridge into wide, undulating valley of Zooblig draining north into the Duringar stream. Thence north over steep undulations to stream and village of Imamgulli, 60 families, Zaffrandoo. Supplies procurable. NOTE.—The Dawand Pass is exceedingly easy, and might with little difficulty be made passable for guns.
Koochan ...	18 miles	70 miles	S.S.E. At 1 mile cross a low ridge on right, and on south by good road over the Katirchi plateau. At 5½ miles cross low ridge of Alumli by good road, and enter plateau of Dowlatkhana; crossing which, at 15 miles, reach the Gobaran Pass, thence to Koochan, 5 miles, over low hills. Light guns have been taken to the Atak by this road, and it might with little labor be made passable for any wheeled carriage.

Route No. 10.

KOOCHAN TO DEREGEZ BY ALLAH-HO AKBAR PASS.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Killa Yusuf Khan.	10½ miles Teelab, 1 mile. Karbala i Aghassi, 3½ miles.	Leave Koochan by east gate and follow Mesbed road. At 1 mile cross stream (shallow, with sound bed, 16 to 18 feet by 2 feet depth) and pass through village Teelab, and on east following hill skirt. At 3½ miles Killa Karbalai Aghassi, with square mud

APPENDIX III.—Routes near the *Attrek*—Continued.

Route No. 10.—(Concluded.)

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
		108½ miles.	Hy Hy, 7½ miles. Chalaki, 10½ miles.	fort on mound, 1 mile right. A road turns off left through hills to Dowlatkhana. Turn E.S.E. across plain, and at 7½ miles pass village Hy Hy. Thence bend towards gap in hills bearing due east and follow course of stream, passing village and ruined fort of Chalaki. At 10½ miles reach Killa Yusef Khan, on the borders of Koochan and Radkan. Thence to Deregez route No. 5, 34½ miles.

Route No. 11.

KOOCHAN FROM ISHKABAD AND ANNAW.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Imamgooli ...	5½ fur.	...	Awardan, 2½ fur. Boozbalk.	From Ishkabad, 1½ fursakhs over plain, and enter glen Koh Asalma on left, Koh Dashtai right. At 2½ fur. (9 miles) pass Awardan, ruined fort, with spring known as Roozbalk. On, for a short fursakh (3 miles), to pass of Balekhar, a long easy ascent. At 14 miles, 3½ fur. after a long, gradual, descent, reach Durbadam (300 houses) Koords. Thence to 17 miles (4½ fur.) up glen, by good road, to Shorak, 100 houses. At 18 miles, 4½ fursakhs, a long easy ascent, on to plateau of Imamgooli. Thence, a short fursakh, 3 miles, to village Imamgooli, and to Koochan, as by route No. 9. Road said to be as good as that by Dawand Pass.
Koochan ...	21 miles.	39	Durbadam, 3½ fur. Shorak, 4¼.	
	18 "		

Route No. 12.

ISHKABAD AND ANNAW TO DURINGAR IN ROUTE No. IX.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Kalta Cheenar..	3½ fur.	...	Sang Surakh.	From Ishkabad (5 miles), 1½ fursakhs, (short) across plain, enter valley, and follow it over level ground to 11 miles, wide, open, pasture of Nissa. Thence a road branches off to Sang Surakh (Route No. 9) by which light guns belonging to the Hissam-u-Sultana's force reached Ishkabad. From Nissa pasture follow, narrow easy glen, 1 fursakh to Kalta Cheenar, a large village of 100 houses of "Sunnis;" a remnant of the populations of the old towns of the Atak, Mehna, Annaw, Ishkabad, still known as Mehna, Annaw, &c. Thence to Duringar descent of 4 miles, 1 long fursakh, over a good road, down a narrow glen. The pass from the Atak, over low part of the Asalma ridge, is described as easy and practicable for light guns dragged by hand.

APPENDIX III.—Routes near the Atrek—Continued.

Route No. 13.

KOOCHAN FROM ISHKABAD AND ANNAW BY AUGHAZ.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Awardan ...	2½ fur.	To Awardan as in Route No. 11. Thence two miles over level pasture passing the Korawul Khana-i-Zilan, and, to 3½ fursakhs, up the Kotul-i-Zilan, a long, easy, slope. Thence, by easy descent for 2 fursakhs, to Aughaz, 100 houses (Koochan). Thence ½ long fursakh to Chappa and Shukarli hamlets in a glen running south, up to a high ridge. Thence over downs ½ fursakh to Killa Sapor, and ascend an easy ridge. Thence ½ fursakh to Koorun, 40 houses, and descending narrow, easy, glen, enter plain of Koochan, at 8 fursakhs. Thence ½ fursakh to Derband-i-Hissar, ½ fursakh to Khabooshan, old fort of Koochan, and 2½ fursakhs to Koochan. Route said to be very easy. It is the one usually followed by the Koords of Koochan in their raids against the Akhal.
Aughaz ...	3¼ "	5¼ fur.	
Koochan ...	6 "	11¼ "	

Route No. 14.

BOOJNOORD TO KAREEKALA, KIZZIL-ARVAT.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Mana ...	6 fur. Germekhan stream, 6 fur.	N. W. over spur of Koh Akhir, north of Boojnoord, to the banks of the Germekhans tributary, over a difficult hill path, practicable for laden mules only. Mana is a large village of 400 to 500 houses, including the neighbouring hamlets.
Peshkalla ...	3 "	9 fur.	Following down the course of the Germekhans, which flows through low undulating hills.
Karai ...	7 "	16 "	From Peshkalla, north, leaving the Germekhans Valley, to Kalta Cheenar, site of a large village now deserted. Thence west to Karai, also a ruined village. Road said to be easy.
Chandyr Stream	6½ "	22½ "	NOTE.—From Karai two roads pass over the spur enclosing the Germekhans tributary to the north, both described as very difficult, though the one to the west was passed by the guns taken with the force under the Saham-u-dowla to Kareekala. The western road ascends the spur at a point known as Geuk Kamar, and crossing it, descends in a north-westerly direction into the valley of the Chandyr tributary. Thence passes north over low hills presenting no difficulties, crossing the Ab-i-Soont tributary of the Atrek, and skirts the west spurs of the Sunt Soor Mountain to Kareekala.
Kareekala ...	6 "	28½ " Ab-i-Soont or Soont Stream.	The eastern road passes north from Karai, is slightly shorter, and more difficult, but is passable for horsemen. It crosses the Chandyr tributary at a point four fursakhs above the western road, where are the ruins of a fort known as the Kalla Dadook, and thence runs N. W. to the Ab-i-Soont, and over the Sunt Soor Mountain to Kareekala, 11 fursakhs.
Kizzil-Arvat ...	10 "	38½ "	Thence to Kizzil-Arvat is a distance of 10 fursakhs, 7 to the Atak, by a difficult road skirting the Dasht, a high plateau extending along the south slope of the outer or Atak Range for some distance, and reaching down to the banks of the Ab-i-Soont, and passing at two fursakhs some ruins known as Khaja Mohalla. The descent to the Atak is said to be easy and practicable for light guns. From the foot of the hills to Kizzil-Arvat is three fursakhs N. W. across the plain. From Khaja Mohalla, or Mohallasa, a road passes N. E. to Bami Burma, seven fursakhs distant, in the Atak.

APPENDIX III.—Routes near the Attek—Continued.

Route No. 15.

BOOJNOORD TO DORAN, KARA KHAN, AND KELAT-I-NUR VERDI KHAN IN "ATAK."

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Dadyana ...	16 fur.	...	Germekhans Stream, 2 fursakhs. Moujah Pass. Ab-i-Soont.	From Boojnoord due north to the Germekhans tributary, 2 fursakhs. Thence a footpath strikes off due north over the higher spurs of the Attek watershed, and gaining the Atak by the Dihana or Pass of Moujah, 1 fursakh beyond which lies the Khelat of Nur Verdi, the leading Aksakal of the Tekke of Akhal. The bridle road follows the stream S.-W. for 3 fursakhs, and then strikes off north over a low portion of the spur into the plain or plateau of Harar; traversing which and crossing a high spur into the Ab-i-Soont Valley, it passes at 16 fursakhs the ruins of Dadyana. Thence a road goes north to the Dihana or Pass of Abzar, 5 fursakhs, and one fursakh across the plain to Doran and Karakhan (or Karghan). Another turns towards the east to the Dihana Moujah, 8 fursakhs, and thence to Khelat-i-Nur Verdi Khan. Both roads are said to be passable for laden mules.
Doran ...	6 "	22 fur.	Abzar Pass, 21 fur.	

Route No. 16.

BOOJNOORD TO GURGAN AND ASTRABAD.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Simulghan ...	7½ fur.	From Boojnoord, west, across a spur of Akhir Koh, over a good road, to Simulghan, a collection of 8 or 10 villages, with 400 to 500 houses, lying in a fine plateau, which stretches west for 8 or 10 fursakhs.
Rabat-i-Karaguez.	8 "	15½ fur.	W. and S., 32 miles to Rabat-i-Karaguez or Karabil, an old caravanserai of the time of Shah Abbas, on a plateau draining to the Gurgan.
Chanda Abbas	4 "	19½ "	About west to Chanda Abbass and Arghoot, depopulated places on the same plateau, near its western edge. On the hills to the north lie Karagifan and Shah-Abat (which appears as Shahbaz on many maps).
Gurgan ...	7 "	26½ "	West, at 2 fursakhs reaching the defile known as the Dihana-i-Gurgan. This defile is described as narrow and shut in by precipitous hills; and from a distance it has this appearance, but the road is good, and might be made passable for guns. A wide road, cut by Shah Abbas, is now buried in dense forest. From the defile to Gurgan in the plain is 5 fursakhs, following the stream, which rises below the defile. At Gurgan are camps of Goklen.
Goombuz-i-Kaoo.	8 "	34½ "	Thence, following along the high banks of the Gurgan, west to the Goombuz-i-Kaoo, a tower in the plain, where are ruins of a city and camps of Goklen.
Finderesk ...	6 "	40½ "	Across Gurgan plain, west to Finderesk, a large village on the skirts of the belt of forest, and in the district of Astrabad.
Astrabad ...	9 "	49½ "	Thence to Astrabad, 36 miles, 9 fursakhs.

APPENDIX III.—Routes near the Attrek—Continued.

Route No. 17.

JAH JERM TO ASTRABAB BY NOWDEH.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Jah Jerm ...	30 miles Iwar, 7 miles, 50 houses. Durra, 9½ miles. Murtaza Ali Maidan, 18 miles.	N. W. across plain and hill skirt broken by ravines. Road fairly good. At 7 miles Iwar, village of Jah Jerm, 50 houses. Thence west through broken, hilly country, cultivated. At 9½ miles pass village Durra. Thence through uncultivated, open glen, enclosed by low, easy hills. At 13 miles glen branches. Left branch bearing S. W. leading into the Bostam plain at village of Moghz. Follow right branch W. N. W., narrow and winding, hill slopes easy. At 10 miles bear west and at 18 miles reach open plateau, draining from N. & S., opening S. on the Bostam plain, distant 3 fursakhs, and known as Murtaza Ali Maidan. Cross plateau west and at 21 miles enter glen. Two miles to the right a mule path leads over the hills to Kalfash and Gurgan in the Gurgan plain. At 23 miles pass through narrow defile between masses of trap rock known as Sang Sarrak, and by easy ascent reach a plateau, broken by low hills. On north and at 27 miles bend west to Nardin, and descend into basin 6 or 8 miles, by three or four, surrounded by high mountains, towards the west end of which lies the fort of Nardin, a small mud walled enclosure with high thin walls and circular bastions, defended by three light field guns. Supplies scanty. Road good. Except for half mile at the Sang Sarrak Pass; guns might be driven to Nardin, and at that point a little labor would render the path practicable. No water, save a brackish spring at Sang Sarrak, after leaving the village of Durra.
Kanchi ...	23 miles	53 miles Nardin Pass, ascent 1,500 feet, descent easy. Toolbin, 50 houses, Nowdeh stream. Gulistan, 11 miles, Chimask, 200 houses. Descent to Poursian, 2,800 feet.	Leaving Nardin Fort cross open plain west for half mile, thence W. N. W. to foot of hills at 6 miles. Thence up rugged hills of limestone and trap over fair bridle road, with easy ascent to crest of ridge at 6 miles. Ascent 1,500 feet. Thence easy descent into glen leading down to valley of Nowdeh, tributary of the Gurgan. At 8 miles reach stream, village Toolbin, one mile right up stream. The ascent and descent of this Pass are both easy. 30 guns were taken over it by the Sipah Salar some years ago; they were dragged, but with a little labor might have been driven. The hill side is of friable traps, and trap tuffs of soft clays and marls. Follow Nowdeh stream S. W., the road good, and keeping above and to the right side of stream. Hillside soft. Guns might follow bed of stream, or road, if widened in parts. At 11 miles pass village Gulistan, 30 houses. At 13 miles pass village Chimask, 200 houses (with hamlets,) on hillside above stream, left. Through Chimask lies a road over a high shoulder of Khushyulak Mountain to Bostam, by which guns have been brought to Nardin. At 21 miles, valley opens out and bends west. A stretch of well cultivated ground, half mile in width, extends thence to 23 miles, where on a sub-tributary from N. E. is Kanchi Poursian, one of three hamlet known collectively as Poursian, consisting of 50 houses. Supplies ample.
Nowdeh ...	19 miles	72 miles	Cross Kanchi glen and spur of opposite hill, and at 1 mile strike Nowdeh stream, and bear west Khushyulak Peak bearing S. S. W. Valley open and cultivated. Road narrow and stony along right banks. At 11 miles across small stream of Alaroo from village Abre, at head of a glen in mountains to left. Thence valley narrows and bends, north banks of stream high, and covered with heavy forest of oak, elm, alder, and other deciduous trees. Forest clad slopes of mountains on either hand, reach banks of stream. At 17 miles

APPENDIX III.—Routes near the Atrek—Continued.

Route No. 17.—(Concluded.)

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Ramyān ...	12½ miles	84½ miles	Nowdeh, 1,600 feet.	valley again opens out to 1½ to 2 miles in width, and is cleared and cultivated. Keeping left side of valley at 19 miles, reach village Nowdeh, 50 houses. Supplies ample. Between Nowdeh and the Gurgan plain a few isolated hills, and four or five miles of dense forest, and cane-brake intervene. The forest is traversed only by narrow winding paths. Between Kanchi and Nowdeh some labor would have to be expended in clearing a road through the six miles of forest that must be traversed, but the route presents no other difficulties. W. S. W. from Newdeh through dense thickets of undergrowth scrub, covering deserted clearings. Path narrow and winding. At 2 miles enter heavy forest, free of undergrowth. At 9 miles reach foot of wooded spur, ascent and descent of half mile, very steep. Thence through open forest west into the glen of Ramyan, a large village of 200 houses, in a gorge opening on the Gurgan plain, but separated from it by some miles of forest and cane-brake.
Katool ...	22 miles	106½ miles	West from Ramyan through scattered patches of forest and dense cane-brakes. At 11½ miles reach Finderesk, chief village of the district, of 1,000 houses with surrounding hamlets, lying near the edge of the submontane belt of forest. From Finderesk to Nowdeh there is a direct road, shorter and easier, but crossing for some distance the open plain. The Ramyan route is only selected for safety.
Astrabad ...	25 miles	131½ miles	From Finderesk bear W.S.W., and at 14 miles pass Maintaloo in the forest on the edge of the plain. At 15½ miles cross small stream Odaroooh from hills left. Dar Killa, 200 houses, half mile left. Country open and cultivated to base of hills 7 to 8 miles distant. At 16 miles enter forest, and bear N.W. At 18 miles cross wide, gravelly bed of stream, from Abre, impassable at times in early summer. Thence through forest clearings, 22 miles to Katool, large village of 400 houses. Supplies procurable. Bear west across cultivated plain and scattered forest to Peechuk Moballa, 3 miles. At 12 miles enter heavy forest, and at 14 pass ruined village, Ganara, in forest. At 16 miles still west reach Nowdeh, village of 200 houses. Thence west through scattered cultivation, forest, and plain covered with dense scrub of thorns, 13 miles, to Astrabad. Track for the most part good, but narrow and heavy from recent rain. NOTE.—By striking across the plain from Astrabad, Nowdeh might be reached in two long marches, for the most part over open ground.

Route No. 18.

MARDIN TO KIZZIL-ARVAT.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Kalposh ...	3½ fur.	From Nardin N.E. into the Kalposh plateau.
Chanda Abbass.	8 "	11½ fur.	Thence E. N. E. to Kalyoon Durra, and descend north into the plain of Dasht, traversing which, at 8 fur., Chanda Abbass is reached. Road good and passable for guns.

APPENDIX III.—Routes near the *Attrek*—Continued.

Route No. 18—(Concluded).

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Karat ...	10 fur.	21½ fur.	From Chanda Abbass across plain for three or four miles, passing Yaghi Oghan on hill skirts (depopulated), and thence over high spurs of Korkhood mountain to Karat, at west end of plateau of Sumilghan.
Kari ...	6 „	27½ „	Descend north into valley of the Germekhana tributary, and cross stream at Chihl Guzr, thence 4 fursakhs to Karai. Road passable for light guns. From Karai as in Route No. 14.

Route No. 19.

NARDIN TO GURGAN.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Kalposh ...	3½ fur.	N.-E. from Nardin.
Gurgan ...	8½ „	12 fur.	N. and W. from Kalposh over the outer range of mountains into the Gurgan plain, and across the plain for eight or nine miles. The 30 guns taken by the Sepah Salar to Gurgan were dragged by hand on their carriages, over the range of mountains dividing Kalposh from the plain.

Route No. 20.

GURGAN TO ATTREK (RIVER).

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Khalid-i-Paighambar.	8½ fur.	From Gurgan west, following stream for a few miles, thence north, across an undulating plain, and over a low ridge dividing the two rivers, to Khalid Paighambar, an Imamzada, on an isolated hill.
Chat-i-Attrek	3½ „	11½ fur.	Thence across the plain to the junction of the Ab-i-Soont and Chandyr, tributaries of the Attrek, known as the Chat-i-Attrek. The whole line is described as broken and difficult ground, much cut up by ravines.

Route No. 21.

ASTRABAD TO ATTREK.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Gurgan River...	3 fur.	From Astrabad to Akkalla N.-E. for two fursakhs, crossing at 1½ fursakhs the Kara-Su stream, thence one fursakh to the Gurgan.
Attrek ...	7 „	10 fur.	From the Gurgan about north to the Attrek, across which lie the Attrek, pastures, extending from Hussun Kooli on the estuary of the Attrek, for two or three fursakhs up stream.

APPENDIX III.—Routes near the *Attrek*—Concluded.

Route No. 22.

HUSSUN KOOLI TO KAREEKALA.

STAGES.	DISTANCE.		Rivers, passes, and villages.	GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
	Miles, &c.	TOTAL.		
Byat-i-Haji ...	12 fur.	From Hussun Kooli, a settlement of Ogurjilly Turkomans, on the north shore of the <i>Attrek</i> estuary, to the <i>Attrek</i> pastures, 2 fursakhs. Thence along bank of river to Byat-i-Haji olang (pasture), 12 fursakhs.
Chat or Chat-i- <i>Attrek</i> .	10 „	22 fur.	Along bank of river to junction of the <i>Germekhans</i> , the main tributary with those from the north.
Chat-i-Chandyr	7 „	29 „	Along the banks of the <i>Chandyr</i> , or north tributary to the junction of the two main branches from the <i>Atak</i> range, <i>Ab-i-Soont</i> and the <i>Chandyr</i> , rising in a plateau known as <i>Charik-Olang</i> .
Kareekala ...	10 „	39 „	<i>Soongdagh</i> ...	North of the <i>Chat-i-Chandyr</i> is the <i>Soongdagh</i> , a range of hills said to have many springs and fine pastures. Its spurs reach to the banks of the river. Thence following the <i>Ab-i-Soont</i> tributary, flowing through open plateau, for 8 fursakhs, turn off north to <i>Kareekala</i> , up a steep ascent over spurs of the <i>Soont Soor</i> Mountain.

APPENDIX IV.

SUGGESTIONS OF THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL FOR THE GUIDANCE OF THE MISSION TO YARKUND REFERRED TO IN SECTION 217 OF CHAPTER VIII.

As the Council of the Society have not been informed of the strength and qualifications of the scientific party which has been, or will be, selected to accompany the Yarkund Mission, or of the routes they will follow, and the facilities available for carrying out those investigations which seem the most desirable, it is somewhat difficult to form an idea of the particular branches of science in which the members of the Mission will best be able to make observations, but without going into details they will endeavour to notice the principal points to which attention may most advantageously be directed.

Zoology and Botany.—The knowledge of zoology and botany to be obtained from these regions will chiefly depend upon the facilities and assistance which the naturalists of the Expedition will have in procuring and transporting zoological and botanical specimens. There can be no doubt that both, and particularly the former, will prove of great interest, not only for the study of our Indian fauna, but also as being intermediate between that of India and Siberia on the one hand, and that of the Mediterraneo-Caspian and the Northern Chinese and the Japanese on the other hand. It would be very interesting to notice whether any, and which of the birds, and also of mammals which leave Siberia during the winter for the south, remain in the Trans-Himalayan valleys; such observations would greatly aid the study of geographical distribution of animals. Reliable observations regarding the forms of animal and vegetable life at great altitudes will be of particular interest, and especially so on the Karakoram range, which is not only the true watershed between Northern and Southern Asia, but virtually the average highest mountain range in the world.

If any limestone caverns be met with, they should be carefully searched, especially if of great extent, for any traces of the existence of a subterranean blind fauna, such as has made the caves of Corniola in Europe and of Kentucky in America so famous. The position in the cave of such animals, as may be found, should be noted, so that the observations of Schiödte, that those animals nearest the mouth of the caves (of Corniola) were most nearly allied to forms co-existing in the surrounding country, and their eyes least affected of all, while of those that occupied the deepest recesses many were not represented even in the fauna of the country, and all had their organs of vision completely aborted by disuse, may receive corroboration.

Geology.—In geology there is an immense field for observation. One of the principal tasks for the geologist should be to construct a geological section across the Himalayan and Karakoram ranges, a section which would bear comparison with similar ones made across the Alps in Europe. It is needless to say that the officer entrusted with this work should be well acquainted with the geological structure of the Alps.

Collections of fossils made in these regions would materially aid in establishing a proper correlation between the geological formations of the Himalayas and those of the Alps. It is known from previous travellers that the large plain of Thibet had formerly been inhabited by large pachyderms such as elephants, mammoths, &c., similar to those which we find on this side of the Himalayas in the Sewalik deposits. As yet only stray fragments of these ancient relics have reached the scientific world, and an endeavour should be made, not only to collect as many of these fossils as possible, but also to ascertain the age and stratigraphical relations of the deposits which contain them. Further, it is possible that the Great Vienna and Hungarian Miocene basin which gradually retreated towards the Caspian Sea, as the centre extended eastwards as far as the Pamir heights. Any information on the subject would prove of very great geological interest. We know on the one hand the Eocene nummulitic deposits are found in Japan, while the southern parts of China,

according to the recent explorations of Baron Richthofen, chiefly consists of crystalline and other rocks not younger than the Trias. It is possible that the Eocene Sea extended from Europe right through Central Asia to Japan; geological data bearing on this subject should be recorded with particular care.

Mineralogy.—Among useful minerals coal may be found, as it is believed that rocks of the carboniferous age had been brought from beyond the Karakoram; again the geological position of jade, turquoise, amber and other minerals, brought from the Trans-Himalayan regions, should as much as possible be ascertained. The gold washing should, if possible, be inspected.

Physical Geography.—The general physical features of the country are so intimately connected with the geological structure that a geologist ought to be able to do justice to them if he co-operate with the topographical survey, or particular attention should be paid to the former extent and depth of the Central-Asian lakes and water-basins, and their gradual diminution, because information on this subject will give us an idea of the former greater richness of animal and vegetable life in those regions, and because it is intimately connected with evaporation. The existence and nature of saline deposits, such as borax, salt, carbonate of soda, &c., should not be overlooked in connection with this subject. The extent, flow, and progress of glaciers should be noted.

The party should be supplied with the instruments necessary to make these observations, and also with a suitable instrument by which the evaporating power of the air can be at least approximately determined at different elevations in the valleys and on large glaciers.

Meteorology.—Whether meteorological observations can be taken with any degree of fullness must depend greatly on the means of transport. If these do not admit of instruments being taken other than such as are most compact and portable, it will be necessary to restrict the observations to the temperature and humidity of the air and to the direction and estimated force of the wind, the occurrence of rain, and the forms, quantity, and movements of the clouds; but if the means of carriage suffice, a barometer, radiation thermometer, an anemometer, and an actinometer should be taken, and also a small rain gauge. The chief points to which attention should be given are the following:—

1st.—The diurnal range of temperature in the shade which may be expected to be very great in so dry a country. Care will be required in selecting a proper place for the thermometers, to guard them from being affected by direct radiation to or from the clear sky.

2nd.—The minimum temperature of radiation at night should be observed, whenever possible, by a thermometer placed on the ground, and fairly exposed to the sky. In taking these observations it is necessary, if the ground is not level, to place the instrument in a slight hollow, or on black woollen cloth in a shallow box, or it will be affected by the convection of the air, and show a temperature many degrees higher than one protected from this influence.

It is probably greatly owing to this cause that the registered temperature of nocturnal radiation at certain of the Himalayan stations appears to be but little below that of a shaded thermometer.

3rd.—Any observations of the absolute heating power of the sun will be very valuable, since the dryness of the air is such that its absorption of solar heat must be small. At such times particular attention should be paid to the clearness of the atmosphere from dust, since if a dust haze prevails to any great height, the absorption of solar heat by the atmosphere may be very considerable. If the means of transport do not allow of an actinometer being taken (Hodgkinson's is the best), the maximum heat of the sun, taken by a black bulk thermometer *in vacuo*, will be valuable.

4th.—Observations of barometric pressure will probably be made for the determination of heights. If possible, a few sets of hourly observations, extending from midnight to midnight, should be taken for showing the range of periods of the diurnal oscillation. At the Himalayan hill stations the morning minimum is most frequently the absolute minimum of the day, which is far from being the case on the plains of India. It will be interesting to see whether on

the more elevated parts of the Himalayan and Trans-Himalayan plateaux the oscillation follows the same law as on the Indian plains or that of the hill stations. Also how the epochs of maximum and minimum vary in the higher latitudes.

A register of the direction and (in the absence of an anemometer) the estimated force of the wind, according to the Beaufort scale, is especially important. Particular attention should be given to the direction in which the clouds drift. It is stated by Mr. Shaw that in Eastern Turkestan the wind is chiefly from the north up to the great mountain range, whereas it appears from Hooker's and others' observations that to the south of Thibet it is from the south at all times of the year. It is scarcely necessary to say that among the mountains the winds are greatly affected by the direction of the valleys, so that the movement of clouds is the best criterion of that of the great air currents. But any observation on the local variation of the wind will be of interest. Its diurnal changes in the valleys and in the passes are worthy of special observation. The violent winds from the south which blow through the passes during the afternoon hours are described by many travellers, and are referred to by General Strachey to the heating and rarefaction of the air over the lofty table-lands of the interior. Night winds also blow down the valleys which are probably streams of air cooled by radiation and gravitating like water down the hill slopes and beds of the valleys. Any observation on them, the time they set in, their duration and force, and the temperature of these winds, will be important; also their upper and lower limits.

5th.—The humidity of the air will necessarily be very low. It should be observed when actinometric observations are taken and whenever hourly observations of the barometer are made; those of the hygrometer should be made also. Besides these, observations of the wet and dry bulb thermometer should be taken at other times as often as practicable. The movement of the clouds has already been referred to. Their quantity, forms, and estimated height at different seasons should also be attended to. These and the wind observations may be made at all times without the aid of instruments other than a compass.

Magnetic observations.—The only attempt to procure magnetic observations in Thibet and Turkestan, of which the Council are aware, was made in 1857 by the Brothers Schlagintweit, one of whom lost his life in the expedition. They only made a small number of observations, and none have since been attempted, so that the magnetic condition of the country north of the Himalayas may be looked upon as utterly unknown. John A. Bourne, who made a magnetic survey of part of Southern India in 1854, remarked, in the year 1860, that the magnetic lines in India are so abnormal and so discordant with the usual theory that a thorough examination of the whole area about the Himalayas was strongly to be recommended.

As the subject is one of extreme importance, and as the opportunity now presented of making such observations is one which may not occur for some time, the Council would urge upon the attention of the Government the desirability of taking advantage of it as far as may be practicable, and would suggest that Colonel Walker, the Superintendent of the Great Trigonometrical Survey, should be consulted on the subject and be asked, if he has not already done so, to make arrangements for the supply of such of the necessary instruments as may be available in India and can be taken with the expedition. If possible, the intensity should be determined at a few places, but if the time at the disposal of the observer should not be sufficient for the determination of this, observations of the declination and dip at even a few points would be valuable.

Ethnology.—An endeavour should be made to ascertain whether any traces of a pre-historic race of man exist. Caves and subrecent gravel deposits ought to be searched for any human or animal remains they may contain. Attention should be paid to the physical characteristics of the different races inhabiting the regions visited by the Mission, and any information as to their origin, migration, language, and dialects, the distinctive appellations of the tribes, and their sub-division, would be valuable. In all cases, when possible, measurements and photographs, showing the general appearance and costume, as well

as the distinctive facial characteristics and shape of the head of males and females of the different races and tribes should be taken and carefully recorded.

Geography.—The appointment of an officer of the Great Trigonometrical Survey, under the direction of Colonel Walker, R. E., is a guarantee that the interests of geographical science will be furthered to the utmost possible extent, and considering that Colonel Walker is most probably in possession of all available information regarding the geography of these regions, it seems unnecessary to the Council to enter into details on this subject beyond pointing out the desirability of making, if possible, an exploration in advance north and east from Yarkund towards Karashar.

History.—It is unknown what historical records and ancient remains exist in Turkestan, but every opportunity should be taken of securing oral and written information, with copies of any inscriptions, bearing on the history and antiquities of the countries visited by the Mission. Endeavour should be made to obtain the following manuscripts:—

1. *Tarikh-i-Rashidi* by Mirza Haidar Gurgani. It is a history of Kashgar to the reign of Abdurrashid, King of Kashgar [16th century], and contains interesting descriptions of Thibet, Kashgar, and Cashmere.

2. *Tazkirah Mugim Khani*, a history of the Uzhak Khans of Transoxiana.

3. Any other history on the family of Chengis Khan especially of more modern date. For the history of Kashgar during the years 1817, 1818, and 1819, we have no work whatever.

4. *A Tazkirah*, or history of the literature of Kashgar and surrounding countries.

5. *Nasabnamahs*, or genealogical works on the tribes in Kipchak, Bokhara, Kashgar, and Maghulistan (Mongolia) in general.

A collection of coins, plans, photographs, and description of Buddhist and Mahomedan antiquities will also be very valuable.

[*Progs., Polll. A., June 1873, Nos. 18-22.*]

APPENDIX V.

A COLLECTION OF PAPERS BEARING ON THE QUESTION OF THE ROUTE TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE MISSION TO YARKUND IN 1873.

I.

ACCOUNT OF EVENTS IN THE DOMINIONS OF THE AMEER OF KASHGAR GIVEN BY BUNIAD ALI IN THE BEGINNING OF 1873.

The Atalik Ghazee after conquering Urumchi made it over to Daud Khuleefa, the former King, and left Hakim Khan Tora in command of the fort of Urumchi with 3,000 sowars and four guns. The city was placed in charge of Daud Khuleefa. In the month of Shamval Daud Khuleefa rebelled, and for two months the troops of the Atalik were shut up in the fort, and the provisions in the fort were exhausted. Outside the fort the Tunganees had laid a gunpowder train. The garrison obtained knowledge of this; the Tora sallied forth, fired the train, and then attacked the Tunganees. The King with his son fled. The guns were loaded with pice instead of balls. The son of the King fled to Mannush Shahr, three or four marches from Urumchi, occupied by the Karakhatais. The Tunganees dispersed in various directions in the hills. The Tora reduced the Karakhatai whom he compelled to pay a tribute of 50 *yambus* monthly. Beyond Turfan the Atalik possesses two cities, named Lekchan Shahr and Pechan Shahr. From Pechan Shahr at a distance of eight or nine days' journey is situated Kuhul, which is ruled by a Mahomedan lady, who is feudatory of the Emperor of

• 23rd February.

China, but is on terms of correspondence with the Atalik Ghazee. On the 13th of Zilhij* Khal Mahomed Pansad started for Aksu in command of 200 sowars. On the 14th Mahomed Ali, son of the Dadkhwah, with 100 sowars, started for the same place. The same day Mirza Ahmed Yakub Kushbegi with 50 horse and Haji Beg Dadkhwah, Badakhsi, left with 200 sowars. Kuli Beg, eldest son of the Atalik, after reading prayers on the day of the Eed, left Yarkund with 400 sowars for Aksu. During the month of Zilhij, 3,000 sowars, under the command of Kuli Beg, started for Urumchi. As provisions were very dear in Turfan and Urumchi, the Atalik sent supplies for his troops. Kik Delawar, Yuzbashi, arrived from Aksu to bring to order the Surbazes in Yarkund.

On the 4th of Mohurram,† the son of the Dadkhwah returned from Aksu.

† 14th March 1872.

The second son of the Atalik arrived from Andijan. The Atalik sent for him to Aksu, and entrusted to him the government of Kashgar. He impressed men to enlist in the army. This year the road to Aksu was much injured by the rains. Between ten and twelve thousand persons were sent from Yarkund, Khotan, and Kashgar, &c., to repair it. The walls of the city of Yarkund were ordered to be repaired at the expense of the people. The Kakote (Customs Officers) of Yarkund was placed in confinement. Kazi Ibrahim Askar was deputed by the Atalik to enquire into certain extortions which had been reported to have been committed. The Kazi put up at a khankah. The Dadkhwah sent him a ziafut, but the Kazi refused to accept it. The Kazi went through the city, street after street, and affixed in a conspicuous place a proclamation written in the Turkish language.

The Atalik entered Kashgar on the 8th of Safar‡. He deputed an officer

‡ 17th April 1872.

Meer Ghazab from Kashgar to Yarkund. Six cart-loads of chogas and boots were sent to Kashgar. Kazi Shums-ud-din, Kazi of the city, was forwarded to Kashgar in charge of twenty sowars. In the month of Safar, Niaz Hakim, the Governor of Khotan, sent presents for the Atalik to Kashgar on 125 camels. On the 1st of Rabi-ul-awal§ the son of Niaz Kakim returned to Yarkund from Kashgar. On the 6th idem the Dadkhwah distributed "jamas" to the troops. There were at Aksu about three

§ 9th May.

thousand Chinese and Tunganees. The Atalik summoned all to Kashgar. These had all been brought away by the Atalik from Urumchi and Turfan. A large gun was sent from Yarkund to Kashgar.

In the month of Rabi-ul-awal* an Envoy from Kokan and one from the Russians, one after the other, arrived at Kashgar.

* May.

The Russian Envoy arrived on the 23rd of the month, attended with 30 Russian and a few Noghai followers. On the day of his arrival the Atalik had all his troops of all arms, including artillery, paraded in the plain outside Yangshahr. About four thousand Chinese and Tunganees were also exposed to view at the same time. The Envoy was lodged outside the fort. The troops were exercised for some days daily, and the Russian Envoy used to go to see them. He used to laugh at the arrangements which were made and the evolutions through which the troops went. The Chinese made a certain description of fireworks and let them off. The Russian Envoy went about freely wherever he pleased. The presents brought by him consisted of a few guns in boxes, &c.

The Atalik according to custom presented the Envoy with kinkhab, chogas and shawls, &c., 'tiwari' (Chinese silk), but the Envoy declined to take them, saying that the chogas were not suitable dresses for them. The Atalik then ordered dresses to be prepared for them in accordance with the Russian fashion. The Russians remained about 15 days in Kashgar; they left for their own territory on the 15th of Rabi-us-sani.† The Atalik sent with the Envoy a trustworthy principal officer of his own, named Mirza Makhdinn.

† 22nd June.

In the same month, on the 23rd, a Russian visitor arrived at Yarkund. The troops were turned out to practise. The Russian visitor saw them practise from his residence in the serai. The Surbazes under the command of Mahomed Pausad marched in separate files. Women, whether old or young, were prohibited through the Imams of mosques to go out into the streets. The Russian went through the bazar, and at each shop enquired for English goods, but none of the shop-keepers sold to him any article. They had orders from the Atalik not to sell to the Russian any articles of English manufacture, and to demand exorbitant prices, and in fact not to expose for sale any valuable English articles. If any trader was found to have sold any goods to the Russians, he would be punished. He went to the Zakatkhana, and enquired when kafilas usually arrived from Thibet, or what merchandize was ordinarily brought. He was informed in reply that the kafila used to arrive at close of the spring, and that merchandize of all descriptions was brought. The Russian enquired whether English guns were imported, and being answered in the affirmative, asked the number and the prices which they fetched. He was told that about 400 guns were brought, and the prices varied from 400 to 1,500 tungas. Next morning he again went through the bazar and took small samples of English clothes from several shops, and enquired why English goods fetched higher prices than Russian. He was told that English 'khasa' and 'malmal' was superior. Russian 'shalphar' and 'chintz' alone was good; the price of an article depended on its quality. The following day he went to the Yang Bazar, and the next day to the horse market. He selected a horse. An official of the Atalik's Government accompanied him. He instructed the owner of the horse not to sell him to the Russian. The owner, who was following the Russian, went away with the horse. The Russian on looking back found that the horse was gone, and asked where it had been taken away. The official replied that the owner had taken him away. He was much annoyed, but said nothing. He then went over to Mahomed Ishak Pansad, and told him that he suspected the traders had been all ordered by him not to sell any articles to him (the Russian). Mahomed Ishak replied that the owners of the goods were free to sell or not, as they chose.

The next day the Dadkhwah arrived in Yarkund. The Russian visitor before his departure solicited an interview with him, but was informed in reply that he must await till the Dadkhwah was able to obtain orders from his master permitting the interview. The Russian thereupon left without seeing the Dadkhwah.

A report was received during this same month from the Begbacha saying that perfect tranquillity had been secured in Urumchi and Turfan, the majority of the enemy had been destroyed, and the remnant had fled to Dawan. The Atalik was much delighted to receive this report.

Certain merchants from Buduksban brought double-barreled guns, the price of which was settled at 300 tungas each. Good swords and horses also were brought by them. The horses were sold at from 500 to 1,000 tungas each.

Thirty Afghan sowars were despatched from old Yarkund to Kashgar.

Three marches beyond Kashgar is a fort called Turk Koorgan. There two roads diverge respectively to Almati and Kokan. The Kurghan is garrisoned by 500 troops of the Atalik and several hundred Tunganees and Andijanees were stationed in it. After the Russian Envoy had left for Almati, the Tunganees attacked at night and killed about twenty of the Andijanees. A sowar was sent off to report the circumstance to the Atalik. Five hundred horsemen and two guns were sent off at once, with orders to annihilate the Tunganees. Two hundred Tunganees were then put to death; some fled.

An Envoy arrived from Kokan. He brought a letter from the Ruler, Khoda Yar Khan. The latter in his letter asked for 30,000 gold tillas. The Envoy was hospitably received. After the second interview orders were given for his being lodged in a certain house, and he was informed that orders for his departure would be given after a few days. He has not been yet permitted to return. It was generally said that the Envoy had been deputed by Khoda Yar Khan at the suggestion of the Russians. There is long-standing enmity between Khoda Yar Khan and the Atalik. The Envoy was permitted to return

• August, in the month of Jamidi-us-sani.*

When the Atalik on his way from Urumchi to Aksu arrived at Kara Shahr and Korla, all the Kilmaks, with their Queen, waited on him, presented a few horses, and acknowledged homage to him.

The Atalik accepted the presents and treated them kindly. He halted there a few days, but on his departure did not permit the Queen of the Kilmaks to go back, but directed her to reside in the fort. When the Atalik reached Aksu several thousand Kilmaks attacked the Atalik's troops, rescued and carried away their Kilmaks and Queen. The Atalik then despatched troops to Korla and Kara Shahr; one thousand men were slain.

“Give† us Tashkurgan and Koh-i-Zamarrud or Sugat to enable us to build a serai there. Both these places were given to us by the Emperor of China.” It is also reported that the Russians sent a message to the Atalik to say that all his relatives and family were residing within the territories of the white Emperor, why then was he corresponding with, and sending Envoys to, the British. Also that he should consider how the Rulers of Bokhara and Kokan had acknowledged submission to the Russians, and when these had done so, what objection had the Atalik to follow their example. The Atalik is reported to have replied that both these Rulers belonged to ancient dynasties, and had cause for gratitude, but that his country was the gift of God and had been acquired by the sword. It is also generally reported that the Atalik told the Russian Envoy that he himself was only Commander of the army, the country belonged to Yunus the Dadkhwa. It is also commonly said that it was the Atalik's wish to annoy the Russians, and to interdict their intercourse with his territory, but that he was advised by Mahomed Yunus not to do so, as circumstances were unfavourable to the adoption of such policy. The Atalik is irresolute what to do. He is anxious to fight and also to maintain peace. Should the Russians demand a tribute of slaves and slave-girls, he will certainly fight. If a money tribute alone is demanded, he will gladly pay it. He feels reluctant to give up so large a kingdom. The Atalik is anxious to extend his dominions beyond Urumchi. The Tunganees and Chinese dread him, but they are more afraid of the Russians. The principal Andijanees are much alarmed, and wonder whither the Russians will now direct their attacks. The army is being placed on an improved footing. During this year four times the usual revenue has been realized from the people who are much discontented.

† The sense is incomplete here; it would seem that the writer meant to say that a message had been received from the Russians to the following effect.

(Sd.) P. M. L.

Masonry hamams (baths) have been ordered to be built in the cities of Kashgar, Yarkund, and Khotan.

After the departure of the Russian Envoy, the hamams in Yarkund have been completed.

Mirza Shadi, the Atalik's Envoy to India, who returned with Mr. Forsyth, was not permitted for some time after his return to appear before the Atalik. During several months he was ordered to be flogged after being stripped; subsequently the flogging was discontinued. When the Atalik proceeded from Aksu to Kashgar, Mirza Shadi accompanied him thither. He was made to sit in the sun daily from morning till evening. Some days after arrival at Aksu the Atalik sent an attendant of his own to Mirza Shadi to enquire whether he had yet become a Mahomedan or not. The Mirza replied that by the grace of God he was a Mahomedan before, and that he had now been confirmed. The Atalik laughed on hearing this, and after two days summoned him to his presence, bestowed a *jama* on him, and ordered him to reside in an appointed place.

An Envoy came from Meer Mahomed Khan of Budukshan, and brought a message to the effect that during the Chinese rule the Meer used to receive zakats from Yarkund, but that since the occupation of the country by the Atalik none had been sent, and arrears were due for seven years. The Envoy has not yet been permitted to return. The Meer is reported to have also intimated that if the Atalik refused to pay the zakat, he (the Meer) would not permit horses and other merchandize to be taken to Yarkund from Budukshan. The Atalik replied that it was lawful to demand zakat from the Chinese, but unlawful for a Mahomedan to demand it from a Mahomedan.

Certain merchants from Budukshan brought double-barreled guns and swords manufactured at Oorgunj; the Dadkhwah did not offer more than 150 tungas for any gun. The merchants refused to sell them for that price, and if the Atalik does not purchase them at a larger price in Kashgar, they propose to take them back to Budukshan.

In the year in which Mr. Forsyth proceeded to Yarkund, an Arab, Khalil Afendi, accompanied his camp. The Atalik during this year summoned him to Kashgar, where he remained about a month. The Atalik treated him with marked hospitality and gave him valuable presents. It appears that this man always spoke of the British with contempt, calling them Kafirs and Nazarenes; he also spoke of the Nobles of India as haughty and proud. Before he had obtained audience of the Atalik, he used to speak of none so. The gifts of *yambus* and gold tillas which he received from the Atalik, however, did not permit him to restrain himself. He spoke ill of Buniad Ali to the Dadkhwah, and said generally that no Mussulman of India was worthy of reliance.

Khwaja Ghafur Shah, Naksbandi, arrived at Yarkund three days after the great Eed. Regarding him all Cashmerees, small and great, Khalik Dad Ras-ul-Meer, and Mahomed Shah among the former, and Kabir Shah, Sadik Shah, Ahmed Shah, Mahomed Shah, &c., among the latter, told the Dadkhwah that Ghafur Shah was a paid spy of the British Government; that formerly, during the rule of the Chinese, his father had come to Yarkund and had died there. The Dadkhwah was thus prejudiced against him. The day following his arrival, Khwaja Ghafur Shah visited the Dadkhwah and gave some presents. The Dadkhwah sent him a choga, some cash, and provisions. In a few days the Khwaja succeeded in acquiring the good-will of the Dadkhwah. Subsequently, on the invitation of the Atalik, the Khwaja proceeded to Kashgar; the Dadkhwah provided the expenses of the journey. The Khwaja was very honorably treated by the Atalik, and remained for about a month in Kashgar.

The Bokhara Prince is still in the Yang Hissar Fort; his old dependants have been separated from him.

Abdoolla Khan, the Maharaja of Jummo's Agent at Yarkund, has been kept under surveillance during the past year, and his movements have been circumscribed by the authorities. An allowance of 40 tungas (= Rupees 8) daily was made to him, besides provisions. When the Russian, one of the Embassy to Kashgar, came to Yarkund last summer, he tried to obtain an

interview with Abdoolla Khan, but did not succeed. There is, however, good reason to believe that the Russian had an interview with Khalik Dad, the Cashmeree, who has been in Yarkund for six or seven years past, and who is supposed to be an Agent of the Maharaja.

Abdoolla Khan and Khalik Dad have both now returned to Leh; the former paid his respects to the Atalik Ghazee at Yang Hissar before he left for Leh.

The armourers, natives of Kotli, are at Aksus, those of Lahore, &c., at Yarkund; they are in great distress. They cry and weep to return to their own country, but are not permitted. Hassan Khan, gun-powder manufacturer, makes very superior powder, compared with which English powder is not prized.

During this year, Khalik Dad, Mahomed Shah, and Rasul Shah caused me much annoyance; they brought accusations against me before the Governor, but the latter did not listen to them. At length they instigated a man and a woman of Yarkund to bring a charge against me of having murdered their son, who was employed as a servant by me, and appropriated his property. They claimed one thousand tillas as blood-money from me. The case was referred to the Court. The Magistrate called for witnesses; none were procurable. I was ordered to make oath before the Cazeec.*

* Sense not complete.

(Sd.) P. M. L.

A report was received that the interpreter who accompanied the Russian Envoy had died of an epidemic disease at Tashkend which had raged in Andijan, and had carried off ten thousand Russians and five thousand Mahomedans. The Governor of Tashkend did not permit the Atalik's Envoy to proceed to the Imperial Court, but informed him that a reply would be received to the Atalik's reference.

Hamid Kari, the Atalik's Envoy to Jummo, had been supplied on his starting from Yarkund with 1,200 gold tillas for the expenses of his journey, besides provisions to take him to Ladakh. This man borrowed 30 *yambus* from the Maharaja. He was ordered to repay these to Abdoolla Khan, but he was unable to liquidate the debt, and asked Abdoolla Khan to give him an acknowledgment, who replied that he would do so only after the *yambus* had been paid. Hamid Ali was thrown into prison, his property sold, and the *Yamus* repaid to Abdoolla Khan.

It is reported by people who have arrived from Almati that the Russians have collected large supplies there, and the Russians have made very good arrangements there. A road has been made from Almati to Och-Turfan, which will enable merchants to reach Aksu in ten or twelve days. The Atalik has erected a fort on that route. It is also reported that some verbal quarrel took place between a Yuzbashi Officer of the Atalik and some Russian troops. The Atalik has sent Haji Beg, Badakshi, to explain matters.

In the month of Rajab† a Russian Envoy, with 40 followers and a confidential Agent of the Atalik's Envoy, was reported to have arrived on the Kashgar border. The Atalik sent word to the Envoy intimating that he alone might come accompanied by the aforesaid Agent. The Envoy complied with this request, and came on leaving his attendants in Russian territory.

† September.

Syud Ahrar Khan Tora, the Envoy from the Atalik, returned to Yarkund from India at night on the 14th of Rajab,‡ and was sent on the same night to Kashgar. Strict orders were given that mention was not to be made of the Envoy having returned from India. All his followers were placed in confinement. It was reported that two Englishmen had come with the Tora, and they had been sent on at night. It was also said that Ehrar Khan had stopped in Yang Hissar, where the Atalik would himself come over.

‡ 18th September.

The people, the troops, the merchants are all groaning under the Atalik's oppress on. He is fortunate, and has already taken possession of the country as far as Urumchi. He now contemplates taking Kunjut. Thus far he has noted down much information which has been collected from deserters from the

Maharaja's army; also regarding the route to Kunjut. He causes men without distinction of rank, whether Pansad, Yazbashi, or Sowar, to be slaughtered for the slightest fault. The zemindars complain bitterly, especially as they have been fleeced this year. Some were only able to pay the demands made by selling, not only their lands, but household property. If they utter any complaint, they are beaten; many killed themselves. The people cannot find a way to India, or they would congregate to it with their families. Even now they intend to attempt to do so on pretext of a pilgrimage to Mecca. The principal Beks are anxious to be rid of the Mahomedan Government, and to place themselves under the protection of the British Government. They are anxious that the British Government may take possession of the country; and if the Government desired to do so, the principal Beks or Chiefs would readily afford every aid in providing supplies, &c. The people are in dread of the Russians.

[*Proceedings, Secret, April 1873, No. 60.*]

II.

OBSERVATIONS BY MR. T. D. FORSYTH ON BUNIAD ALI'S MEMORANDUM.

Buniad Ali's account of events in the Atalik's territory is, I think, tolerably correct, and agrees in most particulars with the version given by the Envoy.

Fide Secret Proceedings, December 1873, No. 191.

But on the following points I think he is in error:—

He makes out that there is now enmity between Kokan and the Atalik, and that Khodayar Khan, Ruler of Kashgar, had demanded 30,000 gold tillas from the Atalik. The Envoy assured me there was friendship between the two Rulers, and certainly the Atalik draws his staff of officers from Andijan (Kokan).

The same remark applies to Budukshan, between which country and Yarkund there has been an interchange of civilities. The alleged demand of *zukt* by Budukshan is more than doubtful. Budukshan is not in a position to make any aggressive demands, unless backed up by some higher power; and as the ruler is subordinate to Cabul, we should have to believe that Ameer Shere Ali was the instigator or supporter of the alleged demand.

The road said to have been made from Almati (Vernoje) to Och-Turfan I do not believe in. The Envoy assured me there were only three roads from Russia to Kashgaria—one from Kokan by the Terek Pass, the second from the Naryn by the Jadir (or Chatyr) Kul, and the third from Kuldja over the Tengri Khan to Aksu. Buniad Ali says the Atalik contemplates taking Kunjud or Kunjut.

This place is on the north side of the Karakoram Range and is the abode of a robber tribe, who for years have molested traders and travellers between Ladakh and Yarkund. The Envoy told me that the Atalik had received deputations from Kunjut, who offered a kind of allegiance or friendly relationship and had offered presents to him.

The turbulent character of the Atalik is probably exaggerated. When I met Buniad Ali coming from Yarkund in 1870 near Sanju, he gave rather alarming accounts of the state of feeling amongst the people which I found was not true. It was then said by him that the people were anxious to rise, and a revolt was considered by him to be imminent. But three years have passed away in perfect tranquillity. The alleged desire of the Beks to be rid of the Mahomedan Government, and to place themselves under the protection of the British Government I altogether disbelieve. As a comment on this supposed state of ferment, I may mention that this Buniad Ali, a native of Mozuffernuggur, North-Western Provinces, India, has established family connections in Yarkund which he prefers to his family in India. He told me a short time ago he intended to settle in Yarkund and is now hastening thither.

The story he tells of the Russian sayings and doings in Yarkund is, I think, tolerably correct, and agrees with what the Envoy said.

It is remarkable to find him quoting the message from the Russians:—
'Give us Tashkurgan and Koh-i-Zamarrud or Sujet to enable us to build a

serai there. Both these places were given us by the Emperor of China.' We know from their Treaty with China in 1860 that the Russians desire to establish themselves in the south-west parts of Yarkund territory. I reported in 1868 the demands of the Russians for a road through Sir-i-kol, and for a cantonment at Yoomah. Buniad Ali seems to know nothing of the Treaty concluded last year between the Russians and the Atalik, by which they will of course carry out their intentions.

What those intentions are I think we may tolerably easily guess. I observe in the Cabul Diaries a report that the Russians had demanded permission to establish themselves in the Sir-i-kol District. This agrees with Buniad Ali's statement, and with information given us by the Envoy, Mahomed Yakooob, who told us that the Russian officers in Kashgar had spoken of the route to India over the Pamir as much more practicable and desirable than that over the Karakoram.

It appears to me that the point to which our most urgent and earnest attention has to be turned is the Pamir. We have drawn, on paper, a boundary line, it is true, across which the Russians are not to pass. But beyond the fact of the Oxus being the boundary, we know very little of the geography generally, and next to none as regards the portion not bounded by the river. The negotiations between our Foreign Office and Russia this year did not attempt to go beyond Wood's Lake. It was considered that the Atalik's territory came in there, and somehow or other that territory was excluded from all negotiation. But what would happen supposing Russia to declare Kashgaria to be under her protection, and she were to establish her officers or a cantonment or serais at Tashkurgan (Sir-i-kol)? Russia would then have full right to come up to Wood's Lake on the north-east side, and from thence could come down into Yassin.

Yassin is at present not under British or Afghan influence, and perhaps if the Russians got up to the Pamir as far as Wood's Lake, we should find it difficult to object to their entering into their immediate neighbour's territory, Yassin. Anyhow, as this point has been left out of the negotiation, it is quite possible for the Russians to raise discussions on it.

In these negotiations the Oxus has been made the boundary, but nothing has been said about its navigation. Supposing then it be an object to the Russians to hold the line of the Oxus to Kashgaria, I do not see that our negotiations have in any way hindered them. They can use the river as far as it is navigable, and then they can take the road on the north side up to Wood's Lake, whence they can pass through Kashgar territory to Yassin, who knows what is the boundary of Wakhan on the East? *No one in India!*

Now assuming, which I think the information we possess justifies us in assuming, that the Russians are very desirous of locating themselves in Tashkurgan (Sir-i-kol); we must also assume that they will lose no time in taking advantage of their new Treaty, and will at once extend their influence as far in one direction as they possibly can. They will explore the Pamir, travel in the direction of Yassin, and then declare it to be all within their sphere of protection.

We may come after and look and protest, but the mischief will have been done.

It is everything to be first in the field, especially in tracts of which we have so little accurate knowledge.

I therefore adhere to the opinion expressed by me in March last, as to the advisability of sending the Yarkund mission by the Budukshan route. By passing over that route we make it our own, and we shall get the first correct knowledge of the country. It may be very different and exceedingly difficult if we have to pass from Yarkund to Budukshan through a Russian position, and perhaps having to ask their permission.

III.

NOTE BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, DATED JUNE 5TH, 1873, ON BUNIAU ALI'S MEMORANDUM OF EVENTS IN YARKUND.

So far as we at present know, Russia does not claim any protectorate over Yarkund. The engagements sent us officially are purely commercial, and in the general discussions with Russia we *have* received assurances from her to which I have referred in the draft despatch about Central Asia, that she will not make aggressions on Yarkund.

I quite agree with Mr. Forsyth that it is desirable we should be the first to explore the Pamir. But to send the Yarkund Mission up that way, through an unknown country, is to court failure. *After our object at Yarkund has been obtained*, the Mission might return by the Pamir and Budukshan if they see their way to do so; but to go up that way would, in my humble opinion, be a serious mistake.

IV.

MINUTES BY SIR R. TEMPLE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ROUTE TO YARKUND, DATED 19TH AND 21ST JUNE 1873.

Minute of 19th June 1873.—The matter discussed at the end of Mr. Forsyth's note is, no doubt, of much importance.

The Pamir and Budukshan route may prove to be of consequence.

And if we do send a Mission to Yarkund, we may well take the opportunity of exploring the above route.

But I incline to concur in thinking that the best plan will be for the Mission to *first* go straight to Yarkund and accomplish its object there, and then to return by Pamir and Budukshan.

Minute of 21st June 1873.—In continuation of my note of the 19th regarding the Pamir and Budukshan route being taken by Mr. Forsyth on his Mission to Yarkund, I desire to revise the opinion therein expressed.

I am much impressed by the information which from time to time crops up about the Russians desiring to settle at *Tashkurgan* in the south-west corner of the Yarkund territory.

I do not say that the truth of this is proved. But there is probably some sort of proof, and I find that Mr. Forsyth believes it.

If the Russians do entertain this particular desire, it can mean nothing but mischief to British interests.

In the first place, it must mean some sort of interference with Wakhan and the eastern boundary of Budukshan.

But in the second place it may mean interference with Chitral and Yassin.

For Tashkurgan lies just north of the two last-named places.

Now we are on bad terms with Chitral and Yassin (especially since the murder of Mr. Hayward): these places are independent, acknowledging allegiance neither to Cabul nor to Cashmere.

Moreover, they form topographically a wedge in the midst of the northern boundaries of Cabul and Cashmere, which otherwise form a tolerably continuous line from east to west as a general direction.

A Russian Agent then established at Tashkurgan might intrigue with Chitral and Yassin and obtain a status there, thus impinging right upon the British political limit, cutting the line as it were, and intervening like a wedge between Cabul and Cashmere.

Further, from Chitral there runs a river in a southerly direction to join the Cabul river near Jellalabad. On the whole, topographically and apart from political difficulty, the Chitral route might be quite the best and straightest from Peshawur to Yarkund.

Again any foreign influence extending to Chitral would make itself felt, first at Gilgit, and secondly at Swat.

The first would affect Cashmere ; the second would affect Peshawur.

Altogether the *possibility* of the Russians establishing themselves at Tashkurgan is a consideration demanding the attention of the Government of India.

But *how* does all this affect the question of Mr. Forsyth's taking the Pamir route on his way to Yarkund instead of on his way *back* ?

Nobody proposes to send him by the Chitral route, because there would be no guarantee for the safety of the mission. What, then, has the Pamir route got to do with Chitral ?

Well just this. If the mission went by the Pamir route, it would pass, not by, but tolerably near, Chitral. The Chief would most probably wait upon the British Envoy. Some relations more satisfactory than those now existing would be established.

If he, Chitral Chief, came in, the Yassin man would come in too.

However much the murder of Mr. Hayward is to be deplored, we must come to some understanding for the future with these two Chiefs.

It might not be advisable to send a mission for this purpose alone. But as the Yarkund mission can perhaps pass that way, the opportunity should not be lost. Again, the mission going by Pamir would emerge near Tashkurgan ; would pass close by Wakhan. The moral effect might possibly be to prevent or retard the Russians settling at Tashkurgan at all, and probably prevent their interfering with the Wakhan boundary. It would certainly prevent their interfering with Chitral.

If my view of the importance of the matter be at all correct, then *time* is an object. And it would be of some moment that the mission should go by Pamir as *soon* as possible, that is, on its way *to* Yarkund.

Of course there remains the question whether the Ameer of Cabul will provide for safety of mission as it passes through his territory on its way to Pamir.

If he refuses, there would be an end to the project. But if he agrees, then I would let Mr. Forsyth take his mission by the Pamir route, if he sees fit, on the way to Yarkund.

[*Fide Keep-Withs, Secret, December 1873, Nos. 189-191.*]

V.

MEMORANDUM DATED 8TH JULY 1873, BY MR. T. D. FORSYTH, GIVING AN ACCOUNT OF A CONVERSATION WITH SYUD NOOR MAHOMED SHAH, ENVOY FROM THE AMEER OF CABUL, WITH MARGINAL NOTES BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY.

In accordance with the permission given by the Foreign Secretary, I called on Syud Noor Mahomed a few days ago to ask the co-operation of the Ameer of Cabul in establishing postal communication for our mission between Yarkund and Peshawur *viâ* Budukshan and Cabul.

I do not think anything whatever is to be inferred from the Envoy's ignorance about Wakhan. He has never been in Turkestan at all, has not even been to Herat ; the only parts of Afghanistan, with which he is well acquainted are Cabul, Candahar, and Furrak. He told me himself that he knows very little about Turkestan ; and, considering the system of government in Afghanistan, there is nothing surprising in the geography of distant dependencies not being known at head-quarters. What, e.g., do we know of the geography of Looshai land or Munnipoor

I found the Envoy completely ignorant of the fact of Wakhan being incorporated with Afghanistan, and quite unacquainted with the geography of the country. I, therefore, drew up a paper in Persian, copy of which is submitted herewith, and sent Faiz Buksh to explain matters to him.

Yesterday the Envoy called on me to discuss the subject. He then informed me that he had never heard of Wakhan except casually, and he called it *ba* Wakhan. Possibly in the records at Cabul he said there might be some mention of it as being part of Budukshan

or the Assam frontier; or for that part of it what do we know of the Garrow hills or the northern boundary of Cashmere?

and paying its quota of the tribute which the Ameer receives from Budukshan.

(Sd.) C. U. A.

As regards Chitral and Kafirstan he acknowledges that it is at present rebellious and pays nothing; but he said it was the peculiarity of the States which belong to Afghanistan that sometimes they paid tribute and often did not, and though for 100 years a State might not pay anything, that would be no argument in favor of its independence. He, therefore, considers Chitral and Kafirstan to be parts of the Ameer's kingdom. In fact it was not so very many years ago that the Chitral Ruler did pay tribute to Budukshan. Later on in our conversation, when he heard that Futteh Ali Shah was Ruler of Wakhan, he said that this personage had presented himself to the Ameer three years ago and declared his submission, but he did not know that his country was called Wakhan.

I think we should be very careful how we commit ourselves in the present state of our information to any definite statements regarding the boundary between Afghanistan and Yarkund. The Yarkund Envoy, when in Calcutta, went so far as to say that Budukshan belonged to Yarkund. What is the precise boundary cannot be settled on the mere statement of F. B. It is matter to be settled if necessary after communication with both Governments and when fuller information has been acquired.

The Envoy then asked how far the boundary of Yarkund was from Afghanistan, and Faiz Bukesh who was present explained that the Yarkund boundary extends as far as the Shindi Pass at the head of the Aktash river. Between the Shindi Pass and Wood's Lake there is the high tableland of the Pamir extending for five days' journey.

The Envoy asked how far the Anglo-Russian agreement carried the boundary, and on being told as far as Wood's Lake, he said:—

(Sd.) C. U. A.

Then there is a wide plain of five days' journey in breadth which is open to dispute, and gives a road to Russia, to Chitral and Cashmere.

This caused him some deep reflection, and he finally expressed a hope that the Viceroy would allude to the subject with the importance of which he was fully impressed, but said he had not sufficient knowledge to volunteer its discussion. He further said that if His Excellency expressed a wish to that effect, he would arrange through the Ameer for the establishment of communication with me in Yarkund. At one time he seemed to think it difficult to keep communication between Punja in Wakhan and Tashkurghan in Yarkund, the distance between being twelve days' journey over an uninhabited country. But on my pointing out that between Ladakh and Yarkund communication had to be kept up over much higher and desert ground for a distance of more than a month's journey he understood my reasons and gave a general assent.

With reference to his desire that some definition of the boundary between Afghanistan and Yarkund should be made, I beg to call attention to the information given by the Hon'ble Mr. Davies in his letter to the Viceroy, dated 29th May, and repeated by Mr. Wynne in his last communication forwarding Colonel Gardiner's statement.

I think the Report indicates the necessity of great caution as to what we may say regarding the boundary between Yarkund and Afghanistan. We really know little or nothing about it.

(Sd.) C. U. A.

It is very evident that some one desirous of causing mischief has started the idea that the effect of the Anglo-Russian boundary agreement has been to transfer a portion of the Atalik's territory to Afghanistan, and if this idea be instilled into the Atalik's mind we may perhaps have trouble with him.

Unfortunately, owing to our defective knowledge of the geography of the Pamir, and a misapplication of names, some color is given to the false report that we have assigned away part of the Atalik's territory.

The distinction between Lake Sir-i-kol and the territory called Sir-i-kol is perfectly well understood and is noted on Montjomerie's route maps.

(Sd.) C. U. A.

This word Sir-i-kol was first used, I believe, by Wood, and Faiz Buksh thus explains how it came to be so used: "Kol" is Turki for lake, "Sir" is head or end. In going up the valley of the Oxus towards the lake, the native of that part would speak of the going up to the end of the lake Sir-i-kol, and thus Wood speaks of the roads up the (Durrak) valley to (Sir-i-kol) head of the lake. It is properly called Pamirkol and the Tarikhi Rashidi calls it simply Kol.

On the north side of the Amu the long broad valley which runs up to the head of the Aktash river is called Sir-i-kol or head of the broad valley, or perhaps it might be translated "upon broad valley." This term is applied to a large tract and is popularly accepted to refer to that tract only.

I observe that Colonel Gardiner remarks* in his communication to Mr.

* This refers to a man who was sent forward by the Envoy as a sort of *avant courier* to announce his approaching arrival. No foundation could ever be found for these reports.

Davies that Syud Yakoob Khan's follower left his master and returned to Yarkund to let the Atalik know that England and Russia have agreed to deprive him of the sovereignty of the Dasht-i-Kirghiz or Sir-i-kol Lake in Pamir Kullan and have transferred the same to the Ruler of Cabul, and, adds Colonel Gardiner very significantly, 'it may not be from this quarter alone that the Atalik has been advised on this matter.' This last remark of his, coupled with the concluding portion of his remarks to Mr. Wynne as last reported, indicate pretty clearly the quarter whence this rumour is being sent forth to disquiet the Atalik's mind.

I think this matter should be left quite open till we know more about the facts.

(Sd.) C. U. A.

We have taken the Oxus boundary up to what is called the Sir-i-kol Lake. But I have already pointed out that Wood's Lake, which is what we really mean, is not popularly, in those parts at least, known as Sir-i-kol. But the word Sir-i-kol is applied to the tract of country on the northern slopes of the Pamir, the chief place in which is called Tashkurgan.

When, therefore, the term Sir-i-kol is used, it is understood by the people of those parts to apply to the Atalik's territory, so that it is quite possible that through this mistake the Atalik may be led to believe that we have encroached on his possessions.

As regards the proprietorship of the tableland between Wood's Lake and the Shindi Pass, Faiz Buksh, who having travelled over the ground is the best authority I can quote, considers that it should belong to Wakhan and so to Afghanistan. This tableland possesses the finest pasturage in the world, and is frequented during summer months by the Kirghiz with their flocks. So far as I can make out these Kirghiz roam from the Alai Pamir (in Kokand) boundaries southwards down to the Hindoo Kosh, and it is very probable, as pointed out by Colonel Gardiner, that the Khan of Kokand may be induced to assert his claim to the ground intervening between Woods's Lake and the Shindi Pass.

I may be wrong but I cannot avoid the conviction that the requisition of the Russians for permission to establish themselves at Tashkurgan in the Sir-i-kol District, their reluctance to accept our ideas of Wakhan boundaries, and the alleged assertion of his rights by the Khan of Kokand, and our experience of Cashmere diplomacy, have all some connection, and whilst we

Yes, but after obtaining fuller data which, if the mission return by the Pamir, Mr. Forsyth will have an opportunity of collecting.

should put a stop to this mischievous rumour that we are invading the Atalik's rights over Sir-i-kol, I think we ought to define clearly the boundary between Afghanistan and Yarkund, and this is evident by the wish of Syud Noor Mahomed.

(Sd.) C. U. A.

[*K.-W. Progs. Secret, January 1874, Nos. 74-76.*]

APPENDIX VI.

DRAFT OF TREATY WITH YARKUND REFERRED TO IN SECTION 223, CHAPTER VIII.

Whereas it is deemed desirable to confirm and strengthen the good understanding which now subsists between the high contracting parties, and to promote commercial intercourse between their respective subjects, the following Articles have been agreed upon :—

ARTICLE I.

The high contracting parties engage that the subjects of each shall be at liberty to enter, reside in, trade with, and pass with their merchandize into and through all parts of the dominions of the other, and shall enjoy in such dominions all the privileges and advantages with respect to commerce, protection, or otherwise, which are or may be accorded therein to the subjects of such dominions, or to the subjects or citizens of the most favored nation.

ARTICLE II.

Merchants of whatever nationality shall be at liberty to pass from the territories of the one contracting party to the territories of the other with their merchandize at all times and by any route they please ; no restriction shall be placed by either contracting party upon such freedom of transit unless for urgent political reasons to be previously communicated to the other ; and such restriction shall be withdrawn as soon as the necessity for it is over.

ARTICLE III.

European British subjects entering the dominions of the Atalik Ghazee for purposes of trade or otherwise must be provided with passports certifying to their nationality. Unless provided with such passports they shall not be deemed entitled to the benefit of this Treaty.

ARTICLE IV.

[For future consideration.]

ARTICLE V.

Goods imported from India into the territories of the Atalik Ghazee will not be opened for examination till arrival at the place of consignment. If any disputes should arise as to the value of such goods on which the duty not exceeding $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. is to be levied, the Customs Officer or other Officer acting on the part of His Highness the Atalik Ghazee shall be entitled to demand not more than one-fortieth part of the goods in lieu of the payment of duty. If the aforesaid Officer should object to levy the duty by taking a portion of the goods, or if the goods should not admit of being so divided, then the point in dispute shall be referred to two competent persons, one chosen by the aforesaid Officer and the other by the importer, and a valuation of the goods shall be made, and if the referees shall differ in opinion they shall appoint an arbitrator whose decision shall be final, and the duty shall be levied according to the value thus established.

ARTICLE VI.

The British Government shall be at liberty to appoint a Representative at the Court of His Highness the Atalik Ghazee and to appoint Agents subordinate to him in any towns or places within His Highness' territories. His Highness the Atalik Ghazee shall be at liberty to appoint a Representative with the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and to station Commercial agents at any places in British India. Such Representatives shall be entitled to the rank and privileges accorded to Ambassadors by the law of nations, and the Agents shall be entitled to the privileges of Consuls of the most favored nation.

ARTICLE VII.

British subjects shall be at liberty to purchase, sell, or hire land or houses or depôts for merchandize in the dominions of His Highness the Atalik Ghazee, and the houses, depôts, or other premises of British subjects shall not be forcibly entered or searched without the consent of the occupier unless with the cognizance of the British Representative or Agent and in presence of a person deputed by him.

ARTICLE VIII.

The following arrangements are agreed to for the decision of civil suits and criminal cases within the territories of His Highness the Atalik Ghazee in which British subjects are concerned :—

(a.)—Civil suits in which both plaintiff and defendant are British subjects and criminal cases in which both prosecutor and accused are British subjects, or in which the accused is a European British subject, shall be tried by the British Representative or one of his Agents;

(b.)—Civil suits in which one party is a subject of the Atalik Ghazee, and the other party a British subject, shall be tried by the Courts of His Highness in the presence of the British Representative or one of his Agents or of a person appointed in that behalf by such Representative or Agent;

(c.)—Criminal cases in which either prosecutor or accused is a subject of the Atalik Ghazee shall, except as above otherwise provided, be tried by the Courts of His Highness in presence of the British Representative or of one of his Agents or of a person deputed by the British Representative or by one of his Agents;

(d.)—Except as above otherwise provided, civil and criminal cases in which one party is a British subject, and the other the subject of a foreign power shall, if either of the parties is a Mahomedan, be tried in the Courts of His Highness; if neither party is a Mahomedan, the case may, with consent of the parties, be tried by the British Representative or one of his Agents: in the absence of such consent by the Courts of His Highness;

(e.)—In any civil case disposed of by the Courts of His Highness to which a British subject is party, it shall be competent to the British Representative, if he considers that justice has not been done, to represent the matter to the Atalik Ghazee, who will cause the case to be re-tried in some other Courts, in the presence of the British Representative or of one of his Agents or of a person appointed in that behalf by such Representative or Agent. The decision passed on such re-trial will be considered final.

ARTICLE IX.

The rights and privileges enjoyed within the dominions of the Atalik Ghazee by British subjects under this Treaty shall extend to the subjects of all Princes and States in India in alliance with Her Majesty the Queen; and no separate agreements shall be made by His Highness with any such Prince or State.

ARTICLE X.

Every affidavit and other legal document filed or deposited in any Court established in the respective dominions of the high contracting parties, or in the Court of the Joint Commissioners in Ladakh, may be proved by an authenticated copy, purporting either to be sealed with the seal of the Court to which the original document belongs, or in the event of such Court having no seal, to be signed by the Judge or by one of the Judges of the said Court.

ARTICLE XI.

When a British subject dies in Yarkund, his moveable and immoveable property situate therein shall be vested in his heir, executor, administrator, or other representative in interest or (in the absence of such representative) in the Representative of the British Government in Yarkund. The person in whom such property shall be so vested shall satisfy the claims outstanding against the deceased, and shall hold the surplus (if any) for distribution among those interested.

ARTICLE XII.

(Alternative.)

If a British subject in Yarkund becomes unable to pay his debts, or fails to pay any debt within a reasonable time after being ordered to do so by any Court of Justice, the British Representative may, on being satisfied of the propriety of so doing, declare such insolvent person to be a bankrupt. The bankrupt shall be bound to state the amount and particulars of his property and of his debts with the names and residences of the creditors. The British Representative, or such person as he shall appoint, shall take possession of the property of the bankrupt situate in Yarkund, and shall use his best endeavours to obtain possession of the property (if any) of the bankrupt situate elsewhere, and shall convert into money all the property of the bankrupt, and distribute it among the creditors existing at the time of the application according to their several rights, and deliver the surplus (if any) to the bankrupt. The bankrupt and all property subsequently acquired by him shall be discharged from the claims of his creditors, provided he has made a full and true disclosure of his property and debts, and has done all that reasonably lies in his power to aid the British Representative or his appointee in obtaining such property. And a certificate to that effect shall be granted by the British Representative or his appointee to the bankrupt when the British Representative or his appointee is satisfied that the bankrupt has duly performed the conditions.

If a British subject in Yarkund becomes unable to pay his debts or fails to pay any debt within a reasonable time after being ordered to do so by any Court of Justice, the creditors of such insolvent shall be paid out of his goods and effects; but the British Representative shall not refuse his good offices, if need be, to ascertain if the insolvent has not left in India disposable property which might serve to satisfy the said creditors. The friendly stipulations in the present Article shall be reciprocally observed with regard to Yarkund subjects, who trade in India under the protection of the laws.

ARTICLE XIII.

This Treaty having this day been executed in duplicate and confirmed by His Highness the Atalik Ghazee, one copy shall, for the present, be left in possession of His Highness, and the other, after confirmation by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, shall be delivered to His Highness within twelve months in exchange for the copy now retained by His Highness.

[*Secret, January 1874, No. 195.*]

APPENDIX VII.

INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY CAPTAIN MOLLOY REGARDING THE PERSONS WHO ACCOMPANIED THE ENVOY ON HIS RETURN FROM CONSTANTINOPLE IN AUGUST 1873.

I HAVE the honor to supply you with the following information concerning the followers the Yarkund Envoy brought back with him from Constantinople. They are 12 in all, and their names and description are as follows :—

No. 1. Zaman Beg, Mahomedan, native of Shukki, a village near Tiflis in Daghistan, subject of Russia.

This man is undoubtedly a gentleman of birth and position. As far as I have been able to learn of his history, it appears that he passed several years of his boyhood at a school in St. Petersburg, and that afterwards he obtained some civil appointment in Tiflis, where he has property of his own.

He married in Tiflis and has four children, all boys.

The two eldest of these children were put to school in Tiflis, where it seems pressure was put upon them to change their religion from Mahomedanism to that of the Russian creed; as Zaman Beg said to me, "The Russians wanted to their make my children Russians, not only in ideas and feelings, but also in religion."

Indeed Zaman Beg felt this so much that he took his boys from school, and shortly after throwing up his civil appointment at Tiflis betook himself with these children to Constantinople, where he has now been living for the last two years, and there it appears he intended settling altogether.

He has left his wife and two children at Tiflis to look after his property, which he is trying to negotiate the sale of, but it appears that the Russian Government are putting all the obstacles they can in the way of his selling this.

He talks openly and strongly of the harsh treatment he has experienced at their hands, and I have no doubt that his dislike and distrust of them is honest and not feigned. He met the Envoy at Constantinople through an introduction he got from the Prime Minister of the Sultan, who is a compatriot and also a personal friend of his (Zaman Beg's).

His avowed motive in accompanying the Envoy is to travel and see the country, but I cannot help thinking that he may also have an idea of seeing and reporting to the Turkish Government all he may be able to find out of the Russian movements in Central Asia. I know that he would be glad to get some official employment under the Turkish Government at Constantinople, so it is not unlikely he may now be doing something to lead to this.

As he has a perfect acquaintance with the Russian language, he will have great opportunities of gaining information as to their movements.

Though his manner is modest and retiring, I found him very ready and willing to talk, and after a time he would often come of himself to my tent to see me.

The Envoy's manner to Zaman Beg puzzled me at times; he seemed in Bombay to make more of him a good deal than he did latterly, and from what I heard from others at Constantinople Zaman Beg was made more of than he was in Bombay.

He was told by the Envoy at Constantinople that there would be no necessity for his bringing any servants of his own, as his (the Envoy's) men would look after him, but no man ever did a thing for him on the road, and Zaman Beg often regretted to me that he had not brought a servant of his own, saying he had to do things now which he had never put his hand to in his life before.

No. 2. Ismail, an officer of artillery in Turkish army, come out for two years to drill and instruct artillery of Atalik Ghazee. This officer is on

the pay of the Sultan, who supplies all his expenses. He is a young man who recently passed out of some military college at Constantinople.

No. 3. Yusuf, cavalry officer in Turkish service, come out with Envoy for two years to train cavalry. Quite a young man, recently having got his commission, seems intelligent and smart. Took copious notes of the road and country he passed through every day.

No. 4. Yusuf, infantry officer in Turkish service, come with Envoy for two years to drill infantry. Quite a young man, recently got his commission.

No. 5. Mahomed Tahir, formerly a Yuz Bashi in Turkish army, has seen a good deal of service, and has three medals, retired from Turkish service a year or two ago on account of bad health, was persuaded by the Envoy at Constantinople to take service with him. Envoy promising to make him, on arrival in Yarkund, a Bimbashi (Colonel), and look after him on the road, supplying him with funds, &c.

He has, however, given him no funds on the road, and it came to my ear that Mahomed Tahir has more than once expressed himself much disgusted at the way he is being treated.

No. 6. Ismail, a Khivan, many years settled in Constantinople, a man who learnt in Constantinople how to make caps, and who has come out with Envoy to carry on this business in Yarkund. This man and his son were left sick at Leh.

No. 7. Mahomed Tahir, son of above, a boy of 10 or 12 years of age.

No. 8. Hajee Mahomed, a gun-founder, who knows how to cast guns, and has been taken on by Envoy for this reason.

No. 9. Mahomed Murad, Turk, personal attendant.

No. 10. Hafiz Hussein, Turk, personal attendant.

No. 11. Bushir, Ethiopian, personal attendant, left sick at Leh.

No. 12. Hazi Tajik, Turk, personal attendant.

It would perhaps interest you to know that I one day read out to the Envoy the account of Yarkund and Kashgar by Pundit Munphool. Although the Envoy, from the fact that he was during the whole period of the Atalik Ghazee's rise to power absent at Constantinople, is ignorant of many of the details of these events, still he has a general idea of all that went on, and he seemed to think Pundit Munphool's account on the whole very correct.

The end of the Kirghiz Chief, Sidik Beg, is not mentioned in this history. According to the Envoy, after the arrival of the Atalik Ghazee with Buzurg Khan on the scene, Sidik Beg twice stirred up insurrections. The first time he applied for assistance from Moollah Alum Kul, regent of Khokand, from whom he got 2,000 men.

This force was completely defeated by the Atalik Ghazee, who took Sidik Beg prisoner, but afterwards released him.

The second time Sidik Beg got together 5,000 men and took the city of Kashgar, where he was besieged for 40 days by the Atalik Ghazee, who then took the place and put Sidik Beg to death with many others of the insurgents. I think it right to mention that Mr. Shaw does not seem to think the story of Sidik Beg's having got assistance from Alum Kul likely to be true, as he says Alum Kul was the person under whose orders the Atalik Ghazee proceeded to conquer Kashgar.

Buzurg Khan, after having been deposed by the Atalik Ghazee, was sent by him to the Haj; he is now living at Khokand.

Sultan Mahomed, who formerly as a boy was nominal ruler of Khokand, with Alum Kul as his regent, the Envoy says, paid a visit to Khokand last year, where he was killed.

APPENDIX VIII.

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM BY SIR T. D. FORSYTH, DATED SANJU, OCTOBER 31ST, 1873,
GIVING AN ACCOUNT OF CONVERSATIONS WITH SYUD YAKOOB KHAN TORAH ON
THE JOURNEY FROM SHAHIDULLA TO YARKUND SECRET, SEE SECTION 233,
PAGE 175, CHAPTER VIII.

THE visit at Constantinople has evidently had the very best possible effect on the Syud in enabling him to form a correct idea of the relative positions of European nations and their politics, and the advice he appears to have received from the Turkish Government is sound and judicious.

He was advised on no account to allow any deviation from a strict adherence to any engagement entered into with the Russian Government, and so long as peace is maintained between England, Russia, and Turkey, to keep friends with Russia and England.

As regards England, the Syud said her friendship with Turkey was a source of great strength to the Mahomedan nations in Asia, and it was the advice of the Turkish Government that the Atalik should make friends with Afghanistan as being an ally of Great Britain.

* * * * *

At Constantinople the Envoy said he received a visit from a German who professed to be quite disinterested in his enquiry regarding the Atalik Ghazee's feeling towards Russia, but on learning from the Envoy that there was no sort of hostility lurking in his mind he soon developed into a messenger from General Ignatief and proposed an interview. The Envoy says that General Ignatief endeavoured by every means in his power to dissuade him from

* Something omitted apparently :—
"were distrusted by" (?)

(Sd.) C. U. A.

† Something apparently omitted :—
"at Hussan Abdul where" (?)

(Sd.) C. U. A.

trusting the English, who, General Ignatief said, were proverbial for their want of faith* people subject to their influence. The Envoy said he replied by relating the scene he saw at the Durbar held† about 500 Chiefs and leaders from the Punjab and beyond the frontier were received by His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor. General Ignatief warned the Envoy not to allow the English to improve the road to Yarkund, or to open posts or erect telegraphs in that direction, as this would only be a precursor to their taking the country from the Atalik Ghazee. The Envoy says he replied that it was the Atalik Ghazee's object to open his country as much as possible to their civilization; that he lived in a corner of the Globe where little news of what passed in the rest of the world could reach; and unless he took measures to communicate that civilization he would be some day swallowed up by a Power without the knowledge or being able to ask the assistance of any one. General Ignatief then tried to persuade him to return through Russia, promising him every assistance of every kind. To this he replied that he dared not comply even if he wished to do so, as it would be a direct disobedience of the Atalik Ghazee's orders; moreover, he had left India after arranging for the despatch of an English mission to accompany him on his return, and he could not break faith with the Indian Government. General Ignatief asked him if the movements of the English mission were dependent on his, and asked whether it was true, as reported in papers, that if its departure was delayed till late in the season the road would become impassable. To this the Envoy replied that the mission was sent by the Viceroy to the Atalik Ghazee, and was not dependent on his movements. General Ignatief finally endeavoured to tempt the Envoy to abandon his allegiance to the Atalik Ghazee by pointing out that as that person had risen from nothing to be the ruler of a large kingdom, there was no reason why the Envoy should not carve out a kingdom for himself, and if he wished it General Ignatief offered to help to secure for him Budukshan and Cashmere, the former of which belonged to nobody, and the latter was dissatisfied with the English rule. The Envoy's reply to this was that the

Atalik Ghazee had not sought any kingdom for himself. God had given it to him, and so long as it was God's will he would keep it, and the Envoy had cast in his lot with his relative and desired no change.

* * * * *

Whilst at Constantinople the Syud heard of the arrival of the Envoy from Kashgar at St. Petersburg, and of his cordial reception by the Czar. This was quite in accordance with the treaty of friendship already concluded, but as a matter of precaution, the Syud addressed a letter to his master, couched in general terms, informing him that all was well, and begging the Atalik to let his mind be at ease. This letter he sent through General Ignatief to the Envoy at St. Petersburg, to be forwarded to Kashgar, and he informed me yesterday that it had arrived at its destination.

Of the Syud's hearty determination to maintain close friendship with the British Government so long as there is peace between us and Turkey and Russia, there can, I think, be no doubt. Should war unfortunately break out between these countries, he says the Atalik from his position would be obliged to consult his own safety according to circumstances, and, as he acknowledges that we are too far off to render his master active help, and that Russia's hand is on his throat, I suppose the meaning is that, should war break out, he would join Russia in self-defence. But the tendency of his mind is to avoid falling into the Russian hands if it can possibly be avoided, and his inclinations are all towards England.

The Syud spoke with some warmth on the doubts cast on his sincerity in Srinuggur by his not being allowed to see Dewan Kripa Ram, except in the presence of an English official. Wherever he went, whatever he said, and to whomsoever he wrote, he said he had openly proclaimed his sentiments towards the British Government, and he said it was paying a poor compliment, either to his wisdom or his sincerity, to suppose that in half an hour's conference with the Cashmere Prime Minister that official could accomplish what so astute a statesman as General Ignatief had failed to attain.

I am wholly in ignorance, except from what he tells me, of what passed at Cashmere, but from him I learn that he had an interview with the Maharaja, who personally expressed his own opinions, and the Syud informs me the Maharaja was most anxious to remove the impression that he was opposed to the present British Mission, and begged him to efface any such idea should he have received it. The Maharaja pointed out, however, that he had been the first to enter into friendly relations with the Atalik and had interchanged friendly missions, and he hoped that now he would not be left out of consideration altogether. The Syud's feelings have undoubtedly undergone a change regarding Cashmere. He acknowledges that in 1870 Abdoolla, the emissary sent from Cashmere when the former mission from the Viceroy was in Yarkund, did his utmost to thwart British interests; but he says the Maharaja has been taught a severe lesson, and as the trading interests of Yarkund are bound up with Cashmere, he does not wish to see the country treated thus without full consideration. He admitted that Dewan Kripa Ram was not worthy of much trust, but he was satisfied of the sincerity of the Maharaja's intentions. The position now taken up by the Syud with reference to Cashmere may have an embarrassing effect when we come to discuss the details of the proposed Treaty, and I have, therefore, given the account of our conversation at length.

The Syud informed me that Ghuffur Shah, true to this character, had utterly denied having spread injurious reports, and with cool impudence had attributed them all to some designing persons who propagated them to meet a supposed opposition on the part of the Lieutenant-Governor to the despatch of a mission.

The Syud asked, with some anxiety, whether the stories of Ghuffur Shah had been believed by the Viceroy, and was much relieved, evidently, when I gave him a satisfactory assurance. He informed me that the fiction of an army of 4,000 men having been sent to Yarkund had been industriously spread and had caused considerable alarm, and he gave a good reason for attributing the origin to Ghuffur Shah. He purposes ascertaining the exact truth from Haji

Russoul when we meet him in Yarkund. The Syud asked me what object I had in view as regards the Treaty; I know not whether Mr. Aitchison spoke* to him on the subject at Umballa, but the Syud professed to have heard nothing; I therefore alluded to his conversations in Calcutta, a

* I carefully avoided speaking to him at Umballa about the Treaty. The negotiations having been committed to Mr. Forsyth's hands, it would have been obviously wrong on my part to have discussed the Treaty with the Envoy.

(Sd.) C. U. A.

copy of which, I said, I had by me. Everything, he said, which had been agreed to by him then would be ratified by the Atalik. I asked him then regarding the establishment of a British officer as ambassador in Kashgar. In this he professed acquiescence, but expressed doubts as to the Atalik's consent on one ground only, *viz.*, that as the Russians would not be behind us in anything, the grant of this to us would be the signal for their demanding the same, and this he would wish to avoid. However he said there would be no hesitation on the part of the Atalik to place us on the footing of the "most favored nation," and whatever was accorded to Russia would be immediately granted to us, or in fact more would be given to us than to others.

This is rather a serious matter and I recurred to it yesterday, and thinking that by naming Mr. Shaw as the person to be employed I would remove all objection, I again put the question, but the Syud was rather more positive than before, and said he knew perfectly well what things the Atalik would not consent to. I then suggested that as the Envoy to St. Petersburg had not yet returned to Kashgar, and as the Russians would be pretty sure to send a return embassy with him, it would be as well for us not to talk on this subject for the present, but wait to see what came from Russia. To this he replied that the Russians had completed their treaty and could not now ask for more: that probably they would despatch Envoys periodically, but there was no intention on their part to locate a regular Russian in Kashgar. All they proposed doing was to appoint some Russian subject, a Nogai perhaps, as trading Agent, and this is what he proposes we should do. Hereafter if necessary, we could appoint an English Ambassador. I then said, how, in such case, would you propose to provide for disputes and the protection of our merchants, and what rules would there be as regards their liberty? He answered, as regards men of your own country we arranged in Calcutta that none were to come without passports given by the Commissioner at Leh. Natives of Hindoostan may come and go quite freely and would be subject to the Shayat—Mahomedan law. I was unable to pursue the conversation then, and have not had another opportunity of resuming it.

The matter is one of much importance, for it affects securing the successful accomplishment of the wishes of His Excellency as regards the appointment of Mr. Shaw, but I hope that the wording of the Treaty may be adopted without objection, and the question as to whether the British representative should be a native of Hindoostan, as probably desired by the Atalik, or whether His Excellency the Viceroy would wish me to press the point is one on which, perhaps, I may receive further instructions before leaving Yarkund territory. My present feeling, in the circumstances as presented, is that it would be advisable not to attempt too much. The Atalik is described by the Syud to be proud and apt to take offence, and but little acquainted with the customs of Western nations. He has been accustomed to rule in the most despotic manner and to keep everybody in a state of subjection. To ask him all at once to throw open his country to new traders is a very great step to take, and it is possible he might be alarmed if we pressed every point too hard. I alluded in conversation to the rapid conclusion of the Russian Treaty. Yes, he said, but the officer who came demanded it as a proof of friendship and gave a threat of different treatment if it was not conceded.

The evident inference to be drawn from this being that the Atalik knew he might hope for much, but had nothing to fear from us.

The Syud's advice is *festina lente*, and I believe him to be both sincere and right. By degrees, as he frequently assures me, everything will come right, whereas precipitation may spoil all. Even supposing us to accept the proposal only to establish a British (non-European) representative at first, there will be no opposition raised to the periodic despatch of an English Envoy on a friendly

visit to the Atalik's Court, and all things considered, perhaps this would be a better proceeding, as regards the personal safety of the officer concerned, than leaving him in Kashgar for a continuance. And the Treaty, if adopted in its integrity, is so worded as to include a European representative should it be considered advisable to send one.

As regards the liberty of the present Mission there is not the slightest intention expressed of limiting our action or movements, but it is highly inexpedient to take advantage of this liberty, so opposed to all former ideas and practice, till we have met the Atalik and thoroughly established ourselves in his confidence, and I have, therefore, desired the officers and followers to keep as quiet as possible and conform as much as can be to the customs of the country, and I have given the Syud an assurance that nothing shall be done without his approval.

Even in the matter of surveying, and the pursuit of geological and other science, though the Syud, with his liberal ideas, sees no positive objection, still I agree with him that until we have made the acquaintance of the Atalik, and have explained fully the objects of the Mission, it is better not to excite suspicion by exhibiting scientific instruments to an ignorant superstitious people.

As regards our return by Budukshan, the Syud has expressed himself in very decided terms of approval; he promises to lend every assistance, and will be glad of the opportunity to enter into friendly communication with Afghanistan. I suggested the possibility of some one coming from the Ameer of Cabul to arrange for our dâk and for our return by that route, and the Syud accorded his cordial approval.

[*Proceedings, Secret, No. 210, January 1874.*]

APPENDIX IX.

RECEPTION OF THE BRITISH MISSION BY THE AMEER YAKOOB KHAN AT KASHGAR ON THE 11TH DECEMBER 1873. DELIVERY OF LETTERS TO THE AMEER FROM HER MAJESTY AND THE VICEROY.

Thursday, 11th.—The formal reception of the Mission took place at 2 P.M. to-day in the Fort.

The Mission left the Residency (Elchi-khana) in the following order:—

Two Sowars of the escort preceding Sergeant Rhind, who carried the casket containing the Queen's letter, and Havildar Ahmed Gool, who carried that containing the Viceroy's letter, two chuprassis on either side in scarlet with silver sticks.

Mr. Forsyth, accompanied by Ahrar Khan Torah, and followed by the officers of the Mission.

The Cavalry of the escort in rear.

Behind all came the presents, carried by upwards of 100 men, under the charge of Ibrabim Khan and Tara Sing.

The party dismounted in the first quadrangle after passing through the first gate, and proceeded in the same order (the Cavalry remaining with the horses) to the "Audience Hall," where the Ameer received on the first occasion.

There was a great display of armed men in the gateways and quadrangles. The guard (a very strong one) at the inner gateway rose as the Queen's letter was carried past.

On reaching the Audience Hall the Envoy was conducted in alone by Ahrar Khan Torah, and was received by the Ameer standing. Mr. Forsyth after the first salutations congratulated His Highness on the title of "Ameer" conferred by the Sultan of Turkey, both then sat down, and the officers of the Mission were introduced one by one, shaking hands with the Ameer, saluting him by his new title, and taking their seats near the Envoy.

Mr. Forsyth then, addressing the Ameer, said that he was the bearer of letters from the Queen and the Viceroy which he wished to deliver to His Highness with their accompanying presents.

Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon and Ressaldar Mahomed Afzul Khan rose, went to the door, and received the casket containing Her Majesty's letter from Sergeant Rhind, carrying it half way up the Hall, where it was taken by the Envoy, and by him, kneeling on one knee, placed before the Ameer. Mr. Forsyth, then rising, presented the letter with a complimentary address in Persian to the following effect: "I have the honor to present this letter from Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and Empress of Hindostan. Since the Government of Her Majesty is on terms of amity and friendship with all the Governments of the world, it is hoped that the same relations may be established between the British Government and that of Your Highness."

The Ameer replied: "God be praised! This is a very great honor, and it makes me exceedingly happy." He expressed his extreme pleasure in many similar words.

Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon and Ressaldar Mahomed Afzul Khan returned to the door and arranged for the presents from the Queen passing by the verandah before the open door before which the Ameer was seated, after which they were taken into His Highness' private apartments close at hand.

On the Envoy intimating to the Ameer that he would next present the letter from the Viceroy of India, Captain Biddulph rose, went to the door of the Hall, and received the casket containing it from Havildar Ahmed Gool, of the Guide Infantry. He carried it half way up the Hall and was met by Mr. Forsyth, who placed the casket before the Ameer, and delivered the

letter standing with a complimentary address to the following effect: "I have the honor to present this letter from His Excellency Lord Northbrook, Viceroy and Governor-General of India. When Syud Yakoob Khan went to India and had the honor of meeting the Viceroy at Calcutta he made known Your Highness' virtues and high qualities. On hearing which His Excellency was extremely gratified and pleased, and when he returned from the capital of Turkey and the success of his Mission was known, it became a source of still greater pleasure to His Excellency. On the part therefore of the Queen, the Viceroy, and all people of England, I congratulate Your Highness. Happy be your dignity of 'Ameer' and title of 'Khan!' May the sun of your State always shine with effulgence."

The Ameer replied with warmth and earnestness: "Praise be to God. This is a very high mark of distinguished favor. I am extremely gratified." He spoke continuously in this style of his gratitude for, and his pleasure in, the honor he stated himself to have received.

Captain Biddulph then returned to the door and arranged for the presents from the Viceroy passing before the Ameer in the same manner as before. The following report of the conversation that ensued is furnished by Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon and Dr. Bellew.

The Ameer said: "You have done much for me in coming here, and I am exceedingly glad to welcome you. The Queen of England has shown me great favor and has done me very high honor. I look mainly to England, and I consider myself most fortunate in obtaining the friendship of the English nation. The Queen of England is a great Sovereign, whose friendship is to be greatly desired, for it is always most beneficial to those who possess it. I look to the English for favor and good-will. I prefer their friendship. The Queen of England is as the sun to me, making poor people like me happy when shining on them."

In reply to Mr. Forsyth's speech that the desire of the Queen and of the Viceroy was to increase the friendship and intercourse between them and Kashgar, he said with eagerness and earnestness: "*Inshallah* (please God!) it will be so! it will be so! the road is open, free, and safe even to London! I have heard much of the Queen of England and her treatment of other nations; how anxious she always is to promote peace and encourage trade and intercourse between them. I have heard much of the Palumpoor bazaar, and your name has always been mentioned in connection with it. You established a trade with my country. You planted seed there which is bearing good fruit. The name of 'Forsyth Sahib' is well known to me as one who has always worked with a kindly intent towards my people and country." With reference to the success of Syud Yakoob Khan's Mission to Constantinople, he said: "What could he, helpless man, have done there without the great and valuable assistance of the English Government. The English have shown me great favor and wonderful kindness. Syud Yakoob Khan was treated with great honor in India. You raised me in dignity by the honor paid to him. Ahrar Khan Khoja was also treated with high respect and favor. The kindness of the English towards my Envoys and people is great. You have gone through much fatigue and hardship on a long and difficult journey to come here to show the favor of England towards me."

A *dastar-khwan* was brought in, of which the Ameer partook with the Envoy and officers.

On taking leave the Ameer repeated his welcome ("*Kush-Amaded*") as on the previous occasion.

The Mission then returned to the Elchi-khana attended by Ahrar Khan Torah.

The only person present at the reception of the Mission and during the interview was Ahrar Khan Torah, and he remained standing at the door at the farther end of the Audience Hall.

P.S.—As Kashgar is the capital of the Ameer's kingdom, His Highness should be addressed as "Ameer of Kashgar and Yarkund."

APPENDIX X.

LETTERS BROUGHT FROM KASHGAR BY MR. FORSYTH.

TO THE QUEEN.

HOLY is the Almighty God, who is most beautiful, and who has no other veil over His face than that of light. The beauty of God is ever visible and not covered.

A stanza of four lines.

O God! thou art concealed by great lustre.
Thyself art the universe, as thou art all in all.
Thou art a Being of whom no description can be given.
Thou art a Being, who cannot be pointed out.

God be merciful to his friend (the Prophet), whose perfections, such as are fit for him, are now concealed, but which will become known to all in due time.

God's mercy be also upon the Prophet's descendants and companions (who draw light from His light) at all times, both when the negligent people forget to repeat His name, and when the people offer up their prayers to him.

Be it known to Your Gracious Majesty that, praise be to God, my condition is a cause of gratitude to the Almighty. Actuated by feelings of friendship, I always offer up my prayers to the Creator of the universe for the welfare of Your Gracious Majesty (Sovereign of the world), and of the pillars of Your State.

At this fortunate time Mr. Forsyth, one of the confidential officers of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, having been appointed as Envoy was deputed to this country with a letter containing sentiments of sincere friendship, and proposals for the welfare of the people of both States, and he reached this territory at an auspicious moment. By this I was placed under a great obligation, and the ties of friendship were strengthened. To form friendship and union is considered to be the principal object of life, and nothing can be deemed more beneficial to a kingdom than to have a regard for the promotion of the welfare of its people. Naught save what has been said above finds a reflection in the mirrors of my heart, and it is my constant desire to do these good things. Acting in accordance with the contents of Your Gracious Majesty's letter, I entertained, as far as lay in my power, the said Envoy with hospitality for a few months and attended to his business. On the last day of Mohurrum I gave him leave to take his departure.

My hope is that the doors of this sincere friendship between the two Governments may ever remain open, and that the people may be benefited thereby.

I beg to be gratified from time to time with accounts of Your Majesty's good health.

TO THE VICEROY.

YOUR Excellency's gracious letter with the accompanying presents, forwarded by Mr Forsyth, the Envoy deputed by Her Gracious Majesty the Sovereign of the world, has duly reached me, and since it gave expression to sentiments of sincere friendship, it served to afford me pleasure. My Envoy, Syud Yakoob Khan, described to me Your Excellency's virtues and sincere wishes for the welfare of my Government, and when these same were repeated to me by the Envoy of Her Majesty's Government, how is it possible for me not to be gratified, since it is well known to every wise man that friendship is approved by every people, and that a regard to the welfare of the people is an excellent quality and pleasing to the Almighty. For all these reasons a deep friendship has been engendered in me towards Your Excellency. Acting therefore in accordance with the requirements of Your Excellency's letter, I entertained the above Envoy for a few months, and on the last day of Mohurrum I gave him leave to take his departure. My hope is that, as long as I live, amity and concord may be maintained between the two Governments, and that the advantages thereof may be perpetuated to the people of both States.

I trust that Your Excellency will always communicate to me accounts of your good health.

APPENDIX XI.

RULES SANCTIONED FOR THE PUNJAB REGULATING THE IMPORT OF CHURRUS.

I.—Merchants bringing churrus into the Punjab from Yarkund must obtain a pass from the British Joint Commissioner at Leh or from the Deputy Commissioner of the Frontier District. The name of the merchant, the quantity of churrus (both the gross weight of the packages and the net weight of the churrus being given), the tract of country and period of time covered by the pass shall be entered.

II.—The possession of churrus in any quantity exceeding five tolahs without a pass signed by one of the officers mentioned in Rule I. is prohibited, but a reasonable time shall be allowed to enable the merchants to reach the head-quarters of the frontier district, or (in the case of churrus brought into Kula) the Sultanpoor Tehsil.

III.—No pass shall be issued for a smaller quantity than five seers; merchants arriving in British territory possessing churrus in excess of five tolahs and below five seers must make arrangements for the disposal of such churrus to the Government farmer of excise or his Agents, or to wholesale dealers licensed under Section 15 of Act X. of 1871. They should ascertain at the nearest Police Station or Tehsil the names and addresses of these persons.

IV.—No fee shall be levied on account of the pass.

V.—When application for a pass under these rules is made to the Deputy Commissioner of the Frontier District, or to the Joint Commissioner of Ladakh, such officer shall on granting the pass seal the packages in such a manner that no churrus can be removed from the packages without breaking the seals.

VI.—Traders wishing to show a specimen of their churrus to any of the persons licensed to sell churrus wholesale under Section 15 of Act X. of 1871, or to the Government farmer of excise or his Agents, may make an incision not more than two inches long in the case containing the churrus and may take out a small quantity not exceeding two chittacks in weight. Traders should be cautioned to make these incisions in the presence of some revenue or excise officer not below the rank of a Jemadar. Such incisions are to be made only at the instance of a person who is licensed to buy churrus.

VII.—The period of time covered by the pass may extend to any period not exceeding six months.

VIII.—The tract of country covered by the pass may comprise any districts in the Punjab or North-Western Provinces named by the merchant, which can be reached by a continuous route.

IX.—On entering any district mentioned in the pass other than that in which the pass has been granted, the merchant must present his pass to the Deputy Commissioner or Collector of the District, or to the Tehsildar of the Tehsil through which he intends to pass, who will examine the seals and compare the packages with the entries in the pass, and after satisfying himself that the amount of churrus, after making allowance, for deduction under Rule XVII., coincides with the amount entered in the pass, will attest it by his signature.

X.—If on arrival at the head-quarters of any district mentioned in the pass the merchant wishes to alter the route covered by the pass, or to convey part of the churrus to one place and part to another, the pass may be cancelled, and a fresh pass or passes granted.

XI.—If on the expiry of the period covered by the pass the churrus is not all disposed of in the manner hereinafter described, the merchant must procure a fresh pass from the Deputy Commissioner or Collector of the District covered by the pass in which he may be.

XII.—The fresh passes mentioned in the two preceding rules are subject to the same conditions, and confer the same privileges as the original pass.

XIII.—The quantity of churrus actually in transit should be compared with the amount covered by the pass in the manner prescribed in Rule VIII. on each occasion on which it is presented for countersignature or renewal.

XIV.—No sale of churrus under these rules shall be effected unless it is protected by a pass obtained as above.

XV.—The merchant on arriving at the head-quarters or at any tehsil of any district mentioned in the pass may dispose of his churrus to the person or persons holding the farm of the duties leviable on the retail sale of churrus for the district in which the sale is made, or to wholesale vendors of churrus licensed under Section 15 of Act X. of 1871, but to no other person on penalty of the fines and forfeitures described in the Act.

XVI.—On the occasion of every such intended sale the sealed package must be presented, if at head-quarters, to the Deputy Commissioner of the district, or if at any Tehsil, to the Tehsildar with its seals unbroken, and the above-mentioned officer, after satisfying himself that the amount of churrus contained in the package corresponds with that entered in the pass (due allowance being made for the deductions mentioned in Rule XVII.), will record the sale, which may then be allowed, and will re-seal the packages in the manner described in Rule V.

The merchant must be warned that if the packages are found open and any churrus is sold from them, except as above provided, he will be proceeded against under the excise laws, and the packages will be liable to confiscation.

XVII.—In all comparison between the amount of churrus in transit and the amount covered by the pass, allowance shall be made for previous sales recorded under Rule XVI. and for samples given under Rule VI., and for dryage on the following scale:—

APPENDIX XII.

TEXT OF THE CONCESSION GRANTED TO BARON REUTER BY THE PERSIAN GOVERNMENT.

ENTRE le Gouvernement de S. M. I. le Schah de Perse, d'une part et le Baron Julius de Reuter résidant à Londres d'autre part. Il a été convenu et arrêté ce qui suit :—

ART. I.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale Le Schah autorise par les présentes le dit Baron de Reuter à fonder à Londres sous le nom et avec les statuts qu'il déterminera, une ou plusieurs Sociétés pour entreprendre et exécuter dans toute l'étendu de l'empire les travaux d'utilité publique qui font l'objet de cette Concession.

ART. II.

Le Gouvernement Persan accorde au dit Baron de Reuter et à ses associés ou représentants la concession exclusive et définitive pour une période de soixante dix ans, d'une ligne de chemin de fer s'étendant de la mer Caspienne au Golfe Persique, avec droit exclusif et définitif de faire tous embranchements qu'ils jugeront convenable, soit pour rélier entre elles les provinces et les villes dans l'intérieur de l'Empire, soit pour rélier les lignes Persanes aux chemins de fer étrangers par n'importe quels points de la frontière, vers l'Europe ou vers les Indes.

ART. III.

Le privilège exclusif est également accordé aux présents concessionnaires d'établir des "Tramways" sur tous les points qu'ils jugeront convenables, soit pour mettre en communication les différents centres de population, soit pour rélier aux chemins de fer ou aux différentes entreprises de la compagnie. La compagnie jouira pour l'établissement et l'exploitation de ces Tramways de privilèges accordés aux chemins de fer (Art. 4, 5, and 6).

ART. IV.

Le Gouvernement accorde gratuitement aux concessionnaires sur les domaines de l'Etat tous les terrains nécessaires pour la construction et l'exploitation de la ligne avec double voie, voies d'évitement, gares, stations, habitations d'employés, usines, chantiers, et dependances. Pour les terrains appartenant à des particuliers, la compagnie devra s'entendre de gré à gré avec les propriétaires mais le Gouvernement s'emploiera de tous ses moyens pour les lui faire obtenir au prix courant du pays, usant au besoin du droit d'expropriation forcée. En dehors de la largeur normale de la voie le Gouvernement accorde gratuitement à la compagnie sur tout le parcours et de chaque côté de la ligne, trente mètres de terrain à prendre dans les domaines de l'Etat sur les terres incultes et non mises en valeur. Si en dehors des villes et des villages les plus importants où il est de l'intérêt de la compagnie d'établir ses stations les nécessités de la ligne exigeraient l'établissement de stations sur plusieurs points isolés et incultes, le Gouvernement concèdera gratuitement à la compagnie une superficie de quatre kilomètres carré aux lieux désignés par elles pour ces stations afin d'assurer une existence facile aux employés qu'elle serait obligée d'y établir.

ART. V.

La compagnie est autorisé à prendre gratis sur les domaines de l'Etat les matériaux nécessaires à l'établissement et à l'entretien de la voie tels que pierres, sable, gravier, &c. Quant au matériel accessoire, utensiles, provisions, bêtes de somme, &c., que la compagnie aurait à acheter sur place aux différents lieux de ses travaux, le Gouvernement empêchera qu'elle soit taxée pour les prix d'une manière vexatoire et excédant le prix courant du pays.

ART. VI.

Tout le matériel nécessaire à la construction ou à l'exploitation de la ligne entrera en Perse sans payer aucun droit, ni le droit de Douane ni le droit de mer pour le débarquement des marchandises, ni le droit d'emmagasinage ni enfin à l'entrée ou sur la route aucun autre droit quelconque qui pourrait être mis en avant par quelque autorité ou quelque particulier. La Douane se réserve cependant le droit de contrôle mais de manière à ce qu'il n'entrave en rien l'exacte et rapide arrivée du matériel à sa destination. La même franchise de franchise s'appliquera au matériel de toutes les entreprises ou exploitations de la compagnie, ses employés seront exempts de tout impôt à l'intérieur, tous ses terrains quels qu'ils soient seront libres de tous impôts ou taxes quelconques et les produits de ses exploitations en tout genre auront libre circulation dans l'Empire et libre sortie, francs de toute taxe et de toute droit.

ART. VII.

Le mode de construction et d'exploitation de la ligne et l'époque ou chaque section devra être livrée à la circulation seront déterminés de gré à gré avec le Gouvernement au cahier des charges qui sera annexé à la présente concession.

ART. VIII.

Un cautionnement de quarante mille Livres sterling sera déposé le jour de la signature du contrat, à la Banque d'Angleterre, au nom du Gouvernement Persan et des concessionnaires. Il sera confisqué dans le cas où les travaux n'auraient pas été commencés dans un délai de quinze mois à partir de la date du présent contrat, étant acceptés les cas de force majeure, ou empêchements indépendants de la volonté de la compagnie, tels que guerre, naufrage, suspension des transports dans les pays étrangers. Le cautionnement sera retourné à la compagnie contre un recépissé du Gouverneur de Resht constatant l'arrivée à Enzelle de la quantité de rails nécessaire à la construction de la ligne de Resht à Téhéran.

ART. IX.

La compagnie s'engage à payer annuellement au Gouvernement Persan pendant toute la durée de la concession une prime de vingt pour cent sur les bénéfices nets de l'exploitation de la ligne.

ART. X.

A l'expiration du terme de la présente concession (soixante dix ans) les concessionnaires auront à s'entendre d'avance avec le Gouvernement Persan relativement à la continuation de leur jouissance de la ligne. Dans le cas où ils ne seraient pas tombés d'accord pour quelque nouvel arrangement à ce sujet, toutes les lignes construites en vertu de la présente concession feront retour au Gouvernement avec leur matériel fixe et roulant. Quant aux constructions et dépendances de la ligne on s'en rapportera aux règles généralement suivies dans les concessions faites par les Etats qui ont stipulé en ce point les conditions les plus favorables. Les concessionnaires n'auront à demander au Gouvernement, pour ce retour de la ligne aucun remboursement aucune indemnité quelconque.

ART. XI.

Le Gouvernement accorde par les présentes aux dits concessionnaires, pour la durée de cette concession, le privilège exclusif et définitif d'exploiter dans toute l'étendue de l'Empire les mines de charbon de terre, de fer, de cuivre de plomb, de pétrole, &c., et tout autre mine à leur convenance, à l'exception des mines exploitées actuellement par des particuliers et pour les quelles la compagnie devra, si elle désire les acheter, s'entendre de gré à gré avec les propriétaires. Il est bien convenu qu'aucune autorité civile ou religieuse, aucun particulier ne pourront faire valoir leur titre à la propriété d'une mine, que si l'exploitation en a été faite régulièrement et de notoriété publique depuis une période de cinq ans au moins. En dehors de ces conditions, toute mine

découverte par la compagnie sera traitée comme simple terrain et achetée comme tel au prix courant de la province où elle est située, le Gouvernement usant au besoin du droit d'expropriation forcée, le Gouvernement se réserve les mines d'or, d'argent et de pierres précieuses, pour l'exploitation desquelles il pourra prendre avec la compagnie des arrangements spéciaux.

ART. XII.

Sur les bénéfices nets de toute mine exploitée par la compagnie le Gouvernement percevra annuellement une prime fixe de quinze pour cent.

ART. XIII.

Le terrain nécessaire à l'exploitation de ces mines et à leur mise en communication avec le chemin de fer, la route ou le tramway sera donné gratis à la compagnie sur les terrains appartenant à l'Etat. Pour l'exploitation de ces mines la compagnie jouira du privilège mentionné à l'Art. VI, et sera soumise à l'engagement stipulé pour le chemin de fer à l'Art. 10.

ART. XIV.

Enfin le Gouvernement accorde aux concessionnaires pour la durée de cette concession le droit exclusif d'exécuter dans tout l'Empire les travaux nécessaires pour détourner les rivières ou cours d'eau, faire des barrages, établir des réservoirs, des puits artésiens, des canaux, des réservoirs, prendre et amener sur différents points où ils le trouveront avantageux l'eau sur laquelle le Gouvernement n'aura encore accordé aucun droit. Aucun propriétaire ne pourra apporter des entraves au passage de cette eau et de son côté, la compagnie indemniserà tout propriétaire qui aurait à souffrir de ce passage.

Le Gouvernement accorde gratis à la compagnie le terrain nécessaire pour tous ses travaux et établissements hydrauliques et de plus vingt mètres de terrain de chaque côté des courants d'eau établis par elle. La compagnie aura le droit de culture et la libre disposition de tout terrain inculte, mis en valeur par l'eau qu'elle y aura conduite. La compagnie devra fixer de gré à gré avec le Gouvernement le prix de l'eau à vendre. Le Gouvernement percevra une prime annuelle de quinze pour cent sur les bénéfices nets.

ART. XV.

Le Gouvernement accorde aux concessionnaires par le présent contrat, pour la durée de cette concession, le droit exclusif et définitif de l'exploitation des forêts de l'Etat, dans toute l'étendue de l'Empire. Cette exploitation sous une forme généralement quelconque pourra se faire sur tout terrain non cultivé jusqu'à la date du présent contrat. Dans tout endroit où la compagnie aura coupé des bois elle aura le droit de premier acquéreur pour acheter au Gouvernement les terrains qu'il consentirait à vendre, le Gouvernement percevra annuellement une part fixe de quinze pour cent sur les bénéfices nets de l'exploitation des forêts.

ART. XVI.

Pour l'exécution de la ligne du chemin de fer accordée par la présente concession et des travaux exigés par les entreprises susmentionnés, le Baron de Reuter et ses associés, ou représentants, sont autorisés par le Gouvernement Persan, en vertu des présentes, à émettre un premier capital de cent cinquante millions de francs (six millions sterling) en actions ou obligations dont les concessionnaires détermineront ultérieurement le taux, le mode et les conditions d'émission.

ART. XVII.

Le Gouvernement Persan garantit à la compagnie par les présentes, pour tout capital émis ou à émettre, un intérêt annuel de cinq pour cent plus une somme annuelle de deux pour cent pour l'amortissement du dit capital.

ART. XVIII.

La dite garantie de sept pour cent portera sur les revenus des mines, des eaux, des forêts et des Douanes de l'Empire. Elle ne sera valable qu'après l'achèvement complet de la ligne de Resht à Ispahan, d'après les formes déterminés au cahier des charges. Jusqu'à ce moment la compagnie paiera aux actionnaires l'intérêt annuel sur le premier capital émis ou sur un nouveau capital qu'elle est autorisée à émettre à sa convenance.

ART. XIX.

Le Gouvernement s'engage par les présentes à accorder aux concessionnaires la Regie des Douanes à partir du mois de mars 1874 pour une période de vingt cinq ans. Pour cette ferme des Douanes, les concessionnaires paieront au Gouvernement la somme actuellement payée pour cette ferme, plus une prime annuelle de cinq cent mille francs (vingt mille Livres sterling) les conditions seront fixées pour les cinq premières années à partir de la sixième année la prime de cinq cent mille francs sera remplacée par une prime de soixante pour cent sur tout bénéfice net en dehors du prix de fermage.

ART. XX.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Persan se determinerait dans l'avenir à accorder le privilège d'une Banque ou de quelque établissement de crédit, ce privilège est, dès aujourd'hui par le présent contrat, réservé et assuré à la présente compagnie de préférence à toute autre partie.

ART. XXI.

Les concessionnaires auront un droit de préférence sur toute autre partie, pour les enterprises telle que gaz, pavage et embellissements de la capitale, routes chausées, postes, telegraphes, moulins, usines, fabriques, &c., dont le privilège pourrait être ultérieurement demandé.

ART. XXII.

Les concessionnaires pourront en tout temps, transférer à toute autre partie les droits accordés par la présente convention, avec les obligations assumées par eux.

ART. XXIII.

Les concessionnaires s'engagent à commencer les travaux ci-dessus énoncés (usines, eaux, forêts) en même temps que les travaux de la ligne et à en conduire l'exécution avec toute l'activité possible. De son côté, en dehors des mains d'œuvre étrangères que la compagnie peut engager à son gré le Gouvernement procurera à la compagnie au prix courant du pays, toute la main d'œuvre dont elle aura besoin pour ses différentes entreprises. Il promulguera tous les règlements et autorisera toutes les mesures nécessaires pour maintenir la sûreté de tout terrain ou emplacement accordé à la compagnie pour chacune de ses entreprises aussi bien que la sécurité parfaite de chacun de ses représentants, agents ou employés quelconques.

ART. XXIV.

La présente concession sera traduite en langue Persane, mais en cas de difficultés entre les deux parties contractantes, le texte Français sera la seule autorité.

Fait à Téhéran en double expédition le 25 Juillet 1872.

Son Altesse le Grand Vizir ayant en vertu des pleins pouvoirs à lui conférés et d'accord avec les Ministres ses collègues, a approuvé et signé le présent acte. Sa Majesté Impériale Le Schah a daigné le ratifier par sa signature Impériale.

EN vertu de mes pouvoirs en bonne et due forme, j'accepte et je signe le présent contrat acte au nom et pour le Baron J. de Reuter.

Appendix explicatif de l'article 18 et qui devra être enseré au cahier des charges.

Il est bien entendu et nettement stipulé que même à cette époque de l'achèvement de la ligne de Resht à Ispahan le Gouvernement Persan ne sera pas responsable du paiement des intérêts de sept pour cent, mais la compagnie devra avoir mis les mines, les Eaux, les forêts et les Douanes, par l'excédant de leurs revenus, en état de produire un revenu égal à l'intérêt du capital garanti. Dans le cas où les concessionnaires n'obtiendraient pas, à l'époque ci-dessus fixée un pareil résultat, ils n'auraient à faire au Gouvernement aucune réclamation ils n'apporteraient aucune modification, aucune retard dans le paiement à faire au Gouvernement de la ferme des Douanes et de la prime stipulée Art. 19 mais ils devraient continuer le paiement des dits intérêts sur le capital émis, ou à leur choix, émettre un nouveau capital avec les garanties semblables à celles stipulées dans la présente concession.

En vertu de mes pleins pouvoirs en bonne et due forme j'accepte et je signe le présent contrat au nom et pour le Baron J. de Reuter.

(Se.) E. COTTE.

APPENDIX XIII.

DRAFT OF THE FALKENHAGEN RAILWAY CONCESSION AS AGREED TO BY PERSIA.

THE following Articles respecting the construction of a railway from the Aras to the town of Tabreez have been agreed upon between His Excellency Hassan Ali Khan, Persian Minister of Public Works, and Mirza Yussuf Khan, Councillor of the (Foreign) Office, being both furnished with full powers from their Government on the one side, and His Excellency Major-General Falkenhagen, of the Engineers, who has retired from the Imperial Russian service, on the other hand :—

ARTICLE I.

Major-General Falkenhagen, of the Engineers, having retired from the service of the Russian Government, engages to construct and to work at his own cost and risk a railway between the River Aras near the village of Julfa and the town of Tabreez. It will be named the Tabreez Line.

In order that he may connect this line with those of Europe, the Government of His Majesty the Shah promises to request the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia to construct a railway from Tiflis to the Persian frontier at Julfa, or to some other point on the Aras near Julfa. In this case the aforesaid General engages to connect his own railway with that of the Russian Government, and to pay to its Directors half the cost of the bridge which will be constructed over the River Aras.

ARTICLE II.

General Falkenhagen has no right to transfer this concession which the Government of His Majesty the Shah has granted to him for the construction and the working of the railway to any other party, excepting to a Company which the said General will himself form for this special purpose. He must himself be regarded as the Agent of that Company during the whole period (of the construction) of the railway. When this has been completed, the Company will be at liberty to confide the administration with the working of the railway either to General Falkenhagen or to another person. This Company must conform itself to the laws of Russia which regulate the formation of Railway Companies.

ARTICLE III.

Major-General Falkenhagen engages that the Company which he will form for this purpose will, eight months after the exchange of this concession, commence the construction of the railway, the intention being that such commencement is not to represent work of a trifling nature, but to be effected in a serious and earnest manner, so that competent persons may admit that the work has been thoroughly undertaken.

If the Company should wish to commence the work sooner than eight months after the exchange of this concession, it will be at liberty to do so. The Company also engages entirely to complete and to work the railway within five years at the outside from the date of its commencement. It engages in the meantime that if the Government of His Majesty the Emperor should complete the railway from Tiflis to Julfa before the expiration of the aforesaid period, General Falkenhagen's Company will entirely complete its railway six months after that from Tiflis to Julfa has commenced to work. The Government of His Majesty the Shah promises that conformably to the statement contained in the 1st Article of this concession, it will request the Government of His Majesty the Emperor to hasten to commence and bring to a completion the line from Tiflis to Julfa. As a security for the fulfilment of its engagements by the said Company, General Falkenhagen, the founder of this Company, will deposit at any one of the Banks of Russia which the Persian Government may indicate, in accordance with the usages established in Russia, the sum of

100,000 ducats. This deposit will in proportion to the work done be returned to the Company in the following manner :—

	Ducats.
After levelling the line	25,000
After laying the sleepers	25,000
After fixing the rails	25,000
After starting the engine	25,000

ARTICLE IV.

All the works must be solidly constructed and in accordance with the rules of modern art and the rules adopted for the Russian railways. The limits of the gradients and of the lines of the curves in winding parts must conform to local conditions, and must not impede the working of the railway. The line must be single, and the width between the inner edges of the rails must be five English feet. The length of the reserve and shunting lines must be regulated by local exigencies and the working of the route, and in any case must not be less than one-seventh of the length of the whole route. The weight of the rails, if they are of iron, should not be less than 66lbs. English per English yard; and if the rails are of steel, not less than 54lbs. English per English yard. The bridges and tunnels must be made of stone, bricks, or metal, or else partly of stone and partly of iron. The stations, sheds for locomotives, and workshops, must be made of stone and brick. Other buildings, whether at stations or on the road, may be built of materials and according to the methods used in those localities. The stations must be provided with water in sufficient quantity. The number of stations must not be less than nine. The number of crossings over the railway and of the guard-houses must be regulated by local exigencies. When the working of the railway begins, there must be a rolling stock to the following amount: 18 locomotives, 50 carriages for passengers of three classes, and 250 carriages for goods. The Company undertakes to construct a special train for His Majesty the Shah and his suite. The Company should increase the amount of rolling stock in proportion to the increase in the passenger and goods traffic on the line, until it has obtained enough for the extreme limit of the requirements of the railway.

ARTICLE V.

The exact length of the railway will be fixed after a survey of the line based upon a detailed investigation.

ARTICLE VI.

The Company shall have the right of possession in the railway at its own cost and risk and peril during the time fixed by Article 3 for the construction of the line, and for 44 years, according to the European calendar, from the day when the railway is opened.

ARTICLE VII.

The nominal capital of the Company is fixed at three millions four hundred and forty thousand Russian ducats, and will be raised by means of shares. The Company will be at liberty to substitute for a part of the shares an equal number of bonds.

ARTICLE VIII.

The Government of His Majesty the Shah grants the Company from the day when the Tabreez Railway is completely finished, and is begun to be worked and connected with the Tifis-Julfa Railway, for the whole duration of the present concession, a guarantee of an actual net revenue of 3 per cent. on the nominal capital of the Company mentioned in Article VII, *i.e.*, sum of 102,000 Persian tomans, each toman being worth 10 Sahib-krans, and each Sahib-kran corresponding to 31½ Russian metal copeks; but the Persian Government is only obliged to pay in Persian money, *i.e.*, 10 Sahib-krans for a toman. It is meant by this that if the annual net revenue of the Tabreez Railway does not produce the sum of one hundred and two thousand (102,000) tomans, the Persian

Government will make up the sum. These payments will be made once a year, 31 days after the presentation of the Company's accounts, and this presentation should take place on the fête of the Nowroz, *i.e.*, on the 19th-21st March in each year.

ARTICLE IX.

The Government of His Majesty the Shah will have the right of control over the expenses and the receipts of the working of the Railway. This control will be exercised by employés specially nominated by the Persian Government according to the custom enforced on existing railways. The Company engages that the outlay for the working of the railway shall be kept within the limits and in accordance with the rules enforced on Russian railways.

ARTICLE X.

The Company engages to pay the Government of His Majesty's the Shah 40 per cent. of the revenue received by the Company above the sum forming 6 per cent. of the Company's nominal capital mentioned in Article 7.

ARTICLE XI.

The Government of His Majesty the Shah promises to request the Government of His Majesty the Emperor to support the Company in the sale in its dominions of the shares referred to in Article VII.

ARTICLE XII.

After the expiration of the term during which, as specified in Article VI, the Company is to hold the line, the Government of His Majesty the Shah shall take possession of the same with all its plant. But in that case the price of the engines, carriages, &c., which the Company shall have added to those existing when the line was first completed, as set forth in Article IV, shall, according to their value at the time, be paid to the Company. The Persian Government shall restore to the Company the real value of all the said additional rolling stock, which will be settled upon the estimation of competent assessors, or by mutual agreement. In like manner the Company shall make over all the fuel and other materials to the Persian Government, the price thereof being settled in either of the ways above quoted.

ARTICLE XIII.

The Company shall have the right to fix the fares of passengers and the rates of transport of merchandize on the Tabreez line according to the exigencies of trade and to the amount of traffic. It is the duty of the Company to conform its regulations for the acceptance and transport of goods and passengers to those which are established on the railways of Russia and other European States.

ARTICLE XIV.

The Company is bound to erect, alongside of the line of railway, two telegraph wires which are necessary for the maintenance of order and for the safety of the trains.

ARTICLE XV.

The Company shall have the right of engaging the subjects of His Majesty the Shah of Persia or strangers for all kind of service according to their pleasure, on condition that the persons who shall enter the Company's service, enter it of their own accord; that these persons shall not be of bad character, and that they are not pursued or suspected by the authorities for any crime or offence. If by chance the Company should engage such a person, they would be obliged to dismiss him from their employ as soon as they should be informed by the local authorities.

ARTICLE XVI.

The Persian Government engages to give gratis to the Company out of the State land situated on the railway line from Tabreez to the River Aras the

ground which may be required for the railway with its stations, &c. The breadth of this ground from each side of the rails must be 20 French metres, but in the places where store-rooms and stations are to be built the ground will be 100 French metres in width by 100 French metres in length. And if it should become necessary to extend small branches of railway from the main line, the above conditions are to be similarly observed. If any ground belonging to private individuals should anywhere be required for the railway, or for its stations, &c., or should it become necessary that any building belonging to the State or to private individuals should be demolished, the Government will afford its support to the Company for the purchase of such private grounds and for the destruction of buildings provided that the Company shall pay their fair value.

Should any person not agree to the sale of (his) lands, or to the destruction of his buildings upon payment of their usual price, the Government will induce him in the manner it may deem fit to consent to evacuate the grounds, to destroy the buildings (in question), and to accept their price based upon a fair estimation. Mosques, burial-grounds, and holy edifices are exempted from destruction.

ARTICLE XVII.

The Company will be at liberty to use gratis any materials found on the stipulated borders of the lands which may be evacuated for the railway and its buildings which may be required for the construction of the same.

If on the borders of the lands evacuated for the Company, or within a distance not exceeding 50 English miles from the railway, or from the grounds acquired for it, a coal mine should be discovered, the Persian Government agrees to grant to the Company the right of working it. And the Company engages not to injure the rights of the proprietors of the surface of the grounds. Should the said proprietors, however, oppose the working of such mine by the Company, the Government of His Majesty the Shah will support the Company in the same manner as has been stipulated above with reference to the evacuation of lands (required) for the railway, and will induce the proprietors to give their consent.

ARTICLE XVIII.

The Persian Government agrees, should it possess it, to grant to the Company, at the usual price, the water which may be required at the time of constructing the line and while it is worked.

Should the Company find it expedient to acquire water from some quarter where it may be useless, or by digging an artesian well, or by clearing out old *kanats* (aqueducts) which have no owners, and which may not be likely to injure in any way other person's *kanats*, in such case the water thus acquired shall become the special property of the railway.

ARTICLE XIX.

The implements and materials specially (required for) the railway, whether at the time of its construction, or while it is worked, shall be exempted from Customs dues and other taxes.

ARTICLE XX.

The lands, money, and income of the Tabreez Railway are to be free from all taxation. The Company is also exempted from fees on transactions and documents connected with the construction and the working of the line. For the transport of passengers, merchandize and other articles by the railway beyond the fares and freight fixed by the Company, neither the Government, nor its Agents, nor any other party are to claim or levy any kind of fee or tax excepting the established and customary Customs duty.

ARTICLE XXI.

The Company makes over the administration of the affairs connected with the regulating and the working of the railway and its offices and accounts to a

Board composed of three Directors for whom a place will be selected on the line. This Board is to represent the Company both before the Persian Government, its officials, and other persons who may have to deal with the Company. All matters therefore connected with the Company must be referred to this Board.

ARTICLE XXII.

For the investigation and settlement of all discussions and complaints which may arise in the affairs of the Company in carrying out the articles of this concession, whether proceeding from the Governments of Persia and Russia, or from their subjects, or from the Company, a permanent Commission is to be formed consisting of a President of rank, of two persons representing the Persian Government, of a member of the Russian Consulate-General at Tabreez, and of two persons representing the Company, who are to settle such matters whenever their opinions coincide. Should there be a difference of opinion, the majority of votes is to decide. Should they be equally divided, the question is to be referred to the Deputy Governor of Azerbaijan and to the Russian Consulate-General. If these two high functionaries can settle such matters between them, well and good, otherwise the two parties are to make a reference to Teheran.

ARTICLE XXIII.

If the Government of His Majesty the Shah of Persia wishes to construct a railway starting from any point on the Tabreez Railway, and joining that Railway at another point, he can only do so with the consent of the Company.

For the construction of any railways, which within the space of five years from the day of the definitive signing of this concession, the Persian Government itself or else another Company should deem it expedient to construct at a distance of 100 English miles from either of the points of the Tabreez Railway, the Government of His Majesty the Shah of Persia will give the preference to the Tabreez Railway Company if the terms offered by that Company are equal to those of others who may wish to undertake the work.

ARTICLE XXIV.

If General Falkenhagen's Company should not complete the Tabreez Railway within the time specified in Article III, and this should be owing not to any fault of its own but to circumstances beyond its control, such as the occurrence of war, the blockading of ports, rebellion and contagious diseases which may at the time prevent the prosecution of the work, or other calamities,—the loss of ships conveying materials for the railway or engineering difficulties which may be admitted by the Commission, (in that case) the term for the completion and the opening of the line shall be extended in proportion to the nature of such impediments and difficulties. But should the Company through its own fault or that of its Agents not complete the railway within the specified time, the Persian Government will in the first instance give it a warning, and three months after it will repeat that warning. Should the Company six months after the issue of this second warning fail to fulfil its engagements, it shall forfeit all the rights conceded to it in the concession, and shall pay over to the Persian Government the deposited sum of 100,000 ducats which is mentioned in Article III, and it must within the space of one year liquidate its accounts. In this case the Company shall have the right to sell all its property to whomsoever it pleases.

ARTICLE XXV.

As, in accordance with the terms of this concession this Company must be formed in Russia, General Falkenhagen engages within six months at the outside from the commencement of the construction of the railway as set forth in Article III of this concession to present to the Persian Government a copy of the bye-laws of the Company called in French "status" drawn up and ratified in conformity with the usages of Russia.

The Persian Government in order to facilitate the Company's operations promises to make arrangement with the Government of Russia that the Russian Government should authorise that the Company's bye-laws be drawn up in Russia, and that the Company's shares (actions) and bonds (obligations) be circulated in that country.

ARTICLE XXVI.

The Company itself is to prepare its paper, denominated "actions" and "obligations," which must be written either in one Foreign language opposite the Persian or in several European languages in addition to the Persian, so that it may bear the registered seal of the Persian Government. But this condition is to be observed that the Company is to insert in the writing of its paper that the Company is responsible for the payment of the same and of the interest thereon, and that the Persian Government is not concerned therein.

ARTICLE XXVII.

General Falkenhagen's Company engages that in the waggons separate compartments shall be assigned to women: that Mussulman cooks, coffee-men, and sherbet-makers shall be placed at the stations, and that places reserved for prayers shall also be built thereon.

ARTICLE XXVIII.

The Persian Government engages that after the exchange of this concession it will forthwith issue the necessary orders to the Governors and Superintendents stationed on the road to afford all necessary support to the Engineers and Agents who may be appointed by the Company for the purpose of examining, surveying, and laying down the railway line.

ARTICLE XXIX.

All the contents of this concession having been submitted to His Majesty the Shah and confirmed by His Royal hand, Major-General Falkenhagen, of the Russian Engineers, is authorised to take all necessary steps for carrying the same into effect; and the Government of His Majesty the Shah agrees to afford to General Falkenhagen and to the Company which he will form, at all times and in every way, all the support in its power for the construction and the working of the Tabreez Railway.

This concession having received the auspicious seal and signature of His Majesty the Shah has been delivered to Major-General Falkenhagen, so that by possessing this deed he may do what is necessary to give effect to its contents.

ARTICLE XXX.

This concession has been written in duplicate. One copy bearing the auspicious signature and seal of His Majesty the Shah of all the dominions of Persia has been delivered to Major-General Falkenhagen of the Russian Engineers; and the second copy bearing the signature of the aforesaid General is kept at His Majesty's Foreign Office. And it is decided if within four months from the date of the exchange of this concession Major-General Falkenhagen having obtained the acceptance and signature of his partners thereto shall notify the same to the (Persian) Foreign Office, either by telegraph or by an official letter from the Russian Legation at Teheran, in that case the present concession shall remain in force, and the date of the commencement (of the work) specified in the first part of Article III shall count from the day the (aforesaid) announcement reaches the Persian Foreign Office from the (Russian) Mission. Otherwise this concession, whatever it may be, shall be null and void and shall cease to be of any value.

APPENDIX XIV.

EXPLORATION OF THE AMÚ-DARYA AND THE ARALO-CASPIAN REGION IN 1874
(TRANSLATED FROM No. 3 OF THE *RUSSISCHE REVUE* FOR 1875).

THE general information and special knowledge in various branches of science, which the Khivan campaign of 1873 gave us the opportunity of adding to our former stock, were of such an interesting nature as to inspire educated people with a wish for a more extensive and detailed exploration of these unknown regions of Central Asia than the disturbed state of the country had as yet permitted. The scientific labors during the Khivan expedition were conducted by the "Imperial Russian Geographical Society" in compliance with a request preferred by Adjutant-General Von Kaufmann, Governor-General of Turkestan. Soon after the successful termination of that campaign, which cleared the way for a peaceful exploration of the Amú-Darya district and the Aralo-Caspian region, the same Society determined upon sending a well-appointed scientific expedition to these regions.

The scheme for it was laid before the Governor-General of Turkestan. After due consideration of the political questions bearing upon an undertaking of this nature he expressed a favorable opinion, and the project was accordingly sanctioned by His Imperial Majesty on the 9th-21st of February 1874, subject to the condition "that the expedition was to confine its labors in the Amú-Darya district to the right bank of the river." The state of affairs in the Khanate of Khiva proper ensured no guarantee for the personal safety of its members unless they were well protected, and a larger military escort was not approved of by the Government on political grounds.

In the meantime the contemplated expedition had been maturely discussed by committees of experts of the different branches of the Society, and on the 10th-22nd of April the detailed programme was laid before a general meeting for approval. It was proposed to form four distinct sections. The respective plan for each was as follows:—

I.—The Geodetical and Topographical Section.

Leader.—Colonel Stoletof of the general staff.

Members.—Two officers, four topographers, and Lieutenant-Captain Zúbof, commanding a steamer of the Aral Squadron which the Government will put at the disposal of the expedition.

Specification of labor.

(1).—The exact surveying of the Amú-Darya delta and of other places which have not yet been surveyed but promise to be interesting from a geographical

* *Sheikh Djeli* in Colonel Walker's Map of Tur- point of view—as, for instance, the *Sheikh*
kestan. *Jelil* * range of hills.

(2).—The taking of the following levels:—

(a) From the mouth of the Amú to the points at which the main channels of that river branch off; (b) across the breadth of the delta; and (c) between the rivers Amú and Syr-Darya.

(3).—Captain Zúbof will survey and gauge the channels of the Amú and make some hydrological observations.

II.—The Meteorological and Hydrological Section.

Leader.—M. Dorandt, Meteorologist of the Physical Central Observatory, assisted by M. Milberg.

Members.—Several observers from the military districts of Turkestan.

Specification of labor.

(1).—Study of the climate generally.

(2).—Study of the currents of the rivers and the feasibility of navigating them.

Two stations will be established for the purpose of carrying out these labors and of making the following observations, the results of which are to be recorded every hour:—

(a) Of the behaviour of all meteorological elements; (b) of the fluctuations of the magnetic propension; (c) of the positive measurements of the magnetic propension and deviation; and (d) of the horizontal force of the magnetism of the earth.

(3).—As regards the Amú-Darya stream this section of the expedition will make hydrometrical observations of the fluctuations of its surface and the velocity of its current, gauge its depths, and take sectional levels* of its bed.

* "Profiltrirung."

As far as possible the same observations will be made at the second smaller station, at which however the results will not be recorded every hour.

The main station will be erected at one of those points of the river where the entire volume of water forms one deep channel—for instance at Nukús;† the second above the *aryks*,‡ in order to calculate the quantities of water which are absorbed by these canals for the fields.

† *Nukhaz* in Colonel Walker's Map of *Turkestan*.

‡ Irrigation canals.

III.—The Ethnographical and Statistical Section.

Members.—Colonels Stoletof and Sobolef, M. Sártlánof (interpreter) and M. Karázin (painter).

Specification of labor.

(1).—The collection of ethnographical data.

(2).—The compilation of tables showing the number and distribution of the settled and nomadic population.

(3).—The description of their customs, economical circumstances, dwellings, national garb, &c.

(4).—The collection of traditions, manuscripts, coins, &c.

(5).—The determination of the exact bearings of various places named by Oriental geographers and the exploration of ruins, &c.

IV.—The Section for Natural History.

§ *Vide* Proceedings of a Meeting of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society held on the 10th-22nd of April 1874.

Members.—M. Severtsof, Professor Barbot de Márny, and M. Smirnof (Botanist).§

Besides the general programme every section was provided with detailed instructions.

Almost simultaneously with the Geographical Society the "Society of Natural Philosophers of Saint Petersburg" also resolved upon sending an expedition to the Aral region for the following purposes:—

(1).—Of studying the aquatic animals of the Aral and Caspian Seas.

(2).—Of investigating the geology and zoology of the Ust-Urt, the northern part of the Chink,|| the lower Amú-Darya, and of the right bank of the latter as far as the Sheikh Jelíl hills.

|| The precipice of the Ust-Urt tableland.

(3).—Of deciding the questions in reference to the diminution and division into two seas of the old Aralo-Caspian basin.

The gentlemen who undertook these labors were: M. Alenítsin, *fauna* of the Aral; and M. O. A. Grimm, that of the Caspian Sea; M. Barbot de Márny, *Geology*, and MM. Boghdánof and Butlerof, *Zoology*.

Thus the projects formed a complement to each other in a practical manner.

As regards the geological investigation of the Amú delta and the Sheikh Jelil, which was aimed at by both, it was a very favorable circumstance that M. Barbot de Márny kindly consented to act for both Societies. Thanks to this arrangement, the geological departments of the two expeditions were placed under one hand.

To the above it may be added that from April to September the Government intended to employ two detachments of the Orenburg troops on the Ust-Urt for the purpose of reconnoitring the tracts on that high level. Owing to this circumstance M. Glúkhafskoi proposed to the "Physico-Geographical Section" of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society to undertake on its own behalf and independently of the Amú-Darya expedition—

- (1) The levelling of the Ust-Urt and the determination of the difference between the levels of the Aral and Caspian Seas.

• The Uzboi.

- (2) The levelling of the old dry bed* of the Amú-Darya.

- (3) An investigation of the physical geography of the interesting region of the dry river-bed between the lower Amú and the bay of Krasnovodsk.

This proposal was accepted accordingly. Colonel Von Tillo was entrusted with the labor specified under (1), and the Academician M. Middendorf with those under (2) and (3).

Besides these three official expeditions, which were most liberally equipped by the Crown, M. Glúkhafskoi privately organised a caravan at Moscow which was to proceed *viâ* Astrakan, Astrabad, Herat, and Cabul, to Afghanistan, and to return by way of the Bamian pass, Báلكh, Bokhara, Khiva, and Krasnovodsk. In accordance with an invitation from M. Glúkhafskoi, the Geographical Society availed itself of this opportunity also and deputed M. Ogarodnikof to accompany the caravan throughout its tour. He undertook—

- (1) The surveying of the travelling route.
- (2) The measuring of altitudes.
- (3) The description of the entire journey.
- (4) The collection of objects of natural history and of statistical and ethnographical data.
- (5) The photography of views and types.

Towards the middle of April the necessary preparations for the above undertakings had been finished† and the execution was begun under hopes of a favorable issue.

† *Vide* the Proceedings of a Meeting of the "Imperial Russian Geographical Society" held on the 10th-22nd of April 1874.

A portion of the members of the Amú-Darya expedition of the Geographical Society left St. Petersburg in company with their leader, Colonel Stoletof, during the latter part of April, and others a little later. The last of the party who had taken the usual post road round the north of the Aral arrived on the 1st-13th of June at Kazali on the lower Sir-Darya, whilst the earlier arrivals were already busily engaged in the low country of the Amú itself. Colonel Sobolef and the Orientalist M. Alexandrof from Orenburg had begun their operations on the 19th-31st May. MM. Severtsof and Smirnof started on the 4th-16th of June from Kazali to the east coast of the Aral, from whence they intended to proceed by land to the delta. Colonel Stoletof with the rest of the expedition crossed the Aral in the Steamer *Perofski* of the Aral Squadron and reached the Ulkún-Darya on the 6-18th. Major Wood, R.E., availed himself of the opportunity which was offered by an Imperial resolution permitting foreign scholars to participate in the expedition.

According to the general plan the members on their arrival in the delta were in the first place to finish all the labors which were to be executed there before they started for their respective destinations.

Although the expedition had to work under somewhat unfavorable conditions, all was speedily brought to a successful termination. Myriads of mosquitoes were a great plague and the heat (35° Celsius in the shade) was very burdensome. The natives behaved anything but amicably, especially the Karakalpaks, who were rude and obstinate. Thus at the end of May Colonel Ivánof, acting Sheriff for the district, ordered them to fill up certain census papers which they failed to do within the given period. They suspected that hostile measures would spring from these papers. For instance, that their sons were to be subjected to conscription by Russia, or that their wives were to be taken from them, and the like nonsense: whereas the Khirgiz promptly did as desired. Besides it was rumoured that the Turkomans, who were again committing depredations on the left bank of the Amú and even in the Khivan town of Khodshale, opposite the Russian camp at Nukús, intended also to invade the delta and the right bank of the river. These tales augmented the obstinacy of the Karakalpaks and a small military display became at last necessary to induce them to become a little more pliant. Colonel Ivánof himself with a detachment of 50 riflemen and 30 Cossacks from the fort of Nukús repaired to Chimbai, the central point or capital of the delta, and secured their rebellious chiefs; but their attitude remained

sullen.* It was the advancing success of the scientific expedition itself which from the 24th of July onwards placed peace beyond danger. On that day the hydrographical investigations were concluded with generally brilliant results.

* Compare with the correspondence to the *Golos* dated Chimbai, the 25th of July 1874.

By this time the investigations referring to the formation of the banks and shores, the depths of the channels, the velocity of the currents and the traverse sections of the river-beds were terminated between the coast from the bay of Túshche-Bass to the mouth of the Kichkíne-Darya and the rivers Kichkíne-Darya, Amú, and Ulkún-Darya, the Lai-Kúl and Dau-Kara lakes near Kungrád, the Ogus and Chartámbai side-channels, the Burly-Tau hill, the Kúvan-Jarma and the Yangí-Sú. The experience of the previous year was fully confirmed. The most important result attained was, that by way of the Kichkíne-Darya steamers cannot reach the main stream, but by the way which Baron

† *Vide* Colonel Stoletof's Report in the *Communications* of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society, 1874, No. 7, pages 239 to 241.

Kaulbars had proposed, namely, from the Bay of Túshche-Bass up the Yangí-Sú, the Dau-Kara and the Kúvan-Jarma,† this was accomplished.

The obstacles on the first-named way are—

(1) The shallowness of the Ulkún-Darya above the mouth of the Yani-Darya and at the point where the tributary which comes from the great Sáry-Kúl lake (near the heights of the Kúshkan-Tau) falls into it: even during the period of high-water in the latter part of the month of June the depth at these points was too insignificant for the steamers to pass.

(2) The dense masses of reeds which cover the channels between the Amú and the lakes near the fork of the Ulkún and Yani-Darya. The steamers *Samarkand* and *Perofski*, the latter drawing 3½ feet of water, could only come up to the Kara-Tau, a spur of the Kúshkan-Tau, *i. e.*, about 100 versts (57 miles) beyond the bar of the Kichkíne-Darya. The country near the Kara-Tau is particularly full of reeds. The minimum depth on the bar is 4 feet. For the first 84 versts (about 48 miles) of the Kichkíne-Darya the depth varies from 21 to 49 feet. For the first 20 versts (about 12 miles) of the smaller channels and lakes, more properly marshes, the steamers could pass without particular difficulty, but beyond that the

‡ Exceedingly flat crafts, drawing but little water: nevertheless some of them have a burden of 16 tons. During the fishing seasons the lakes swarm with regular flotillas of them.

above-described obstacles prevented their further progress. The remainder of the distance to Nukús could only be accomplished in local *kayuks*,‡ or overland by way of Chimbai, which stands 45 versts (about 26 miles) from the spot where the steamers brought to.

The search for an entrance into the Yangí-Sú gave some trouble on account of the numerous shoals in the bay. In the Dau-Kara district the steamer

came upon a rather shallow place. Higher up, the bed becomes very narrow and winding and the current very strong. But all these difficulties were happily overcome and on the 24th of July (5th of August), after a passage of seven days, the *Perofski*, the veteran of the Aral Squadron, commanded by Lieutenant-Captain Brukhof, arrived at Nukús.

This important success made a very powerful impression on the natives, and it was chiefly owing to the appearance of the *Perofski* on the Amú that the apprehended disturbances did not break out. The Turkomans understood perfectly well that Russia had now discovered the means for an expeditious transport of troops at any moment.

On the 28th of July (9th of August) the steamer continued her course up. Upon the whole the fairway was found to correspond with the observations of the previous year; on many occasions it had to be searched for with the lead from boats. The channel proved everywhere sufficiently deep, and the formation of the banks permitted almost throughout the whole trip of a landing *ad libitum*. At five different points traverse levels of the river-bed were taken and the velocity of the current was ascertained. The latter was sometimes so rapid that the *Perofski* with her engine of 40-horse power could hardly get ahead, and did not reach the heights opposite the fort of Petro-Alexandrofsk till the 9th-21st of August.

There the steamer was finally brought to, whilst Colonel Stoletof, Captain Zúbof and Major Wood proceeded in *kayuks*, and passing the Bokharian frontier at *Meshekli*, plied up the river as far as *Toyebayun*, alias *Fort Mangakly*, beyond *Pitniak*, which stands above all the irrigation canals which branch off from the Amú. During this *kayuk* trip the observations of the current, which was very rapid, and traverse levels of the bed were taken as usual. The mean depth of water above *Pitniak* was found to be 20 feet; the bottom was clean and the river free from rapids.

On the 16th-28th of August the *Perofski* started on her return voyage from Petro-Alexandrofsk to Nukús. It was at first intended to let her float down with the current, but this was found to be impracticable since the latter proved too strong. Steam was got up again, and on the sixth day from her departure she reached her destination.

This successful experiment with the *Perofski* is proof positive that by means of a steamer of 3 feet draught, with a sufficiently powerful engine and otherwise built so as to meet the desired end, a reliable communication could easily be established between the Aral and the north-western border tracts of Bokhara which adjoin the natural water boundary between Russia and Khiva. The return trip of the *Perofski*, which was accomplished at a much later period, has further proved that even during the season of low water the Amú retains a sufficient depth to ensure a safe passage. This result is momentous, whether from a commercial, military, social or political point of view, and by itself eloquently testifies to the great importance of the expedition of 1874.

On the 28th of September (10th of October) the first section had also

* The particulars about these labors have not yet been published. satisfactorily concluded its topographical labors and taken the desired levels.*

Only in the west of the delta between the *Ulkún-Darya* and the *Taldyk* nothing could be done in consequence of the prevailing insecurity on the frontier.

The second section under M. Dorandt went early to work. Even

† It was situated between the fort and the *Kúvan-Jarma*, 350 feet from the walls of the former. before the station† for the intended observations then in course of erection near the fort of Nukús which stands 2,450 feet from the *Amú-Darya* and 1,260 feet from the *Kúvan-Jarma* was completed, the operations had begun. From the 1st-13th of July the instruments were regularly observed every two hours from 7 o'clock in the morning till 11 in the evening. The marking of the water-level was begun as early as on the 23rd of June (5th of July), just in time to note the rising and falling of the *Kúvan-Jarma* during the third and last height of 1874, which on this occasion happened to

reach its climax on the 10th-22nd of July, *i. e.*, a fortnight earlier than usual. Beginning from the 29th of June (11th of July) the water rose almost 2 arshins.* The following table showing the mean heights will indicate the variations :

Dates.†		Arshins.	Vershoks.
June	23rd	2	8½†
"	24th	2	9
"	25th	2	9¾
"	26th	2	9¾
"	27th	2	9¼
"	28th	2	10¼
"	29th	2	10¾
"	30th	2	9¼
July	1st	2	2
"	2nd	1	13¾
"	3rd	1	13½
"	4th	1	13¾
"	5th	1	9¼
"	6th	1	5¼
"	7th	1	1¾
"	8th	...	14¾
"	9th	...	12
"	10th	...	10½
"	11th	...	10½
"	12th	...	11¾
"	13th	...	13½
"	14th	...	15¾
"	15th	1	2½
"	16th	1	4¼

During the same period the maximum temperature of the air was +35° Celsius in the shade; at night the thermometer did not fall below +15° Celsius. The heat of the sand reached +60° Celsius. The prevailing current of the air was a gentle north wind. The weather was clear and mild.

In the middle of August the construction of the second station at the fort of Petro-Alexandrofsk was also nearly completed. The boating trip in *kayuks* from Nukús to the last-named place consumed 10 days.

As regards the question how much water is absorbed from the Amú-Darya for the irrigation of the oasis of Khiva, Major Wood's observations from June to September have led him to the following conclusions :§

(1) That the quantity absorbed by far exceeds the requirements of the oasis; and

(2) That the imperfections of the canals and the entire system year after year unnecessarily cause a considerable loss to the stream, inasmuch as it is deprived of more than the half of its total volume of water, which above the *aryks* amounts to the average of 3,328 cubic metres per second, below the same at Nukús to 1,586 cubic metres only. Consequently the quantity at present absorbed in the irrigation of Khiva is 1,742 cubic metres, whereas according to Major Wood's calculations 1,133 cubic metres would perfectly suffice for that purpose. The waters of the Amú have always carried with them great quantities of sand and slime which form a sediment along the bottom of the river. To this circumstance Major Wood chiefly attributes the alteration of its former course. His *résumé* is:—

"Formerly the greater volume of water and consequent velocity of the current were strong enough in the spring seasons to carry off the sediment which accumulated during every winter. The excavation of the *aryks* disturbed this natural equilibrium and the river no longer remained its own dredging machine. The accumulations formed banks which blocked up the

* 1 Russian arshin sub-divides into 16 Russian vershoks, and is = to 28 English inches or 0.71119 metres.

† According to the new style.

‡ The construction of the instrument is such that the descending figures denote a rising and the ascending ones a falling of the water-level.

§ *Vide* the Proceedings of Meetings held by the Imperial Russian Geographical Society on the 6th-16th of November (*Communications*, 1874, No. 8, page 396) and on the 4th-16th of December.

westward channel to the Caspian Sea, and the centre of gravity was naturally pressed towards the east, until the waters found a more inclined exit than was afforded by the old bed."

This theory is also borne out by the differences of height which exist between the Úzboi and the Amú.*

In the meantime Messrs. Sobolef and Alexandrof had collected valuable historico-geographical and ethnographical materials. In reference to the former, their collection added fresh data in regard to the old and new course of the Amú. In the first place M. Sobolef was able to assert that all the ruins of forts and tombs west of the Kúshkan-Tau and north of Chimbai were of a later date; the former being of a still more recent date, outlasted the latter. Some of the ruins of towns in the east of Chimbai are of historical value. Thus, according to the natives, the town of Ak-kala (its ruins stand 10 versts, about 6 miles, from Chimbai) was once the seat of the Usbeg tribe *Massid*, now entirely disappeared; in the fourth decade of the 18th century this place was conquered by Nádir Shah. The ancient town of *Baghdad*, 20 versts (about 12 miles) further east near the so-called canal of *Naupir*, was another seat of the Usbeks, which that Persian conqueror converted into a ruin. Of great value is the determination by M. Sobolef of the bearings† of *Kara-Úigur*, *Túgai*, and *Tök*, places of which Abulgázi makes mention when he relates how‡ 30 years before his birth, *i. e.*, in 1575, the river Amú took a new direction *viá* Tök to the Aral, deserting its old bed a short distance above Kara-Úigur. According to M. Sobolef this new exit must have been the northernmost channel. If this be correct, we arrive at the comparative age of the Taldyk as well as of the Ulkún-Darya. He has also found the ruins of ancient *Kát* which are situated near the present bazaar of *Sheikh-Abbas-Vali* on the right bank of the Amú opposite New-Urganj.

Three years ago M. Sobolef already understood some Bokharians to say that a direct communication between the rivers Amú and Syr had at one time actually existed.§ According to all appearances this highly interesting scientific question must be answered in the affirmative. As regards native opinion, Nazar Khan, Sultan of the Dau-Kara Kirghiz, stated that according to the traditions of his people the Yani-Darya is a very ancient river which five hundred or even a thousand years ago formed *one* stream as far as *Kaska*, at which place it divided off into two channels—one of which took its course through the *Kara-kúl* and *Ak-Sai* to the sea; the other in a southerly direction by *Kukcha* and *Shurakhan* to the Amú. The bed of the latter is now for the most part filled with sand, but here and there still very deep and clearly traceable, as Nazar Khan could testify from personal observation. Other inhabitants corroborated the statement that a large stream once did flow from the Syr to Shurakhan. All these assertions are further strengthened by Russian Cossacks who have passed through this region and speak of traces of large canals between *Kaska* and *Bozgánan* at which they saw the ruins of former buildings. From the Bokharians M. Sobolef had already heard of the former existence of a canal between the Yani-Darya and *Karaul*, which had a southerly course, passing *Bardanzi* and *Bokhara* on its way.

A valuable illustration accompanying the ethnographical and physico-geographical studies are the 33 water-color drawings by M. Karázin, which he executed in the vicinity of the mouth of the Amú-Darya and on the east side of the Aral. Commencing with the environs of Kazali, which, though not opulent, show us a picture of busy life, the artist leads us through a

* The German *St Petersburg Gazette*, No. 322, 1874, says: "Major Wood comes to the interesting conclusion that towards the close of the 16th century, in the time of the English traveller Jenkinson, the Amú-Darya was still discharging itself into the Caspian Sea." The only point of interest in this note lies in the contradiction of well-known facts. Moreover Major Wood never made the above-quoted statement. In the month of December 1558 Jenkinson was on the spot and distinctly declares that the Amú "did not fall into the Caspian Sea." Compare with P. Lerch's *Khiva or Kharezem*, St. Petersburg, 1873, pages 27 and 28.

† According to a private communication to the author.

‡ *Historie des Mongols et des Tatares* publiée par le Baron Desmaisons, T. I. Texte, page 291.

§ In 1873 Baron A. W. Kaulbars returned with the same impression: personal observation on his journey from Khiva to Kazali by land, as well as the tales of the natives, led him to that conclusion.

series of interesting views. The waste island of *Kos-Aral* near the mouth of the Syr-Darya, which contains the permanent station of the Aral Squadron. The yet smooth surface of the Aral Sea in its dark, mysterious glow before a stormy night. The wild chaos of the foaming, roaring sea in a storm. The mouth of the Ulkún-Darya studded with numerous reed-islets. Here we meet the yellowish sandy beach of the Aral in all its disconsolate desolation: not a single human being is visible and great flocks of aquatic birds, chiefly sea-gulls and pelicans, are the only representatives of animal life. The steamer on the Sary-kúl passing through a multitude of islets which are covered with gigantic reeds. The rocky heights of Kúshkan-Tau beyond which the steamer could not proceed: they are surrounded by numerous conical sand hillocks, and after a long succession of wastes human life re-appears. Almost upon the water the Karakalpak fishermen have here established their simple beds on four poles, from which they suspend a piece of common cloth to protect themselves against the rays of the sun: these contrivances stand within small clearings of the primæval reed forest. Further inland the natives dwell in *yurtas* which are made of the skins of beasts in the form of a globe from which one-quarter is cut off: their appearance is not unlike that of the egg of Columbus. Chimbai is a picture of activity and trade. After New-Urganj it is the most important commercial point within the low country of the Amú, and the number of people attending on bazaar days exceeds 7,000.

On such occasions the primitive bridge across the narrow side channel Kigeili, which is constructed of logs and boards and covered with straw, is crowded with pedestrians and riders from the country, all hastening to buy or sell something, whilst the crouching boatmen have some difficulty in propelling their *kayuks* with earthenware under the low, rickety bridge. Every available spot in the bazaar is crowded: even on the flat roofs people expose their wares, and the buyers do not mind ascending them by means of common ladders. The communications on the delta are very much impeded by the labyrinth of small, shallow side-channels, through some of which even the native *kayuks* have to be dragged by ropes. But even this is difficult, and the men who tow them are often forced to wade through the water or to clear a way through the reeds across one of the many islets before they can accomplish their task. A little further on between the rivers Syr and Amú the desert recommences, in which the dry, dead sand reigns supreme.

Very interesting also are the Kirghiz, Karakalpak and Turkoman types which the artist has brought us. Among the first-named we generally find uncouth, rude physiognomies and round faces with broad noses, big mouths, thick lips and dull-looking eyes. The features of their old men are much weather-beaten; their expression and bearing denote a combination of sensuality and indolence. Upon the whole remarkable faces seem to be scarce among the Kirghiz. M. Karázin's collection contains but one head à la Napoleon III. Much better looking are the Karakalpaks; their profiles are prominent, the chins pointed, and their gaze is piercing; even softer lined faces are not unprepossessing and their bold-looking eyes express more or less independence and energy. The sharp-cut faces and shifty eyes of the Turkomans bear evidence of their choleric temper. This is particularly noticeable among the female types. A few Kirghiz and Karakalpak women have angular features, but even these lack expression. The collection of Mongrel types contains a particularly interesting portrait of a Karakalpak boy in whose features Russian blood cannot be mistaken.

The expedition of MM. Severtsof and Smirnof commenced with a deplorable accident. On the eve of their departure from Kazali they had the misfortune to lose their topographer, who suddenly died. All endeavours to replace him proved ineffectual and on the 12th-24th of June the abovenamed gentlemen at last started alone. Thus the projected survey of the east coast of the Aral could not be executed. Nevertheless the excursion has yielded much valuable information.

The following were the daily stages during the first three weeks:—

12-24th June.—S. W. to the well of *Jideli*, 10 versts (about 6 miles) from Kazali,

13-25th June.—Almost due S. to the *Kos-kúl* (otherwise *Koskuli*) lake,

- 14-26th June.—To the hillock of *Togúsken* on the Kúvan-Darya.
- 16-28th June.—To the *Bálykti Kúduk*, 67 versts (about 38 miles) from the Syr.
- 17-29th June.—S. W. viâ *Shutkúl* to the well of *Kungún-Sandál* on the coast of the Aral, 30 respectively 50 versts (about 17 and 28½ miles) from *Bálykti-Kúduk*.
- All on a parallel line with the east coast of the Aral. {
- 19th June-1st July.—S. W. to the well of *Airyán-Kurgán*, 7 versts (about 4 miles) from *Sandál*.
- 20th June-2nd July.—Viâ *Berdi-Kazgán* to *Kimper* and *Kimper-Ûzyuk*.
- 22nd June-4th July.—To *Jalnak-Kúduk* on the former island of *Uzún-kair*.
- 23rd June-5th July.—W. to the *Jalnak-kúl* and the hillocks of *Jalnak-Tau* and *Jalkamán-Tau*.
- 24th June-6th July.—W. to the well of *Súlu*, 35 versts (about 20 miles) from *Airyán-Kurgán*.
- 25th June-7th July.—To the *Súlu-Tau* and the island of *K'chí-Yali*.
- 26th June-8th July.—S. to the well of *Biktau*, 25 versts (about 14 miles) from *Súlu*.
- 27th June-9th July.—To the hills of *Biktau*.
- 28th June-10th July.—Due S., from the coast to the well of *Tambai Kazgán* in the western part of the *Kizil-Kum*.
- 3rd-15th July.—S. W. to the *Kara-kúl* (the eastern tributary of the lower Amú).

The alluvial tracts of the Syr extend to *Bálykti-Kúduk*. As far as the *Kos-kúl* they have formed a perfect plain, which is 15 to 20 versts (about 8½ to 12 miles) broad. The black soil consists of sand and slime; the vegetation is very scanty. Far between, grow small clusters of reeds and here and there the eye meets single *tamarisk* and *halimodendron argenteum* shrubs. Towards the south these shrubs gradually disappear from the plain, and near the Kúvan-Darya they are only found in recesses and caverns. Still further south this alluvial region assumes an undulating character, and as we proceed in the same direction the hillocks of sand increase in size. As a rule they are thinly covered with small *calligonum pallasii*. Together with the undulating, sandy steppe appeared the *antilope subguttarosa*. Towards the south these animals steadily increase in numbers. The Kúvan river is one of their favorite resorts. On this exposed strip of alluvial land the ebbing of the water-level of the Syr is plainly traceable. Places which M. Severtsof in 1857 had himself seen under water, now lie dry, and the bottoms of former canals are higher than the present level of the river. The proportions of these metamorphoses are altogether surprising. Thus, for instance, pieces and entire specimens of the *anodonta* shell which thickly cover the plain are also to be found on the tops of hillocks which, judging them by eyesight, ascend about 25 feet above the level of the canal, which feeds the *Kos-kúl*.

Beyond *Bálykti-Kúduk* the vegetation of the undulating steppe assumes a greater variety and single *saksaul* shrubs become frequent. The higher and solid hillocks of sand contain a moderate mixture of clay and are covered with different kinds of grass and herbs, among which we may mention *wormwood* and *ceratocarpus*. The still higher hillocks of quicksand which occasionally stretch in parallel lines from N. N. W. to E. S. E. bear a larger kind of *calligonum*.

On the stretch from *Bálykti* to *Sandál* water is very scarce. From the moment when in the south-west of *Shutkúl* the shores of the Aral were gained, the *demonstratio ad oculos* began in a manner not to be mistaken that the question whether that sea was growing less must be answered in the affirmative. From the very beginning several extensive inlets which are still shown as such in the maps were found to be dry land. In many parts the former lines of the coast are yet distinctly marked by the deposited remains of sea-wrack and several lines of various shore-plants on the old-bed. The first bare streak which is covered by the breakers during prevailing west and north winds only bears a scanty growth of *salicornia*. The ground of the second consists of a saline slime which produces *anabasis*. Then follows a streak of *saksaul*, and on clear sandy spots *tamarisk* and *calligonum* take the place of *anabasis* and *saksaul*. The *tamarisk* is evidently of a young growth, and the small shrubs always stand apart from

all other vegetation—a sure sign that the exsiccation of these beds is of recent date. In 1857 the former island of Úzún-Kair was already found connected with *terra firma*. Now it is densely covered by *tamarisk* bushes which have attained considerable size and strength.

At the Kimper-Úzyuk and the Jalnak-Kúl the strip of young *saksaul* shrubs runs 4 to 5 feet above the level of high-water. These 4 to 5 feet of ground between the vegetation and the water have been laid bare within the last 20 or 30 years, and the living maritime Kirghiz bear testimony to the fact.

The oblong narrow inlets end invariably with a dry, shallow recess which contains sea-shells from the Aral, and wherever the strong winds have driven the seas against the sides of the openings of such hollows the shells lie considerably above the sea-level.

At Kimper-Úzyuk we find further evidence shewing the decline of the Aral. Here in westerly winds the downs stand 60 *sagens* (420 feet) from the present beach.

On Úzún-Kair the formation of the downs presents a very instructive picture of the whole origin of the parallel hillocks of sand in the undulating steppes. Here we have at first the sandbanks which have already that three-sided prismatical shape which subsequently develops into the downs, though they are yet covered by water. Then follows the first line of sea-beaten downs which are still growing under the impact of the waves. The second parallel range which is connected by a few cross spurs with the first produces already a thin growth of small *tamarisk* shrubs. The land-winds throw continually more sand on this range, which furthers its growth in height. In the third range we find the high sand hillocks of the steppe which are covered with a thick growth of stout *tamarisk* bushes. In this manner M. Severtsof explains the origin of the undulating steppes in the whole region between the rivers Amú and Syr, from the hills in North Bokhara to the present east coast of the Aral. In the same proportion as the sea declines the desert advances, continually expanding the former downs into hillocks and making them fit for vegetation.*

The small hills of Jalnak, Jalkamán-Tau and Súlu-Tau, south of Úzún-Kair, were formerly islets. In course of time they became one large island, and as such existed not very long ago. The Jalnak-Kúl lake which lies between these hills and the steppe was within the memory of old natives a channel of the sea. But these hills are of a different nature. They belong to the class of the so-called *búgors*† in the Russian language, literally *heaps*, and are monuments of sudden geological revolutions. Radiant-like they stretch towards the crescent-shaped coast, at which they end in precipitous slopes. The sectional elevation of these *búgors* has the appearance of a tusk projecting from the ground. They are overgrown with *wormwood* and some *tamarisk*, and surrounded by numerous sand hillocks of the down formation which bear *calligonum* and *ammodendron Karelini*. The *búgors* are not covered with the loose sand which we find on the hillocks of the steppe; they are composed of a firmly cemented, hard sand which is intermixed with a little clay. Small hills of the same formation are to be found on the whole distance between Shutkúl and Biktau, though some of them are not so well developed as those at Úzún-Kair. In some parts they end in a pointed spur which slides as it were into the undulating steppe. This is especially the case at the beginning and the end of the whole line of them. For the rest the *búgor* region, which has a breadth of from 2 to 4 versts (7,000 to 14,000 feet), is generally bounded by long rows of salt-pits which run parallel with the coast. Finally M. Severtsof agrees with

* In 1873 M. M. N. Boghdánof, Bachl. of Zoology, arrived at a similar conclusion. He calls the sand hillocks in the Aralo-Caspian steppe *atmospheric formations*, which have arisen in the same proportion as the former Aralo-Caspian Sea declined. Wherever the winds met an obstacle in the rugged ground they strewed loose sand against it, till small elevations became the hillocks which we now see. Vide the proceedings of a meeting in common of the Sections for Physical and Mathematical Geography (Imperial Russian Geographical Society) held on the 14th-26th of December 1873 (*Communications*, 1874, No. 6, pages 304 and 305).

† Vide Baer's description of them in his *Kaspische Studien*.

Baer that these *búgors*, as well as those on the Volga and about the Caspian Sea, date from the time when the Aral and Caspian Seas were still one basin, or at all events from a period at which the Aral was much larger than at present.

Between the different ranges of *búgors* we find yet a third class of hillocks which are covered with the same firm sand and bear the same vegetation except that the *saksaul* is more frequent, but run parallel with the coast like the steppe ranges of loose sand. This direction chiefly distinguishes them from the *búgors*; in all other respects they belong to the same class.

From the *búgor* of Jalkamán to the former island of Úzún-Kair runs a sandy isthmus right across the channel that once existed. It bears a growth of *calligonum* and *ammოდendron*, and has altogether a different composition from the surrounding saline soil which at one time formed the bottom of the channel. This former isthmus (now we ought to call it a hillock) is another interesting object. It shows us how the channel was at first divided in two parts before it finally dried up, *i. e.*, the action of the waves from two opposite directions formed a sandbank in the centre; this bank became subsequently an isthmus, and is now a low hillock. Insignificant traces of the channel are still visible at the eastern and western extremities of Úzún-Kair. Exactly the same is now going on between the land and the islet of *K'chí-Yali*, and also between the latter and the island of *Úlí-Yali*. Ten or fifteen years ago they were separated by tolerably deep channels, but within this short space of time sandbanks have sprung up which serve already as fords to the natives. There can be no doubt that the seas will not much longer wash them.

All these observations have convinced M. Severtsof that the levels of the Syr-Darya and the Aral are slowly but steadily sinking. In the low country of the Amú everything testifies to the same fact.

The wells along the beach generally lie from 700 to 2,100 feet from the edge of the water, some much nearer, and a few are almost touching the line of high-water. Except the well of Súlu-Kúduk, which is bitter and contains sulphur, the rest are almost fresh, though not abundant. Their depth varies from 28 inches to 7 feet; the water level within is almost on a par with that of the sea. Besides the atmospheric supply, these wells draw a portion of their water from the sea; it trickles through the sand, which serves as a natural filter and retains the salt. The latter accumulates in the lower stratum between the levels of the sea and the wells; only here and there, for instance between Jalkamán, Súlu-Tau, and Úzún-Kair, as well as on the bottom of the former channel, there are salt-pits which produce the mineral in pure crystals on the surface.

MM. Severtsof and Smirnof continued their respective zoological and botanical investigations. In the meantime M. Barbot de Márny had concluded his labors on behalf of the Society of Natural Philosophers on the Úst-Urt and joined them. During the months of August and September he explored the geological conditions of a zone which embraced the Kúshkan-Tau, Chimbai, Nukús, Shurakhan, Meshekli, the range of Sheikh Jelíl, and lastly the Kizil-Kum steppe which he traversed from Petro-Alexandrofsk to Samarkand. The main result of his labors is interesting enough. He has found a very material difference between the geological structures of the east and west coasts of the Aral: *Throughout the Úst-Urt the dominant wealdens are formations of the tertiary strata, not a trace of which could be discovered on the east side of the Aral Sea;** even the lower strata of the secondary rocks (chalk formations) were rarely found in full development.†

* *Vide* the Proceedings of a Meeting of the "Imperial Russian Geographical Society" held on 6th of November 1874 (*Communications*).

† On the other hand it should be borne in mind that the collection of petrified organic remains which were gathered at Meshekli near the Russo-Bokharian frontier in 1873 contained some specimens of the diluvial era. Compare with *Die Expedition gegen Chiva, Russian Revue*, 1874, Vol. V., page 195, in the special edition the foot-note, page 186. The geological investigations in the Syr-Darya district during the summer season of 1874 by M. Romanofski have shown that the layers of coal in the said district do not really belong to the proper formation of the coal era. Like the stratum between Tashkend and Turkestan, which stretches over a space of 200 versts (about 114 miles), they belong to the class of the nether *Jura formations*, and in the Syr-Darya district generally lie about 1,500 metres above the sea-level. M. Romanofski made an exact calculation of the entire quantity, and found

The special expedition of the Section for Physical Geography of the Geographical Society was not able to execute the projected levelling of the old bed of the Amú-Darya, nor could the exploration of the vicinity of Krasnovodsk be carried out, because the Academician M. Middendorf was personally prevented from undertaking these labors. But the levels which were taken by Colonel A. A. Tillo, the Engineers Solimani and Moshkof, and the Assistant O. A. Struve have yielded most valuable information. On the 25th of July (6th of August) the work was begun at Karatamak on the north-west coast of the Aral, and on the 12th-24th of September the expedition reached the Caspian Sea at the *Mertvi-Kultúk* (Dead Bay). In spite of the unavoidable privations and the great heat, all worked for 12 hours daily, every one using separate instruments independently from the rest. The line along which the levels were taken runs as follows: From *Karatamak* north-west to the well of *Bai-Kadúm* (19·2 kilometres), then steadily westward at a southerly inclination of 15° to the lake of *Kas-Búlak* (90 kilometres from the Aral) which was passed on the south side, *Asmantai-Matai* (124 kilometres), *Sám* (209 kilometres), *Kos-Kúduk*, *Jar-Kúduk*, and through the north part of the sand desert *Sám* (230 kilometres from the Aral). From here *viá* *Úch-Kúduk* (249·6 kilometres), and *Amán-Turlú* (291·9 kilometres) to the beach of the *Mertvi-Kultúk*. Total distance 367·6 kilometres.

According to the first barometrical measures which were taken by MM. Sagoskin, Anjou, and Duhamel during Berg's expedition in 1826, the level of the Aral was supposed to be 117·6 English feet above that of the Caspian Sea. M. C. Struve, a member of Ignatief's expedition in 1858, found a difference of 132 feet. In 1872 even this figure became doubtful when Colonel Stebnitski calculated the height of Igdy, near the old bed of the Oxus, and found it to be 191 feet above the level of the Caspian Sea. The latest measures and calculations have indeed led to a very different result. *The Aral lies actually 74 metres or 242·78* English feet above the level of the Caspian Bay Mertvi-Kultúk*; in other words, 157·2 feet above the sea-level. The exact results found were 74·1 metres by M. Solimani, and 73·9 metres by M. Moshkof. These figures confirm M. Stebnitski's determination on the *Úzboi*, and it can no longer be doubted that there is a sufficient fall along the upper part of the old bed of the Amú.

The highest point between the two seas was found beyond *Bai-Kadúm* (28·3 kilometres from the Aral). It proved to be 158·2 metres above the level of the Aral and 232·2 metres above that of the Caspian Sea. From here the line proportionably descends to the *Kos-Búlak* (36·7 metres above the Aral) and this incline forms the transition from the Northern Chink to the *Ust-Urt* proper. The country in the west of the lakes *Kos-Búlak*, *Asmantai-Matai*, and *Sám* is of an average height of 30 metres above the level of the Aral, and forms a gentle hollow which opens towards the bay of *Mertvi-Kultúk*. The lowest elevation above the Aral (11·198 metres) lies 309·9 kilometres from it. The last 57 kilometres following after that lie on an average 49 metres below the Aral level.

In the month of October all these labors were brought to a close, and the members of the several expeditions were on their way home. Only M. Dorandt and Milberg remained on the spot in order to continue their meteorological observations for one year as projected.

M. Ogarodnikof, who accompanied the caravan of M. Glúkhafskoi, has returned with a large herbarium, several collections of insects, samples of the seeds of various useful plants and specimens of metals, minerals and ancient

similar formations of the tertiary era almost in all the hills of the district, especially in the *Kara-Tau* range; further rich beds of iron and copper-ore near Samarkand and great quantities of lead-ore in the *Kara-Mozdr* hills. The latter contain an abundance of turquoises, small grains of which often lie alongside of the road. On the road to Khodjent, near the settlement of *Sangár*, lies an open salt-pit which, as regards the structure of the pit and the appearance of the mineral, resembles exactly the *green salt* of Wieliczka. *Vide* the *Russian Invalide*, 1875, No. 12, page 2, second column.

* The previously published figure of 250 feet was an error and should be corrected accordingly.

pottery; also a collection of old coins and of Turkoman songs which he sent to the Society from Persia. The commotions in Afghanistan compelled him to interrupt his progress at the eastern frontier of Persia.*

* *Vide* the protocol of the "Imperial Russian Geographical Society," 4th-16th December 1874.

As regards the result of the Aralo-Caspian expedition on behalf of the "Society of Natural Philosophers of St. Petersburg," the particulars have not yet been published. That the undertaking has likewise been successful we know.

Besides many valuable scientific data, a rich collection of the Aralo-Caspian *fauna* deserves to be mentioned. It comprises nearly 500 specimens, and contains 14 kinds of mammalia, 108 of birds, 18 of reptiles, and 5 descriptions of fish.

Upon the whole we can already draw the balance :

"The Russian expeditions to the Aralo-Caspian region and to the low country of the Amú-Darya in 1874 have rendered a prominent service to science and contribute a new proof to the fact that Russia's advance in Asia is indeed a sowing and reaping on the field of general civilisation."

This truth, we regret to say, is not only still beginning to be recognised, but in some quarters has even been denied.